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3ABSTRACT
This thesis is an analysis of the role of low level political and economic functionaries 
in the organisation and management of the farming collectives, the implementation and 
development of agricultural policy and the parallel development of the East German 
village in the 1960s and 1970s. With the completion of the (forced) collectivisation of 
agriculture in the spring of 1960 began the next major step towards the socialist 
transformation of rural society in East Germany. The process by which over 
subsequent years the rural population came to terms with this new situation and by 
which the SED regime established new systems of economic and social organisation in 
the rural communities of the GDR was long and complex in comparison with the 
campaign for collectivisation. Using a broad range of archival material from state and 
SED party sources as well as Stasi files and individual farm records along with some 
oral history interviews, I have made a thorough investigation of this process with 
respect to one of the GDR’s 15 regions (Bezirk Erfurt). This thesis examines on the 
one hand how East Germans responded to the end of private farming by resisting, 
manipulating but also participating in the new system of rural organisation and on the 
other how the regime sought via its representatives to implement its aims with a 
combination of compromise and material incentive as well as administrative pressure 
and other more draconian measures. In addressing the roles and responsibilities of the 
various levels of functionaries involved in the development of agriculture, my research 
has contributed to a more differentiated understanding of the nature of authority 
(.Herrschaft) at the grassroots in the SED dictatorship, which qualifies the simple top- 
down model of the transmission of authority and a starkly dichotomous view of the 
state and society.
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS
Betriebsegoismus
Enterprise Egotism: Catch-all criticism attributed to farms and factories thought to be 
acting in their own rather than the common interest.
Bezirk
Administrative Region: In 1952, the Lander which made up the territory of the GDR 
were divided into smaller administrative regions, mapping the state bureaucracy on to 
the party bureaucracy.
Bezirks leitung
Regional SED Administration 
Bezirksparteiaktivtagung
Assembly of select SED members with leading roles in particular fields in the region. 
Bezirksvorstand
The leading members of one of the Bloc parties in the Bezirk e.g the DBD 
Delikat
Chain of shops established to sell ‘luxury’ food items to the population.
9Eingaben der Bevdlkerung
People’s Petitions: formal complaints made in written or verbal form to any state or 
party official or body. Essential to the gauging of popular opinion and popular 
concerns.
Genossenschaftliche Demokratie
Collective Democracy: the practice of including collective farm members in the 
running of the LPG through ballots in the members’ assemblies on specific issues, as 
well as election of members’ to the directing board and advising commissions of the 
LPG.
Grossbauer
Wealthy farmer: technically any farmer owning more than 20 hectares of land, or 
operating a capitalistic enterprise.
Kleinbauer
Small farmer: technically owning less than 5 hectares of land 
Komplexeinsatz
Integrated deployment: the use of several machines (often from several LPG) in 
conjunction usually during the harvest.
Konsum
Standard all purpose shop, often the only retail outlet in small villages 
Kooperationsgemeinschaft
Cooperative Community: The collective term for two or more LPGs contractually 
bound to cooperate with one another in some aspect of agricultural production
Kooperationsrat
Cooperative Council: A body compromised of delegates from each of the LPGs in the 
cooperative community, usually the LPG chairmen but also other leading members of 
the LPG, including brigade leaders or SED party secretaries. Meetings of the council 
were attended too by village mayors, although they tended to be seen as irrelevant by 
LPG chairmen. The primary purpose of the council was to arrange and agree upon the 
terms on which LPG, and later LPG P and LPG T cooperated with one another.
Kooperationsverband
Cooperative Union: A body with its own council of delegates, designed to coordinate 
the relationship between food industries and LPG. Cooperative unions were 
established to organise the production of specific crops or food products involving a 
number of LPG with other institutions (e.g. slaughterhouses) in the vertical chain of 
production from the raising of calves through to their processing as sausage over a 
wide territory.
Kreisverband
District authorities of one of the block parties e.g. DBD
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LPG-Aktiv
LPG Committee: Pre-cursor to the formation of an SED Party Organisation, these 
Aktivs were designed to bring SED and non SED members together who were active 
in promoting and developing collective farming practices within the LPG.
Nebenerwerbsbauer
Part-time farmer: a large number of part-time farmers were forced to abandon their 
land to the LPG and receive a share of the produce in return as part of the 
collectivisation. In the 1980s in particular however industrial workers were encouraged 
to take up farming on small allotments, which were not easily fitted into the large field 
systems of the gigantic LPG in order to boost production.
Neubauer
New Farmer: A beneficiary of the land reforms.
Offenstall
An open stall shed: designed as a cheap and easily constructed shed for holding rapidly 
increasing numbers of livestock during the late 1950s and early 1960s. More often than 
not, however they proved counter productive.
Ortsbauernfuhrer
Local Farmers’ Leader: Nazi affiliated local agricultural functionary during 3rd Reich.
Parteitag 
Party Congress
Sozialistische Betriebswirtschaft
Socialist Business Economics: system of accounting and incentive measures designed 
to improve the efficiency of financial planning under the terms of the New Economic 
System
Umsiedler
Refugees from the East settling in the GDR 
Vorstandssitzung
Board meeting: the LPG were run by chairmen supported by boards of LPG members 
elected every two years. The board and chairmen were to meet ideally every week to 
discuss the business of the LPG, managing everything from matters of discipline (often 
drunkenness) in the workforce, to questions over the long term development of the 
LPG. Preparing the resolutions which were put to the vote in the full members’ 
assemblies, they were a vital part of the functioning of ‘collective democracy’, 
qualifying the power concentrated in the hands of the chairman.
Wehrmacht
The army of the 3 rd Reich
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INTRODUCTION
It is commonly recognised that the GDR was a dictatorship. Under the auspices of 
the Socialist Unity Party (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands or SED) whose 
dominant position in government was never legitimated by free democratic elections, 
judicial, executive and legislative powers were also never rigorously separated, 
compromising the rule of law and allowing the infringement of basic human and civil 
rights in the name of the party’s ideological goals.1 The nature of the SED dictatorship, as 
it changed over the forty years of the GDR’s existence, remains nonetheless a matter of 
considerable debate among historians seeking to explain both the causes of the state’s 
longevity and its ultimate collapse. Using material largely unexamined since the collapse 
of the GDR, this thesis addresses the role of low-level political and economic 
functionaries in the organisation and management of the collective farms 
(.Landwirtschqftliche Produktionsgenossenschaften or LPGs), and the implementation and 
development of agricultural policy in the 1960s and 1970s in Bezirk Erfurt. In so doing it 
aims to illuminate the changing practice of authority (Herrschaft) at the grassroots and 
contribute to our understanding of the interrelated history of politics and society in the 
middle two decades of the GDR’s existence, as the SED regime gradually attained an 
unprecedented level of stability, yet found itself increasingly vulnerable to financial 
collapse.
The implementation of SED agricultural policy occurred via an administrative 
network which was by no means simply a well-oiled conduit of dictatorial authority but 
was itself evolving. At the grassroots the mere creation of the LPG and the establishment 
of a hierarchy of chairman and work brigade leaders on paper did not automatically create 
a channel for the consistent transmission of information and authority. Moreover farmers 
themselves were no willing dupes, nor indeed merely victims of the imposition of state 
power. Particularly with regard to agriculture where knowledge of the locality and the 
intimacy of the connection between the farmer and his land and livestock retained an 
economic value (above all under the constraints of the shortage economy), the practice of 
authority necessarily involved an, albeit unequal, dialogue. The aspirations and policies of
1 Ross, C., The East German Dictatorship (Basingstoke 2002) p.20: Ross also points out however that there are “well founded doubts 
about the analytical usefulness of the term”.
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those leading the dictatorship were necessarily re-shaped to some extent in accordance 
with the interests and objections of LPG farmers on the ground. The context in which this 
process occurred was defined in large part by the shifting educational and political 
background of the LPGs’ leading functionaries and their relationship with their constituent 
farmers on the one hand and with the state and party hierarchy on the other.
During the course of the 1960s and 1970s, the SED leadership pursued the 
development of agriculture on an industrial scale and sought to make the process of 
agricultural production not only more successful but more responsive to the demands of 
the economic system - more predictable and thus more plan-able. Against the background 
of technological development and economic fluctuation, the farming population 
themselves were necessarily incorporated into a new apparatus of agricultural 
administration, whose basic unit was the LPG. In the process their understanding of 
farming -  not least of ownership and responsibility to the land - and their relationship with 
the state and to their fellow farmers underwent considerable, if gradual, redefinition. The 
contexts in which those working in agriculture pursued their careers and conceived of (and 
foresaw) their future in the GDR were very different in the late 1970s than they had been 
in the late 1950s or even the late 1960s. The changed context of the late 1970s was the 
product of considerable conflict between farmers and the SED regime. Over the years the 
limits on the expression of divergent opinion or resistance to the implementation of SED 
policy were settled incrementally. It was also the product however of an, albeit limited, 
compromise, in which the aspirations of the SED leadership were necessarily mitigated by 
the process by which its authority was transmitted and received. The attempts of collective 
farmers to assert their own interests not only in spite of or in contradiction to, but also 
increasingly in conjunction with those of the SED culminated by the late 1970s in the 
establishment and consolidation of essentially new structures of farm organisation and 
stable systems of agricultural administration which appeared to guarantee steadily 
improving incomes and working conditions as well as steady (and plan-able) 
improvements to productivity.
A degree of internalisation or at least acceptance of the norms of the socialist system 
certainly took place in the 1960s and 1970s among the GDR’s farmers, driven to a large 
extent by the reduction in the size of the agricultural workforce and by the steady growth
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in the proportion of those with technical training in the forms and methods of socialist 
agriculture. The limitations on rights to property, to participation in decision-making and 
self-determination and to the articulation of complaint too became self-evident by the late 
1970s.
Furthermore across the economy and society as a whole in the GDR in the 1970s, the 
end of radical social upheaval and economic austerity marked a high point for the stability 
of the SED regime. Internationally recognised in 1972 and a signatory to an international 
declaration on human rights in Helsinki in 1975, the GDR appeared outwardly to have 
achieved an unprecedented degree of harmony both domestically and internationally. The 
introduction of welfare and consumerist measures designed to bring about immediate 
improvements to living conditions, alongside continually improving wages brought too an 
unprecedented degree of affluence to the population at large. For many, if not all, 
members of the collective farms levels of income, levels of educational attainment and 
working conditions too reached an unprecedented high. Improvement was by no means 
universal however. Moreover underlying this harmony were the beginnings of serious 
financial crisis.
The cost of welfare and consumerist policies, (as well as a failed yet costly attempt to 
develop a high-tech electronics industry) in the GDR came at the price of an ever 
increasing national debt, much of it to West German banks. This debt, compounded by the 
negative impact of increases in oil prices on the international markets and the reduction of 
some financial support from the Soviet Union, began during the 1980s seriously to 
undermine the GDR’s economic stability. This had serious consequences for agriculture in 
the GDR which more than ever depended on the ability of the rest of the economy to 
supply it with machinery, fuel and chemical fertiliser. Under increasingly desperate 
economic conditions, the mistakes of over-industrialisation of agriculture and the 
vulnerability (when faced with shortage) of the structures established to coordinate 
agricultural production were exposed. Working conditions in farming became thus 
increasingly fraught with crises at the same time as rural communities in general were 
badly hit by shortages in the supply of consumer goods and a growing environmental 
crisis.
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By the end of the 1980s the effectiveness of the system of agricultural organisation 
was being seriously undermined by economic stagnation. As the GDR headed towards 
bankruptcy and the prospects of future stability in agriculture, as in other sectors of the 
economy, receded, so the ability of the SED leadership to satisfy the expectations which it 
had set itself and encouraged not only the population at large but also its constituent 
functionaries throughout the state and party network to adopt, seemed increasingly 
unattainable. If the basis on which the SED regime could achieve relative stability had 
been established in the 1970s, by the late 1980s this stability was increasingly fragile. The 
clear superiority of the West German economy and the failure of the SED to sustain the 
standards it had set itself or even play the role it claimed of protecting the interests of the 
working class and the peasantry, left it with as little popular support in the countryside as 
it had in the towns of the GDR. Ever-growing problems of production and increasing 
differentiation in the quality of life and the standard of working conditions in rural 
communities had compromised the validity of the material and epistemic bases of the SED 
regime’s claim to legitimacy from a population which expected much better.
Bezirk Erfurt
In order to maintain a focus on the grassroots relations between the party, state and 
farming collectives, the scope of this study is limited to the villages of Bezirk Erfurt, the 
largest and westernmost of the three regions (.Bezirke) formed in 1952 to replace the 
former Land Thuringia in the south west comer of the GDR. While being roughly average 
in size and number of inhabitants compared with the GDR’s other Bezirke, it has the 
added advantage of allowing the examination, from a regional perspective, of some of the 
broader issues faced by the GDR during its existence. Religiously the population of the 
Bezirk, in containing a concentrated minority of Catholics in the north-western Eichsfeld 
region alongside Protestants of both the Lutheran and Reformed Evangelical churches, 
reflected the mixture of Christians in the GDR as a whole. Its long border with the Federal 
Republic makes possible too examination of the regional impact of the erection of the wall 
in August 1961. Five districts (Kreise) in the Bezirk bordered West Germany: in the far 
north the district centred on the town of Nordhausen, in the north-west the Eichsfeld 
districts around Heiligenstadt and Worbis and to the south west, Eisenach district. Lying
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between the Harz mountains to the north and the Thiiringer Wald to the south, Bezirk 
Erfurt covered 7,349 km2 and comprised 13 rural districts and 2 urban districts (Weimar 
and Erfurt) subdivided in 1970 into 803 settlements of which 49 were classed as towns.2
Prior to the GDR’s existence, the state of Thuringia was largely cultivated by 
relatively small family farms, lacking almost any grand estates of the size which existed in 
the north east of the country. At the end of the war 98% of the farms were under 50 
hectares in size, cultivating 84% of the arable land.3 As a result the effects of the initial 
land reform - the expropriation of large landowners and the parcelling of property to be 
handed out to Neubauem (“New Farmers” -  largely industrial workers, refugees or 
formerly landless farm labourers) was felt less severely here than for example in 
Mecklenburg and Brandenburg where over 40% of arable land was redistributed.4 Only 
with the second stage of the land reforms which were carried out as part of denazification 
measures against farmers with up to 100 hectares and which lasted until 1950, did the 
proportion of those affected increase significantly. With a steady influx of refugees and 
expelled Germans from the former eastern territories into Thuringia after the war (albeit in 
fewer numbers than in most of the rest of the GDR), a large proportion of rural 
communities were required to accommodate the newcomers.5 As recent work on the fates 
of the so-called “ Umsiedler” in the GDR has shown, a relatively small proportion of these 
newcomers were able to benefit from the land reforms and become so called Neubauem.6 
Rather the vast majority of newcomers to rural communities found initial employment as 
agricultural labourers, replacing the foreign workers and prisoners of war who had been 
freed on the collapse of the Nazi regime and making up for the absence of the generations 
of young men killed during the war. Many of those employed in this way had however no 
experience of farming nor saw their long-term future in agriculture, hoping either for a 
return to their homeland or at least employment in their former trades. Even those who 
had sought and received land as part of the land reforms found in many cases that it did 
not enable them to make a sufficient living -  not least because the quality of the land and
2 Staatliche Zentralverwaltung fur Statistik, Bezirksstelle Erfurt, Statistisches Jahrbuch: Bezirk Erfurt, 1970, Vol I p.3.
3 Bauer, T. Blockpartei und Agrarrevolution von Oben. Die DBD 1948-1963 (Munich 2003), p.33.
4 Kaiser, J-C, ‘Klientelbildung und Formierung einer neuen politischen Kultur. Uberlegungen zur Geschichte der Bodenreform in 
Thuringen’ in Bauerkamper, A. (ed.) Junker land in Bauemhand (Stuttgart 1996) pp.l 19-131.
5 Schwartz, M., ‘Vetrieben in die Arbeiterschaft “Umsiedler” als “Arbeiter” in der SBZ/DDR 1945-1952’ in P. Hiibner/K. Tenfelde 
(eds.) Arbeiter in der SBZ/DDR (Essen 1999) pp.81-128 here p.82.
6 Schwartz, M .,Vertriebene und Umsiedlerpolitik (Munich 2004) p.l 144.
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the livestock which they were allocated was seldom of the best.7 Consequently over the 
course of late 1940s and early 1950s, encouraged by the state, there was a steady exodus 
from rural communities and agricultural employment into urban settlements and industry. 
The proportion of newcomers among landless labourers, which had been nearly 50% for 
the GDR as a whole in 1949 (though far lower in Thuringia), was thus greatly reduced by
O
the time the collectivisation of agriculture was underway. (Statistics ceased to be 
collected on Umsiedler from 1952 onwards making it difficult to ascertain just how many 
remained in agricultural employment and settled in rural communities.9) For the majority 
of farmers in Bezirk Erfurt, therefore, vigorous attempts to persuade them to collectivise in 
the 1950s represented the first major disruption to the organisation of farm land as a result 
of communist control since the war.
Of course conditions for farming in the Bezirk varied considerably. Purely in terms 
of the nature and quality of the land, the Bezirk may be divided into three basic sections. 
Firstly the flat fertile arable lands of the Thuringian basin which included parts of the 
districts of Weimar, Bad Langensalza, Sommerda, Erfurt-Land and Apolda. Farms in 
these areas tended to be the most successful with high yields of crops and correspondingly 
well fed livestock. As a consequence those who farmed them could on the whole afford to 
remain full-time farmers. Secondly the highlands in the north of the Bezirk which included 
much of the districts of Worbis, Heiligenstadt and Nordhausen. These areas in contrast 
had a much smaller proportion of arable land, relying heavily on pasture land for livestock 
feed. Owing to the relative poverty of farming in this part of the country, there was a long 
tradition of migration by men looking for work in mining and industry as well as on farms 
and estates elsewhere, leaving large numbers of small-scale farms (most well under 5 
hectares) in the hands of women and the elderly. Similarly to the far south of the Bezirk, in 
the southernmost parts of Amstadt, Eisenach and Gotha districts the beginnings of the 
hilly Thuringian forests reduced agricultural production to a minimum. Much of the rest of 
these districts however constituted a third section, along with districts such as Miihlhausen
7 Schwartz, M.,Vertriebene und Umsiedlerpolitik (Munich 2004) p.l 146.
8 Schwartz, M., ‘Vetrieben in die Arbeiterschaft “Umsiedler” als “Arbeiter” in der SBZ/DDR 1945-1952’ in P. Hiibner/K. Tenfelde 
(eds.) Arbeiter in der SBZ/DDR (Essen 1999) pp. 81 -128 here p. 126.
9 Schwartz, M., ‘Vetrieben in die Arbeiterschaft “Umsiedler” als “Arbeiter” in der SBZ/DDR 1945-1952’ in P. Hiibner/K. Tenfelde 
(eds.) Arbeiter in der SBZ/DDR (Essen 1999) pp.81-128 here p.90.
18
and Sondershausen in which relatively successful farmers each with between 10 and 20 
hectares of land predominated.10
The pattern of urban settlement and the development of industry within the 
different districts also varied considerably and inevitably made an impact on the nature of 
rural communities and agricultural activity. With the hardening division of Germany 
following the war, the pre-war economic structure of what had become the Soviet zone 
could no longer be maintained. It was essential that the exploitation of native raw 
materials be stepped up and new heavy industry as well as manufacturing be developed in 
the GDR. As a consequence during East Germany’s own (less flamboyant) economic 
miracle in the 1950s, a rapid expansion of industry and urban settlement took place which 
not only drew on the agricultural workforce (as I have mentioned with regard to 
Umsiedler) but on agricultural land as cities expanded and incorporated rural areas. 
Moreover some rural communities began to lose their dominantly agricultural character, 
by their proximity to industrial centres and the high proportion of commuting members of 
the industrial workforce. With the further expansion of industry into previously 
exclusively rural areas and the growth of the commuting population, the combination of 
small-scale agriculture with industrial employment accounted for a not insignificant 
proportion of farming in some districts in the 1950s. In Bezirk Erfurt in the vicinity of the 
many small towns in the Gotha and Eisenach districts in particular there was a tradition of 
part-time farmers and smallholders who also worked in industry. The expansion of mining 
operations, particularly the potash mines in Nordhausen, had a similar impact on the 
surrounding rural communities which supplied much of the workforce.
While progress in industrialisation during the 1960s and 1970s alongside the 
mechanisation of agriculture did result in a reduction in the numbers living in small rural 
settlements in conjunction with the drop in the agricultural workforce, a considerable 
number of people in the Bezirk continued to commute from villages.11 Thus although the 
agricultural and food production sectors dominated the economies of certain Kreise such 
as Bad Langensalza, Weimar-Land and Erfurt-Land a large proportion of the inhabitants
,0 For information on the structure of farming in Thuringia see: Breitschuh, G. et al. Thuringer Landwirtschaft zwischen 2. Weltkrieg 
und Wiedervereinigung (Jena 1999); more specifically for Bezirk Erfurt: Augusten, F. Die Organisation der Rinderzucht im Bezirk 
Erfurt von 1945 bis 1989 (Aachen 1997).
11 Rauch, B. ‘Der Bezirk Erfurt’ in Best, H. & Mestrup, H. (eds.) Die Ersten und die Zweiten Sekretare der SED: Machtstrukturen und 
Herrschaftspraxis in den thiiringischen Bezirken der DDR (Weimar 2003), pp.31-39.
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of these areas were employed in industrial centres, notably in Sommerda and Erfurt. The 
largest factories in the Bezirk, such as the Office Machine Works Sommerda, VEB 
Automotive Works Eisenach and VEB Electric Works Erfurt, operated largely in the 
manufacture of machinery and vehicles and from the 1970s electrical goods and 
technology. Elsewhere in the Bezirk textile and chemical industries were developed, such 
as the VEB Chemicals Rudisleben near Amstadt and the VEB Cotton Weaving Leinefeld 
in Worbis district.12 In 1971 of approximately 600,000 employees in the Bezirk, 14.5% 
worked in agriculture and 38% worked in industry. The numbers of those in the Bezirk 
working in agriculture in the 1970s continued to drop -  albeit more gradually than during 
the 1960s. By the beginning of the 1980s, the size of the agricultural workforce in the 
Bezirk, as in the rest of the GDR, did however stabilise, as the minimum level of 
manpower required to sustain production was reached.
New recruits to the LPGs in Bezirk Erfurt in the 1970s joined farms much changed 
since full collectivisation in 1960, which were nevertheless by no means uniform in size, 
structure and organisation. By the 1980s a peculiarly socialist modernisation and (mis-) 
industrialisation of farming had taken place in the GDR. How this process occurred in the 
specific, yet not wholly unrepresentative, circumstances of the territory of Bezirk Erfurt 
and the impact it had on working and living conditions for the rural population forms the 
background to the shifting relations between state and society with which this thesis is 
concerned.
Pre-1989 Studies of Agriculture and Rural Society in the GDR
Given the declining status of farming within the economies of Europe’s industrialised 
countries and the proportionate growth of the urban population, the attention of historians 
of post-war Europe in general has shifted proportionately away from the development of 
rural society.13 Nevertheless the significance and immediacy of the upheavals in rural 
society in the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany after World War II and then the GDR 
has made it something of an exception in this regard. The social development of the
12 Mestrup, H. Die SED -  Ideologischer Anspruch, Herrschaftspraxis und Konflikte in Bezirk Erfurt 1971-1989 (Weimar 2000) pp. 104- 
127.
13 This suggestion has been made with regard to the work of sociologists and anthropologists: Giordano, Ch. ‘die vergessenen Bauem. 
Agrarwissenschaften als Objekt sozialwissenschaftlicher Amnesie’ in Giordano Ch. und Hettlage, R. (eds.) Bauemgemeinschaften im 
Industriezeitalter. Zur Rekonstruktion landlicher Lebensformen (W.Berlin 1989) pp.9-27, here p.9.
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countryside as well as the politics of agriculture in the Soviet Zone and GDR were the 
subject of interest in the West from the beginnings of the land reform in 1945 and the first 
drive for collectivisation of agriculture in the early 1950s, provoked in part by the 
immediate plight of the steady flow of farmers and landowners fleeing the GDR as a 
result. Equally the significance of the transformation of the countryside for the SED 
regime, both in terms of the ideological battle for the rural population and in terms of its 
goals of autarkic food production saw a large number of historical and political works 
published in the GDR itself in clarification as well as justification of socialist agricultural 
policy. Literature has thus come from a number of different quarters in both east and west 
with works by historians and journalists, as well as social scientists alongside more 
technical literature on specific agricultural issues.
A range of different types of studies was produced in East Germany prior to the 
Wende on the subject of agriculture, village development and collective farm 
management. While much of the content is formulaic and ridden with ideological jargon, 
there was scope too for debates on the future direction of agriculture, particularly during 
the 1960s, amid a climate of innovation generated by the new economic policy and with 
the exact path of development for the farm collectives not yet fixed. The scale and 
complexity of agriculture and (would-be) autarkic food production in a planned economy 
raised numerous questions for debate among agricultural scholars as well as economists 
and theorists of socialist management. While the more accessible works on these subjects 
often did not necessarily reflect the real problems of the average farming collective, they 
and other more technical publications nonetheless highlight the potential for debate, albeit 
within certain bounds.14
A number of works published in the late 1960s and 1970s in the GDR addressed 
the progress of village development, triumphantly highlighting the success of the policy of 
“Annaherung” (“converging”) of living standards in villages and towns with examples of 
modem housing in rural areas and the availability of modem urban amenities in the 
countryside.15 Alongside these largely superficial analyses, several sociological studies of
MSchiitze, W. Investitionsfinanzierung der LPG (Berlin: Staatsverlag 1966); Polsfuss, W “Die Aufgaben der Kreislandwirtschaftsrate 
und ihrer Produktionsleitungen bei der Planung des wissenschaftlich-technischen Fortschritts in der Landwirtschaft” in Egler, G et al 
(eds.) pp.208-231 Zum NOS in der Landwirtschaft (Berlin 1965); Heuer, K. Genossenschaftliche Demokratie als Fiihrungsaufgabe. 
Rechtsfragen der Leitung der LPG und der Beziehungen zur Kooperationsgemeinschaft (Berlin, 1968).
15 Grunberg, H. Die sozialistische Wandlung des Dorfes (Berlin 1970); Hanke, H. Kultur und Lebensweise im sozialistischen D orf 
(Berlin 1967).
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aspects of rural society were carried out in the 1970s and 1980s, largely under the 
direction of Kurt Krambach.16 While again couched in the rhetoric of progress, these 
nonetheless looked more closely at the specific issues facing rural society such as the 
problem of the loss of young people to the towns and often used interesting, if 
ideologically skewed, questionnaires to gauge the opinions of farmers on the latest 
developments of agricultural policy and the position of the farmer within the collective.
The development in the 1970s of the large industrial specialised production units 
in some advanced LPGs also prompted interest from journalists within the GDR. The 
reportage on life and work in the industrial milking station in Berlstedt, Kreis Weimar by 
Ursula Piischel, a cultural functionary and literary critic, is notable for the mixture of 
workers’ and managers’ perspectives on problems and successes which she portrays.17 
More controversially, the recorded testimonies of workers and managers in the specialised 
fruit farms of the Havelland in Bezirk Potsdam edited by Gabrielle Eckart in the 1980s 
highlighted the everyday problems faced by a range of different people living and working 
in a rural area since the development of specialised industrial agricultural production.18 
Both these works were published in West Germany in the 1980s filling a gap in West 
German conceptions of the state of East German agriculture.
The focus of most western studies of East German agriculture and society before 
the Wende concentrated on the period of the land reforms after 1945 and the later process 
of collectivisation.19 In the 1950s and 1960s, this was to some extent the natural result of 
the cold-war ideological division, with the emphasis on the ‘totalitarian’ control and 
repression exerted on the German population by the SED regime. With the thawing of 
relations between east and west from the early 1970s, a number of western analysts began 
to examine the current state of development in the GDR with a more favourable 
predisposition. As a result analytical works on the functioning of the LPGs and the 
development of specialisation and industrial style production were published, which
16 Krambach, K. et al. (Autorenkollektiv), Genossenschaftsbauer -  Verantwortung -  Bewusstsein (Berlin 1973); Krambach, K. et al. 
(Autorenkollektiv) Wie lebt man au f dem Dorf? Soziologische Aspekte der Entwicklung des Dorfes in der DDR (Berlin 1985).
17 Puschel, U. Unterwegs in meinen Dorfern (Rostock 1982).
18 Eckart, G. So sehe ick die Sache — Protokolle aus der DDR. Leben im Havellandischen Obstanbaugebiet (Cologne 1984).
19 For examples at the two ends o f the period of the GDR’s existence, see Kramer, M et al. (eds.), Die Landwirtschaft in der 
sowjetischen Besatzungszone : die Entwicklung in den Jahren 1945-1955 (Bonn, 1957); Krebs, Ch., Der Weg zur industriemassigen 
Organisation der Agrarproduktion in der DDR -  Die Agrarpolitik der SED 1945-1960 (Bonn 1989).
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90presented a more positive picture of agriculture than had hitherto been produced. The 
direction of agricultural policy in the GDR towards larger scale production units was 
contrasted favourably with the limited small-scale family farms which still predominated 
in West Germany.21 Enthusiasm for the socialist model was however tempered by the 
1980s as it failed to prove more efficient when compared with the continuing superiority 
of West German agricultural production levels. Furthermore the social and environmental 
impact of the extreme extent of specialisation of agriculture in the GDR made for further
99points of criticism. Although in many respects accurate, ultimately all Western analyses 
of the contemporary state of agriculture in the GDR were largely limited to the 
information provided by party-approved sources -  making debates in West Germany on 
the success or not of the East German transformation of the countryside as much a matter 
of opinion as evidence.23
The Historiography of Agriculture and Rural Society in the GDR since the Wende
During the early 1990s political divisions continued to find a reflection in analyses of the 
effects of the Wende on rural society and the future of agricultural organisation in the new 
Germany. Competing evaluations of the morality as well as the practical validity of the 
collective farming model were made, as particularly east German commentators sought to 
reassert the positive impact on rural society of the development of the LPG and the 
relative success of agriculture in the GDR compared with the rest of the economy against 
criticism from west German academics and renewed interest in the land reforms and the 
forced collectivisation.24 Since the collapse of the GDR and the reunification of Germany, 
historical as well as journalistic debate on agricultural policy and rural society in the GDR
20 Dreessen, K., Die Bedeutung der landwirtschaftlichen Produktionsgenossenschaften fu r  die DDR (Stuttgart 1973); Bajaja V. 
Landwirtschaftliche Grossuntemehmer in der DDR (W. Berlin 1978).
2' Hartmann, T. Die Kooperation in der sozialistischen Landwirtschaft der DDR (W. Berlin 1971); Immler, H. Agrarpolitik in der DDR 
(Cologne 1971); Thieme, H J Die sozialistische Agrarverfassung der DDR (Stuttgart 1969).
22 Hohmann, K., “Die Industrialisierung der Landwirtschaft und ihre Auswirkungen auf die Umwelt in der DDR”, in Haendcke-Hoppe, 
M. & Merkel, K. (eds.), Umweltschutz in beiden Teilen Deutschlands (W. Berlin 1985); see also for comment, Kluge, U. ‘Die 
“sozialistische Landwirtschaft” als Thema wissenschaftlicher Forschung’ in Kluge/Halder/Schlenker Zwischen Bodenreform und 
Kollektivierung (Berlin? 2001) p. 16.
23 Kluge, U. ‘Die “sozialistische Landwirtschaft” als Thema wissenschaftlicher Forschung’ in Kluge/Halder/Schlenker Zwischen 
Bodenreform und Kollektivierung (Berlin 2001) p. 15: “Die Hauptschwache westdeutscher Analysen ergab sich aus dem Mangel an 
nachprufbaren Daten aus der DDR-Statistik. Die Geheimniskramerei von SED Staats- und Parteifuhrung bescherte der westdeutschen 
DDR-Forschung ein hohes Mass an Informationsunsicherheit.”
24 For an explanation of the some of the conflicts see: Busse, T. Melken und Gemolken Werden. Die ostdeutsche Landwirtschaft nach 
der Wende (Berlin 2001). For different sides of the argument see: Luft, H. “Von der LPG zur Agrargenossenschaft: Eine positive 
Entwicklung?” in Bollinger, S. & Vilmar, F. (eds.) pp.206-225 Die DDR war anders (Berlin 2002); Kuntsche, S. “Die Umgestaltung 
der Eigentumsverhaltnisse und der Produktionsstruktur in der Landwirtschaft” in Keller, D. et al. (eds.) Ansichten zur Geschichte der 
DDR Vol. 1 (Bonn 1993) pp. 204-209; Weber, A. “Usachen und Folgen abnehmender EfFizienz in der DDR Landwirtschaft” in Die 
Endzeit der DDR Wirtschaft (Opladen 1989) pp. 221-269.
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has however primarily focused again on the land reforms and the development of 
collectivisation in the 1950s and early 1960s. Amid ongoing disputes over land ownership 
and claims for compensation from both east and west Germans much journalistic interest 
was provoked by the chance to re-examine the issues of expropriation and forced 
collectivisation as part of the process of coming to terms with the legacy of the SED 
dictatorship in the countryside. Against this background, historians too have focused on 
re-examining the earlier periods of agricultural development in the GDR. As Ulrich Kluge 
wrote in 2001, “no phase of development in GDR agriculture has been so closely 
investigated as the initial years 1945/49 up to the conclusion of collectivisation in the 
early 1960s. Almost three decades are sinking into oblivion. Only the un-extinguished 
claims for land and farm property from farmers who fled to the west under the pressure of 
political coercion made headlines after reunification, which agricultural studies then took 
up, presented and evaluated.”25
Taking the opportunity to use newly available archival sources, several historians 
have re-examined the structure and organisation of agriculture and the impact of 
agricultural policy on rural society in the post-war period and under the SED dictatorship 
up to the early 1960s.26 Looking broadly at agricultural development and SED policy, 
particularly Amd Bauerkamper has re-examined the processes of land reform and 
collectivisation in northern East Germany using archival sources to assess primarily the 
balance between the continuity of traditional social structures and the consequences of 
(forced) socialist modernity in rural society and farming.27 Jens Schone too has provided 
new insights into the development of the policy of collectivisation during the 1950s,28 
while new archival research by Theresia Bauer on the development of the German
25 Kluge, U. ‘Rezension: Blockpartei und Agrarrevolution von Oben. Die DBD 1948-1963....': “Keine Entwicklungsphase der DDR- 
Landwirtschaft ist so genau untersucht worden wie die Anfangszeit 1945/49 bis zum Abschluss der Kollektivierung in den ffuhen 
sechziger Jahren. Fast drei Jahrzente versinken in Vergessenheit. Nur der nie erloschene Anspruch auf Boden und Hofeigentum von 
Bauem, die unter dem Druck politischer Zwangsmassnahmen in den Westen gefluchtet sind, machte nach der Wiedervereinigung 1990 
Schlagzeilen, die die Agrarwissenschaft aufnahm, darstellte und beurteilte.” in Zeitschrift fur Aerargeschichte und Agrarsozioloeie Heft 
1 Jahrgang53 (2005) pp.l31-133 herep.131.
26 For example the contributions in Bauerkamper, A. (eds.) Junkerland in Bauemhand (Stuttgart 1996) as well as Osmond, J. 
“Kontinuitat und Konflikt in der Landwirtschaft der SBZ/DDR zur Zeit der Bodenreform und der Vergenossenschaftlichung, 1945-
1961 ” in Richard Bessel, Ralph Jessen (eds.), Die Grenzen der Diktatur: Staat und Gesellschaft in der DDR (Gottingen 1996) p. 137- 
169, and Bauerkamper A., “Die Neubauem in der SBZ/DDR 1945-1952. Bodenreform und politisch induzierter Wandel der landlichen 
Gesellschaft” in Richard Bessel, Ralph Jessen (eds.), Die Grenzen der Diktatur: Staat und Gesellschaft in der DDR (Gottingen 1996) 
pp.108-136, and Christel Nehrig in numerous articles -  Nehrig, C. ‘Industriearbeit im Dorflichen Milieu. Eine Studie zur 
Sozialgeschichte der Niederlausitzer Nebenerwerbsbauem 1945 bis 1965’ in Peter Hubner (ed.) Niederlausitzer Industriearbeiter 1935- 
1970. Studien zur Sozialgeschichte (Berlin: Akademie Verlag 1995) pp. 167-191; ‘Das Leben auf dem Lande: Die Genossenschaften’ in 
Badstubner E.(ed.) Leben in der DDR -  Befremdlich Anders (Berlin 2000) pp. 195-218.
27 Bauerkamper, A. Ldndliche Gesellschaft in der kommunistischen Diktatur: Zwangsmodemisierung und Tradition in Brandenburg 
1945-1963 (Weimar 2002).
28 SchOne, J Fruhling au f dem Lande? Die Kollektivierung der DDR Landwirtschaft (Berlin 2005).
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Farmers’ Party (Demokratische Bauempartei Deutschlands or DBD) up to 1963 has 
illuminated the functions and attitudes of party members at the grassroots during the
90process of collectivisation. Specifically with regard to Bezirk Erfurt a collection of 
excerpts from documents detailing the collectivisation process in each of the districts of 
the Bezirk has been compiled by Jurgen Gruhle providing interesting source material for 
the activities of party and state functionaries at local and regional level in the 
administration of agriculture in the 1950s -  if little actual analysis.30
In comparison analyses of agriculture and rural society post full collectivisation are 
relatively few in number. Specific aspects have received some examination by social 
historians. For example Dagmar Langenhahn and Sabine Rop have written on the patterns 
of qualification attainment and career advancement for women farmers in the 1970s and 
1980s.31 Thomas Lindenberger has written on the local police constables’ involvement in 
overseeing agricultural transformation in the 1950s and 1960s; Patrice Poutrus has written 
on the phenomenon of the “Goldbroiler” roast chicken, as part of a growing consumer 
culture in the 1970s and 1980s for which industrial-scale agricultural production was 
essential; and Christel Nehrig has addressed the changing position of the chairmen of
^9state-owned farms up to 1970. A number of studies of individual villages in the GDR 
have also dealt with the combination of influences of modernisation and invasive party 
policy on the peculiar traditions of the rural milieu after collectivisation. Daphne 
Berdahl’s anthropological study of a Catholic border village in the Eichsfeld while 
focusing primarily on the experience of transition following the Wende retells her 
subjects’ retrospective understanding of life between duty as Catholics and as GDR 
citizens in a highly sensitive region during the latter course of the GDR.33 Barbara 
Schier’s study of the village of Merxleben between 1945 and 1990, reconstructs elements 
of everyday life in the village as well as analysing the socio-economic effects of SED 
agricultural policy over this period in order to contrast the reality with the socialist ideal of 
“a village community of an historically new type”. Schier, on the basis of extensive
29 Bauer, T. Blockpartei und Agrarrevolution von Oben. Die DBD 1948-1963 (Munich 2003).
30 Gruhle, J. Ohne Gott und Sonnenschein (Nauendorf 2000).
31 Rosz, S & Langenhahn, D. ‘Berfuskarrieren von Frauen’ in Hombostel, S. Sozialistische Eliten. Horizontale und Vertikale 
Differenzierungsmuster in der DDR (Opladen 1999) pp. 147-162.
32 Lindenberger, T “Der ABV als Landwirt” in Lindenberger, T. (ed.) Herrschaft und Eigen-Sinn in der Diktatur. Studien zur 
Gesellschaftsgeschichte der DDR (Cologne 1999) pp.167-203; Nehrig C. ’Das Leitungspersonal der VEG 1945-1970’ in Peter Hflbner 
(ed.) Eliten im Sozialismus, Beitrage zur Sozialgeschichte der DDR (Cologne 1999) pp.309-324; Poutrus, P. Das Phanomen der 
Goldbroiler in der DDR (Berlin 2002).
33 Berdahl, D. Where the World Ended (Berkeley 1999).
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interviews with villagers and LPG members, also provides analysis of the functioning of 
the LPG caught between its special status as a model collective and its own internal 
conflicts, particularly in the early years of its development.34 Antonia Maria Humm’s 
more limited study of the village of Niederzimmem (in comparison with a similar village 
in West Germany) between 1952 and 1969, demonstrates the complex relationship 
between some aspects of SED policy and the response to its implementation within the 
village and the LPG. She also provides some insights into the functioning of the local 
government in the village and other local socialist organisations, which go beyond much 
of the available literature on the subject of political institutions at and below district 
level.35
With specific regard to the development of socialist agricultural policy and rural 
society since the end of the collectivisation campaign, there have however been few 
convincing in-depth studies which make satisfactory use of archival sources now 
available.36 Many of the most interesting works on the subject of agriculture in the GDR 
in the late 1960s, 1970s and 1980s published since the Wende are the accounts by former 
LPG members and functionaries of the development of their LPG and their experiences as 
collective farmers. While one must be careful to see such accounts in the context of 
developments since the Wende, they need not be dismissed as valueless.37 With regard to 
Thuringia, Manfred Kipping’s local history of the Farmers in Oberwiera, 1945 -1990 
provides some interesting insights into his experience as an LPG functionary amid the
I Q
constrictions of SED policy on cooperation and specialisation. Similarly the history of 
agriculture in Worbis district by a former LPG chairman, Dr. Heinrich Klose, provides an 
outline of local agricultural development as well as some impression of his own 
experiences as an LPG chairman. More broadly a volume published for the Thuringian 
Interior Ministry gives a methodical overview of the development of agriculture in 
Thuringia after collectivisation, reaching conclusions as to the technical deficiencies of 
policy decisions made during the GDR -  in particular the problems associated with the
34 Schier, B. Alltagsleben im "Sozialistischen D o r f  (Munster 2001).
35 Humm, A-M. A u f dem Weg zum sozialistischen Dorf (Gottingen 1999).
36 Comments by Jens Schone citing Gabler, D. Entwicklungsetappen in der Geschichte der Landwirtschaft der DDR (Berlin 1995), 
aptly describe the current historiographical situation: “Vorliegende Gesamtdarstellungen.. .vermogen inhaltlich und methodisch nicht 
zu iiberzeugen”: Schone, J., ‘Landwirtschaft und Landliche Gesellschaft in der DDR’ in Eppelmann, Faulenbach, Mahlert (eds.), Bilanz 
und Perspektiven der DDR-Forschung (Paderbom 2003) p.259.
37 Schneider, Chr. Was bleibt von uns? Bauemstimmen (Bautzen 1991) - e.g., although stylised, the accounts here are nonetheless 
instructive on the tensions and concerns faced by LPG members during the transformation of GDR agriculture.
38 Kipping, M. Die Bauem in Oberwiera: Landwirtschaft im Sachsisch-Thiiringischen 1945 bis 1990 (Beucha 1999).
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over-expansion of the farming units. The particular value of this book is however the 
transcribed interviews with former LPG functionaries which it contains.39
There are thus some considerable gaps in the research done since the Wende on 
SED agricultural policy and the development of rural society in the GDR from the mid 
1960s onwards, which with this thesis I hope to fill. Articles by Christel Nehrig and in 
particular Dagmar Langenhahn in recent years have raised some of the questions which 
have yet to be thoroughly addressed with regard to the structure, formation and changing 
organisation of LPGs and the implementation of SED agricultural policy through the later 
1960s and 1970s. Langenhahn for example most recently has written on the position of 
leading agricultural functionaries in the 1970s as they responded to the problems of 
cooperation between LPGs and the separation of crop and livestock production. More than 
anything however these articles highlight the need for greater research in precisely these
40areas.
The process of consolidation of LPGs, the development of cooperation, 
industrialisation and specialisation in agriculture as they transformed the working 
conditions of farmers and affected the living conditions of rural communities are essential 
to a complete picture of the workings of the SED regime and the stability as well as the 
failure of the GDR. The day-to-day working of the collective farms -  the experience of 
“collective democracy” within the LPG, the reception of and reaction to SED agricultural 
policy by collective farmers and in particular the pivotal role of LPG functionaries in the 
dual transmission of authority and information -  needs to be more definitively assessed as 
it varied over time. Investigation into the structures of authority in the administration of 
agriculture and rural communities via the bureaucracies of state and party and the 
significance of the presence or absence of strong SED groups in rural areas versus those of 
other bloc parties are essential to understanding a large proportion of the politics, 
economics and society of the GDR. In order to gain an effective view of the network of 
institutions and influences shaping agriculture and rural society, this thesis offers a limited
39 Breitschuh, G. et al. Thuringer Landwirtschaft zwischen 2. Weltkrieg und Wiedervereinigung (Jena 1999).
40 Langenhahn, D. ‘Machtbildung und forcierter Strukturwandel in der Landwirtschaft der DDR der 1970er Jahre’ in Zeitschrift fur 
Agrargeschichte und Agrarsoziologie Heft 2 (2003) pp.47-56; ‘Auf dem Weg zur genossenschaftlichen Demokratie?’ in Hurtgen, R. & 
Reichel, T. (eds.) Der Schein der Stabilitat. DDR Betriebsalltag in der Ara Honecker (Berlin 2001) pp.263-274; Nehrig, C. ‘Das Leben 
auf dem Lande’ in Badstubner E. (ed.) Leben in der DDR -  Befremdlich Anders (Berlin 2000) pp. 195-218.
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regional study aiming thereby to go beyond the specific intricacies of a study of a single 
LPG or village, yet retaining a focus on the grassroots of state and society.
Sources
My sources for this thesis come predominantly from the archives of a range of institutions 
concerned with rural affairs at different levels of the party and state hierarchies. My 
intention is both to gain a closer perspective on the functioning of the regime at the 
grassroots within one Bezirk and to develop an understanding of the process of policy 
implementation and information transfer within the various administrative hierarchies 
from the regions to the centre. Consequently the bulk of my sources come from the level 
of the Bezirk and Kreis administrations which played a naturally key role in the 
transmission of information and the process of policy implementation between the centre 
and the regions. Nevertheless I have examined too the files of the various figures and 
institutions with an influence over the development of rural affairs at a national level on 
the one hand and on the other the documents of individual LPGs -  primarily the minutes 
of board meetings and members’ assemblies -  and of individual SED party organisations.
In accordance with my intention to gain a picture of the experience of “ordinary” 
East Germans and the low-level functionaries operating primarily in the LPGs and other 
institutions at a local level, I have paid particular attention too to those sources which 
highlight local concerns. Thus alongside general mood and opinion reports compiled by 
the Bezirksleitung of the SED, the Bezirksvorstand of the DBD and the Rat des Bezirkes 
(among others), I have used the files of district state and party administrations as well as 
samples of Eingaben der Bevdlkerung (People’s Petitions) and reports on public village 
meetings. Where possible I have used police, Stasi and SED Party Control Commission 
reports as evidence not only of state and party discipline and law enforcement methods but 
also as sources describing local circumstances. With these as with the other archival 
sources I have sought where possible to balance statistical evidence with evidence of 
contemporary opinion among the rural population. In addition I have carried out a number 
of oral history interviews with former functionaries in LPGs as well as in the Kreis and 
Bezirk administrations of party and state which have provided invaluable explanations for 
some finer points of state and party policy as well as farmers’ responses to the same.
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Dealing with the documents of a vast bureaucracy, one has to be aware that even if 
one examines a vast quantity of documentary evidence, there is nonetheless considerable 
room for a distorted picture to be presented, in which minor concerns take on a greater 
significance in the surviving sources, or in which the concerns of the bureaucrats are 
unrepresentative of the concerns of those with whom they are dealing. Nonetheless this in 
itself is revealing of the manner in which the bureaucracy functions and the relationship 
between the various operatives of the regime, those above and below them in the hierarchy 
and their relationship with the system and the society which they served. The documents 
of the system -  in their falsehoods, vagueness or accuracy -  provide in themselves 
valuable insight into the manner in which the administration functioned and the tensions 
within it. There is no doubt that there is a regularisation of the bureaucracy involved in 
running collectivised agriculture in the planned economy which is visible in the style as 
well as content of the sources. There are advantages and disadvantages to the historian in 
this respect. Documents of the late 1950s and early 1960s, particularly in the LPGs and at 
the lowest levels of the party and state bureaucracy are often more revealing as a result of 
their lack of ideological polish or formulaic content. By the same token the increasing 
competence of the report writers in the 1970s and 1980s, in their selection of information 
and its presentation within a fixed ideological framework, compromises the value of the 
document as a source for the event or the issue under discussion. Nonetheless the value of 
earlier reports as descriptions of actual events or circumstances may be compromised too 
by the sheer inconsistency of the picture presented and by gaps in the information 
provided. By contrast, later sources are often more comprehensive in the extent -  if not the 
depth -  of information they impart.
As to the reliability of the sources, it must be taken into account that there is 
considerable potential for the statistical information offered in certain documents to be 
inaccurate. The importance of presenting an image of progress to the world certainly was 
apparent in presentation of statistics to the international community. The accuracy of 
internal statistics and indeed reports requires some consideration however too. There was 
good reason to falsify, under- or overstate at various levels of the bureaucratic hierarchy, 
from the LPG right up to the State Planning Commission (Staatliche Planungskommission 
or SPK). Nonetheless the administration of agriculture relied heavily on the collation of
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accurate statistical information: for the system to have functioned at all, there must have 
been some accuracy in the reporting. In most respects the statistical analyses of the 
problems in agriculture in the GDR (if not the actual figures) are borne out by alternative 
sources -  such as the complaints of the farmers or villagers in Eingaben or the mood 
reports of the police, Stasi as well as the SED and DBD party organisations.
With regard to the mood reports and analyses of popular opinion among farmers, 
there is considerable variation in the degree of scepticism which needs to be applied, 
depending on the time and reference points of the document. There are long lists in the 
files of statements of gushing support for the SED, for Walter Ulbricht as well as his 
successor as the leading figure in the SED regime, Erich Honecker or for particular 
policies or achievements of the GDR or the Soviet Union. Many of these include quotes 
from farmers or LPG functionaries. I have tended to exclude such declarations of opinion 
as reliable sources of popular attitudes, not on the basis that no such opinions were ever 
expressed but on the basis that they present an artificially sanitised response to the SED 
regime. Many other analyses of opinions among farmers were also clearly sanitised to 
some extent. The coherence and complexity of arguments opposed to SED agricultural 
policy are often summarised in single phrases, or reduced to the catch-all notion of 
“Unklarheiten” (“points of uncertainty/confusion”). In this respect analyses referring to 
specific circumstances (Eingaben, party control commission/police/Stasi investigations, 
individual LPG documents/party organisation documents) are useful in giving examples of 
the possible broader individual/local concerns surrounding common complaints. Analyses 
by state functionaries, as well as the DBD and the SED, are consistently vague in many 
respects. Opinions among farmers for example are often attributed variously to gradations 
of “a few”, “some... and others” or “many” without the actual scale becoming entirely 
clear. I have found it expedient to reproduce these classifications myself, backing them 
where possible with statistical evidence. There was undoubtedly misreporting, intentional 
and unintentional, to go along with the vagueness and ideologically motivated distortion 
of information. Nonetheless, with due awareness for the possible flaws of individual 
documents, the quantity and quality of evidence available is capable of providing a 
reasonably comprehensive picture of the concerns of both farmers and functionaries.
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Such was the wealth of as yet unexamined documentary evidence available that, 
owing to time constraints, I was unable to analyse (as much as I would have wished) the 
files of the complete range of agricultural institutions other than the LPGs. For the same 
reason, my analysis focuses too on the agricultural elements of rural society, rather than 
village life as a whole. These remain topics requiring further research.
Contribution
The contribution of this thesis to the body of literature on the history of the GDR is two­
fold. On the one hand it provides an insight into the process of agricultural development in 
the GDR during the 1960s and 1970s at the grassroots which has been largely absent from 
the historiography thus far. On the other it offers a new perspective on the long-standing 
debates over the relationship between state and society in the GDR, seeking to highlight 
the long-term processes by which the SED regime attained stability in the 1970s but was 
increasingly vulnerable to economic decline in the 1980s.
Since the collapse of the GDR numerous attempts have been made to characterise 
the dictatorship and the relationship between state and society. In the immediate aftermath 
of the “velvet revolution” of 1989, the concept of totalitarianism was resurrected by many 
observers and despite having been abandoned as a useful analytical concept for historians 
for much of the previous decade, began to be reapplied to the SED dictatorship.41 The 
totalitarian concept appears to suit well attempts to explain how things fundamentally 
were, claiming to explain the complete context in which all lived experience took place. 
While few users of the totalitarian concept have not accepted that there were limits to the 
success of the regime’s total claims on society, these claims are seen nonetheless as the 
benchmark against which anything meaningful can be understood about the society.42 
However while the totalitarian concept appears to explain all, in doing so it tends to leave 
much else un-illuminated, making it a barrier against, rather than a tool for, understanding 
the way things “really” were. Or rather it explains some things better than others: since it 
is concerned primarily with the projects of rulers, it provides a top-down perspective on
41 Schroeder, K., Geschichte und Transformation des SED-Staates (Berlin 1994).
42 Kowalczuk 1-S, Legitimation eines neuen Staates (Berlin 1997), p. 345; McFalls, L.H. Communism's Collapse, Democracy's Demise 
(London 1995), p. 6.: as L.H McFalls has written, “ ...theories of communism’s evolution and revolutionary end have, in fact, merely 
elaborated on one or more of the three possible sources of change that the classic theories of totalitarianism identified: international 
competition, ideological and institutional erosion and corruption, or societal resistance.”
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the ruled and the relationship between ruler and ruled, where other perspectives might 
give rise to a more differentiated picture.
Since the mid 1990s increasing numbers of historians of the GDR have found 
totalitarianism inadequate as a theoretical framework in which to position their research 
on the complex relationship between state and society. Certainly the SED regime had 
aspirations to total control over the population, seeking in theory to develop the socialist 
personality and infiltrate all aspects of society. However recognition of these aspirations 
does not satisfactorily explain the variety and complexity of the relationships within and 
between the SED party hierarchy, the state and economic administrative apparatus and the 
citizens of the GDR over the forty years of its existence.
Alternative characterisations of the dictatorship have drawn upon arguably less 
rigidly prescriptive concepts, working outside the discourse of implied comparison with 
(western) democratic rule. All too often these have however fundamentally replicated the 
top-down totalitarian perspective.43 A significant strand of arguments has sought to point 
out the limits of the SED dictatorship. Among others Ralph Jessen and Richard Bessel 
have argued that “looking more closely it could prove to be the case, that many of the 
peculiarities of east German history between 1945 and 1989 may only be explained, once 
there is success in describing the complicated interaction between the total claim of the 
dictatorship and the conditions of the environment which acted upon it -  in part created by 
but not always controlled by the dictatorship itself.”44 Not dissimilarly Detlef Pollack has 
argued in opposition to the notion of an homogenous “shut down society”45 that the limits 
of the SED’s control were such that all attempts to homogenise society were bound to 
come up against barriers from within society which then shaped future policies (e.g. the 
hardiness of traditional structures and milieus, the formation of networks of informal 
relations, loss of belief in the value of progress, the counter-productive consequences of 
state repression).46
43 For example Konrad Jarausch’s description of the GDR as a modem welfare dictatorship in Konrad Jarausch (ed.), ‘Care and 
Coercion: the GDR as Welfare Dictatorship’, in Konrad Jarausch (ed.), Dictatorship as Experience: Towards a Socio-Cultural History 
o f the GDR (New York, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1999), pp. 47-69.
44 Bessel, R. and Jessen, R. ‘Einleitung: Die Grenzen der Diktatur’, in Richard Bessel, Ralph Jessen (eds.), Die Grenzen der Diktatur: 
Staat und Gesellschaft in der DDR (G6ttingen 1996), pp.7-23 here p.9.
45 Sigrid Meuschel argued that the GDR was a “stillgelegte Gesellschaft” suggesting that the totalitarian expansion of the state resulted 
in a dying away of society: Meuschel, S. Legitimation und Parteiherrschaft in der DDR, Zum Paradox von Stabilitat und Revolution in 
der DDR (Frankfurt am Main 1992)‘Uberlegungen zu einer Herrschafts- und Gesellschaflsgeschichte der DDR’ in Geschichte und 
Gesellschaft 19 (1993) pp.5-14.
46 Pollack, D. ‘Die Konstitutive Widerspriichlichkeit der DDR’, Geschichte und Gesellschaft 24 (1998), pp.l 10-131.
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Attempts have been made also however to characterise the interrelations of state 
and society within the GDR focusing on the practice of authority within society. The ideas 
of Herrschaft als sozialer Praxis (“authority as social praxis”) and linked to it the notion 
of Eigen-Sinn (literally “own sense or conception”) have been developed in the context of 
the GDR in order to escape the top-down perspective by emphasising the interrelations 
and mutual impact of authority on society and society upon authority at the grassroots.47 
The artificial distinctions of active ‘rulers’ and passive ‘ruled’ and hence the distinction 
between oppressive ‘state’ and oppressed ‘society’ are from this perspective complicated 
by the actual interdependence of dictatorial control and the individual motives and 
intentions, identities and self-conceptions of those on whom and through whom authority 
is exerted. Thomas Lindenberger’s use of the term Eigen-Sinn has been to illustrate the 
potential for people in the GDR to use and negotiate with the structures of the regime for 
their own interests, adapting and changing but also building and sustaining them in the 
process within a limited local circumstance 48
Building on these ideas this thesis seeks to provide an historical analysis of the 
SED dictatorship, which qualifies the traditional top-down model of the functioning of 
authority in the dictatorship and a starkly dichotomous view of the state and society. In 
order to explain how the GDR functioned with regard to agriculture and rural society in 
practice, it is necessary to examine the internal complexity of the economic, political and 
administrative structures of the regime at the lower levels of the hierarchy. These 
structures as they operated at the grassroots over an extended period of time not only 
controlled and shaped the boundaries in which farmers lived and worked, but were shaped 
themselves by the integration and participation of people as farmers and agricultural 
functionaries into the system of rule. Using the example of Bezirk Erfurt I shall examine 
how East Germans responded to the end of private farming by resisting, manipulating but 
also participating in the new system of rural organisation. In addition I shall attempt to
47 Both terms were originally used by Alf Ludtke in other contexts: Liidtke, A. “Einleitung: Herrschaft als soziale Praxis”, in Liidtke, A. 
(ed.) Herrschaft als Soziale Praxis. Historische und sozial-anthropologische Studien (Gottingen 1991) pp.9-63; Ludtke, A. Eigen-Sinn. 
Fabrikalltag, Arbeitererfahrungen und Politik vom Kaiserreich bis in den Faschismus. Ergebnisse (Hamburg, 1993). But they have 
since been used in the context of the GDR, most notably by Thomas Lindenberger: Lindenberger, T. “Der ABV als Landwirt” in 
Thomas Lindenberger (ed.) Herrschaft und Eigen-Sinn in der Diktatur. Studien zur Gesellschaftsgeschichte der DDR, (Cologne 1999) 
pp. 167-203; “Herrschaft und Eigen-Sinn in der Diktatur. Das Alltagsleben der DDR und sein Platz in der Erinnerungskultur des 
vereinigten Deutschlands” in Aus Politik und Zeitpeschichte B40/2000 pp.5-12; Volkspolizei: Herrschafispraxis und offentliche 
Ordnung im SED Staat, 1952-1968 (Cologne 2003).
48 Lindenberger, T. ‘Die Diktatur der Grenzen. Zur Einleitung’, in Lindenberger T. (ed.) Herrschaft und Eigen-Sinn in der Diktatur. 
Studien zur Gesellschaftsgeschichte der DDR (Cologne 1999), pp. 13-44.
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show how LPG functionaries went about their work operating under as well as with a 
combination of compromise and material incentive, administrative pressure and physical 
force. Their relationship with and position within the communities of which they were part 
provides a new perspective on the interrelations of politics and society, of power, authority 
and changing agricultural practice in the GDR as it developed economically and 
technologically. Moreover it offers some insight into the process by which SED authority 
stabilised in the rural communities in the GDR, yet at the same time became increasingly 
vulnerable to economic decline.
SECTION 1
Consolidation and Control: 
Collectivisation and its Malcontents
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CHAPTER 1 
Steps toward Full Collectivisation of Agriculture
“There was once the Kaiser’s empire, there was once Hitler’s empire and yet everything changed again. We 
just want to hold on and wait for what’s going on next year!”1 (One o f  the farmers’ arguments against 
joining the LPG when faced with an agitation brigade in the vicinity o f  Gormar, Kreis Miihlhausen in 
December 1959.)
There is no doubt that despite claiming the title of “the workers and peasants 
state” in 1949 it was the former not the latter who were central to the identity of the GDR 
as both carriers of the revolution and models of the socialist personality. The extent and 
depth to which the SED had penetrated rural society was correspondingly limited. The 
advancement of collective farming during the 1950s was in large part the beginnings of an 
attempt to remedy this glaring deficiency. The completion of the collectivsation campaign 
in 1960, while being an administrative success, revealed however just how deficient the 
permanent structures of control and communication between the SED leadership and rural 
communities were and how little certainty there was in the countryside of a future under 
the SED.
During the 1950s, the campaign for collectivisation of agriculture sought to 
undertake the most radical transformation of the conditions of rural existence since the 
land reforms. It entailed a massive mobilisation of the regime’s apparatus for publicising 
its policies, persuading people of their value and suppressing hostility. In so doing it 
placed the effectiveness of the local, district and regional administration of agriculture and 
rural communities under close scrutiny, exposing the extent and limitations of this 
apparatus. At the same time, with the formation of the new LPGs, collectivisation forced 
farmers and local functionaries to accept new roles and responsibilities and in so doing 
began to change the basis on which the SED regime communicated with and transmitted 
its authority to farmers and rural communities at large. The manner of the campaign, 
which caused in the short term such fear, anger and hostility towards the SED, had long­
1 Thuringisches Hauptstaatsarchiv Weimar from here on ThHStAW BDVP 20/134 VPKA Miihlhausen, Abt. Schutzpolizei, Ergebnisse 
der Auswertung der Brigaden innerhalb des MTS-Bereiches Gormar 10.12.1959.
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term consequences, setting the parameters within which future policies were conceived, 
communicated and received in the next decade and beyond.
The Campaign for Collectivisation
The pace of social transformation was far slower in the countryside than it was in the town 
for a number of reasons. The central role of the church in village life, the complex 
networks of familial relations in the village, the lack of anonymity and the essential 
interdependency of the inhabitants of small communities were important factors in 
preserving the established social order. Moreover the simple geographical isolation of 
many communities meant the ideological as well as purely organisational capacity for 
change in the villages was lacking.
By the early 1950s the self-confidence of the SED leadership under Walter 
Ulbricht had risen sufficiently that it was willing to place more pressure on the population 
in the implementation of the socialist transformation of society and increased norms of 
production. At the II. SED Party Congress in 1952 the phase of “the construction of 
socialism” (.Aufbau des Sozialismus) was announced and the SED began thus the next step 
in its socio-economic transformation of the countryside following the land reforms of the 
post-war period. Having parcelled out the larger estates in the late 1940s, the goal was 
now to re-establish large-scale production units through the amalgamation of farms into 
socialist collectives organised according to a uniform pattern. Where before organised 
cooperation between farmers had been quashed by the SED, material and practical support 
(and with it state interference) was now given to the spontaneous formation of farming 
collectives in some selected villages and the SED advanced a campaign for the formation 
of agricultural collectives more widely, despite the lack of suitable conditions for 
widespread large-scale collective production.
Although aspects of the Soviet model were adopted during the drive for 
collectivisation, this was by no means to be a simple Sovietisation of agriculture since the 
land brought into the collective remained legally, albeit with numerous restrictions, in the 
ownership of the farmer, while the range of types of collective farm organisation enabled
2 The early development of the LPG in Merxleben as described by Barbara Schier highlights the mixture of local impetus and state 
intereference in the establishment of the very first collective farms. Schier B., Alltagsleben im “Sozialistischen D o r f’ (Munster 2001) 
pp. 108-151.
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farmers to maintain, if they chose, individual control of livestock and/or farm machinery.3 
In the LPG Type I only the use of the land was managed in common, in Type II (which 
soon became all but obsolete) the land, tools and machinery and in Type III the livestock 
were also included. The majority of farmers however continued to resist collectivisation 
even as the state offered greater incentives to those who would join - through privileged 
access to machinery, seed and fertiliser, lifting of debts and extension of credit - and more 
severe sanctions to those who would or could not - high taxes and the setting of 
impossibly high production quotas, which effectively meant jail terms and the confiscation 
of property as punishment for alleged sabotage. Under such duress a large proportion of 
Grossbauern (wealthy farmers: defined as those owning 20 hectares of land or involved in 
capitalist enterprise) chose flight from the GDR or abandoned their farms during the 
course of 1952 and 1953, which in turn exacerbated deficiencies in the supply of food to 
the population.4
In the towns, the ultimate results of the more hardline policies of the Aufbau des 
Sozialismus and the increased production norms were the demonstrations of the 17th June 
1953. Despite great opposition to the beginnings of a campaign for collectivisation and 
punitively high production quotas along with false charges of economic sabotage for non- 
compliant farmers, participation in the uprisings remained limited in the countryside, 
though not for want of disgruntlement with the state’s policies. Notable exceptions in 
Erfurt were demonstrations and open opposition to the SED led in part by village pastors 
in Bad Tennstedt, Kreis Langensalza and in Eckolstadt, Kreis Apolda, in the latter’s case 
ending only with the deployment of Soviet tanks. In Bezirk Erfurt, private farmers were 
involved too in demonstrations on 17th June in four (out of 13) Kreisstadte during which 
some of those imprisoned during the “class struggle” in the countryside were forcibly 
released. The most notable of these actions occurred in Miihlhausen where 5000-6000 
farmers who had been attending a farmers’ assembly in Oberdorla on the 17th marched 
through the town and occupied the court buildings, demanding the return of a free market 
and the release of imprisoned farmers.5 The 17th June however, while gaining symbolic 
value (and it continued to be referred to by disgruntled farmers in the Bezirk in subsequent
3 Nehrig, C. “Landwirtschaflspolitik” in Andreas Herbst, Gerd-Rudiger Stephan, Jurgen Winkler (eds.) Die SED. Geschichte -  
Organisation -  Politik. Ein Handbuch,(Berlin: 1997) pp.294-305 - here p.295.
4 Werkentin, F. Politische Strafjustiz in der Ara Ulbricht (Berlin 1995) pp. 73-85.
5 Kermarrec, P. Der 17. Juni 1953 im Bezirk Erjurt (Erfurt 2003) pp. 67-71.
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years6), was not directly experienced by the vast majority of the rural population. Rather 
in subsequent months, as the SED implemented the ‘New Course’ designed to defuse the 
most serious causes of dissatisfaction among East Germans, farmers took the opportunity 
to reassert themselves and reverse measures forced upon them. Thus LPG formed under 
duress disbanded and farmers withdrew to set up independent farms again during 1953.
By the following year however pressure and material incentives were again being brought 
to bear on farmers and farm labourers to form and re-form collective farms.
For much of the 1950s an uneasy situation developed in rural communities. Many 
LPG remained economically unstable lacking both the quality of land and livestock and 
the degree of expertise, dedication and social cohesion among members to function 
efficiently.7 Private farmers faced with punitive production quotas found themselves 
unable to continue in agriculture and in some cases fearing draconian punishments 
abandoned the GDR altogether. While it is clear that the majority of private farmers in the 
GDR managed to survive and in many cases even profit from the system of “freie Spitzen” 
(“free peaks”: i.e excess production for which high prices were paid) and production 
quotas, a basic antagonism remained between much of the rural population and the 
representatives of the SED regime, demonstrated repeatedly in minor acts of resistance. In 
June 1957 farmers in Kreis Apolda called openly for the return of the free market and the
o
abolition of quotas. Minor acts of sabotage also took place to undermine the LPG. In 
early 1958 in an LPG in Kreis Miihlhausen for example, several pigs were reported to 
have been stabbed. The strength of opposition to the LPG in the village meant too that 
those who joined could be seen as traitors and faced social isolation. Various incidents 
were reported in which LPG members were insulted and their children bullied. In a case in 
a village in Kreis Gotha, a woman was reportedly spat at while in the village shop for 
having become a member of the LPG.9
Paradoxically more serious for the regime than these episodes of “class conflict”, 
was the lack of class conflict whatsoever in some rural communities, where local party
6 ThHStAW BDVP 20/134 Kriminalpolizei, Bericht an die HVDP Falle tiber Proklamierung eines neuen 17. Juni. 26.3.1955.
7 The trials and tribulations of the LPG in Merxleben described in detail by Barbara Schier are instructive in this regard, bearing in mind 
that as the first LPG to be set up in the Bezirk, the regime had a vested interest in ensuring its success. Schier B., Alltagsleben im
"Sozialistischen Dorf" (Munster 2001).
8 ThHStAW BDVP 20/044 BDVP, Bericht an die BDVP -  Politabteilung, Wahleinsatz im VPKA Apolda und Mahdrescherwerk 
Weimar 13.6.1957.
9 ThHStAW RdB LI 151 Abt. Landwirtschaft: Bericht iiber den Stand der sozialistischen Entwicklung der Landwirtschaft im Bezirk 
Erfurt im 1. Halbjahr 1958.
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and government functionaries were too often reported for the leniency of their approach to 
the class situation in the communities for which they were responsible representatives of 
the socialist state. Many functionaries of the state run Farmers’ Mutual Aid Union (Verein 
der gegenseitigen Bauernhilfe or VdgB) sympathised with the unwillingness of 
particularly smaller farmers and Neubauern to give up individual use of the farms which 
they had so laboriously established since the end of the war.10 Similarly some local state 
functionaries and local groups of the block parties showed themselves to be less than 
enthusiastic in support of SED moves towards collectivisation for most of the 1950s, 
particularly in areas such as Bezirk Erfurt where successful medium-sized private farmers 
formed a large part of the membership of the DBD and CDU (Christian Democratic 
Union). Even the tractor drivers of the Machine and Tractor Stations (Maschinen- 
Traktoren-Stationen or MTS) were not necessarily reliable, enjoying in some cases better 
relations with the independent farmers than with the LPG.11 Investigations into the 
effectiveness of police officers in a number of districts in the Bezirk at the end of 1957 
found too that strong connections with one or other of the Christian churches had impaired 
the effectiveness of SED party organisations in the villages and police officers alike.12 
While there was still the prospect of reunification with West Germany in the none too 
distant future, willingness to resist interference in central elements of rural existence, such 
as farming and religion remained strong during the 1950s. On essential matters such as the 
religious education of young people or the collectivisation of farming, the importance of 
the church as an alternative source of authority in the village came to the fore with clergy
1 Toccasionally seen to be active in warning against the LPG.
During the 1950s the pressure on farmers to commit themselves to joining or 
forming an LPG was by no means applied comprehensively in the GDR, or even in Bezirk 
Erfurt, with a consistent degree of urgency or with a consistent set of methods and 
arguments. It is in the context of this inconsistency that the behaviour and actions of 
private and collective farmers and the various participants in the regime’s apparatus for
10 Beauftragte fur die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes, from here on BStU Aussenstelle Erfurt, Buro der Leitung 1481, Leitung 
der MfS Bezirksverwaltung an den Leiter der Kreisdienststellen, Orientierung auf die Schwerpunkte der operativen Arbeit der Linie III 
(Landwirtschaft) im I. Quartal 1959 18.12.1958 p.8.
11 The Machine and Tractor stations, manned in part by members o f the industrial proletariat, were in theory to function as bulwarks in 
the otherwise ideologically backward countryside, with responsibilities for a several villages: Gruhle, J. Ohne Gott und Sonnenschein 
(Nauendorf 2002) p. 58.
12 ThHStAW BDVP 20/044 Politabteilung, Bericht an die Hauptverwaltung -  Politische Verwaltung 10.12.1957.
13 ThHStAW RdB LI 151 Abt. Landwirtschaft Bericht uber die Entwicklung der LPG seit der 15. Tagung der Bezirksleitung der SED 
und des Bezirkstages am 23.8.1957.
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agitation, when the drive for full collectivisation of agriculture began, need to be 
understood. The confusion of the situation established in 1960 with the rapid completion, 
on paper, of full collectivisation was bome out of the variety of attitudes among both 
farmers and agitators as to what should or would be created by collectivisation in practice, 
and what would be or should be preserved of the structures and practices of independent 
farming and private ownership. Collectivisation took place in an atmosphere of 
uncertainty with regard to the future organisation of agriculture, leaving a lasting element 
of unpredictability as to the status and future of the LPG.
In the aftermath of the unrest of June 1953 and the introduction of the ‘New 
Course’ policies, designed in part to reconcile the population with the SED regime, the 
explicit forcing of collectivisation was replaced by a set of administrative and economic 
incentives and pressures. Although the number of LPGs, the proportion of land farmed 
collectively and the number of LPG members in Bezirk Erfurt increased -  this was a 
gradual process, driven less by the successful persuasion of independent farmers or 
landowners, than the abandonment of land and the recruitment of industrial workers or 
landless labourers to the collective farms. It was not until 1958 that the rate of formation 
of new collectives increased significantly, with the participation of formerly independent 
fanners. The decision taken at the 33rd Session (Tagung) of the SED’s Central Committee 
(Zentralkomitee or ZK) in the autumn of the previous year to step up the campaign for 
collectivisation, led to attempts at LPG recruitment aimed primarily at those private 
farmers who were politically organised in either a party or a mass organisation.14 From the 
middle of 1958 at the Vth SED Party Congress (Parteitag), the focus of the campaign was 
expanded to encompass all private farmers, including those so-called Grossbauern who 
had previously been prevented from forming or joining LPGs.15 Nevertheless during the 
course of that year the amount of land in the Bezirk farmed collectively reached only
14 Bauer, T. Blockpartei und Agrarrevolution von Oben. Die DBD 1948-1963 (Munich, 2003) p.441.
15 District officers of the Stasi were given instructions to prevent such farmers from taking up positions on the boards of the LPG or 
being chosen to occupy leading functionary positions. In practice of course this proved rather harder to ensure, as one case in the village 
o f Ramsla demonstrated. Here an LPG Type I was established by a farmer who owned 30 hectares of land along with two other 
fanners. The LPG ran intially as something of a family business with the Grossbauer himself chairman, his son the field brigadier and 
daughter the accountant. Despite this seemingly inauspicious ideological composition, as it transpired, this LPG became something of a 
model o f socialist development. BStU Aussenstelle Erfurt, Buro der Leitung 1481, Leitung der MfS Bezirksverwaltung an den Leiter 
der Kreisdienststellen, Orientierung auf die Schwerpunkte der operativen Arbeit der Linie III (Landwirtschaft) im I. Quartal 1959
18.12.1958 p.8; BStU Aussenstelle Erfurt, Kreisdienststelle Weimar, Analyse liber das Dorf Ramsla 2.6.1960 pp.33-40.
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17.7%.16 The vast majority of independent farmers felt themselves able to resist the LPG 
and the agitators for the time being, if not for ever.
Popular Responses to Collectivisation
Opposition to the formation of collective farms was based on a number of objections, not 
least unwillingness on the part of traditionally independent farmers to lose private control 
over their own finances.17 The effectiveness of economic levers such as high delivery 
quotas to encourage collectivisation had been balanced out by the incentives for making as 
much production available as possible for purchase by the state. Successful farmers could 
certainly double their incomes through the sale of excess produce bought up by the state at 
higher prices. The prospect of such forms of additional income being restricted as a result 
of membership in a collective was a strong disincentive for joining. From a purely 
practical point of view the parlous state of many of the collectives in existence did little to 
persuade farmers of the value of collective farming either. While the financial situation of 
the LPGs did gradually improve over the years, at the end of 1959 50% of LPG Type Ills
1 Xin the Bezirk were nonetheless officially categorised as “financially weak”. A minority 
of elite LPGs were able to pay high wages and easily exceed their plans. Others managed 
to get by with some success, taking advantage of the preferential treatment given to LPGs 
in terms of reduced quotas and access to machinery and fertiliser. The majority however 
lagged behind. All too often inefficiency, poor work organisation and a lack of 
commitment to the LPG from its members compounded natural obstacles to improved 
production levels. The lack of financial success in LPGs inevitably led in some cases to a 
sour atmosphere among the members. Certainly personal conflicts between members of an 
LPG put private farmers off joining collective farms. It was enough to live in close 
proximity to one another without having to work together as well. A report on the 
problems facing agitators operating in an MTS area in Kreis Miihlhausen in December 
1959 described the situation in one village thus: “no one wants to join the existing LPG in
16 Allinson, M Politics and Popular Opinion in East Germany 1945-1968 (Manchester 2000) p.78.
17 Gruhle p.85 : “’Zwar sehe ich ein, dass man die besseren Entwicklungsmdglichkeiten hat, aber ich will meine Freiheit haben.”’
18 LPGs were divided into three types: Type I required the collective use of only the land; Type II required the use collectively of both 
land and machinery, Type III required the collective use of land, machinery and livestock. ThHStAW RdB L562, Bericht iiber die 
politische und okonomische Entwicklung der LPG 1959 und den Stand der Betriebsplanung 1960.
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Diedorf because there are always conflicts and people say: ‘we’re not getting involved in 
that mess’”.19
A report by a Stasi informant on the LPG Type II in Wahlhausen Kreis 
Heiligenstadt in November 1958 underlines the mutual antagonism felt between private 
farmers and the LPG. As a private farmer himself he reported on the anger among farmers 
who were constantly being called upon to pick their fields again for more potatoes even 
once they had fulfilled their quotas. In contrast he pointed out that the LPG had actually 
allowed potatoes to go to waste on its own fields. This and other incidences of shoddy 
practice or mismanagement of the LPG had hardened his attitude against the actual 
prospect of joining this collective.20 In a further report the informant noted that a leading 
figure in the LPG had openly proposed that remaining private farmers should be treated 
more severely in order to make them enter the collective.21 For many farmers, the LPG 
represented nothing so much as being forced into the hands of those who would destroy 
them.
In the late 1950s the prospect of joining one such LPG did not appeal to either the 
economic or the social interests of farmers. Rather the LPG was seen at best as a last 
resort for those unable any longer to run their farms profitably.22 LPGs founded prior to 
the.so-called ‘Socialist Spring’ of 1960 were thus seldom formed by successful and 
experienced farmers.23 Rather most often the membership of the LPGs consisted of 
industrial workers, landless farm labourers and small farmers who lacked the wherewithal 
to run a large enterprise effectively. Some of the more severe cases came under the 
scrutiny of the District Party Control Commission of the SED 
(Kreisparteikontrollkommission or KPKK). For example the KPKK carried out an 
investigation into the LPG Type III in Kindelbriick in 1958 which had been formed 
largely from abandoned land left in the inexpert care of the village council (Rat der
19 ThHStAW BDVP 20/134 Kriminalpolizei, VPKA Miihlhausen, Abt. Schutzpolizei -  Instrukteurbereich II. Auswertung der 
Brigadeeinsatze innerhalb des MTS Bereiches Lengefeld zur soz. Umgestaltung der Landwirtschaft 04.12.1959.
20 BStU Aussenstelle Erfurt, Kreisdienststelle Heiligenstadt TA 184/84, Mundlicher Bericht des G1 “Traktor” beim Treff am 
14.11.1958, 18.11.1958 pp.70-71.
21 BStU Aussenstelle Erfurt, Kreisdienststelle Heiligenstadt TA 184/84, Eigener Treffbericht, Treff mit GI “Traktor” 5.12.1958, 
9.12.1958 p.72.
22 ThHStAW, RdB L562 Abt. Landwirtschaft, Bericht uber die politische und okonomische Entwicklung der LPG 1959 und den Stand 
der Betriebsplanung 1960; Gruhle pp.76, 87.
23 As Jonathan Osmond has pointed out, some wealthier farmers sought however to avoid joining an already existing LPG and to limit 
outside interference by forming their own LPG Type I: Osmond, J. “From Juncker Estate to Cooperative Farm: East German Agrarian 
Society 1945-1961” in Major, P. and Osmond J. (eds.) The Workers' and Peasants' State: Communism and Society in East Germany 
under Ulbricht 1945-1971 (Manchester 2002) pp. 130-150 - here p. 139.
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Gemeinde or RdG). The members of the LPG were exclusively former agricultural 
labourers and thus while not new to agriculture, had no experience between them of 
running a farm as a whole. More significantly they had little livestock or draft animals let 
alone machinery with which to work on fields which had been allowed to grow thick with 
weeds. State subsidies were thus absolutely vital over a number of years to enable the 
LPG to construct a collective livestock shed. Even with this support, however, members 
were scarcely able to raise enough profits to give themselves sufficient income, causing 
disgruntlement among the members.24 Even as the drive towards full collectivisation was 
to pick up speed, previously formed LPGs began to implode unable to give their members 
a sufficient income to live on. In the LPG Type I Grossmonra, Kreis Sommerda 19 
members of the LPG resigned sending official notice to the LPG board, some of whom to 
the outrage of the KPKK even consulted a lawyer. In addition the SED party secretary in 
the LPG made clear his intention to hand in his party document. Of the 19, 13 were
9 Spersuaded to return to the LPG, 2 were refused re-entry and 4 remained outside.
Lacking the means to employ a sufficient workforce or children who would run the
farm, older farmers often found no other way to cope with the oppressive demands placed
upon them by the state, than forming or joining an LPG. Here the question of access to
machinery was in many cases decisive. From the beginning of 1958 the MTS were
directed to serve primarily the LPGs rather than allow their machinery to be rented by
private farmers. In practice this did not occur everywhere with MTS workers often
preferring, whether out of conviction or financial incentive, to continue to serve private
26farmers in some cases to the detriment of the LPGs. It was easier for example for an 
MTS worker to fulfil his quota of fields harvested or ploughed if he did not have to move 
his tractor to a different valley halfway through the day. However the preference given to 
the LPGs on the whole in terms of access to new machinery (reinforced by the decision 
announced at the VI. LPG Conference in February 1959 that at first only LPG Type Ills in 
fully collectivised villages with over 500 hectares should receive the machinery of the
24 ThHStAW SED BPA BIV/2/4-103 SED Bezirksleitung BPKK, KPKK Sommerda, Bericht iiber die Untersuchung in der LPG 
Kindelbruck 18.6.1958 pp.98-100.
25 ThHStAW SED BPA BIV/2/4 -  103 SED Bezirksleitung BPKK, KPKK Sommerda, Bericht der KPKK iiber die Untersuchungen in 
Grossmonra 9.6.1959 p.l 13.
26 Gruhle p.45 for an example in Barchfeld, Kreis Weimar -  an MTS Brigadier was replaced for neglecting LPG and serving the 
Grossbauem.
44
97MTS on long-term loan) encouraged private farmers to join up. Faced with the 
possibility of being denied access to machinery and with too little money to purchase their 
own, some of the less wealthy farmers were moved to join or form LPGs. This however 
did little to change the image of the agricultural collectives among the more successful 
independent farmers as the last resort for the desperate.
At this stage the attainment of full collectivisation remained remote for all 
concerned. If some independent farmers expected German reunification, a third world war 
or the state’s financial dire straits to intervene before collectivisation was completed, as 
far as the SED leadership were concerned, full collectivisation would not be possible for 
several years yet either. The State Planning Commission initially had decided on 1963 and 
then 1965 as attainable deadlines for full collectivisation.28 Given the potential damage to 
the economy and to the ability of the GDR to supply itself with food at a time when the 
SED leadership explicitly sought to demonstrate superior living standards in comparison 
with the FRG, progress in the formation of LPGs remained gradual and incremental. 
Successful private farmers were well aware of the weakness of the LPGs and their own 
importance to maintaining production levels and dismissed the prospect of collectivisation 
accordingly. Functionaries throughout the administration of agriculture and the 
government of rural communities were aware of this too and were reluctant to agitate for 
collectivisation when farmers remained so clearly opposed to it. Even the most dedicated 
to the socialist cause or the class conflict were wary of compromising the supply of food 
to the population.
The Limits of Local Agitation
In Bezirk Erfurt the rate of collectivisation in 1959 had sunk below that of the previous 
year, with a total of 59 new LPGs founded adding only a further 4.9% of the agricultural 
land in the Bezirk to the amount farmed in collectives. This slow progress was put down, 
above all, quite simply to the unwillingness of independent farmers to join the LPG, 
nevertheless it was also clear that at a local level not enough was being done to win them 
over. Old antagonisms had led existing LPGs to refuse to accept new members from
27 ThHStAW, RdB L562, Abt. Landwirtschaft Bericht iiber die politische und okonomische Entwicklung der LPG 1959 und den Stand 
der Betriebsplanung 1960. Following, for example, the transfer of machinery to the LPG Tiingeda in Bad Langensalza, six independent 
farmers applied for entry.
28 Bauer p.442.
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among those who had long rejected the collective. More generally consensus had by no 
means been achieved as to whether collectivisation could or should be achieved in the 
near future among the functionaries of those local institutions on which the SED 
leadership relied to exert its influence over farmers - from the village SED organisation, 
the block party groups, the mass organisations as well as the village and district state 
administration, the MTS and any nearby factories. Assessments of opinion in SED 
organisations in the countryside uncovered a number of individual SED members, party 
secretaries as well as entire party organisations who were unsupportive of the current 
progress of collectivisation. Given the lack of SED members among the farming 
population, the local organisations of the Farmers’ Mutual Aid Union (Verein der 
gegenseitigen Bauemhilfe or VdgB) provided a network through which the regime sought 
to exert its influence on private farmers and rural communities in general. However it was 
widely recognised that local VdgB organisations could not always be relied upon to 
espouse the party line with regard to agriculture, particularly on such a divisive issue as 
full collectivisation. In January and February 1960, the Stasi Bezirk administration sought 
to rectify this by instructing their district offices to see that those farmers standing for 
election to local VdgB governing boards were politically and ideologically suitable.29 
Regardless of these instructions, it was clear in early 1960 that in the majority of villages, 
the local VdgB organisations could not be relied upon to act in accordance with SED 
policy.30 In March 1960 at least 26 chairmen of local VdgB organisations in Kreis 
Amstadt were dismissed from their posts for failing to support ‘the socialist 
transformation of agriculture’.31
The unreliability of those charged with driving forward the collectivisation process 
on the ground is in many respects wholly explicable given the choices they were faced 
with. Up until 1960, unless one believed in the importance of collectivisation in itself, 
there was little reason actively to campaign on its behalf. Joining an LPG had not been 
made obligatory by law, most farmers opposed the idea and the potential for success was 
limited by the ease with which rural communities could close ranks against the small
29 BStU Aussenstelle Erfurt, Biiro der Leitung 1446, Leitung der Bezirksverwaltung an die Leiter der Kreisdienststellen, Orientierung 
auf die Schwerpunkte der Linie III in Auswertung der Arbeitstagungen vom 11.1.1960 und 16.2.1960, 19.2.1960 p.l.
30 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/2/2-322 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Landwirtschaft an das Sekretariat: Bericht iiber die Vorbereitung der 
Organisationswahlen der VdgB und ihre Unterstiitzung durch die Partei. 12.3.1960 pp. 168-176.
31 ThHStAW BDVP 20/065 Stab/Operativstab, Information 16/60 Vorkommnisse in der Landwirtschaft 22.3.1960.
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numbers of activists who were prepared to advocate the policies of the SED regime. The 
secretary of the SED organisation and pub landlord in a village in Kreis Miihlhausen 
explained his inaction quite simply, with the reasoning that if he were to make his support 
for socialism known -  “no one will drink a glass of beer in his pub anymore.”32 The 
difficulty of winning over farmers was particularly acute in those communities where the 
church and religion still played a major role in the attitudes of the community as a whole 
to the latest moves by the SED. In the Eichsfeld districts based around the small towns of 
Worbis and Heiligenstadt where Catholicism predominated the functionaries charged with 
advocating collectivisation tended either to lack the conviction themselves or simply had 
insufficient authority within the community to make a convincing case.33 Consequently 
almost no progress was made in the development of LPGs here. In districts where the 
Reformed Protestant church predominated, pastors in a number of villages undermined 
potential support for the LPG by speaking out against collectivisation. Their views were 
not opposed even by the functionaries of local government and members of the SED and 
block parties who themselves had in some cases remained practising Christians.34 Given 
the resolve of farmers and rural communities to resist collectivisation, and the lack of 
resolve among rural functionaries to campaign for it, there appeared in most villages to be 
no coordinated or coherent strategy for overcoming opposition to full collectivisation.
After a difficult harvest in 1959 owing to a long period without rain and even 
greater need for rapid increases in production in order to keep pace with higher 
consumption levels, it was clear more had to be done to achieve a leap forward in 
productivity. Despite the intention to create at least one LPG in every village by the end of 
1959, on 3 1st December, 114 separate communities were recorded in Bezirk Erfurt without 
any LPGs at all.35 The replacement of Erich Miickenberger as Agriculture Secretary in the 
Central Committee by Gerhard Griineberg36 during the 7th Session of the Central 
Committee in December 1959 signalled a change to a higher risk policy of rapid
32 ThHStAW BDVP 20/134 Kriminalpolizei, Kontrolle und Anleitung bei der Abt. K. Miihlhausen am 26.11.1959.
33ThHStAW BDVP 20/106, Schutzpolizei, Bericht iiber die Kontrolle und Anleitung im VPKA Heiligenstadt 19.10-14.11.1959;
20.11.1959 Also Allinson pp.79-80.
34 ThHStAW BDVP 20/065, Stab/Operativstab, Information 6/60 24.2.1960.
35 ThHStAW, RdB L562 Abt. Landwirtschaft Bericht iiber die politische und okonomische Entwicklung der LPG 1959 und den Stand 
der Betriebsplanung 1960, undated (Feb. 1960).
36 Gerhard Griineberg (1921-1981) from 1960 to 1980 was Secretary for Agriculture in the ZK and from 1966 member of the Politburo 
of the ZK.
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collectivisation despite the short term economic shortfalls this would inflict.37 Brigades of 
agitators had already been deployed around the Bezirk charged with persuading farmers to 
form LPGs, establishing bridgeheads from which to move the campaign in the districts 
forward. However their impact on farmers remained limited. With relatively few qualified 
personnel available to staff the brigades, the amount of time each brigade was able to 
spend in a single village was not limitless. Farmers who had no desire to join an LPG 
could thus effectively resist outside interference by weathering the storm and awaiting the 
brigade’s departure. The strategy of relying on the propaganda impact of the media, the 
persuasive efforts of village functionaries and the deployment of occasional brigades of 
agitators alongside the usual tactics of economic pressure and incentive lacked the 
required level o f ‘continuous confrontation’. The SED Central Committee thus charged 
the SED Bezirksleitungen with developing a programme of intensive campaigns in the 
villages.
The Campaign Intensified
Thus far the basic weakness of the SED’s influence over the rural population and 
the basic unreliability of the network of functionaries operating at a district and local level 
in agriculture and rural society had been all too clearly demonstrated. At the same time 
many farmers had exposed themselves as opponents of the socialist regime who were 
willing to resist as far as they could any change in the organisation of agriculture. As such 
they appeared too to be forces of reaction standing in the way of the social transformation 
of rural society. Seen in these terms, the value of a more rigorous approach towards 
resistant farmers was clear. A campaign which mobilised large numbers of supporters of 
SED policy and placed rural and agricultural functionaries under close scrutiny would be a 
telling reminder of the SED leadership’s strength as well as a useful means of testing 
loyalty and exposing opposition in the countryside. The move then in early 1960 to 
accelerate the process and race towards full collectivisation, even if decided much in 
advance by the SED leadership, was met with considerable trepidation by functionaries 
operating in rural communities themselves and at lower levels in the administration of 
agriculture. At the same time, farmers were shocked by the virulence with which they
37 Bauer p.461.
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were being ‘persuaded’ to join or form LPGs, prompting equally radical responses, not 
least of which was flight westwards to the Federal Republic.
From the end of January 1960 the number of brigades of agitators arguing for 
collectivisation in the villages was greatly increased. The personnel of the brigades was 
made up of politically reliable citizens drawn from a number of urban and rural 
institutions: staff and students from universities and polytechnics, MTS and VEG officials 
as well as functionaries of all political parties and mass organisations were called upon to 
promote the ‘socialist transformation’ of the countryside. Once these had been briefed on 
the arguments in favour of collectivisation and the benefits of the LPG, they were sent into 
the countryside to liaise with local functionaries and party members, visit farmers in their 
homes and arrange public meetings, staying in the rural communities for a number of days 
if necessary.
The success of these brigades varied according to their own competency, 
leadership and organisation as well as the receptiveness of the communities which they 
entered. The poor behaviour of certain brigade members and the lack of technical 
agricultural knowledge of urban students and functionaries certainly aggravated the 
resistance among villagers, who resented being bullied by what they saw as a group of 
ignorant “townies” into acting against their will and common sense.38 With agitation 
brigades staying for days at a time in the villages, local functionaries were given the task 
of ensuring they were provided with food and accommodation, as well as the requisite 
information on the locality. While the brigades appear in most cases to have received 
sufficient support, deficiencies of local functionaries could severely impair the work of the 
brigades. For example in Niedersynstedt, in Kreis Weimar, the accommodation provided 
had been locked when the brigade arrived and the members of the one existing LPG in the 
village refused to let any brigade members stay in their houses. In another instance in 
Kreis Weimar the deputy mayor responded to the claim by members of the agitation 
brigade that they intended to remain as long as it would take for them to achieve their 
goal, with the disparaging remark: “let’s see who’s going to last longer.”39
Nevertheless some brigades were able to make an impact in the villages, especially 
if they had been effectively briefed with information on the local circumstances -  a task
38 Gruhle p. 168: “Die Zusage der Unterbringung war vorhanden, und als die Genossen hinkamen, waren die Turen verschlossen...”
39 ThHStAW BDVP 20/065 Stab/Operativstab, Information 6/60 Landwirtschaft 24.2.1960.
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which largely fell to the local police officer (Abschnittsbevollmachtigter or ABV). Despite 
broad resistance to the idea of collectivisation, invariably some village inhabitants saw the 
advantages of the collective farm, not least if they were at a disadvantage in the existing 
social structure. The brigades thus sought to make use of potential splits between 
generations, contrasting the low wages of a family member on a private farm with possible 
earnings in the collective. Similarly they sought to highlight the freedom of small land 
holders, particularly single women, from obligation to the larger farmers in the village 
which supposedly the collective would bring. Attention was also focused on the wives of 
private farmers.40 The alleviation of their heavy work load in the fields and in the home 
which the LPG claimed to provide as well as the opportunity to gain qualifications, 
certainly appealed to some women, (although many farmers’ wives remained among the 
staunchest of opponents to the LPG).41
In the village of Wandersleben in Kreis Gotha, the prospects for a successful 
collectivisation were quite good. Much of the farming community had benefited from 
socialist policy in rural areas over the years. 400 hectares had been made available during 
the land reforms in the late 1940s, an LPG Type III had been in existence since 1952 and 
had managed to raise its grain production levels higher even than the average in West 
Germany. Furthermore it was claimed that the LPG’s mastery of maize production in 
accordance with a much-disputed SED policy had enabled it to avoid the feed problems 
suffered by many other farms. Meanwhile Wandersleben itself had developed into a local 
centre of commerce as well as education with an expanded school population and the 
establishment of an agricultural vocational school. Within the village there were 
organisations of the SED, CDU and DBD as well as the major mass organisations -  the 
Free German Youth (Freie Deutsche Jugend or FDJ), the Democratic Women’s Union 
(Demokratischer Frauenbund Deutschlands or DFD), the Free German Trade Union 
Association {Freier Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund or FDGB). The regime was also 
represented in local sport in the Society for Sport and Technology (Gesellschaft fur Sport 
und Technik or GST) and the German Athletics and Sports Union {Deutscher Turn- und 
Sportbund or DTSB) and care for the elderly with the People’s Solidarity Organisation
40 ThHStAW RdB L590 Abt. Landwirtschaft Einschatzung iiber die Stadt Kindelbriick 3.3.1960.
41 See Osmond, J. “From Juncker Estate to Cooperative Farm: East German Agrarian Society 1945-1961” in Major, P. and Osmond J. 
(eds.) The Workers ’ and Peasants ’ State: Communism and Society in East Germany under Ulbricht 1945-1971 (Manchester 2002) 
pp. 130-150 - here p. 140.
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(Volkssolidaritat). Private farmers too were organised in a local organisation of the VdgB 
-  though the lack of a chairman rendered the organisation ineffective. Importantly the 
village state assembly contained a mixture of collective and private farmers as well as 
industrial workers.
Nonetheless by the end of 1959 still 50% of farmers based around Wandersleben 
had not been persuaded to join or form an LPG. Some private farmers who had high yields 
from livestock production - producing double their state quotas -  expected 
collectivisation to cut their profits. Others claimed simply -  “At the end of the day, I don’t 
want to become an estate farm labourer.” In order to bolster the impetus of the campaign, 
a brigade of agitators organised by the Bezirk committee of the National Front - with 
representatives from the SED Kreisleitung, the Rat des Kreises and the VdgB and CDU 
district leaderships - joined members of the local committee to canvass support across all 
the sections of the community in the village. Railway workers, many of whom owned and 
farmed small plots but were exempt from delivery quotas were to be persuaded to get 
involved with the LPG or at least lease their land to the collective. Christian leaders and 
young people were targeted to persuade them to participate in the campaign for 
collectivisation, while visits were organised to see a functioning LPG and to view Soviet 
technology in action. In addition the members of the brigade were armed with information 
on how much each private farmer was profiting from their current state quotas in order to 
shame people for exploiting the system.42
In Wandersleben as elsewhere in the Bezirk, the initial progress of these campaigns 
was however still tortuously slow. Farmers who had resisted collectivisation thus far 
continued with the usual methods of weathering the storm. They avoided entering into 
conversation with the brigades by shutting doors, disappearing into the fields, and 
avoiding or keeping quiet at public meetings.43 Where they could be brought to talk, 
farmers were careful to raise arguments with which they sought to put off agitators 
without necessarily exposing themselves to accusations of opposition to socialism. One 
farmer in Oberdorla Kreis Miihlhausen called for the immediate implementation of 
communism rather than just socialism -  claiming that just as the workers were given
42 ThHStAW NF 136, Bezirkssekretariat, Erster Entwurf, Dorfplan 1960 der Gemeinde Wandersleben, Kr. Gotha p.l; 
Bezirkssekretariat, Beschluss -  Brigadeeinsatz Wandersleben 29.12.1959 p. 14; Bezirkssekretariat, Kurzanalyse iiber die Situation in 
Wandersleben, Kreis Gotha 9.1.1960 p.21.
43 ThHStAW BDVP 20/065 Politabteilung Information 5/60 Landwirtscaft, 15.2.1960.
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complete factories, so would he enter the LPG once the state had built the new livestock 
sheds. Another pointed out that private farmers still existed in the Soviet Union, so why 
not allow them here. More widely private farmers argued that they would produce more if 
they were allowed to continue to farm individually but received the same financial support 
as the LPG, enabling them better to do their duty to socialism in fulfilling the seven-year 
plan. Alternatively they agreed to the principle of the LPG, deferring, however, their entry 
until they had passed on the farm to the next generation, the harvest had been brought in 
or at the very least until relatives or certain other prominent figures in the community had 
agreed to join as well.44 Others more honestly said that they would only join when they 
had no other choice, but not until then. In the village of Hollenbach for example, the wife 
of an independent farmer told the brigade that her husband was out and refused to let them 
into the house. In the ensuing discussion she then stated: “we are still doing well, and we 
want to keep our independence.. .if the water’s up to our necks, then we’ll go into the 
LPG.” Similarly other farmers made it clear that they would not join voluntarily, but 
would do so only if they were forced to join or if it were made illegal not to.45 The 
principle of voluntary entry into the LPG enshrined in the model statutes was a key 
grievance of farmers who felt the humiliation of “giving up” the farms of their forefathers 
far more keenly as a result of this clause. Resistance in a number of villages continued 
thus to be broad and resolute and with rumours circulating that an international summit 
meeting in Paris in May of that year would “change everything”, many decided to try to 
hold out until the direction of the political tide was certain.46
The “Socialist Spring”
The SED’s response to ongoing resistance and the lack of any very significant rise in the 
percentage of land in the collectives by March, was to increase the intensity of the 
campaigns still further. Following a meeting between the first secretaries of the SED 
Bezirksleitungen at the ZK to discuss agricultural questions on 11th March 1960, the
44 ThHStAW BDVP 20/134 Kriminalpolizei, Abt. K. Dezernat SE: Bericht iiber die Mitarbeit der Volkspolizei bei dem Brigadeeinsatz 
zur soz. Umgestaltung der Landwirtschaft 27.11.1959; ThHStAW RdB Abt. Landwirtschaft L590 Einschatzung iiber die Stadt 
Kindelbriick 3.3.1960; ThHStAW BDVP 20/065 Stab/Operativstab Information 17/60: Information und Geriichte 23.3.1960;
ThHStAW BDVP 20/134 Kriminalpolizei, VPKA Miihlhausen, Abt. Schutzpolizei, Ergebnisse der Auswertung der Brigaden innerhalb 
des MTS-Bereiches Gdrmar, 10.12.1959.
45 ThHStAW BDVP 20/134 Kriminalpolizei, VPKA Miihlhausen, Abt. Schutzpolizei -  Instrukteurbereich II. Auswertung der 
Brigadeeinsatze innerhalb des MTS Bereiches Lengefeld zur soz. Umgestaltung der Landwirtschaft 04.12.1959.
46 ThHStAW BDVP 20/065 Stab/Operativstab Information 17/60: Argumente und Geriichte 23.3.1960.
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Bezirksleitung passed a resolution laying out the initial steps towards mobilising forces 
loyal to the regime throughout the countryside. Meetings were to be held between the 
Bezirksleitung, the SED district 1st secretaries and the agricultural functionaries in the Rat 
des Bezirks. All the heads of the block parties, the mass organisations and other Bezirk- 
wide institutions were to meet to agree a common strategy with regard to collectivisation 
and in all the districts conferences were to be held in the course of the week which all 
responsible functionaries, mayors and chairmen of district institutions were to attend. The 
numbers of agitators in the brigades operating in the Bezirk rose to as many as 9,724 on 
March 26th -  drawing on factory workers and employees from other enterprises to bolster 
numbers.47 Such intimidating and constant pressure soon began to have results. With 
attention focused on the lead farmers in each community to form the collective, others 
soon joined, unwilling to resist unaided and to some extent reassured of the economic 
viability of the LPGs. Reports on the efforts of a brigade operating in early March in the 
small agricultural town of Kindelbriick in Kreis Sommerda illustrate some of the methods 
employed. Over the week from 3rd to 11th of March 1960 the 16 members of the agitation 
brigade were to divide into five groups each concentrating on a single farm. During the 
course of the week, members of the board of the existing LPGs, the MTS and two 
neighbouring State Owned Farms (Volkseigene Giiter or VEG) were to be called upon to 
assist with the work of the brigade, while the arguments arising from individual 
discussions with the farmers were to be published in the press and names of resistant 
farmers announced using the loud speaker. During the following week, the work of the 
brigade was intensified. Meetings were arranged with the school teachers and the National 
Front representatives in each house and street were called upon to involve all inhabitants 
in arguing for the collectivisation, while the local ABV was called upon to produce a list 
of citizens working for institutions of the state or collective, presumably to be recruited for 
the same purpose. Meetings were arranged too with larger groups of farmers, while other 
farms were ominously marked out to be subjected to “constant discussion”. On the week­
ends two members of the brigade were charged with organising further brigades of local 
inhabitants to continue to apply pressure, while during the week farmers were invited 
individually to the town hall for private discussions. After continuous efforts, the agitation
47 Allinson p. 82
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brigade’s loud speaker claimed by 24th March that the formation of an LPG had been 
secured. This included the 5 farms targeted in the first week joined by 7 more.
Nonetheless 30% of the land attached to Kindelbriick remained outside the collective.48
The extent to which force was used explicitly is not clear, however the 
participation of the (people’s) police as part of the agitation brigades implied threat 
enough of imprisonment for some farmers. The “discovery” of insignificant illegal actions 
by farmers appears too to have been used to break their resistance to entering the LPG.49 A 
letter from the chief of the Kreis Weimar-Land police department to his superiors at the 
Bezirk describes the situation as follows:
Through intensive investigations carried out by colleagues in the Criminal 
Department of the Weimar police station it was possible to uncover a number of 
law-breakers and using individual, tactically correct discussions persuade these 
same people to join the LPG, without having used force. Thus in serious cases as 
many as 15 people were invited to the Criminal Department with whom individual 
discussions were held. As a result of these conversations a whole number of other 
agricultural enterprises [i.e. farms] have joined in the socialist transformation. 
Typical for the situation was the fact that it was mostly the spokesmen of the 
communities who were involved.. .However contrary to rumours circulating at the 
Bezirk attorney’s offices, I would like to declare that during these actions no 
arrests of farmers were made.50 
A set of instructions issued by the SED Bezirksleitung to the Kreisleitungen on 21st March 
complained that a number of district and village functionaries were not being strict in 
upholding the law and were therefore themselves hindering the process of socialist 
transformation in the countryside. As a solution it recommended the Kreisleitungen follow 
the example of the SED Kreisleitung in Kreis Amstadt and form groups of financial 
experts to assess individual farmers -  with the implicit suggestion that any irregularities 
uncovered could be used to encourage participation in the LPGs.51 The use of mayors’
48 ThHStAW RdB L590 Abt. Landwirtschaft Einschatzung iiber die Stadt Kindelbriick, Marz 1960.
49 Thus a list of “illegal activities” was collected by the brigade operating in Kindelbriick as part of their campaign. ThHStAW RdB 
L590 Einschatzung iiber die Stadt Kindelbriick -  Feststellungen der Brigade zu Fragen der Ungesetzlichkeiten.
50 ThHStAW BDVP 20/081 Stab/Operativstab, VPKA Weimar an die BDVP Stellvertreter Operativ, Bericht iiber den 
Instrukteureinsatz zur Unterstiitzung der Amtsleitung des VPKA Weimar bei der sozialistischen Umgestaltung der Landwirtschaft 
28.3.1960.
51 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/2/2-322 SED Bezirksleitung Femschreiben an alle 1. Kreissekretare Beschluss-Protokoll Nr. 10/60 der 
Sekretariatssitzung vom 21.3.1960. p. 144.
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offices in which to hold interviews with resistant farmers increased the impression -  
where it had not been explicitly expressed - of possible state sanctions. The use of the 
formula which connected support for the collectivisation with support for socialism and 
hence for peace provided a logical net with which farmers could be threatened and 
labelled as warmongers should they continue to object. Farmers identified as ring-leaders 
of opposition to collectivisation were especially vulnerable if their war record or some 
other element of their past could designate them fascist or reactionary. Furthermore there 
were limits to the farmers’ abilities to defend themselves, with forcible prevention of 
‘trespassing’ on their land or indeed mere insults directed at the agitators likely to mark 
them out as especially hostile.
Alongside open demonstrations of state power, the Ministry for State Security had 
too a covert role to play in driving forward the collectivisation campaign. Judging from 
assessments by the Ministry’s Bezirk administration, the Stasi had not yet recruited 
sufficient numbers of informants in order to gain a complete picture of events in the 
villages, making a campaign of recruitment necessary. Thus it would seem that the Stasi 
had at this stage neither penetrated most rural communities nor had recruited many 
informants from the field of agriculture. Nevertheless it was determined to use those 
informants which had been recruited. Above all it was considered possible to influence the 
formation of new LPGs by forcing those Grossbauern who had been recruited (for 
whatever reason) as Stasi informants to demonstrate their support for collectivisation by 
joining a collective farm ‘voluntarily’.52
Despite the use or threat of considerable force in the process of collectivisation, it 
is also clear that some farmers bargained with local and district functionaries for their 
participation in the LPG. The urgency of the agitation brigades’ requirement for a 
signature or an agreement in order to be able to claim full collectivisation had been 
achieved within their area on time, certainly led to verbal concessions to the farmers’ 
desires. The wish of some larger farmers to form their own collective, to the exclusion of 
weaker small farms, while not permitted in the initial months of the collectivisation 
campaign, was allowed as the deadlines grew more imminent. Thus a police report on 
Kreis Nordhausen in April mentions villagers’ irritation that 3 of the largest and best
52 BStU Aussenstelle Erfurt, Buro der Leitung 1446, Leitung der Bezirksverwaltung an die Leiter der Kreisdienststellen, Orientierung 
auf die Schwerpunkte der Linie III in Auswertung der Arbeitstagungen vom 11.1.1960 und 16.2.1960, 19.2.1960 p.l.
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farmers have been allowed to set up an LPG Type I on their own.53 Where this went too 
far such as in a 15-point set of written conditions for entry into the LPG which one farmer 
dared to put to the mayor in March 1960 in a village in Kreis Sommerda, the Stasi could 
be involved.54 Nevertheless, if the claims of farmers following collectivisation are to be 
believed, far-reaching concessions were indeed granted in return for their agreement. 
These ranged from the freedom to harvest independently in 1960 to guarantees of a certain 
level of profit or wage level, which matched their previous incomes. Thus a police report 
from 23rd March 1960 points to increasing demands from farmers in Kreis Sommerda in 
return for LPG entry such as a minimum wage of 400DM or full reimbursement for the 
livestock and equipment brought into the collective. Requests were also made for 
documents allowing travel to West Germany in return for joining an LPG.55
According to statistics produced by the SED Bezirksleitung after collectivisation 
had been nominally completed on 2nd April, between 21st March and 1st April the 
percentage of arable land in the Bezirk farmed collectively doubled from 40 to 80%, 
entailing quite literally the founding of farming collectives overnight, particularly on the 
weekend of 25^-27* March.56 The situation on paper was a long way removed from the 
reality however. Sufficient signatures might have been gained agreeing to participation in 
the LPG, but the terms on which these agreements were reached, did little to assuage the 
doubts of both farmers and many functionaries as to the long-term viability of LPGs. Nor 
indeed, despite the publication of model statutes in 1959, was there certainty as to how the 
practice of collective farming should be undertaken.
Conclusion
Once the success of reaching full collectivisation throughout the Bezirk had been 
celebrated with greater or lesser degrees of sincerity in the villages in April 1960, the 
difficult task of establishing actual functioning collective farms began. The practical 
purpose behind forming the collectives was to achieve large field cultivation of crops and 
larger more concentrated livestock holdings which allowed production to be increased as
53 ThHStAW BDVP 20/065 Stab/Operativstab Information 10/60 26.2.1960; Information 18/60 21.4.1960.
54 ThHStAW BDVP 20/065 Stab/Operativstab Information 14/60 Landwirtschaft 21.3.1960.
55 ThHStAW BDVP 20/065 Stab/Operativstab Information 17/60 Argumente und Geriichte 23.3.1960.
56 Gruhle p.208: “Die zweite Ubersicht zeigt dass die Forcierung der Agitationseinsatze bewusst auf das Wochenende vom 26. und 27. 
Marz 1960 her zugeschnitten worden war...”
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well as more effectively planned and controlled. Conditions thus had to be created in 
which these goals could be realised, while in addition basic questions of how the 
collective farm was to be managed and who was to do it had to be addressed. Other 
fundamentals of organisation such as the calculation of wages, the division of profits, the 
allocation of private plots, working hours and delegation of responsibility had too to be 
settled in practice among the members. Alongside these organisational issues, however 
farmers had still to be convinced to be as good as their signature and actually work 
together in the collective.
The collectivisation was an impressive feat of administration, but neither the 
political nor the practical argument had been won for most farmers. In addition the 
collectivisation process itself had demonstrated the limitations of the SED regime’s 
authority in rural areas. Worse still the manner in which the collectivisation had taken 
place had left plenty of room for future conflict and recrimination, disorganisation and 
instability in farming, in the administration of agriculture and rural communities in 
general. There was too a real danger that this attack on farmers would rebound on the 
population at large through food shortages. Nonetheless new parameters had been set in 
which the transmission of authority in agriculture and rural society were to function. Both 
farmers and the SED regime (and its local representatives) with completion of full 
collectivisation had signed up to a new set of roles and responsibilities -  how these roles 
and responsibilities were interpreted and transformed was however by no means settled.
In the following section the bases of conflict and the expression of opposition in 
the aftermath of full collectivisation will be examined along with the processes through 
which regional and local functionaries sought to resolve these conflicts and consolidate 
the political, financial and organisational stability within LPGs prior to the increased 
restriction of flight to the West resulting from the construction of the Berlin Wall on 13th 
August 1961.
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CHAPTER 2 
The Aftermath of Collectivisation
“The laws and regulations are not applicable to us. We as fanners have the say over our agriculture.”1 
(Farmer, Mosbach, Kreis Eisenach reported by the police in September 1960.)
The massive deployment of agitation brigades in the countryside and a number of 
tactics ranging from genuine persuasion through to public humiliation, intimidation and 
incarceration succeeded in moving the vast majority of farmers in the GDR to sign up to a 
collective farm. Beyond the paper work however, the situation was by no means so clear 
cut. It was one thing for farmers to be brought to sign up to participation in a collective 
farm, it was quite another for these farms to get up and running in practice. The farmer 
quoted above was by no means alone in his sentiments and the apparatus of 
communication and control available to the SED leadership in the countryside proved 
itself inadequate to take concerted action against farmers who insisted upon their 
independence.
The model statutes according to which LPGs were supposed to be organised - 
established first in 1952 and modified in 1959 - were not entirely unfamiliar to most of the 
newly collectivised farmers. Most had some knowledge of a nearby LPG and discussion 
of the content of the three types of model statute had been part of the agitation campaign. 
Nonetheless the assumption of the roles and responsibilities laid out in the model statutes 
was no simple matter and represented considerable changes not only to farmers’ daily 
routines, but also to their relationship with their fellows, their land and in the LPG Type 
III, to their livestock. It changed above all their sense of their own status. Relinquishing 
individual control over property was considered tantamount to expropriation, and 
participation in a collective brigade under another’s authority was tantamount to becoming 
a farm labourer. Rural communities were thus fraught with discord and many farmers 
continued to reject the agricultural collectives, refusing to take part in collective work and 
in some cases abandoning their farms and fleeing the GDR altogether. The speed and 
aggression with which the collectivisation campaign had been completed, and the
1 ThHStAW BDVP 20/044 Politabteilung, VPKA Eisenach Einschatzung der Feindtatigkeit im Kreis Eisenach 9.9.1960.
2 ThHStAW BDVP 20/065 Stab/Operativstab, Information 17/60 Argumente und Geriichte 23.3.1960: “Eintritt in die LPG bedeutet 
Enteignung und Aufgabe des freien Bauem, man wird kommandiert.”
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inadequacies of the regime’s apparatus for governing agriculture and rural society at a 
local level limited further the prospects for swift acceptance of collective farming 
practices. Nevertheless amid all the conflict, disruption and uncertainty at this time, both 
older and new LPGs did begin a slow, by no means immediately successful, process of 
consolidation. New parameters were officially set to the relationship between the 
individual farmer, his community and the state, and the longer the LPGs survived the 
more necessary it became to assert one’s interests within rather than against them.
The Conditions of Collectivised Agriculture
These new parameters -  the conditions in which farming was now to take place - were 
defined in part by the 1959 LPG Law and the three different types of model statute which 
provided the basis for the rights and responsibilities of collective farmers and dictated the 
basic administrative and financial structure of collective farms.3
The LPG Type I was aimed clearly at those who wished to retain as much 
independent control over their property as possible. The only aspect of farming which had 
to be managed collectively was the arable land brought in by each farmer. It was therefore 
an obvious choice for the majority of those who formed an LPG, reluctantly, during ‘the 
Socialist Spring’. Of central importance to Type I farmers was their continued private use 
and ownership of their own livestock and the stipulation that at least 40% of the profits of 
the LPG had to be shared among the members according to the amount of land each one 
had contributed to the collective farm. With these embellishments, the bitter pill of 
collectivisation and the sense of expropriation and loss of independence were at least to 
some extent mitigated. Nonetheless the model statute’s aim was to commit the farmers 
who had agreed to it (albeit in most cases under some sort of duress) to developing real 
forms of collective practice, at least as far as the arable land was concerned. Clause II.4 
required the removal of any border markers and divisions between field plots, the 
amalgamation of fields and the use of a crop rotation in accordance with state plans.
Although the members continued to own privately their own machinery, they were 
required to put these at the disposal of the LPG in return for a suitable rent should the 
majority of the members’ assembly vote for it. The concessions to the will of farmers to
3 LPG Model Statutes and the LPG Law 1959 published in the Gesetzblatt der DDR (Berlin 1959).
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retain their independence were not insignificant, however the formation of the LPG as an 
institution was nonetheless a radical and symbolic step. The establishment of an 
administrative structure - comprising ideally a hierarchy of a chairman and managing 
board, brigades and brigade leaders, as well as an accountant and various commissions -  
provided the means for the SED state to gain more consistent and more comprehensive 
control over farmers and all aspects of agricultural production. Moreover the LPG Type I, 
as the first of three Types, was recognisably a stepping stone on the way to much greater 
degrees of collectivisation of property: those who formed the LPG Type I realised it was 
unlikely that their children would be able to inherit as much individual control over land, 
livestock and machinery.
The model statute of the LPG Type II entailed a still more immediate commitment 
to reducing private ownership of livestock in the interests of developing collective herds. 
Here the arable land, machinery, equipment and draft animals as far as they were not 
necessary for farming individual land and livestock were held by the collective and only 
30% of profits were shared according to the amount of land contributed. Only very few 
new farmers chose to form an LPG Type II seeing little benefit in adopting a statute which 
was explicitly geared towards transition to greater collective control sooner rather than 
later. The Type II statute’s significance lies rather in its use as a legal tool for shifting the 
terms on which farmers “agreed” to participate in the LPG. As of 1962, the right of 
farmers to withdraw from the collective was redefined in an altered Type II statute as 
being valid only if so doing was “for the benefit of society”. This was a suitably vague 
term giving the state apparatus the explicit sanction of the law in its long running battle to 
prevent LPGs -  of all types -  haemorrhaging much needed manpower and expertise. In 
being prevented from withdrawing from the LPG or taking up other careers unless they 
had the full agreement of the Rat des Kreises, the LPG leadership, and a majority of their 
fellow LPG members, farmers had increasingly to face up to the prospect of earning their 
livelihood only under the conditions of collective farming. The incentive for making the 
best of an inescapable situation (given that fleeing the country for most was not a realistic 
option even before the Berlin Wall had been constructed) became increasingly apparent. 
For some formerly independent farmers, confident in the permanence of the SED regime, 
the lack of alternatives to collective farming encouraged them to embrace it fully by
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taking up the statute of the LPG Type III, rather than cling on to what vestiges of the old 
system were available to them.
In contrast to the LPG Type I, the model statute of the LPG Type III entailed 
comprehensive acceptance of the collective farming idea -  it committed farmers to 
building up collective livestock, placed grazing land in collective use alongside the arable 
land and presupposed the most active participation in the life of the collective farm, 
placing minimal emphasis on property and maximum on labour. In all types of LPGs, 
members had the right to retain private use of a certain amount of arable land as well as a 
garden plot. The amount of individual land according to the model statute was not to 
exceed half a hectare for each household in the LPG -  the idea being in theory to prevent a 
family with several LPG members accumulating a private plot of several hectares. While 
farmers in other types of LPGs were able to retain their own livestock, farmers in Type III 
were restricted to a set number of animals kept for private use, limiting the distinction in 
incomes between members and ensuring everyone continued to devote themselves to work 
for the collective.4 80% of the profits of the LPG Type Ills were to be shared among the 
members according to the amount of labour they contributed, as measured in work units, 
calculated according to norms which reflected the expertise, time and effort required to do 
various jobs around the farm. Only 20% was shared on the basis of land contributions. As 
such the LPG Type III was the preferred choice of all those who had little more than their 
labour to contribute to the farm, as it was necessary for all members to devote most of 
their time to work for the collective in order to earn sufficient income. On entry into an 
LPG Type III, a minimum contribution had to be made to the basic material and financial 
capital of the collective farm. This was paid either in cash, often in instalments, or in the 
form of livestock, equipment and buildings required by the collective. Most of the LPG 
Type Ills in Bezirk Erfurt were founded before the “Socialist Spring”, taking over 
abandoned land and relying on the manpower of workers recruited from industry, landless 
farm labourers and small holders. While having the most state backing, they rarely were in 
possession of the best land and livestock or the most expert workforce. The completion of 
collectivisation changed this to some extent by compelling some independent farmers to 
join existing Type Ills, transferring in the process their land, livestock and machinery to
4 Officially the quota was: up to 2 cows with calves, 2 sows with offspring, 5 sheep with 5 lambs and up to the age of 11 months an 
unlimited amount of goats, poultry, rabbits and other small animals as well as 10 beehives.
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collective control. In theory contributions to the wealth of the LPG in excess of the 
minimum (set generally at 500 marks) were to be eventually repaid: the inconsistency with 
which this was done however became a lasting source of anger among LPG members, 
who continued to call for payment of money owed them by the state since 1960 right up to 
1990.5
Although there was some choice in the type of LPG farmers joined -  as long as 
they joined one -  it was certainly constrained in some cases by practical considerations 
(i.e. ensuring an LPG’s financial stability or the adjacency of members’ lands) as well as 
the degree to which collectivisation was pursued as a means of social engineering. Most 
often more than one LPG existed in a single community but the constellation of farms in 
each one did not necessarily reflect a harmonious balance between the interests of each of 
the members.
The Roots of Conflict in the LPG
The administrative collectivisation of agriculture represented a considerable step in the 
social reconfiguration of rural society in the GDR. It rarely gave rise however to newly 
harmonious social relations within the village. Rather old conflicts were given new form 
and new vigour. Between 1945 and 1960 the social structure of villages in Bezirk Erfurt 
had been shaped by the influx of refugees from the east and the expansion of industry as 
well as the gradual erosion of the local authority of the traditional village elites. The 
collectivisation process during the 1950s, the exodus of people to the West, the 
development of the MTS and the influx of industrial workers to work in the LPGs as part 
of a state-sponsored programme as well as consistent efforts to limit the influence of the 
local pastors over the rural population among other things complicated the network of 
social relations and loyalties in many villages. Beneath the blanket of administrative full 
collectivisation in 1960 a tangled set of antagonisms continued to thus exist within and
5 See for example the anonymous threat by farmers to Werner Felfe, the Politburo member responsible for agriculture in 1982: “for 
approximately 30 years we have been waiting for the payment of the additional inventory contribution brought into the LPG. So now 
you as a powerful man get moving on this. This is what the farmers of not just the northern Bezirke expect.” SAPMO B-Arch DY 
30/294 Biiro Wemer Felfe 14.5.1982 Anonyme Eingabe an Herm Felde: „Wie man uns sagte....“
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between the various LPGs based on politics, religion, class and the rights of new and old 
settlers.6
While one has to be wary of simply accepting the designations of socialist rhetoric 
as corresponding to the real roots of conflict within rural communities, it is reasonable to 
accept that in some LPGs those who saw themselves as victims or opponents and those 
who were beneficiaries and supporters of socialist agricultural policy were perforce 
brought together within the collective farms. Grossbauem had now to work together with 
those whom they had once considered their social inferiors and accept not only the 
common use of their property but also their newly non-elite status. Although compelled to 
be part of the LPGs, some wealthier farmers sought where possible to continue to assert 
themselves, threatening non-cooperation when attempts were made to reduce their share 
of the LPG’s income on the basis of the land they had contributed.7 Attempts to 
implement the statutory right of the members’ assembly to set limits on the proportion of 
land and number of animals which were deemed to belong to any individual member also 
provoked considerable resistance. By October 1960 the restriction of wealthier farmers’ 
property had not been completed in any of the districts in the Bezirk. In Kreis Weimar 
only 8 out of a possible 80 individual farmers and in Kreis Heiligenstadt not a single 
farmer had had his property curtailed. Grossbauem in the LPG Pfiffelbach, Kreis Apolda, 
sought for example to undermine attempts to reduce the number of livestock they owned 
privately by agreeing that the LPG could take their animals but refusing absolutely to 
agree to contract the use of their livestock sheds to the LPG even though these buildings
o
would then stand empty. In the long run Grossbauem did have to accept that their 
buildings and animals were for the most part at the disposal of the collective; actually 
carrying it out however provoked confrontation which few LPG leaders relished. In a few 
cases faced with what they saw as blatant invasion of private property and daylight 
robbery, individual farmers put up some last ditch resistance: a farmer in the LPG Type III 
Hardisleben faced with the prospect of the LPG converting his sheep pen into cattle stalls 
was reported to have tried to prevent it saying: “you aren’t coming into my stables. That’s
6 ThHStAW SED BPA BIV/2/4 -  103 SED Bezirksleitung BPKK, Aktennotiz -  Betr: Lage im Kr. Sommerda, Bezug: Mitteilung der 
staatlichen Kontrolle iiber Feindtatigkeit im Kr. Sommerda 6.10.1960: “Es herrscht das Argument vor: “Das fremde Zieg (Zeug) muss 
raus!”
7 ThHStAW BDVP 20.1/352 Operativstab, Information 53/61 8.6.1961 p.30.
8 ThHStAW RdB L562 Abt. Landwirtschaft, Unterabteilung LPG, Einschatzung der politischen und okonomischen Entwicklung der 
LPG des Bezirkes Erfurt 5.10.1962.
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my property, you just want to expropriate it. Anyway this LPG isn’t going to last much 
longer.”9 Even in late 1961, a farmer in the village of Daasdorf was so angered by the 
transference of his animals from his sheds to collective livestock holdings that he was 
reportedly moved to threaten the livestock brigadier, saying “just you wait, when things 
are different, it’ll be your turn.”10
Even where the questions of lost property and status were not writ large, social 
divides between successful private farmers and the Neubauern, small farmers and 
agricultural labourers who had founded the LPG could be enough cause for conflict.11 
Antagonism came not simply from those who were unwilling to collectivise. Indeed even 
assessments by SED functionaries appear almost as quick to highlight and condemn 
instances of sectarianism by long-standing LPG members and small farmers almost as 
often as they condemn the machinations of the “class enemy”. Long-standing LPG 
members were not necessarily willing to share what they had achieved with those who 
until recently had looked down on their efforts and who (initially at least) certainly did not 
share their politics or their interests in the success of the LPG. Furthermore smaller 
farmers who until March 1960 had nonetheless managed to run a successful farm had no 
desire now to be under the command of either their richer neighbours in the LPG Type I or
1 9what they regarded as inferior farmers in the LPG Type III.
A major source of conflict between members in the LPGs was the balance between 
the manpower supplied by each household and the amount of land brought in. As long as 
one member of the household joined the LPG along with the farm, the whole household 
had the benefit of the half hectare of individual land while other relations were free to tend 
privately kept livestock or pursue careers outside farming. In the first year after the 
socialist spring it was a regular source of antagonism in some LPGs that the wives and 
children of farmers who had contributed a large amount of land could nevertheless not be 
made to take part in helping to cultivate it. Small farmers found themselves thus farming 
the lands of their wealthier neighbours (who still received a share of the profits according 
to the land they had contributed) and yet unable to achieve nearly as good an income. In
9 ThHStAW BPKK BIV/2/4 -  58, SED KL Sommerda an die BPKK, Erfurt, Feindarbeit im I. Quartal 1961, 17.4.1961 p. 169.
10 BStU Aussenstelle Erfurt, Kreisdienststelle Weimar 379, Abschrift Analyse Gemeinde Daasdorf am Berg 11.10.1961 p.70.
11 ThHStAW BDVP 20/065 Stab/Operativstab, Information 25/60, Auswertung der Vorkommnisse in der Landwirtschaft zur 
Beurteilung der Lage 20.5.1960.
12 ThHStAW RdB L590 Abt. Landwirtschaft, Einschatzung der Entwicklung der LPG des Typ I im Bezirk Erfurt 6.7.1960.
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the LPG Type II in Noda, Kreis Erfurt complaints were made by former Kleinbauern 
(small-scale farmers) against two Grossbauem whose wives and children had avoided 
joining the LPG. The daughters of one of these farmers had found lucrative office jobs 
instead of farm work and thus appeared, it was argued, to be enriching themselves on the 
backs of their poorer neighbours.13 In particular, that some farmers’ wives were able to 
hold themselves aloof from the women who went to work in the LPG seemed to highlight 
the failure of collectivisation to change the social inequalities of the village. With regard 
to the LPG Rudisleben it was reported for example that the LPG members were minded 
not to let their wives work in the fields, as the wives of the former Grossbauem did no 
such thing either. Their complaint was given greater force by their wives’ objections to the 
dictatorial manner of the deputising field brigadier who happened also to be the son of one 
of the ex-Grossbauern.14
Given these tensions, those members of the LPG who were chosen or persuaded to 
take up leading functions often soon found themselves unable to organise the collective 
farm efficiently. In the months after the completion of the collectivisation campaign 
several newly appointed chairmen and brigadiers chose to resign, claiming a lack of 
confidence in their own abilities to carry out the tasks required of them.15 Certainly 
running an LPG was a considerable burden with very little material reward being offered 
in return. The work was not made more attractive by the potential for antagonism and 
social exclusion at the hands of one’s colleagues and neighbours, nor by having to face the 
wrath of the district agricultural functionaries, especially if the LPGs were failing 
economically or the members were openly failing to adhere to the statute. LPG 
functionaries understandably found their unaccustomed leadership duties, caught between 
their responsibilities and obligations to those above and beneath them in the new 
hierarchy, difficult to bear. For example a field brigadier resigned from his post in the 
LPG Type III Windeberg Kreis Miihlhausen reportedly on the grounds that he regularly 
had difficulties assigning work to the members who often did not obey his instructions.16 
In May 1960 the aggrieved chairman of an LPG in Kreis Nordhausen sent a letter of
13 ThHStAW BDVP 20/247 VPKA Erfurt Operativstab, Berichterstattung an die BDVP iiber die polizeiliche Lage bei der soz. 
Umgestaltung der Landwirtschaft 18.7.1960.
14 ThHStAW BDVP 20/065 Stab/Operativstab, Information uber Vorkommnisse in der Landwirtschaft 19/60 4.5.1960.
15 ThHStAW BDVP 20/065 Stab/Operativstab, Information 36/60, Einschatzung der Lage in der Landwirtschaft 20.7.1960; Information 
iiber vorkommnisse in der Landwirtschaft 19/60 4.5.1960.
16 ThHStAW BDVP 20.1/352 Operativstab, Information 62/61 Landwirtschaft 5.8.1961 p.43.
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resignation to the local mayor on the basis that he could not continue unless he had the 
confidence of the members.17 Particularly after the harvest in autumn 1960, the boards of 
the newly formed LPGs appeared in Worbis, Heiligenstadt and Miihlhausen districts to
lapse entirely. The main reason given for board members to resign from their positions as
1 8functionaries was the desire to “live peacefully” like the other members.
Ideally, the SED leadership hoped to be able to consolidate the LPGs rapidly, 
implement the model statutes and achieve the leap forward in agricultural production 
which had been a strong motivation for the hasty completion of the collectivisation 
campaign. The actual state of affairs in most new LPGs and many older ones in April 
1960 made the realisation of these goals highly unlikely. In the long term, the 
collectivisation campaign and its aftermath were useful to the SED regime in the extent to 
which it identified those individuals on whom it could rely and exposed those aspects of 
its administration of agriculture and rural communities which were ineffective, inefficient 
or unreliable. The zeal with which some agitators had advanced the cause of 
collectivisation was a sign that the regime could call upon some loyal and obedient 
proponents of socialist transformation. Particularly those who lived or worked in rural 
communities and thus had campaigned and supported the formation of LPGs at the risk of 
lasting opprobrium from their neighbours and colleagues had demonstrated the existence 
of a base for support for socialist agricultural policy on which more secure foundations 
might be built. Those anxious to see that collectivisation worked well were however few 
in number compared to the majority of LPG members who regarded a future in the 
collective farm without enthusiasm, if not with varying degrees of resistance and in some 
cases open opposition. The means at the SED’s disposal for overcoming such negative 
responses to the LPG (provoked in part by the speed and aggressiveness with which the 
campaign had been conducted) were greatly limited. Implementing collective practices 
and suppressing dissent had to be carried out if the collectivisation were to have any 
positive benefit in the long term. In the short term, the apparatus available on the ground 
for achieving these goals however was insufficient given the size of the task, while 
resistance to implementing and the subversion of collective practices were particularly
17 ThHStAW BDVP 20/065 Stab/Operativstab, Auswertung der Vorkommnisse in der Landwirtschaft 20/60.
18 ThHStAW RdB L562 Abt. Landwirtschaft Unterabteilung LPG, Einschatzung der politischen und okonomischen Entwicklung der 
LPG des Bezirkes Erfurt 5.10.1962.
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strong as a result of the widespread uncertainty over the future of collective farming and 
the GDR itself.
The Insufficiency of the SED State’s Apparatus in Rural Communities
In the previous chapter detailing the course of the collectivisation process in Bezirk Erfurt 
it became clear that the local apparatus of the regime was able to achieve only a limited 
degree of success in persuading farmers to join or form an LPG. In order for the rapid 
completion of full collectivisation to be achieved (albeit on paper only), a massive effort 
had been necessary in which large numbers of agitators from outside farming or the 
immediate community were deployed. LPGs had thus been formed (or expanded) often 
without the absolute backing of large sections of the local state administration and the 
politically organised population in the village. The campaign for full collectivisation had 
been marked in its last months primarily too by the prioritisation of speed rather than 
thoroughness. The aggressive tactics employed during the collectivisation had succeeded 
in ‘persuading’ farmers to sign up to an LPG, but local administrations and the LPGs 
themselves remained largely lacking in suitable (politically loyal and technically expert) 
staff and resources to ensure the collective farms functioned in practice. Attempts to 
consolidate the newly formed collective farms and stabilise agriculture in the aftermath of 
collectivisation were thus compromised both by the widespread dissent among farmers 
with regard to the LPGs and by an apparatus of local administration and control ill- 
equipped either to assuage or control this dissent and ineffective at establishing and 
sustaining collective farming in accordance with the statutes.
As early as April 1960 a brigade of investigators was organised by the SED 
Bezirksleitung to assess the effectiveness of the local party and state apparatus in Kreis 
Apolda. Its main task was to “put the work of the party and leadership by the SED 
Kreisleitung and by the state apparatus in order and mobilise all forces in the inclusion of 
large sections of the population in the socialist development of the district”. It found much 
to criticise. The SED Kreisleitung, in lacking an overview of the situation in the district, 
had not only failed to practice its leading role with regard to the state apparatus and the 
mass organisations but had also been negligent in giving suitable guidance to the SED
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party organisations in the villages and LPGs. As far as the state apparatus was concerned 
the brigade also found evidence of serious ideological weakness, particularly among those 
functionaries belonging to the CDU and LDPD (Liberal Democratic Party) who did not 
always appear to recognise the leading role of the SED. Leading functionaries in the Rat 
des Kreises were deemed to have an “unclear” attitude towards collectivisation. Their 
“lazy liberalism”, it was suggested, had allowed mayors unnecessarily to lower the plan 
targets due from farmers in the Bezirk. Moreover 15 out of 47 village mayors were 
considered in need of replacement by cadres better equipped to cope with the sorts of 
political and technical matters which now faced local functionaries since the completion 
of collectivisation.19 While this state of affairs was recognised there were limits to what 
could be done to rectify the situation. In Kreis Apolda for example, it was ultimately 
pointed out, that fifteen suitable replacements for mayor simply did not exist.20
The lack of personnel was a serious problem throughout the agricultural and rural 
administration. Immediately following the establishment of a fully collectivised village, 
the SED Bezirksleitung had directed the operative committees for collectivisation to 
delegate groups of specialists, agronomic experts as well as experienced farmers from the 
VEGs (Volkseigene Giiter i.e. State Owned Farms) and long established LPGs in order to
9 1ensure that “the organisation of work is taken properly into hand in collective farms”. 
Following the announcement of full collectivisation, a number of local brigades of 
specialists were thus deployed in some LPGs. These were however clearly not sufficient 
in number to monitor the progress of all the LPGs all of the time. Investigations at the end 
of June into the cultivation plans for the upcoming harvest revealed not only rejection of 
the state directives on the planting of certain crops but also widespread breakdown in 
collective work. As a consequence calls were made for the immediate redeployment of 
large numbers of trouble-shooting brigades throughout the Bezirk}2 A report on the state 
of the LPGs compiled by the Rat des Bezirks in July 1960 summarised the situation in 
Bezirk Erfurt just after collectivisation. Out of the 1,390 LPGs then officially registered in 
the Bezirk, over 40% were Type I LPGs which had been formed over the last three
19 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/2/3-328 Sekretariat der Bezirksleitung, Vorlage, An das Biiro der Bezirksleitung: Bericht iiber den Einsatz 
der Brigade der Bezirksleitung im Kreis Apolda. 2.5.1960. pp.6-16.
20 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/2/3-328 Sekretariat der Bezirksleitung, Beschluss Protokoll, Beitrag Genosse Asmus. pp. 17-19.
21 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/2/2-322 Sekretariat der Bezirksleitung, Beschluss-Protokoll Nr. 10/60 der Sekretariatssitzung, 
Femschreiben von der SED Bezirksleitung an alle 1. Kreissekretare 21.3.1960. p. 140.
22 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/2/3-338 Sekretariat der Bezirksleitung, RdB Abt. Land, Erf u. Forst: Bericht iiber die Durchfuhrung des 
Maisanbaukontrolle vom 25.-30.6.60 im Bezirk Erfurt 13.7.1960. pp.l 15-117.
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months. Somewhat optimistically attributing most of the problems within the collectives 
to a lack of clarity on political questions - which it asserted simple explanation could 
resolve -  the report suggested that serious difficulties existed in only seventy Type I 
LPGs, where the transition to collective farming had not been “entirely completed”.23 This 
was however something of an understatement -  opposition to collective farming was 
much deeper and much more widespread and the structures in place to control it much 
weaker than the report gave credit.
In July the SED Bezirksleitung drew up plans for the organisation of brigades to 
assess developments in the 68 villages of Kreis Nordhausen. It planned for the deployment 
of 2 to 3 people in each village. The Rat des Kreises was required to provide one person 
for each of these groups while the rest were to come from various departments of the Rat 
des Bezirks, the MTS, VEGs and the technical colleges in Erfurt and Eisenach. Among 
their main tasks was analysis of the constitution and working style of local government 
and the effectiveness of relations between the LPGs and the district and village state 
apparatus.24 In the reports of these groups, there was damning criticism of the way in 
which the staff in the Rat des Kreises and the village mayors treated the LPGs in the 
district. The charge of “liberalism” was directed at state functionaries who had clearly 
done little to prevent farmers from abandoning collective practices and farming 
individually. The closing report on the activities of the investigating brigade in Kreis 
Nordhausen from the end of September 1960 paints a picture of incompetence or at least 
inactivity from a surprisingly large number of local functionaries. Most seriously in the 
villages of Ilfeld and Niedersachswerfen, newly formed LPGs had been left entirely to 
their own devices. ‘Liberalism’ was considered to be widespread in the district apparatus, 
infecting leading SED members in the village as well as infecting the state village councils 
through to the MTS and the agricultural office of the SED Kreisleitung. The brigade’s 
remedy for the situation in the village of Ilfeld, where it was thought an anti­
collectivisation and an anti-regime sentiment was particularly virulent, demonstrated how 
far it thought the district authorities had allowed things to slip. It took administrative 
action to alter the management of the LPG, removing the chairman from his post, and
23 ThHStAW L590 RdB Abt. Landwirtschaft Einschatzung der Entwicklung der LPG des Typ I im Bezirk Erfurt 6.7.1960.
24 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/2/3-335 Sekretariat der Bezirksleitung Konzeption fiir den Einsatz der Brigade zur Verbesserung der 
staatlichen Leitungstatigkeit auf dem Gebiete der Landwirtschaft. 4.7.1960 pp.57-58.
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making an example of him in the newspaper as “an enemy of the people”. The LPG Type 
I was then also merged together with the Type II - with no suggestion here of any 
consideration given to any ballot of the members as demanded in theory by the 
stipulations of ‘collective democracy’. In the district at large 120 instructors were 
deployed by the Rat des Bezirkes in the villages to put a stop to the inefficiency of MTS 
functionaries and village mayors, a small number of whom had to be sacked. Given the 
lack of suitable replacements however, the majority were upbraided and given instructions 
to scrutinise the production levels of the LPGs and to be more assertive at LPG members’ 
assemblies and meetings of the LPG board.25 In October 1960 all the state administrations 
in the districts but especially in Kreis Apolda, Sommerda, Heiligenstadt and 
Sondershausen were highlighted in a report for having failed to have a direct influence on 
the new LPGs Types I and II. Along with the lack of suitable mayors, in some (MTS) 
regions in the districts it was noted for example that there was no one available to instruct 
the LPGs on how to organise their finances. In one MTS area the instructor was left with 
the impossible task of overseeing the work done in 46 LPGs.26
Although trouble-shooting brigades continued to operate in LPGs around the 
Bezirk, with the departure in early summer of the majority of the agitators for 
collectivisation, rejection of collective farming reasserted itself in villages across the 
Bezirk. Open discussion of the intention to harvest individually was liable, if reported, to 
result in some form of investigation. However there were limits to the ability or desire of 
local state functionaries to penetrate sufficiently what was taking place in the many small, 
new LPGs which had just been formed. In the Bezirk as a whole it was estimated that 
approximately 50% of the newly founded LPGs of Type I/II had failed to adhere to the
77model LPG statute during the harvest. It is likely however than the actual proportion was 
somewhat higher. Unless subjected to repeated close investigation, it could not necessarily 
be established whether farmers nominally in an LPG were continuing to farm 
independently of one another or not. Documentary evidence of the collective 
administration of the LPG -  such as the fulfilment of plan requirements, division of profits
25 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/2/3-338 Sekretariat der Bezirksleitung, Protokollauszug -  Sekretariatssitzung - Brigade in Nordhausen 
18.7.1960 p.22; SED BPA IV/2/3-348 Sekretariat der Bezirksleitung, Brigade Nordhausen der Bezirksleitung Abschlussbericht iiber 
den Brigadeeinsatz im Kreis Nordhausen 28.9.1960 pp.77-87.
26 ThHStAW RdB L562 Abt. Landwirtschaft, Unterabteilung LPG, Einschatzung der politischen und okonomischen Entwicklung der 
LPG des Bezirkes Erfurt 5.10.1962.
27 ThHStAW RdB L562 Abt. Landwirtschaft Unterabteilung LPG, Einschatzung der politischen und Okonomischen Entwicklung der 
LPG des Bezirkes Erfurt. 5.10.1960.
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according to work units and proportions of land -  could be supplied to the relevant 
officials at local and district level without necessarily changing anything in practice. One 
LPG in Kreis Amstadt managed to work in this way successfully for two years before 
being discovered.28 In some parts of the Bezirk, failure to adhere to the model statutes was 
the rule rather than the exception -  illustrating clearly the impotence of the local outposts 
of regime authority. In 1960 almost all farmers in Type I LPGs in the districts of
90Heiligenstadt and Worbis, were reported to have harvested individually. It was clear that 
above all in these strictly Catholic rural areas, local village functionaries, including 
members of both the SED and CDU, were not able themselves to enforce the 
implementation of regime policy alone. Certainly in Kreis Heiligenstadt in early 1961, it 
was noted that even SED members acted still too much under the influence of priests and 
members of the church boards and were unwilling to destroy their relationships with 
family and friends by openly advocating the party line.30
Despite the shortage of ideologically and technically suitable local functionaries 
willing or able to enforce adherence to the statutes, the attempt was made to ensure that 
the size of the harvest would not be damaged and that LPG functionaries would be held to 
account for any severe drop in yields. Party members from rural SED organisations along 
with tractor drivers from the MTS were given the task of attending board meetings and 
members’ assemblies of the LPGs throughout the harvest period. Wherever they reported 
an element of conflict or uncertainty about how (or rather according to whose rules) the 
harvest was to be brought in, representatives of the local party, the state apparatus, as well 
as leading figures from the MTS and factories which had been given responsibility for the 
political and material wellbeing of certain LPGs, were to meet to provide sufficient labour 
(bands of so-called “harvest helpers”) and agree a definite plan to ensure crops were 
harvested as quickly as possible regardless of LPG members’ attitudes.31
Throughout the harvest season, operative committees based in the MTS as well as 
in the district administration oversaw the deployment of groups of several hundred 
auxiliary harvest workers and pressed mayors and LPG chairmen for progress reports. The
28 ThHStAW RdB L590 Abt. Landwirtschaft, Einschatzung der Entwicklung der LPG des Typ I im Bezirk Erfurt 6.7.1960.
29 ThHStAW RdB L562 Abt. Landwirtschaft Unterabteilung LPG, Einschatzung der politischen und okonomischen Entwicklung der 
LPG des Bezirkes Erfurt 5.10.1962.
30 ThHStAW SED BPA BIV/2/4 -  59 SED Kreisleitung Heiligenstadt an die BPKK, Einschatzung iiber die Feindarbeit im Kreis im 2. 
Quartal 1961. 30.6.1961 p.455.
31 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/2/3-335 Sekretariat der Bezirksleitung, Abt. Landwirtschaft an das Sekretariat, Informatorischer Bericht 
iiber den Tag der Emtebereitschafl 4.7.1960. p.5.
71
impact of these operative committees varied from district to district, depending on the 
competence of the local and district functionaries themselves and on the reception their 
measures received from LPG members on the ground. These in turn were contingent to 
some extent upon the proximity of centres of SED authority and in part on the suitability 
of collective farming for local conditions. The agricultural authorities in Kreis Erfurt-Land 
in particular were praised by the Bezirk for having succeeded in organising on site trouble­
shooting brigades in almost every village as early as the beginning of August 1960. Kreis 
Bad Langensalza was also reported to have been successful at organising the harvest 
through the operative committees. Further away from the Bezirk's arable heartland and the 
Bezirks capital, however, the picture worsened. In Kreis Gotha it was noted that MTS 
functionaries were not forceful enough in persuading LPG members to adhere to deadlines 
and in Kreis Miihlhausen the harvest had only been brought in “on time” thanks to the 
deployment of Soviet and NVA troops as farm labourers.
The stability of the supply of food was (particularly since the uprising of June 
1953) felt at all levels of the SED to be tied directly to the stability of the GDR as a whole. 
While this fact was precisely the reason for strict police control and for deep suspicion of 
and potentially severe punishments for serious drops in production levels, it was also the 
basis for a more limited repressive response to resistance to collective farming practices, 
where this did not immediately undermine production. The manner in which the campaign 
for full collectivisation had occurred undoubtedly cowed many of those who had opposed 
it -  farmers and functionaries alike. But farmers were not in an entirely powerless 
position. Not only was their active participation in collective practices necessary to the 
survival of the LPGs in the long term, in the short term farmers, along with the rest of the 
population, were in a position to vote with their feet and abandon the GDR.
Flight to the West
Up to the construction of the Berlin wall, fleeing to the west, while still considered risky, 
was nonetheless an option chosen by a large number of farmers who felt that they had 
little to lose in abandoning the farm once collectivisation seemed inevitable. In addition 
large numbers of young people saw no future in agriculture and hoped for better working
32 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/2/3-345 Sekretariat der Bezirksleitung, Abt. Org/Kader, Einschatzung der Biirositzungen vom 2.9.1960 und 
Ablauf der Halmfruchtemte 13.9.1960 p.86.
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conditions in the west.33 Month after month following collectivisation, LPG members 
constituted a significant proportion of those fleeing the GDR. In April and May 1960 78 
LPG members, 27 employees of the MTS and the VdgB along with 59 women and 83 
children were recorded to have fled the Bezirk. In July and August 1960 a further 104 
farmers are recorded as having fled the republic.34 In the border areas of the Bezirk, 
especially in the northern Catholic Eichsfeld, whole villages which had close links with 
the population just across the border absented themselves. In one village in Kreis Apolda, 
three farmers fled with their families during the collectivisation campaign having been 
denied the chance to set up an LPG on their own separate to the one already established. 
As statistics on the numbers of people working in agriculture in Bezirk Erfurt who 
successfully fled to the West show, the culmination of the collectivisation process resulted 
in a sustained increase in flights during the summer months -  despite some small decline 
during the high point of the harvest season, when it might be assumed fewer dared to go 
unaccounted for. As in the rest of the GDR, numbers of people abandoning agriculture in 
the Bezirk to flee to the West did decline slightly during the autumn and winter of 1960. 
However throughout the first half of 1961 the number of flights by LPG members in 
Bezirk Erfurt each month remained high [see Figure 1. below].
Figure 1.
In the opinion of the ZK’s agricultural department the reason for the rapid increase in 
flights was the basic neglect of the politics of the village by the district authorities with the
33 ThHStAW SED BPA BIV/2/4 -  58 SED Kreisleitung Sondershausen an die BPKK, Erfurt, Bericht 15.4.1961. p.160
34 ThHStAW BDVP 20/065 Stab/Operativstab, Information iiber Vorkommnisse in der Landwirtschaft 28/60 21.6.1960; ThHStAW 
SED-BPA IV/2/3-345 Sekretariat der Bezirksleitung, Von der Abt. f. Sicherheitsfragen: Bericht iiber die Republikfltichte, Riickkehrer, 
Erstzuziehenden und die legalen Verziige im Monat August 1960 in Gegeniiberstellung zum Vormonat. 13.9.1960. p. 133
35 ThHStAW BDVP 20.1/361 VPKA Apolda, Abt. S. Analyse uber die Klassenkampfsituation der Gemeinde Stobra 7.4.1961 p .l61.
36 SAPMO B-Arch DY30/J IV 2/3 J/190 ZK der SED -  Sekretariat, Information der Abteilung Landwirtschaft beim ZK, Einschatzung 
der Republikflucht auf dem Gebiet der Landwirtschaft.
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conclusion of the collectivisation campaign. Even the Kreisleitungen of the SED were 
considered to be wholly incompetent on the question of illegal flights, with only sporadic 
attempts to investigate and analyse cases. Village functionaries, notably the mayor or the 
party secretary of the local party organisation, reportedly failed of their own accord to 
react to cases of illegal flights.37 In cases where leading LPG functionaries had fled, a 
more serious interpretation was put on the event. The flight of accountants from LPGs in 
Kreis Gotha and Kreis Erfurt-Land and of an LPG chairman in Kreis Sondershausen in 
January 1961 were regarded as deliberate attempts to sow discord amongst the remaining 
members of the LPG.38 However the flight of less conspicuous figures in the LPG 
received less attention.
The effect on agriculture of this steady exodus was severe in some localities with the 
task of managing abandoned farms falling to the often undermanned and under-funded 
LPGs. The parlous state of the buildings and land left behind, and the insufficiency of 
machinery and labour to farm such abandoned fields and look after livestock meant they 
were more of a burden than a boon to the LPGs. The threat to leave for the west and the 
potential to do so as long as security measures along the border were still relatively lax no 
doubt influenced how the collectives were seen by the LPG members and how they were 
treated by the hierarchy of state and party functionaries. On the one hand, while it was still 
possible to get out of the GDR, farmers did not necessarily think of abandoning their 
property for as long as they could hope that changes would occur in international politics 
to reverse the situation. On the other hand, so long as the flow of farmers to the West 
could not be dammed by careful surveillance alone, it appears limits were set to the level 
of repressive action which could be taken against recalcitrant LPG members.
The local police constable (.Abschnittsbevollmachtigte or ABV) had considerable 
responsibilities for overseeing the consolidation of the LPGs, in exposing and reporting 
any actions by LPG members which could be construed as detrimental to the collective 
farm or indeed the state. The Bezirk police authority (Bezirksbehdrde der Deutschen 
Volkspolizei or BDVP) worked according to the supposition that there was massive 
“hostile activity” in the LPGs in the aftermath of collectivisation; it was just a question of
37 SAPMO B-Arch DY30/J IV 2/3 J/l 90 ZK der SED -  Sekretariat, Information der Abteilung Landwirtschaft beim ZK, Einschatzung 
der Republikflucht auf dem Gebiet der Landwirtschaft.
38 ThHStAW RdB L591 Abt. Landwirtschaft Bericht an die Bezirksleitung der SED, Sekretariat, Stand der Jahresabrechnungen, 
Rechenschaftslegungen und Neuwahlen in den LPG Stichtag 1.2.61.3.2.1961.
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whether their officers were competent enough to recognise it. The range of potentially 
serious crimes for which individuals could be charged was sufficiently broad to intimidate 
most dissenting farmers into avoiding any virulent or public demonstrations of opposition. 
However, despite the guidelines, there was at times a clear gulf between the desired 
attitude of local police and what they were willing to do or capable of in practice. 
Policemen at district and village level had to be repeatedly criticised for failing to take 
‘class conflict’ into account when investigating the situation in agriculture and rural 
communities. The chief of the department for criminal matters in the district police office 
(Volkspolizeikreisamt or VPKA) Amstadt in November 1960 was criticised for attributing 
findings of livestock mortality, bad practice by state functionaries and problems in the 
LPGs to “organisational” and “objective” causes. The investigating brigade from the 
BDVP pointed out that in so doing he had entirely neglected the question of class conflict. 
The brigade also reported that other officers in the department appeared too to have 
misunderstood the meaning of class conflict, believing that with the removal of the hostile 
classes, [i.e. through collectivisation] the conflict was over.39 A report by instructors on 
the work of the VPKA Eisenach in September 1960 commented with what seems like 
sarcastic understatement:
Although in many villages in Kreis Eisenach collective work has not been 
implemented and the people themselves suggest that farmers are being influenced 
ideologically by western television and western radio; although livestock mortality 
is continuing to increase and the number of illegal flights from the Republic by 
people we are interested in has increased, there has so far been no success at 
uncovering hostile activity.40
A set of guidelines issued in April 1960 by the Interior Ministry to local police 
constables indicated which crimes they should expect and prepare to prevent in the newly 
fully collectivised villages and LPGs. Above all, production levels were to be maintained 
through careful vigilance against any form of sabotage, while young people were to be 
prevented from succumbing to hostile influences (presumably in a bid to prevent their
39 ThHStAW BDVP 20/044 Politabteilung, Bericht iiber den Brigadeeinsatz im VPKA Amstadt in der Zeit vom 8.11.-12.11.1960,
26.11.1960.
40 ThHStAW BDVP 20/044 Politabteilung, Bericht iiber den Instrukteureinsatz im VPKA Eisenach vom 14.9.-23.9.1960, 30.9.1960.
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flight to the West).41 Combating livestock mortality in particular was to be seen in the 
context of a class struggle in which almost any premature death could be construed as a 
deliberate act masquerading as neglect or incompetence from a member of an LPG. 
Despite the suspicion with which instances of damage to crops and livestock were treated, 
it is debatable how much was deliberate sabotage. Potentially opponents of 
collectivisation might have wished to demonstrate the un-viability of an LPG by 
aggravating any negative consequences for agricultural production levels which had 
arisen. Potentially too farmers planning to flee the country might have had an interest in 
destroying their property before it was ‘taken over by the state’. However, in the majority 
of cases which received serious investigation in Bezirk Erfurt, supposed acts of wanton 
destruction of crops or livestock could not be proven to have been the result of hostile 
intentions 42 Arguably the intention behind the scrutiny of instances of severe production 
losses was as much concerned with providing LPG members with an additional incentive 
-  based on fear of arrest - to maintain production levels. Nonetheless acts of petty 
sabotage did occur in the LPGs, alongside less subtle demonstrations of hostility toward 
the LPG and the SED dictatorship in general, including threats and acts of violence against 
those who had supported collectivisation. In an extreme case in a village in Kreis Eisenach 
in September 1960 it was reported that a loudspeaker car containing agitators was 
reportedly set upon by 25 to 30 people, one of whom threatened to set it on fire.43
While such acts were no doubt borne of frustration and despair, less extreme 
demonstrations of public opposition were arguably prompted too by some expectation that 
something might really be gained by them. Given the sense of uncertainty about the future 
status of Germany or doubts as to the permanence of collective farming, actions which 
undermined the LPG or demonstrated farmers’ dissatisfaction were not necessarily 
considered to be vain gestures. In May 1960 a village mayor was reportedly asked whether 
“he wasn’t afraid if things were to change since what he has done to the farmers in recent 
weeks can’t be made good and he is now hated by everyone”.44 At an assembly in the 
LPG Type III Wasserthaleben in Kreis Sondershausen in May 1960 calls were made for
41 ThHStAW BDVP 20/081, Stab/Operativstab Arbeitshinweise zu den Aufgaben der Volkspolizei in den vollgenossenschaftlichen 
Dorfem auf der Grundlage der Directive des Ministers des Innem Nr. 4/60 19.4.1960.
42 ThHStAW BDVP 20/065 Stab/Operativstab, Information 39/60 26.7.1960.
43 ThHStAW BDVP 20/044 Politabteilung, VPKA Eisenach, Einschatzung der Feindtatigkeit im Kreis Eisenach 9.9.1960.
44 ThHStAW BDVP 20/065 Stab/Operativstab, Information iiber Vorkommnisse in der Landwirtschaft 19/60 4.5.1960.
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the introduction of free elections, arguing that at least then farmers would not have to be in 
the LPG.45 Similarly in an assembly of the LPG “Fortschritf ’ (“Progress”) in May 1960 in 
Kindelbriick two farmers were cheered when they announced to representatives of the Rat 
des Kreises Sommerda that they had been forced into the LPG.46
The first year after the end of the collectivisation campaign saw a tangle of 
recrimination, repression and conciliation, as farmers, LPG functionaries and local, district 
and regional representatives of the regime attempted to assert or protect their often all too 
divergent interests. While there was enough uncertainty with regard to the permanence of 
the collective farm and indeed the GDR itself, those who sought to limit the impact of the 
proclaimed collectivisation on the conditions in which they lived and worked were well 
provided with motivation and opportunity to do so.
The Strength of Popular Dissent
It was clear that the apparatus of agricultural administration from the (often reluctant)
LPG functionaries and the (liberal) local and district state authorities right up to the SED 
leadership in Berlin was neither consistently able nor always willing in the first year after 
full collectivisation to take repressive action to control widespread disregard for collective 
farming. At the same time throughout 1960 rumours spread regularly throughout the 
countryside in Bezirk Erfurt that collectivisation might soon be abandoned, that the 
Americans might return to Thuringia or more vaguely that “things will be different 
soon”.47 In Gierstadt, Kreis Erfurt-Land, some farmers reportedly even raised the spectre 
of the 17th June 1953 uprising, stating that on this date in 1960 something would happen 
which would help farmers get their land back.48 Against this background of uncertainty 
and instability, the potential benefits of resisting collectivisation, whether by openly 
rejecting it or more carefully subverting it, outweighed the potential repercussions.
In the initial weeks and months after the completion of the collectivisation campaign, a 
wave of withdrawals from the LPGs came from those farmers who had recently been 
pressured into joining.49 The right to withdraw from the collective had been initially
45 ThHStAW BDVP 20/044 Politabteilung, VPKA Eisenach, Einschatzung der Feindtatigkeit im Kreis Eisenach
9.9.1960.
46 ThHStAW BDVP 20/065 Stab/Operativstab, Information iiber Vorkommnisse in der Landwirtschaft 24/60 20.5.1960.
47 ThHStAW BDVP 20/065 Stab/Operativstab, Information 36/60, Einschatzung der Lage in der Landwirtschaft 20.7.1960.
48 ThHStAW BDVP 20/065 Stab/Operativstab, Information 32/60, 6.7.1960.
49 ThHStAW BDVP 20/065 Stab/Operativstab, Information 41/60, Vorkommnisse in der Landwirtschaft 26.7.1960.
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allowed for in the statutes of all types of LPGs. In theory any departure had to be voted on 
by the membership and entailed the return of only an equivalent sized piece of land on the 
edge of the LPG. Nevertheless LPG members made use of this right to withdraw, 
reclaiming their own land in spite of the statute. The lack of an explicit law making refusal 
to participate in an LPG illegal had added to the grievances of private farmers required to 
sign declarations of “voluntary” entry. In this context withdrawal was an equally 
“voluntary” refusal to participate in the LPG any longer. The reports detailing the flow of 
withdrawals indicate that in the vast majority of cases, sufficient pressure and persuasion 
could be brought to bear to induce membership to be taken up again. However conflicts 
were not always quickly resolved. During the first year after the completion of the 
collectivisation campaign new instances of withdrawal from the LPG were registered 
periodically in different parts of the Bezirk, amounting to as many as 640 in 1960 - of 
which only 200 had been persuaded to take up membership again by the following year.50 
Two reports -  one from the beginning and one from the end of July 1961 demonstrate the 
ongoing struggle faced by district functionaries. At the start of the month 57 withdrawals 
were recorded from LPGs in the Bezirk, in addition to 47 withdrawals from gardening 
collectives in the area of Erfurt-Stadt alone. At the end of the month 199 withdrawals are 
recorded, with outbreaks in districts which had previously registered none. In only 94 
cases had members been successfully persuaded to return to the LPG by the end of the 
month.51 Rumours that in the autumn of 1961 the LPGs would be dissolved, were clearly 
motivation enough for farmers to take the initiative to withdraw again in early 1961 and in 
the LPG Type Is to terminate contracts on the use of privately owned machinery.52 In 
Kreis Worbis in at least nine villages, LPGs appeared to be on the verge of disbanding in 
July 1961.53
A less confrontational means of protest against and subversion of collectivisation 
was to limit the extent of one’s active participation. Given that the LPGs relied upon the 
manpower of the farmers as well as use of their land, tools, machinery and livestock, it 
was possible to undermine their economic stability very effectively by contributing as
50 ThHStAW RdB L591 Abt. Landwirtschaft Bericht an die Bezirksleitung der SED Sekretariat, Stand der Jahresabrechnungen, 
Rechenschaftslegungen und Neuwahlen in den LPG Stichtag 1.2.61. 3.2.1961.
51 ThHStAW RdB L591 Abt. Landwirtschaft, Unterabteilung LPG, Informatorischer Bericht iiber Austritte aus den LPG und GPG, 
5.7.1961; RdB L591 Abt. Landwirtschaft, Erfassung und Forstwirtschaft, Unterabteilung LPG, Einschatzung der Austrittserklarungen 
aus den LPG und GPG im Bezirk Erfurt 31.7.1961.
52 ThHStAW BDVP 20.1/352 Operativstab, Information 51/61 Austrittserklarungen und Funktionsniederlegungen 25.07.1961 p.27.
53 ThHStAW BDVP 20.1/352 Operativstab, Information 58/61 Landwirtschaft 28.07.1961 p.38.
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little as was possible -  within the bounds of the law. Farmers would not allow their bams 
to be used by the LPG, and were slow to make their machinery available, amid 
suggestions that they might need them themselves soon.54 In the LPG “Aufbau” 
(“Construction”) in Torba, Kreis Sondershausen, whose chairman had noted that 70% of 
the members opposed the collectivisation, the police reported: “a poor work ethic 
currently predominates here -  this is to be seen in the fact that some members have been 
sick for a fortnight already and no sick notes have been handed in.”55 It was also common 
to refuse to work overtime or on weekends.56 Particularly prevalent in police reports too is 
the deliberate neglect of collective land, while great lengths were taken to look after 
household plots and livestock. Owing to circumstances in Poland where some collective 
farms had been allowed to dissolve because they had proved too much of an economic 
burden for the state, in spring 1961 rumours spread that the same measures might be taken 
in the GDR if the situation became bad enough. On the basis of this some farmers devoted 
more effort to strengthening their household farms while allowing the LPG’s land to go 
untended.57 During the 1961 spring cultivation period in Kreis Sondershausen farmers 
were found to have abandoned planting on collective land in a number of LPGs owing to 
the poor weather and had instead either gone straight to the local pub or off to tend their 
private land.58 In other LPGs, members simply stayed away from work or worked half­
heartedly, expectant of change in the none too distant future. Shortly before the building 
of the Berlin Wall in the summer of 1961 rumours were rife in parts of the Bezirk that 
something momentous was about to change the entire political situation in Germany. In 
Tiefthal, Kreis Erfurt-Land, the CDU mayor reacted to plans to build a communal laundry 
with the words: “what’s the point of that when everyone is going to get all his stuff back 
anyway?” In the village of Witterda in Kreis Erfurt-Land a large number of LPG members 
had stopped going to work at the end of July 1961 responding to the rumoured instruction: 
“work slow, it will be different soon.”59
More directly in contravention of the statutes, no action was taken to reorganise or 
amalgamate fields or transfer livestock into collective sheds. In the upland districts of the
54 ThHStAW BDVP 20/065 Stab/Operativstab, Information 44/60 Vorkommnisse in der Landwirtschaft 8.8.1960.
55 ThHStAW BDVP 20/065 Stab/Operativstab, Information 68/60 Vorkommnisse in der Landwirtschaft 9.11.1960.
56 Bauer, T. Blockpartei und Agrarrevolution von Oben. Die DBD 1948-1963 (Munich 2003) pp.506-7.
57 ThHStAW SED BPA BIV/2/4 -  58 SED Kreisleitung Sondershausen an die BPKK, Bericht 15.4.1961 p.160.
58 ThHStAW BDVP 20.1/352 Operativstab, Information 51/61 1.6.1961 p.25.
59 ThHStAW BDVP 20.1/352 Operativstab, Information 59/61 29.07.1961 p.40.
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Bezirk in particular farmers resisted moves to amalgamate fields - a state of affairs which 
reportedly local state functionaries did little about.60 LPG members failed to divert a 
proportion of the profits into a common fund -  a fundamental requirement for the future 
development of the LPG, without which not only the establishment of common amenities 
but also the building of the necessary capital for investment in the tools of industrial 
production as foreseen by socialist agricultural policy were not possible. In other areas 
adherence to the statute was not enforced within the LPG, compromises being reached in 
members’ assemblies over aspects of pay and work organisation and the allocation of land 
for members’ gardens and private plots. In the LPG Type I in Wechmar, Kreis Gotha the 
members decided to share profits simply according to the amount of land contributed to 
the LPG with each member receiving the same wage. This was done on the basis that each 
member would work “normally” and that there was no need therefore to differentiate.61 
Without the participation of the LPG members in record keeping, the value of the LPG as 
a means of forcing improved labour productivity and of integrating agricultural production 
more efficiently into the planned economy was considerably reduced. In several LPGs 
there were simply no records kept of the numbers of livestock kept in the LPG, or indeed 
the numbers which had died or been slaughtered.62 Members of LPG Type Is sought 
reportedly too to prevent outside interference in the way they distributed profits by failing 
to keep records of the work done by members or of the amount of produce they had 
received as payment in kind. Thus it was difficult to work out a system of performance- 
related pay or assess exactly what had already be paid out to the members and what should 
thus be accumulated as capital by the collective. Equally without effective records of 
production levels and turnover, it was difficult for the members to commit to raising their 
plan targets for the coming year.63
The strength of dissent was considerable, and remained so while neither 
collectivisation nor the GDR’s future seemed certain. Nevertheless as an institution the 
LPG could not be discounted. Farmers were confronted constantly by the existence of the
60 ThHStAW BDVP 20/081 Stab/Operativstab, Information 59/60 Vorkommnisse in der Landwirtschaft 12.10.1960; BDVP, 
Lagebesprechung am 14.10.1960 zur Einschatzung der Feindtatigkeit auf dem Lande. 17.10.1960.
61 ThHStAW RdB L590 Abt. Landwirtschaft, Einschatzung der Entwicklung der LPG des Typ I im Bezirk Erfurt 6.7.1960.
62 B-Arch Abt. DDR DE 1/12164 Zentrale Kommission fur Staatliche Kontrolle -  Der Vorsitzende, Informationsbericht Nr.7 1.3.1961 
p.87; Zentrale Kommission fiir Staatliche Kontrolle -  Der Vorsitzende, Bericht: Berzirk Erufrt -  Unrealer Nachweis iiber 
Rinderverluste durch die Organe der Zentralverwaltung fur Statistik 1.3.1961 p. 103.
63 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/2/3-362 Sekretariat der Bezirksleitung Abt. Landwirtschaft: Informatorischer Bericht iiber den Stand der 
Plandiskussion mit dem Stand vom 3.2.1961,4.2.1961 pp.8-13; BDVP 20/247, VPKA Erfurt, Abt. K -  Komm.SE: Bericht iiber 
Verbrechen in den Ortsschaften an der Femverkehrsstrasse IV 5.8.1960.
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LPG as the administrative body within which they were organised -  through which they 
were defined as citizens - even in those parts of the country where the collective farm 
existed in name only. The longer LPGs survived, so the gradual (and often inconsistent 
and incomprehensive) application of administrative pressure made them an unavoidable 
part of the reality of farming in the GDR.
The Seeds of Consolidation in the LPG
During September 1960, the SED Bezirksleitung sent into the Type I LPGs within the 
Bezirk further brigades made up mostly of students studying agriculture at the technical 
colleges in Eisenach, Weimar and Nordhausen (although 115 students were recruited from 
the philosophical faculty at the university of Jena, in neighbouring Bezirk Gera). 725 
students worked in groups of two or three per LPG under the guidance of the SED 
Kreisleitung’s representative in each of the MTS regions. The tasks set them were 
considerable: “implementation of the statute and the establishment of internal work 
ordinances; the introduction of socialist principles of work and performance; realisation of 
collective democracy; the formation of commissions to establish work norms and 
performance related pay; creation of the preconditions necessary for collective livestock 
holdings; and guidance in the creation of a production and finance plan for 1961.”64 Given 
the small amount of time (3 weeks) and the enormity of the tasks facing these brigades, it 
is not surprising that there continued to be many Type I LPGs in which aspects of 
collective farming had failed to be adopted. Nevertheless the passing of the harvest and 
the relative quiet of the winter months in agricultural terms provided opportunities for 
farmers and LPG functionaries to take stock of the situation. The desire to rebel against 
collectivisation certainly continued to exist; however the LPG as an institution, though 
hugely flawed, continued to survive too and in so doing grew slowly in stature and 
permanence. Farmers were certainly still fleeing to the West but the majority who 
remained, increasingly had to reconcile themselves to the fact they only had a status 
within the LPG. In order to sell their produce, earn an income and improve the conditions 
in which they lived and work, there was no alternative other than participating in the 
structures of the collective farm.
64 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/2/3-345 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Landwirtschaft an das Sekretariat, Einsatz von Studenten und 
Fachschiilem zur Unterstutzung der LPG besonders des Typ I im Bezirk Erfurt p.46.
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The beginning of the new year saw the holding of the main yearly assemblies in 
the LPGs. These assemblies -  being held for the first time in approximately half of the 
Bezirk’s LPGs -  were a crucial test of how far attitudes of LPG members, particularly new 
ones, had changed over the year. That LPG members were willing to attend the assembly 
and at least listen to discussions was some sign that the LPGs were recognised as the 
institution through which action might be taken and their interests articulated. Reports on 
the discussions held during the assemblies of the LPGs of Types I and II, especially those 
of the new LPGs, referred to the concentration of the discussions on resolving local 
problems affecting the community, and avoidance of any ideological or political 
commentary on the merits of collective farming. In an LPG in Bad Tennstedt Kreis Bad 
Langensalza in March 1961, farmers walked out of the members’ assembly during the 
political speeches of leading Bezirk functionaries who had attended as guests, reportedly 
commenting: “when that fellow in there has finished babbling, we’ll go back in to the 
assembly”.65 Nevertheless advocates of collective farming -  whether LPG functionaries or 
local representatives of party and state - were too clearly winning (or enforcing) some 
acceptance of, if not support for, the statutes of the LPGs. There were reports of 
discussions in LPG Type I on whether to change the ratio of income from 60:40 to 70:30 
in favour of work units over land contribution for the coming year. The question of 
whether meadows and grazing land would be better tended collectively was also raised. 
Furthermore it was reported that almost all LPGs of Types I and II in Bezirk Erfurt had 
diverted 15% of the farm’s profits into an investment fund.66 Perhaps still more 
significantly LPG members in a proportion of Type I LPGs were reported to be backing 
the restriction of the number of animals and land granted to the wealthier farmers. In other 
words, LPG members themselves were acting to redistribute the sources of income in their 
collective more evenly. This suggests if not ideological acceptance of the LPG then at 
least some practical acceptance of its existence and a willingness to use its structures in 
their own interests. With the new year came further impetus for the consolidation -  at least 
administratively speaking -  of LPGs: reluctant members could no longer reasonably claim 
the right to harvest individually and it was increasingly difficult for LPG members to
65 ThHStAW SED BPA BIV/2/5-10 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. OrgTKader, Zwischenbericht iiber die Arbeit der Brigade in Bad 
Tennstedt pp.267-273.
“  ThHStAW SED BPA IV/2/3-362 RdB Abt Landwirtschaft. an die SED Bezirksleitung, Stand der Jahresendabrechnungen, 
Rechenschaftslegungen und Neuwahlen in den LPG -  Stichtag 1.2.1961. 3.2.1961 pp.32-39.
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separate their interests from those of the LPG as an institution. The allocation of unjust 
plan targets to the LPG by the Rat des Kreises in early 1961 was now a matter of concern 
for all, even reluctant, members of the collective farms.67
Conclusion
In the first year after full collectivisation major initial steps were taken in the 
reorganisation of agricultural production. The LPG had been introduced and no longer 
remained a distant possibility but rather increasingly appeared to be a permanent feature of 
agriculture in the GDR as long as the current regime remained. Despite the numerous set 
backs and failures of the first year after full collectivisation, with farmers resistant and 
functionaries incapable or unwilling to implement collective practices, limited success had 
been achieved in consolidating the LPG as a lasting, potentially stable institution.68 It was 
clear however that whatever successes had been achieved in reconciling farmers to the 
LPG, the future development of agriculture in the GDR was by no means certain.
67 ThHStAW NF 275 Kreissekretariat Erfurt-Land, Betr. Tel. Durchsage vom 7.2.1961, 8.2.1961 p.9.
68 The transfer of some heavy machinery from the MTS to LPG Type III in the fertile flat lands of the Bezirk, above all in Kreis Bad 
Langensalza, Weimar and Sommerda, had proved beneficial in improving the profitability of some LPG Type III - for example, 
ThHStAW RdB L615 Abt. Landwirtschaft, Erfassung und Forstwirtschaft, Ergebnisse der bisher an die LPG Typ III leihweise 
tibergebenen Technik und Schlussfolgerungen fur die weitere Ubergabe. 22.6.1961.
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CHAPTER 3 
Farming behind the Wall
“You just want to dominate us, there are so many who think for us now -  why so much pressure, we will 
manage things just as we do every year.” 1 (The complaint o f farmers in Kreis Amstadt in September 1962 
as functionaries from the district administration sought to control the harvesting o f crops.)
On 13th August 1961 the obstacles to an illegal departure from the GDR to West 
Germany were suddenly made considerably more severe. Along with the Wall running 
through Berlin, measures were taken to strengthen security along the entire border with 
West Germany, a considerable part of which ran along the northern and western edges of 
Bezirk Erfurt. Although attempts continued to be made to get across the border by citizens 
of the GDR -  with some limited success in the first weeks after the Wall’s construction -  
the steady flow of people to the West was brought to an abrupt halt. This brought to an 
end the drain on manpower and expertise from the GDR which was severely undermining 
the East German economy as well as any claims the SED regime made to legitimacy. With 
the economic security lent by the Wall, the prospects for the survival of the GDR under 
SED dictatorship improved significantly. This security lent the leadership of the SED 
greater self-confidence in pursuing radical and often unpopular policies and taking 
punitive action against those it considered hostile. However it also encouraged East 
Germans as a whole to reassess how to make the best of their lives within the SED 
dictatorship now that they were deprived of the possibility of an alternative life in the 
West and the likelihood of reunification had receded significantly. It thus ensured a much 
increased proportion of the population reconsidered their future in the GDR and were 
moved to participate in and in so doing sustain and shape the structures and systems of 
authority by which the SED dictatorship was run over the coming years. There is no doubt 
that the construction of the Wall was thus a major turning point in the GDR’s social and 
economic development and had an impact, in both the short and long term, on the way in 
which the authority of the SED leadership was communicated and understood within East 
German society.
1 ThHStAW SED BPA BIV/2/7-557 Bericht der AG die in Amstadt zur Emte eingesetzt ist. 10.9.1962 p.20.
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In the past, flight to the West had certainly not been an easy option which citizens 
of the GDR had taken lightly. This was perhaps especially so for farmers where an 
inherited or long standing connection and sense of responsibility to the land, to their 
livestock and to their community could act as an additional restraint on the desire to leave 
the country. Nonetheless a very large proportion of the population, many of them farmers, 
had deemed the risks and losses involved in flight to the West worthwhile. For those 
farmers who had thus far remained in the GDR despite collectivisation, departure to the 
West was thus always a potential alternative to remaining in the LPG. The complete 
locking of the border removed this alternative, bringing stability and greater certainty as to 
the long term survival of the LPG. The subsequent forcible resettlement of “unreliable” 
villagers away from the border regions too made clear the limits of opposition and the 
lengths of repression possible in the GDR. Now that the SED leadership could afford to be 
less tolerant, the test of conscience, loyalty and obedience put to farmers and mral 
functionaries during the collectivisation campaign was reapplied in August 1961 with still 
less room for dissent and greater incentive to support the consolidation of the LPG.
The Limits of Dissent
Public outbursts of resentment directed towards the regime or the LPG continued to occur 
in Bezirk Erfurt despite the construction of the Wall. Swastikas were graffitied on LPG 
buildings and in instances in 1961 and 1962 in Kreis Heiligenstadt manure was spread on 
a field in such a way that a swastika became apparent in a darker shade of green making it 
visible for miles around. There were however now very severe repercussions for any LPG 
members suspected of deliberately hindering the successful development of collective 
farming. There had certainly been instances of draconian punishments meted out for acts 
of supposed economic sabotage against the LPG before August 1961. On a national level 
the death penalty was applied and publicised in two cases of arson both before and after 
the construction of the Wall.3 Nevertheless the more secure position of the SED leadership 
after August 13 th 1961 immediately allowed the stricter application of ideological
2 ThHStAW BDVP 20.1/241 BDVP Kripo an die HVDVP, Hauptabteilung K, Abt. U. Berlin, Brennpunktmeldung fur den Monat Mai 
1962 28.5.1962 p.376.
3 Werkentin, F. Politische Strajjustiz in derAra Ulbricht (Berlin 1995) pp.106-109.
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discrimination both within the ranks of the regime’s own apparatus and among the 
population at large.
Communities within the 5km exclusion zone along the Bezirk's border with the 
Federal Republic were subjected to a sudden crack down on “hostile” elements. In part 
because of the strength of religious affiliation in the border areas of the Catholic Eichsfeld 
and in part because of the proximity of the West, villages in this area were suspected of 
being potentially dangerous hotbeds of enemy agents and sympathetic reactionaries.4 
Individuals and families deemed politically unreliable - not least on the basis of their 
behaviour during the collectivisation campaign and the degree of their acceptance of the 
LPG - were forcefully deported in early October 1961 with little or no warning. The 
brutality and in a large number of cases, the arbitrary nature of these actions sent a clear 
signal of the ruthlessness with which the regime was willing to go about consolidating its 
authority in rural communities. In some cases seemingly arbitrary expulsions provoked 
attempts by villagers to have the decision revoked. Petitions were signed and sent to the 
Central Committee of the SED in Berlin -  these had however very little success. Rather 
such evidence of unchecked negative opinion towards the regime resulted in further 
investigations by the Stasi and the SED Party Control Commission not only into those 
involved in the petition but also into those functionaries who had failed to act against it on 
the ground.5 The virulence of the SED regime’s actions against sections of the population 
in the border areas succeeded in demonstrating the potential repercussions of any future 
behaviour which might be construed as hostile to the state. This no doubt limited any 
potential support which those who sought to flee the GDR received from locals in the 
border regions. No less significantly it also raised the spectre of forced resettlement as a 
possible punishment for ‘hostile’ villages elsewhere in the Bezirk, as one villager in Kreis 
Bad Langensalza pointed out: “with the actions on the border, it would not be long before 
people in Reichenbach will be expelled too.”6
During late summer in 1961 action was taken, in the words of the Ministry for 
Agriculture in Berlin, to “unmask hostile and counterrevolutionary forces in the village.”
4 ThHStAW SED BPA BIV/2/4-59 SED Kreisleitung Heiligenstadt an die SED Bezirksleitung BPKK Einschatzung iiber die 
Feindarbeit im Kreis im 2. Quartal 1961,30.6.1961 p.455; SED Bezirksleitung BPKK, Information iiber die Feindarbeit im Bezirk 
entsprechend den vierteljahrlichen Berichten der KPKK 17.7.1961 p.400.
5 For example ThHStAW SED BPA BIV/2/4-59 KPKK Nordhausen, Bericht iiber Feindarbeit im IV. Quartal 18.12.1961 p.79.
6 ThHStAW SED BPA BIV/2/4-59 KPKK Bad Langensalza, Bericht iiber Feindarbeit im IV. Quartal 13.12.1961 pp.62-67.
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Public confrontations were staged with numerous farmers, above all those who had been 
local agricultural functionaries under the Nazis (Ortsbauernfuhrer), as well as other Nazi 
party members and Wehrmacht officers, resulting in a number of arrests or restrictions on 
their movements. The crack-down on such elements of the rural population resulted, it was 
claimed, in immediate improvements to the labour discipline and the work ethic of LPG 
members. Villagers generally had become more active in their “confrontations with hostile 
and un-progressive forces in the villages and LPGs”. Moreover several thousand farmers 
around the country who had up until then continued to farm individually had been moved 
to “participate actively in the collective”. For all the confidence and authority lent the 
regime’s apparatus by the construction of the Wall, there were still considerable 
limitations on the scale of the confrontation with ‘hostile forces’ which could be mounted 
in rural communities. Local functionaries could not always be relied upon to pursue the 
class conflict with the degree of zeal required. Nonetheless it is likely that the construction 
of the Wall itself and the exemplary punitive action which followed, targeted particularly 
against those who could be easily identified as having “reactionary tendencies”, had a 
monitory effect on the rural population -  LPG members included.7
According to district police reports from around Bezirk Erfurt, even minor acts or 
expressions of anti-GDR and anti-LPG sentiment in villages were punished severely, 
especially if they were combined with other evidence of a reactionary attitude such as a 
Nazi past or regular watching of Western television.8 One farmer in Bad Suiza who had in 
previous months come to the attention of the police for his ‘hostile attitude’ was now 
given a one-year prison sentence for ripping down a GDR flag from a sports ground.9 In a 
particularly severe case, action was also taken against religious opposition to the 
collectives, which was hampering progress particularly in Catholic areas. A Catholic lay 
preacher was arrested and sentenced to as much as four years imprisonment charged with
7 SAPMO B-Arch, DY30/TV 2/7/376 Ministerium fur Landwirtschaft, Erfassung und Forstwirtschaft, Einschatzung der Entwicklung 
der Lage auf dem Lande in Vorbereitung der Wahlen zum 17.9.1961 pp.65-70.
8 BStU Aussenstelle Erfurt, Kreisdienststelle Weimar 379, Analyse iiber die Gemeinde Legefeld 11.10.1961 p.62.
9 ThHStAW SED BPA BIV/2/4 -  59 SED Kreisleitung Sondershausen an die BPKK, Einschatzung iiber einige Erscheinungen im Kr. 
Sondershausen 25.9.1961 p.344; KPKK Erfurt-Land, Bericht iiber Feindarbeit im III. Quartal 25.9.1961 p.222; KPKK Miihlhausen, 
Bericht iiber Feindarbeit im III. Quartal 26.9.1961 p.300.; SED Kreisleitung Apolda an die BPKK, Bericht iiber Feindarbeit im III. 
Quartal 29.9.1961 p.135.
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having persuaded a number of board members in LPGs across the Bezirk to give up their 
posts.10
The potential for a criminal and ideological interpretation to be applied by the 
police and Justice Ministry to almost any circumstance which undermined collective 
farming or damaged productivity was a strong incentive for farmers to disassociate 
themselves from any manifestations of hostility towards the LPG. Outbreaks of disease or 
sudden death among livestock, damage to crop stores caused by fires and even petty 
vandalism or damage to LPG property tended to be classed as the result of ‘enemy 
activity’, and where the ‘perpetrators’ were identified, very severe punishments could be 
handed out. According to police reports from February 1962 one LPG member in Kreis 
Miihlhausen was sentenced to four and a half years hard labour for mistreating and 
neglecting the cows in his charge, thereby contributing to livestock losses.11 In Heringen, 
Kreis Nordhausen, the LPG chairman and two members of the board were arrested for 
“consistently hostile activities”. Alleged to have once been active Nazis, they were held 
responsible for ‘consciously’ causing a high livestock mortality rate in the LPG and 
thereby bringing about the failure of the LPG to fulfil its market production quota. In one 
case an LPG member was sentenced to fourteen months imprisonment for not declaring 
the full number of potatoes which were in his possession, farming other villagers’ small 
plots of land for them and for declaring that he had been forced into the LPG.12 That the 
new climate had an impact on collective farmers themselves can be seen in the attitude 
expressed by the district shepherd in Kreis Weimar when faced with a severe shortage of 
feed for the animals in his charge. In a report by a Stasi informant on an assembly in the 
LPG Type III Legefeld held in January 1962, the shepherd was heard to comment that:
“he knew from experience the police would hold him responsible and he wasn’t going to 
let himself be locked up for this!”13
With the construction of the Wall came new legislation enabling serious punitive 
action to be taken against farmers who refused to work in the collective. Classified as
10 ThHStAW SED BPA BIV/2/4 -  59 SED Kreisleitung Worbis an die BPKK, Quartalsbericht iiber Feindarbeit im 3. Quartal 29.9.1961 
p.379.
11 ThHStAW BDVP 20.1/352 VPKA Miihlhausen, Abt. K an den Leiter des VPKA, Einschatzung der Lage in der Landwirtschaft im 
Kreisgebiet. 5.2.1962 p.154.
12 ThHStAW SED BPA BIV/2/4 -  59 SED Kreisleitung Nordhausen an die BPKK, Einschatzung iiber den Umfang und die Wirkung 
der Feindarbeit im Kreisgebiet Nordhausen im III. Quartal 1961 28.9.1961 p.310; KPKK Amstadt, Bericht iiber Feindarbeit im 
IV.Quartal 21.12.1961 p.2; SED Kreisleitung Apolda an die BPKK, Bericht iiber Feindarbeit im IV. Quartal 20.12.1961 p.10.
13 BStU Aussenstelle Erfurt, Kreisdienststelle Weimar 379, GI “Max” Bericht iiber die Jahresendversammlung der LPG Legefeld, 
Abschrift 2.2.1962 p.33.
“work-shy” and truants, they could be sentenced to serve in a labour-education camp if 
they chose to resist the “will of the majority” and refused to work for the LPG. The 
number of farmers actually punished on this charge is not clear, nevertheless police 
sources in Bezirk Erfurt do refer to a few, seemingly exemplary arrests where LPG 
members were known consistently to refuse to work for the collective farm. For example a 
farmer in Hohenfelden, Kreis Weimar-Land was reported to have been put under arrest for 
truancy. He had failed to do more than a few days work in the LPG since the previous year 
and had encouraged other members to do likewise.14 Action also began to be taken against 
those LPG members who were thought to maintain an excessive household plot or private 
livestock and thereby earn an income without participating fully in the LPG. A report by 
the District SED Party Control Commissions (Kreisparteikontrollkommission or KPKK) 
in Kreis Amstadt and in Kreis Langensalza in December 1961 discovered one farmer in 
the LPG Type III Amstadt who was allegedly earning over 15,000 Marks a year for 
produce from his private plot and livestock, while farming 1.4 hectares rather than the 0.5 
hectares officially allowed him.15 Police also investigated an LPG Type III in Kreis 
Sondershausen where it was revealed that a large proportion of the members gained 
incomes from private production which were significantly higher than their incomes from 
the collective. Of the sixty-three members, only thirty ever appeared for work in the LPG 
on a regular basis, while twenty-nine of the men had completed less than one hundred 
work units in the year.16
That such situations should have arisen is demonstrative of the limits to which 
functionaries of the LPG or indeed the local state authority had been able or willing to 
curtail abuses of the statute up to this point. The construction of the Wall and the 
escalation thereafter of punitive action against those who appeared to be undermining 
collective farming began to create a new climate in which the limits to dissent were clearly 
marked. With this background LPG functionaries stated clearly the connection between 
the limited success of the LPG and the behaviour or attitude of recalcitrant members who 
preferred to work on their private land and contributed little time to the LPG. The Rat des
14 ThHStAW SED BPA BIV/2/4 -  59 KPKK Erfurt-Land , Bericht iiber Feindarbeit im III. Quartal 25.9.196lp.222; SED Kreisleitung 
Weimar-Land an die BPKK, Informatorischer Bericht iiber Feindarbeit im Kreis Weimar-Land im Zusammenhang mit den 
Sicherheitsmassnahmen vom 13.8.1961,9.9.1961 p.360.
15 ThHStAW SED BPA BIV/2/4-59 KPKK Amstadt, Bericht iiber die Feindarbeit im IV. Quartal 21.12.1961 p.2; KPKK Bad 
Langensalza, Bericht uber die Feindarbeit im IV. Quartal 13.12.1961 p.62.
16 ThHStAW RdB L52 - BDVP Operativstab, Information 6/62 Landwirtschaft 9.1.1962.
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Bezirkes reported approvingly for example of an LPG in Kreis Amstadt where farmers
who had completed few work units were addressed by name and house number during the
main annual members’ assembly in 1962, shaming them with the censure of their
neighbours.17 Similarly local committees of the National Front also sought wherever
possible to publicise the efforts or lack of them of individual members of the collectives.
Agitation groups addressing farmers in 1962 came thus armed with information on how
18much each one had contributed to the fulfilment of the plan.
With the realisation that there was little benefit in opposing the LPG and few if any 
alternatives to working within it, many new and reluctant collective farmers accepted their 
LPG as the institution within which they would be allowed to earn a livelihood, and set 
about working for its profitability. One collective farmer in Kreis Heiligenstadt reportedly 
admitted that he had been among those who sought to hinder the development of the LPG. 
He claimed however to have changed his mind and considered it in his own and everyone 
else’s better interests to make the LPG work.19 How far such realisations were widespread 
is difficult to gauge. Nevertheless instances of a general “go slow” attitude did clearly 
diminish as acceptance of the LPG increased during 1962. Many more LPG members thus 
began to work effectively as collective farmers, within the framework laid out in the LPG 
statutes. The fact that members’ assemblies were held in LPGs throughout the Bezirk at 
the start of 1962 with a higher than ever average attendance level at 80% appeared to
signal the seriousness with which collective farmers took the LPG, at least as an
20institution.
There is no doubt that the building of the wall and the subsequent crack down 
diminished the level of overt hostility towards collective farming, particularly among 
those farmers who objected to the LPG on principle. It was certainly an important step too 
towards raising the level of acceptance of the LPG as the essential framework in which the 
land was farmed. However while there remained little evidence of the benefits of 
collectivised agriculture, rural communities continued to be marked too by outbursts of
17 ThHStAW RdB LI 153 Abt. Landwirtschaft Informatorischer Bericht iiber den Stand der Jahresendabrechnung in den LPG am
29.1.62, 1.2.1962.
18 ThHStAW NF 126 Bezirkssekretariat, Referat zu der Entwicklung der Nationalen Front (undated) p.61.
19 ThHStAW BDVP 20.1/352 Operativstab, Information: Vorkommnisse in der Landwirtschaft 18/62 9.2.1962 p.72.
20 ThHStAW RdB LI 153 Abt. Landwirtschaft Informatorischer Bericht iiber den Stand der Jahresendabrechnung in den LPG am
29.1.62, 1.2.1962.
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popular dissatisfaction not least because fear of financial destitution remained very real for 
some collective farmers.
Sources of Continued Instability
The pay and conditions for large numbers of LPG members, particularly those in LPG 
Type Ills, appeared to have little prospect of improving in 1962, resulting in 
demonstrations of discontent at the start of the new year. For 1960, the state guaranteed an 
annual income of 3,120 Marks for each LPG member working full time, which 
corresponded approximately to a work unit value of 6 Marks.21 This amount was 
considerably lower however than most considered reasonable compensation for the 
difficulty of the work they put in and the restrictions preventing them seeking better paid 
work elsewhere. A member of the LPG Type III “Fortschritt” in Kindelbriick made this 
clear to representatives of the Rat des Kreises Sommerda in May 1960, shouting out at the 
members’ assembly: “you yobs, food-stuffed officials, you’re alright for money. We’re 
not going to be kept quiet with promises. We want the work unit to be paid at 7 Marks”.22 
At the end of 1960 there were at least 126 LPG Type III in the Bezirk which were 
officially deemed loss-making. Although this was considered a marked improvement on 
the previous year, the value of the work unit in most LPG Type III remained barely more 
than the minimum. In the upland districts the situation was particularly dire; 63% of LPG 
Type III in Kreis Miihlhausen and 54% in Kreis Heiligenstadt continued to be financially 
unviable.23 This already difficult situation was compounded further in 1961 when heavy 
rainfall in the Bezirk in May and June promised to do serious damage to the first fully 
collective harvest.24 By the end of the harvest in 1961 -  thanks to a combination of bad 
weather and the disruption resulting from collectivisation and the flight of farmers to the 
West - the gross production of crops in Bezirk Erfurt had reached only 71% of the 1958
21 This work unit value takes into account the amount deducted for payment in kind over the course of the year. To qualify for subsidies 
to ensure the income of members did not sink below 3,120 Marks LPG were required to keep to limits on the amount accumulated as 
capital and the number of work units performed by the members. ThHStAW L562 Rat des Kreises Worbis, Abt. Landwirtschaft, 
Analyse der Entwicklung der LPG hinsichtlich der Erfullung der Produktions- und FinanzplSne im Jahre 1960 20.2.1961.
22 ThHStAW BDVP 20/065 Stab/Operativstab, Information iiber Vorkommnisse in der Landwirtschaft 24/60 20.5.1960.
23 ThHStAW RdB L562 Abt. Landwirtschaft Bericht iiber die politische und Okonomische Entwicklung der LPG des Bezirkes im Jahre 
1960. 27.2.1961.
24 Gabler, D. Entwicklungsabschnitte der Landwirtschaft in der DDR (Berlin 1995) p. 118: in 6 Kreise 80% of fields suffered some 
damage; ThHStAW RdB L591 Abt. Landwirtschaft Einschatzung des Standes der Entwicklung der LPG, besonders der LPG Typ I und 
II im Bezirk. 1.7.1961; ThHStAW RdB LI 153 Abt. Landwirtschaft Begriindung zur Erhohung der Uberbriickungskredite re 
Ratsbeschluss Nr 186-104/61 Undated (Nov. 1961); SED BPA, BIV/2/4-59 SED Kreisleitung Eisenach an die BPKK, Bericht iiber die 
Feindtatigkeit im Kreis Eisenach 30.6.1961 p.429.
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level25 prompting comments such as the parodying slogan “Mit Regen und Gott geht die 
LPG Bankrott.” (“With the help of God and rain, the LPG goes down the drain”).26 From 
all appearances the rush for full collectivisation had failed to bring about the dramatic rise 
in production which had been a prime motive for its introduction.
The poor harvest exacerbated the difficulties faced by LPG chairmen in mediating 
the demands of the state, while maintaining some degree of harmony among their 
members. It is unsurprising that some LPG chairmen threatened to resign, if the 
production plan targets set for their LPG were not lowered. Not only would failure to 
exceed plan targets reduce the price paid for produce by the state, it would also mean the 
LPG members received a smaller portion of the produce for their own use.27 In September 
1961 in Bezirk Erfurt, all collective farmers were required to allow inspection of their 
private stores of potatoes and allow a portion of them to be bought by the state to ensure 
the requirements of the population as a whole were well covered.28 The actual extraction 
of produce from LPG members’ stores appeared to some collective farmers as an 
incontrovertible demonstration of their second-class status in the GDR and gave grounds 
for hostility towards local state functionaries required to oversee this process. In the 
village of Mellingen, Kreis Weimar, it was rumoured for example that the mayor and the 
ABV were receiving a bonus for every sack of potatoes they could collect from farmers. 
The complaints of LPG members were clearly borne out of frustration with the lack of 
options available to them to resist (what they considered) unfair treatment. According to a 
report by an informant for the Stasi in Mellingen, some LPG members had indeed 
attempted to conceal some of their potatoes. On being discovered, one was reported to 
exclaim: “Why don’t you just take the whole lot and give me a train ticket to Bonn”.29 
This way out was of course now barred. Those who felt aggrieved by the state’s treatment 
of them had little choice other than to make their protests within the bounds of their 
current situation.
25 Gabler p. 118.
26 ThHStAW BDVP 20.1/139 Stab/Operativstab, Information 56/61 23.8.1961.
27 ThHStAW SED BPA BIV/2/4 -  59 SED Kreisleitung Gotha an die BPKK, Feindtatigkeit im Kr. Gotha im 3. Quartal 1961 29.9.1961 
p.275.
28 B-Arch Abt. DDR DE 1/29131 Zentrale Kommission fur Staatliche Kontrolle -  Der Vorsitzende, Informationsbericht Nr.36
10.11.1961; Beschluss des Politburos iiber operative Massnahmen zur Sicherung der Versorgung mit einigen Nahrungsgiitem und 
Futtermitteln 13.3.1961.
29 BStU Aussenstelle Erfurt, Kreisdienststeile Weimar 772, GI “Buchmann”, Lageeinschatzung der Gemeinde Mellingen iibergeben am 
10.11.1961, 14.11.1961 pp.91-94.
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At the end of 1961 LPG accountants assessed the impact of the year’s harvest on 
the financial status of the LPG. The state of affairs in LPG Type III was dire. In Kreis 
Miihlhausen alone LPG Type III had to be subsidised by 1,400,000 Marks to bring 
members’ incomes up to the minimum level which itself was considered a famine wage.30 
In the Bezirk as a whole 50% of LPG Type III had required subsidies in order to be able to 
pay their members the minimum value of the work unit. When the value of the work unit 
was publicly announced in each of the LPG assemblies at the start of the new year, there 
was unsurprisingly considerable disgruntlement. In Kreis Bad Langensalza members of a 
number of LPG complained openly about the money which they were to receive, while 
elsewhere in the district slogans were graffitied in LPG such as: “we work cheaper than 
coolies”; “SOS we want money” and “Work slow”.31 The ones most directly affected by 
the LPG’s low profits were those machine operators and former industrial workers who 
did not supplement their income from the LPG with their own livestock or household plot 
and relied exclusively on being paid in monthly advance instalments for their work over 
the year. Faced by the failure of the LPG to provide a sufficient income and discussion of 
a possible state directive to LPG chairmen to limit the amount paid out in monthly 
advance wage instalments, a number of LPG Type III members sought to show their 
dissatisfaction.32 Professional tractor drivers -  who had been moved to join the LPG from 
the MTS with the transfer of machinery -  and former industrial workers, many of them 
SED members, held work stoppages and sought officially to withdraw their membership 
of the LPG in protest.33 Between 12th December 1961 and 15th January 1962, the Bezirk 
police authority recorded at least 162 withdrawal declarations.34 In February 1962 at least 
101 attempted withdrawals were registered from LPGs in the Bezirk?5
Where in previous years withdrawal had represented an act of resistance to the end 
of private farming and was a reaction against surrendering land into the collective, in 1962 
it represented more a matter of protest at the poverty of working for the LPG -  primarily 
by those who had not contributed land in the first place. A report from the Rat des
30 ThHStAW BDVP 20.1/352 Operativstab, Information 21/62, Vorkommnisse in der Landwirtschaft 15.02.1962 p.80.
31 ThHStAW RdB L52 BDVP Operativstab, Information 11/62 Landwirtschaft 26.1.1962.
32 B-Arch, Abt. DDR, DK1 928 Ministerium fur Landwirtschaft, Erfassung und Forstwirtschaft, Protokoll iiber die Auswertung der 
bisherigen Durchsetzung des Beschlusses vom 18.1.1962 mit den Verantwortlichen fur die Bezirke 21.2.1962 pp.218-226.
33 ThHStAW SED BPA BIV/2/5-43 Abt. Org./Kader, Einschatzung der MV in den PO der Landwirtschaft zur Auswertung des Briefes 
des 1. Bezirkssekretars der Bezirksleitung 4.1.1962 pp. 1 -6.
34 ThHStAW BDVP 20.1/353 Operativstab, Zur Situation in der Landwirtschaft 20.1.1962 p. 18.
35 ThHStAW BDVP 20.1/352 Operativstab, Information 29/62, Vorkommnisse in der Landwirtschaft 9.3.1962 p.91.
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Bezirkes in November 1962 notes the tendency of members of weak LPG in Kreis 
Miihlhausen and Nordhausen to threaten withdrawal during discussions over rates of 
payment.36 Similarly in an LPG Type III in Kreis Heiligenstadt, a large proportion of the 
members threatened withdrawal unless they continued to receive the state subsidies 
required to increase the income level.37 Withdrawal or the threat to do so was more a 
means of drawing attention to perceived injustices within the LPG and gaining the 
required investment to raise wages than a serious attempt to oppose the continuation of 
collective farming.
The Bezirk Police Authority’s political department reporting on the role of the 
ABV in that year stressed that 1962 was the year of transition in agriculture where 1963 
would be the year of “normality”.39 Certainly there were still numerous instances in the 
Bezirk at the start of 1962 where police investigations were deemed necessary as 
collective farmers not only protested but appeared also to be attempting to subvert or 
manipulate the structures of the LPG. The Ministry for State Security began an 
investigation in early 1962 into the LPG Type III in Trugleben, Kreis Gotha, after only 
three LPG members were found to have attended the annual members’ assembly.40 
Elsewhere secret ballots for the election of the board which resulted in fewer SED 
members being chosen than before prompted police investigations, as did odd cases where 
the members’ assemblies were held secretly in the private home of the chairman, 
deliberately to prevent local state or party functionaries from attending 41 In Kreis 
Nordhausen district state functionaries attending an LPG assembly found themselves 
having to talk down “negative elements” who were strongly opposed to SED agricultural 
policy. More seriously in the LPG Type I Niederzimmem in Kreis Weimar, plans to vote 
out the chairman -  the only SED member in the collective farm -  and replace him with 
someone else had to be stopped by the intervention of the SED Kreisleitung and the Rat 
des Kreises 42
36 ThHStAW RdB LI 153 Abt. Landwirtschaft Bericht iiber die Vorbereitung und Durchfiihrung der Jahresendabrechnung der LPG, 
besonders in den Nomenklatur-LPG, wirtschaftsschwachen LPG sowie LPG in den Grenz und Hohengemeinden. 5.11.62.
37 ThHStAW RdB L52 BDVP Operativstab, Information 61/62 27.7.1962.
38 ThHStAW RdB L52 BDVP Operativstab, Information 4/62: Einige Hinweise zur Beurteilung der Lage in der Landwirtschaft
5.1.1962.
39 ThHStAW BDVP 20.1/083 Politabteilung, Protokoll ueber die Arbeitsberatung der Politabteilung 9.7.1962 p. 15.
40 ThHStAW RdB LI 153 Abt. Landwirtschaft Informatorischer Bericht iiber den Stand der Jahresendabrechnung in den LPG am
29.1.1962.31.2.1962.
41 ThHStAW BDVP 20.1/352 Operativstab, Information 18/62, Vorkommnisse in der Landwirtschaft p.75.
42 ThHStAW BDVP 20.1/352 Operativstab, Information 21/62, Vorkommnisse in der Landwirtschaft 15.02.1962 p.80.
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Throughout the spring, troubleshooting brigades continued to operate around the 
Bezirk and agitators were deployed on certain festival days to encourage farmers to adhere 
to the state demands for increased planting of certain unpopular crops or to develop 
collective practices further. At the end of February in Kreis Nordhausen alone in one day 
as many as 1,200 agitators were at work.43 At the same time, a tense atmosphere clearly 
continued to exist in many rural communities. In March 1962 suggestions seemed to be 
made during the VII. German Farmers’ Congress that the boards and functionaries of 
LPGs Types I and II might be given access to the private bank accounts of their members 
in order to enable the purchase of machinery from the state. This sparked rumours of 
obligatory contributions to the funds of the LPGs being removed from farmers’ bank 
accounts, with police reporting a panic rush by farmers to withdraw money from banks 
throughout April 1962 in Kreise Weimar, Worbis and Sondershausen.44 If nothing else, 
there remained an atmosphere of considerable mistrust in LPGs as to what new means the 
SED state might employ to reduce farmers’ control of their own resources or at least short 
change them for the use of their labour.
Two years on from the completion of the collectivisation campaign and a year on 
from the construction of the Berlin Wall, the situation in the various LPG in Bezirk Erfurt 
continued to be highly variable. There had been a general reduction in outright opposition 
to or even subversion of collective farming and indeed an increase in the acceptance of the 
collective farm as an institution with a long-term future. Acceptance of the LPG as the 
only means through which it would be possible to secure a livelihood and a willingness to 
work for the prosperity of the farm were not however necessarily reflected in an 
harmonious relationship with the regime’s apparatus for running agriculture. There 
remained a considerable degree of mistrust among farmers that the state was in the process 
of finding new ways to underpay (largely LPG Type Ills) or expropriate them further 
(largely LPG Type Is). At the same time, the huge pressure for collectivised farming to 
prove itself and for the 1962 harvest to be successful, after the difficulties of the previous 
years, coupled with the uncompromising confidence of sections of the regime apparatus 
since the building of the Wall made for continued confrontations.
43 ThHStAW BDVP 20.1/352 Operativstab, Information 23/62, Vorkommnisse in der Landwirtschaft 22.2.1962 p.86.
44 ThHStAW RdB L52, BDVP Stab/Operativstab Information 35/62, 5.4.62; 36/62 13.4.62; 39/62 28.4.1962.
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Confrontation and Control
The collectivisation campaign itself had been characterised from the regime’s perspective 
as an assertion of the science of socialist necessity over the conservative selfishness of 
farmers. However a potent basis of opposition to the collectivisation in practice, if not in 
principle, was the demonstrable proof that it damaged production. The organisational 
turmoil of 1960 and 1961 left a large number of fields uncultivated and while this was 
clearly the result of the manner of the collectivisation and not the notion of collectivised 
agriculture in itself, the resulting low production figures were grist to the mill of those 
who had opposed the process in the first place. As farmers in Kreis Nordhausen pointed 
out: “with so many fields uncultivated, things cannot go on like this”.45 In those LPGs 
where farmers had been compelled, in the interests of larger plantations of crops, to fill 
dividing ditches and remove hedging between fields, opposition to the LPG found still 
further vindication. Farmers blamed the collective farming system for exacerbating the 
effects of the bad weather in 1961. Heavy rains had caused widespread damage to fields 
and because the intervening ditches had been removed between the various plots, it was 
argued, the water could not drain preventing any attempts to re-cultivate the soil46
Even as the LPGs became more stable, there was still a clear gulf on numerous 
farming issues between socialist agricultural policy and farmers’ own sense of good 
practice. The methods already initiated during the 1950s to improve the levels of livestock 
in the LPGs rapidly and raise the overall productivity of the GDR in meat and dairy 
products above that of the FRG -  namely the extensive cultivation of low-maintenance 
maize as a feed crop and the construction of large yet inexpensive open sheds (Offenstalle) 
for more concentrated livestock holdings -  had had only limited success. In the opinion of 
many farmers they also clearly contradicted received wisdom and good practice. The 
construction of Offenstalle had too often been seen to have disastrous consequences for 
livestock. Use of shoddy materials and poor choices of location exposed the animals kept 
in them to poor conditions.47 In extreme weather, such conditions in these sheds too easily 
became fatal. Investment was thus wasted on livestock and on buildings which ultimately
45 ThHStAW SED BPA BIV/2/4 — 59 SED Kreisleitung Nordhausen an die BPKK, Einschatzung iiber den Umfang und die Wirkung 
der Feindarbeit im Kreisgebiet Nordhausen im III. Quartal 1961 p.310.
46 ThHStAW SED BPA BIV/2/4 -  59 SED Kreisleitung Eisenach an die BPKK, Bericht iiber die Feindtatigkeit im Kreis 
30.6.196lp.429; SED Kreisleitung Gotha an die BPKK, Feindarbeit im Kreis Gotha 23.6.1961 p.449.
47 ThHStAW RdB L562 RdK Worbis -  Abt Finanzen: Landwirtschaft. Analyse der Entwicklung der LPG hinsichtlich der Erfiillung 
der Produktions- und Finanzpl&ne im Jahre 1960,20.2.1961.
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were of little value.48 Discussions among voluntary auxiliary policemen from across the 
Bezirk at a conference in April 1961 highlighted Offenstalle as a particular cause of 
irritation in the LPGs. The report of this meeting shows too however the resistance of the 
Bezirk functionaries present to recognising this problem. Despite the insistence of these 
voices from below, the discussion was closed with the remark: “Offenstalle will continue 
to be built and we will learn from the experiences we collect” 49
The use of maize as a feed crop was also not well received. The cultivation of 
maize had been adopted by the Soviet Union, mimicking the USA, as a safe means of 
producing reasonably high quality feed in large quantities, which could be cheaply and 
easily harvested with machinery if planted over large enough expanses. Thus in turn 
farmers in the GDR were initially encouraged to ‘learn from the Soviet friends’ and later 
then directed to devote a certain proportion of land to cultivating maize. In meeting these 
directives, LPG functionaries found themselves required to go against their own 
knowledge of the suitability of the land for this purpose. Even though the effectiveness of 
the maize crop was compromised by insufficient silage capacity in most LPG, arguments 
that traditional feed crops, while requiring more attention, would produce better quality 
feed were ignored. As a result the number of animals sustainable was overestimated and 
led naturally to shortages of quality feed.50 Although maize came gradually to be 
recognised by farmers as an essential part of the diet of livestock, at the start of 1962 in 
some LPG Type I the size of maize plantations was still being hotly debated. The Rat des 
Bezirkes insisted that a minimum of 12% of the arable land of the LPG be used for 
cultivating maize to ensure feed stocks were sufficient to prevent a repeat of the shortages 
arising from the previous year. LPG members continued to refuse to use this much land 
for maize production arguing that they themselves had enough pasture land to ensure their 
own livestock were well fed come what may.51
48 ThHStAW BDVP 20/065 Stab/Operativstab Information 54/60 Vorkommnisse in der Landwirtschaft 22.9.1960; Erwin Strittmater’s 
novel “Ole Bienkopp” vividly depicts some of the problems associated with the Offenstalle and the frustration of LPG farmers upon 
whom they were imposed. Strittmatter, E. Ole Bienkopp, (Berlin 1971) e.g pp.260-262.
49 ThHStAW BDVP 20.1/225 BDVP Abt Schutzpolizei, Protokoll von der Bezirkshelferaktiv-Tagung am 24.4.1961,26.4.1961 p.75.
50 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/2/3-335 SED Bezirksleitung Sekretariat Beschluss-Protokoll Nr. 22/60 der Sekretariatssitzung Bericht iiber 
der Arbeitsgruppe zur Untersuchung der Ursachen des derzeitigen Standes der Produktivitat der Milchkiihe (im Kreis Weimar)
4.7.1960 p.l; Gruhle p.89; ThHStAW SED BPA BIV/2/4 -  58 SED Kreisleitung Eisenach an die BPKK, Bericht iiber die 
Feindtatigkeit 18.4.1961. p. 199.
51 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/2/3/414 Bezirkssekretariat der Nationalen Front, Informationsbericht V/62: Stand der Vorbereitung des VII. 
Deutschen Bauemkongresses 17.2.1962 pp.14-24.
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The greater self-confidence of the regime a year after the construction of the Wall 
and two years after the completion of the collectivisation campaign was reflected in the 
treatment of collective farmers during the harvest in 1962. During the heightened pressure 
of the harvest period, district state and party functionaries sought more than ever to assert 
their authority over collective farmers. The crucial point of contention remained in how in 
particular this harvest was to be conducted -  with mistrust apparent as to the effectiveness 
of the methods and the true motives of farmers and functionaries alike. The arguments 
were finely balanced. On the one hand the state administration claimed to be able to 
maximise the cost-efficiency and productivity of the harvesting, collection, storage and 
distribution of crops if the whole process was run according to a strict timetable on a 
sufficiently large scale. This claim however did not always ring true, seeming to be at 
times a thin veil for the exertion of authority by the administration, at the expense of the 
interests of LPG members. As one field brigade leader asked a delegate from the Rat des 
Kreises in Kreis Apolda: “What sort of bonus are you getting for putting us under all this 
pressure?”52 Farmers reasonably claimed to know best when their crops ought to be 
harvested, how long it would take them and what was possible with the machinery 
available in practice, especially when faced with state or party officials who had little or 
no agricultural training. As the accountant in one LPG in Kreis Apolda put it: “the 
comrade functionaries should let the farmers get on with their work and not set down 
regulations... .”53 Nevertheless the superiority of modem machinery and equipment for 
drying, storing and distributing crops in theory refuted the need to follow the traditional, 
local mles on what and when to plant and harvest and what the weather would be. 
Farmers’ objections to the interference of the regime’s representatives could thus at times 
be disregarded as part of an unhealthy regard for tradition and an unfounded suspicion of 
modem methods, as well as a simple hostility towards the SED state.
Confrontations occurred in a number of LPG particularly where district and MTS 
functionaries insisted upon measures to speed up the harvest. In Kreis Apolda a brigadier 
was abused and threatened with the Stasi by the director of the MTS for refusing to allow 
grain to be harvested just after it had rained. Although the brigadier was motivated by a
52 ThHStAW SED BPA BIV/2/7-557 Bericht der AG die in Amstadt zur Emte eingesetzt ist.10.9.1962 p.25.
53 ThHStAW BDVP 20.1/364 VPKA Apolda, Aufklaerung und Meldewesen an die BDVP, Informationsbericht iiber die Lage in der 
Landwirtschaft 03.10.1962 p. 124.
98
desire to maximise the yield and prevent it from rotting in storage, the MTS director 
regarded the delay as an unnecessary -  and costly -  interruption to the progress of the 
harvest machines under his command.54 Still more common were disputes over the state’s 
deployment of outsiders (students, school children and factory workers from the towns) in 
the LPG to ‘help’ with the harvest. LPG members opposed such measures, claiming that 
such helpers were not only unnecessary, they would not do the job well and that they 
would undercut farmers’ incomes. In one LPG in Kreis Gotha, it was reported that two 
women farmers opposed the arrival of the harvest helpers from the town suggesting, 
presumably with reference to by-gone years that the workers “had only come because they 
were hungry”. As a result of such antipathy some LPG functionaries sent the helpers away 
pointing out too that they would not be able to offload all of their crop if they harvested 
too quickly.55 Despite the various instances of LPGs rejecting help, the Bezirksleitung 
registered a total of 50,000 harvest helpers deployed during the harvest in the Bezirk, 
recruited both locally and in the towns and factories of the region. There was a 
documented tendency of the district authorities to overestimate these figures. Nevertheless 
they appear to have been successful at imposing helpers on LPGs in large numbers.56
District functionaries’ moves to speed up the harvest against the better judgement 
of LPG chairmen and collective farmers provoked in places considerable irritation. A 
police report in late September noted “widespread discussion among farmers that the pace 
of the harvest is too quick and that instructions are being given by functionaries of the Rat 
des Kreises which are causing damage to the LPG.” The chairmen of an LPG in 
Schwobfeld, Kreis Heiligenstadt was quoted bitterly pointing out that “LPG members 
would have to keep their mouths shut and the gentlemen from the Rat des Kreises decide 
when the grain is to be brought in.”57 Board members in the LPG Aschara Kreis Weimar 
complained that “everything was being dictated from above”, while the chairman of the 
LPG Wolfsbehringen complained that the SED “had no need to concern itself with 
everything”.58
54 ThHStAW RdB L1086 Brief an den Vorsitzenden des RdB 19.9.1962: Beschwerde fiber die Arbeit mit den Menschen durch den 
Direktor der MTS Apolda-Heusdorf.
55 ThHStAW SED BPA BIV/2/5-44 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Org./ Kader, Informationsbericht zur Emtesituation in den Kreisen
5.9.1962 pp.154-158.
56 ThHStAW SED BPA BIV/2/5-44 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Org./ Kader, Situationsbericht Getreideemte 9.9.1962 pp.172-174.
57 ThHStAW BDVP 20.1/352 AufklSrung und Meldewesen, Information 66/62 p. 158.
58 ThHStAW SED BPA BIV/2/5-44 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Org./Kader, Informationsbericht Nr. 29/62 undated, pp.281-291.
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Such matters concerned not only LPG members and LPG functionaries but also at 
times, local functionaries of party and state who could see only the negative impact of 
bureaucratic interference where it took precedence over local and practical understanding 
of the situation. A report from September 1962 noted that leading local SED members and 
village mayors openly spoke out against SED policies and in some cases sought to resign 
their positions in protest. The mayor of Gamstadt was reported to have argued that it was 
no good setting campaign targets but rather it should be left up to the farmers to set their 
deadlines. Even a leading member of the SED Kreisleitung Miihlhausen, concerned by 
the situation in his home village, argued against any action which might jeopardise the 
quality of the harvest for the sake of saving time.59 The mayor of Herbsleben, Kreis Bad 
Langensalza asked to resign saying the measures of the party were “stuff and nonsense”
(“Kdse und Quatsch”). Other leading village functionaries, among them SED members, 
were openly hostile to outside interference. In nearby Henningsleben, a leading member of 
the SED party organisation was reported saying during a meeting: “we should be out 
working not holding discussions. Next year we should plant five hectares of clubs and 
with them thrash all the functionaries who come out here.”60 Such comments were 
indicative of the extent of local irritation at the interference of the district authorities and 
the unnecessary dictates of the SED leadership. They were made too with some 
justification. At the beginning of 1963 an assessment was made of the numbers of LPGs 
still struggling in the Bezirk and those which had improved sufficiently to be classed as 
financially stable. Of the 175 LPGs counted in 1962 as “left behind”, 84 had improved. 
However a further 20 LPGs had sunk into financial difficulty during the year leaving the 
net total of struggling LPGs in the Bezirk at 111, approximately 1 in 10.61 Moreover with 
the results of the harvest only marginally better than in previous years, collective farmers 
continued to show their dissatisfaction with the LPG by seeking to withdraw from it.62
59 ThHStAW SED BPA BIV/2/5-44 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Org./ Kader, 5. Informationsbericht iiber die Emtesituation in den 
Kreisen 7.9.1962 pp. 163-167.
60 ThHStAW SED BPA BIV/2/5-44 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Parteiorgane, Abt. OrgTKader, Informationsbericht Nr.29/62 undated 
pp.281-291.
61 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/A/2/3-051 Sekretariat der Bezirksleitung, Abt. Org./Kader, Information an das Sekretariat, l.Anlage
7.2.1963 p. 155.
62 In Kreis Gotha a total of 65 withdrawal notices were recorded in 15 LPGs: ThHStAW SED BPA BIV/2/5-10 SED Bezirksleitung 
Abt. Org./ Kader, Information iiber die Tatigkeit der Arbeitsgruppe der Bezirksleitung auf der Grundlage des Sekretariatsbeschluss vom
12.11.1962 im Kreis Gotha 17.12.1962 pp.401-406.
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Conclusion
With the removal of lingering doubt over the future existence of the GDR, a degree of 
coherence had been lent to previously fragmented collective farms. Moreover farmers had 
been made well aware of the limits of dissent. However there had been no consistent and 
comprehensive stabilisation of the LPG, either financially or politically, while the bullying 
tactics of the 1962 harvest had shown themselves only of limited value and were in some 
cases literally counter-productive. Despite the security gained by the SED regime through 
the construction of the Wall, farmers in both LPG Type Is and LPG Type Ills remained 
thus hostile to further state intervention in agriculture. Collectivisation in the vast majority 
of LPGs was by the end of 1962 far more than just collectivisation on paper. However the 
SED leadership’s prospects of gaining consistent and comprehensive control over the 
conduct and development of agricultural production at the grassroots were severely 
limited, not least by the deficit of ideological support for socialism and the lack of 
confidence in socialist agricultural policy among collective farmers and LPG functionaries 
alike.
The next section deals with the conflicts, compromises and consensus of interests 
which developed between collective farmers and the functionaries of the LPG and the 
party and state administration in Bezirk Erfurt during the 1960s. It will show how attempts 
to reform the financial and agricultural organisation of collectivised farming were shaped 
by the changing circumstances in which SED policy was communicated and received in 
the LPG. In the next chapter, I shall look back in particular to the beginnings of a drive to 
increase the proportion of farmers who had received technical training since the late 1950s 
and the attempts to extend the network of SED party organisations into the LPGs both 
before and after the construction of the Wall as part of the gradual transformation of the 
context in which SED agricultural policy was implemented on the ground in the farms of 
Bezirk Erfurt.
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SECTION 2
Communicating Reform:
The Limitations of Economic Transformation
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CHAPTER 4 
Steps toward Reform
“We still have time and anyway w e’re not ripe for becoming candidates for party membership!”1 
(Comments by LPG members to SED recruiters in Bezirk Erfurt, July 1963)
During the 1960s, the impact of the hasty completion of the collectivisation campaign 
on the consistency with which SED agricultural policies were communicated to the LPGs 
and implemented on the ground continued to be felt. In 1960 the agricultural workforce in 
Bezirk Erfurt as in the rest of the GDR was marked by a lack of technical qualifications 
and only very low levels of participation in political parties or indeed mass organisations. 
From the late 1950s, in conjunction with the collectivisation campaign, the pace of 
recruitment of farmers by the SED as well as the block parties2 had increased. At the same 
time the proportion of the agricultural workforce in training for a technical qualification 
had also increased. Nonetheless the rate at which both political recruitment and technical 
qualification, particularly to an advanced level, could occur by no means matched the 
speed with which ultimately collectivisation was completed. This defined the context in 
which LPGs were formed and collective farming was subsequently consolidated and 
developed in an era of economic reform and technological development in agriculture, as 
in the rest of the economy.
The use of overt force and mass agitation in rural communities had had some success 
in ensuring resistance to SED policies was overcome. Nevertheless in the process 
productivity had been severely compromised. Moreover such an approach was not 
practically a sustainable basis for the long-term transmission of agricultural policy in any 
comprehensive or effective manner. The consistency with which district state 
functionaries were able to see to the implementation of SED agricultural policy continued 
thus to be hampered by the lack of a clear body of support on the ground within the LPGs. 
Steps were taken to increase the size and influence of SED party organisations over the 
LPGs and improve the political reliability and technical and managerial abilities of LPG
1 ThHStAW SED BPA BIV/2/7 -  500 SED Bezirksleitung, Biiro fur Landwirtschaft, Analyse iiber die Mitgliederbewegung in den 
ersten 7 Monaten des Jahres 1963 und die Durchfiihrung der Mitgliederversammlungen im Monat Juli.15.8.1963 p.87.
2 In Kreis Apolda, there was a particularly large contingent of DBD and LDPD members in the LPG: ThHStAW BDVP 20.1/353 6. 
Bericht zur Situation in der Landwirtschaft 24.2.1962 p.43.
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functionaries. The construction of the Wall undeniably played a role in encouraging LPG 
members to pursue their own interests in conjunction with those of the SED regime, by 
joining a political party or at the very least pursuing advancement in the collectivised 
system through participation in agricultural training. Additionally the transition of the 
state apparatus for agriculture to a production oriented administration in 1963 appeared to 
offer better scope for winning over LPG members to participation in and acceptance of 
agricultural reform in the pursuit of common material interests. However in the early 
1960s, hostility to SED membership remained strong. Financial and agricultural reform in 
the LPGs continued thus to be tempered by the inadequate communication of authority 
between the district state and party administration and collective farmers. Without the 
influence of an active and capable body of SED supporters or themselves lacking in a 
political or technical appreciation for SED agricultural policy, LPG chairmen often lacked 
either the ability or the desire to implement change in the collective farm especially where 
it appeared to be against their own interests or indeed the will of the majority of their 
constituent collective farmers.
Changing the Context for Communication of Authority
Both technical education within the parameters of socialist agricultural policy and the 
expansion of the regime’s political network at the grassroots were essential to reconciling 
farmers with active participation in and development of collective farming. By re-defining 
the terms in which the transmission of authority occurred between the SED regime and 
farmers, political recruitment and technical qualification were necessary elements in the 
long term of a process of establishing a new stable context in which SED policies could be 
comprehensively and effectively implemented. A feature of the early 1960s in particular 
was thus the concurrent growth of adult qualification levels in agriculture on the one hand 
and, on the other, the expansion of the network of SED party organisations with specific 
responsibility for the LPGs.
The strength of support for the SED in the countryside was limited in the 1950s by 
a range of factors. The desire of rural communities for a return to peace following the 
upheavals of the Second World War, the Soviet occupation and the subsequent de­
nazification and land reforms hindered the SED’s attempts to find a foothold of support
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among them. In the face of radical communist policies, the farmer proclaimed himself 
apolitical and focused on his land and livestock. In its turn the largely urban SED 
hierarchy was suspicious and resentful of the rural population: villages were religious, 
conservative and bound by local tradition and long-established social networks which 
made them impenetrable to an outsider. Some progress had without doubt been made by 
the second drive for collectivisation, beginning in 1958, in aligning the interests of certain 
groups of farmers more closely with those of the regime. However often this alignment 
was achieved by proxy through the VdgB -  the farmers’ mutual aid union - and the DBD 
-  the farmers’ party established under the auspices of the SED - whose independence at 
the grass roots made them at best unreliable outposts of loyalty to the party line. The SED 
itself struggled in the eyes of most rural communities to be taken seriously as an advocate 
of farmers’ interests, being seen as the party of the urban proletariat more than anything 
else. Hence, where it did recruit members, this tended to be among those who stood 
outside the traditional farming circles -  the school teacher, the pub landlord, craftsmen, 
industrial workers who commuted from the villages to the factories as well as the 
mechanics and drivers who worked in the Machine and Tractor Stations and those workers 
who had been persuaded to move to the countryside who were organised in either the 
pioneering -  and heavily subsidised - LPG Type III or the state-owned farms (Volkseigene 
Gtiter or VEG).
From the late 1950s onwards important initial steps were taken in recruiting LPG 
members to the SED and establishing party organisations dedicated to organising and 
influencing collective farmers. The two exceptional years (1958-60) of exponentially 
increasing pressure on farmers to collectivise, culminating in the critical last weeks of 
March 1960, drew lines of loyalty or submission, active opposition and passive resistance 
towards the regime within rural communities more starkly than before. While forced 
collectivisation without doubt provoked broad resistance and deepened hatred of the 
communist regime, it also persuaded some individuals to come off the fence and work 
together with the SED. In the course of the confrontation, people necessarily grew more 
accustomed to the idea of collectivisation and took seriously the prospect that once 
achieved it might not be reversed. Those who saw their future in agriculture undoubtedly 
considered how best to position themselves within the new system. As a result alongside
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the resentment of the SED state, there was also some readiness to compromise with it, 
which grew as collective farming began to pay off and opportunities for advancement 
were tied up with party membership. By the same token, as the land was collectivised, 
more and more members of the LPG began to participate in a process of qualification, 
which redefined their status and prospects within collectivised farming.
Nonetheless the SED lacked a consistently reliable base of active supporters in 
many LPGs, particularly in the LPG Type Is, for much of the 1960s. Where there were 
SED members in the LPGs, they did not necessarily have sufficient influence over the 
running of the collective, being massively outnumbered by non-party members. In January 
1961 the SED Bezirksleitung recorded 709 LPGs in the Bezirk without an SED party 
organisation dedicated to the collective farm (i.e. an SED Betriebsparteiorganisation or 
SED BPO).3 While party organisations existed in all but 19 villages by June 1961, only 
3% of collective farmers in LPGs Types I and II and 8% of farmers in Type Ills were 
members of the SED.4 By December 1963 there were still 503 LPGs without any SED 
organisation, despite concerted efforts to recruit SED members among the Bezirk’s 
collective farmers. 423 of these were Type I LPGs.
Recruitment proved especially difficult in the largely Catholic northern and 
western border districts of Worbis and Heiligenstadt which continued to have the most 
LPGs without SED party organisations. There were strong disincentives for LPG members 
to join the SED or even take an active role in so-called LPG-Aktivs, committees of 
‘progressive’ collective farmers which served as pools for potential SED recruits. The 
potential for social exclusion, particularly where religious loyalty was also a factor, 
remained in the 1960s a considerable barrier to membership. Speaking at the end of the 
SED Bezirksparteiaktivtagung in 1964, the first secretary of the SED Bezirksleitung, Alois 
Brautigam despaired at the number of LPGs without a functioning party organisation. He 
recommended overcoming the reluctance of potential candidates by persuading them all to 
sign up in alphabetical order so that: “no one takes the blame for being the first or for 
being the last. As that’s important in villages.”5
3 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/2/3-362 Sekretariat der Bezirksleitung, Abt. Org/Kader- Informationsbericht Nr.4/61 1.2.1961 p.100
4 Gabler, D. Entwicklungsabschnitte der Landwirtschaft in der ehemaligen DDR (Berlin 1995) p. 125.
5 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/A/2/2-042 Protokoll der Bezirksparteiaktivtagung, Biiro fur Landwirtschaft am 18.12.1964, Beitrag Genosse 
Brautigam, 1. BezirkssekretSr p. 171.
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Very often objections to joining the party focused on the poor example given by 
existing SED members. Party membership in such small communities was as much a 
social as a political decision and dislike of those already in the club at a personal level 
made membership naturally less attractive. Certainly the low reputation of SED members 
hi the village was given as a reason by LPG members for not wishing to join the SED, 
with arguments such as: “we’re not joining the party, because the comrades are no model 
for us”; “Put your own ranks in order first”; “teach your comrades to work like we do 
first.”6
In 1962 the KPKK was called in to investigate a particularly severe division 
between the SED members and other members of an LPG in a village in Kreis 
Sondershausen. The SED party organisation was attached to an LPG Type III which had 
been established there for the past 5 years. The LPG BPO consisted of 12 members, most 
of whom were LPG members. Given the standards of the time, this was ostensibly a good 
basis for the SED to influence the day-to-day running of the collective. Unfortunately the 
LPG BPO was flawed in a number of aspects. Meetings were only held when the SED 
Kreisleitung instructor arranged them, and the course of ideological instruction supposed 
to take place in each of the LPG BPO annually had not been held once. The party 
secretary, an SED member since only 1960, had left school after finishing only the 4th 
grade of primary school and despite having become a good farmer, had difficulty reading 
and writing: he was thus more or less unable to run the administrative side of party life 
and relied heavily on the SED Kreisleitung instructor responsible for this part of the world 
to do it for him. He was not however particularly open to instruction on the ideological 
issues of the day and knew very little of the party resolutions for which he was supposed 
to lobby in the LPG. Additionally he liked his drink and several of his fellow party 
members were prone to getting drunk in the pub (run incidentally by another SED 
member) and getting into arguments with the other collective farmers. Non-party 
members, which included the chairman of the LPG, objected to what the KPKK described 
as the party secretary’s “selfish private ambitions” (privategoistische Bestrebungen) and
6 ThHStAW SED BPA BIV/2/7-500 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Landwirtschaft, Stand der Mitgliederbewegung. 12.10.1963 p.l 15. Some 
examples, from districts across the Bezirk, of the social conflicts caused in rural communities by SED membership: ThHStAW SED 
BPA BIV/2/4-107 KPKK Sondershausen, Bericht iiber die Untersuchung in der GO der LPG West-Greussen durch die KPKK.
15.8.1962 p.22; BIV/2/4-288 KPKK Bad Langensalza, Bericht uber die Untersuchungen der KPKK in der PO der LPG Homsommem
20.5.1963 p.155; BIV/2/4-288 KPKK Muhlhausen, Bericht iiber die Untersuchung der KPKK in der LPG “4. Parteitag” in Ammem
24.5.1963 p. 162; BIV/2/4-299 KPKK Erfurt-Land, Bericht iiber die Untersuchungen in der PO/LPG III “Karl Marx” Grossfahner.
26.10.1964 p.28.
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relations were marked by continual confrontation. Even in those situations where the party 
secretary was deemed to have been correct to address deficiencies in the running of the 
LPG, his actions “usually took on a hurtful guise so that his criticism gave cause for 
conflicts from which he drew the wrong conclusions and found himself in opposition to 
the LPG’s economic functionaries.” To make matters worse the members of the LPG BPO 
were all originally factory workers who had themselves brought no land into the collective 
-  a circumstance which gave rise necessarily to conflicts of interest with the established 
farmers within the LPG.7
Even where a party organisation was formed in an LPG in the 1960s, there was no 
guarantee that its members would be active advocates of SED policies or even take part in 
the life of the party. In early 1964, an investigation in Kreis Sommerda found that the 
agricultural department in the SED Kreisleitung was not particularly efficient in making 
sure that LPG party organisations were functioning properly.8 In the Bezirk as a whole in 
late 1964 attempts were made to improve the effect of the party organisations on 
collective farms. Working groups were sent into problem areas by the Kreisleitungen and 
party activists delegated into LPG party organisations. Severe problems in the LPG BPO 
in the Kreise Apolda and Erfurt-Land were found to be the result of the small proportion 
of actual LPG members in the party organisations.9 The help which party secretaries ought 
to have been receiving from the Kreisleitung was also found to have been limited owing to 
a lack of personnel. Instructors found that they were rarely able to do more than give basic 
administrative help. Instructors for the SED Kreisleitung Sommerda complained of having 
to manage the party organisations of up to 12 villages and consequently could achieve 
little in any one of them.10 Party secretaries often tended to do the work of the party on 
their own with little or no help from other members of the party, with the consequence that 
in the absence of the party secretary the party organisation ceased to be effective.11 
Certainly the apathy of a large proportion of SED members in LPG BPO undermined their 
effectiveness. Party secretaries were encouraged to name and shame non-attendees, and
7 ThHStAW SED BPA BIV/2/4-I07 KPKK Sondershausen, Bericht fiber die Untersuchung in der GO der LPG West-Greussen durch 
die KPKK 15.8.1962 p.22.
8 ThHStAW SED BPA SED Kreisleitung Sommerda IV/A/4.10/077 Sektor Parteiinformation, Einschatzung der MV im Monat Januar
4.2.1964 p.83.
9 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/A/2/3-099 Sekretariat der Bezirksleitung, Abt. Parteiorgane, Informationsbericht Nr.22/64 p.55.
10 ThHStAW SED BPA BIV/2/5/363 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Parteiorgane, Zweite informatorische Einschatzung....17.5.1966 p.l 1.
11 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/A/2/3-179 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Parteiorgane, Informationsbericht fiber den Stand der 
Parteiwahlen...22.11.1966 p.40
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failing that to begin a process of party punishments and discussions forcing members to 
justify their behaviour. Ultimately persistent refusal to attend should have ended in 
exclusion. An alternative method to such disciplinary proceedings used by party 
secretaries was simply to report false figures to the Kreisleitung, showing higher 
attendance than was actually the case. Nevertheless the attendance levels at party meetings 
remained a constant source of worry for functionaries in the agriculture departments of the 
Kreisleitungen because they were regularly found to be lower than in other sectors of the 
economy.12
For the majority of LPG members, the disadvantages of party membership seemed 
quite clearly to outweigh the benefits, as one disgruntled member of the LPG Olbersleben 
was reported to put it to recruiters: “what influence does the little man have on things, the 
big men do just what they want anyway?”13 There was also little enthusiasm for the 
additional work required by participation in party life. Farmers claimed that they had 
neither the time nor the energy after work to attend party meetings or prepare for them 
properly by reading up on the political issues of the day, particularly if they had to spend 
time tending their household plot or livestock.14 Nor indeed was the prospect of receiving 
a task assigned by the party particularly welcome. For the ordinary member this could 
mean taking on extra work in the commissions of the collective farm or at the very least 
taking an active role in agitating for party policy. For a manager, party membership could 
result in being selected to advocate SED policy in another (weaker) LPG -  again not 
always an enticing prospect. An attempt to recruit a brigadier in Kreis Apolda failed for 
example as he did not want to be delegated into a struggling LPG. Party membership 
could thus be seen as making for extra duties with few privileges to balance them out.15
Supplying Loyal Cadres
It was vital to the SED’s long-term goals of transforming agriculture that leading 
functionaries in the LPG were loyal to the party as well as being efficient managers of
12 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/A/2/3-144 BPKK Einschatzung der Parteiverfahren aus dem Jahr 1965 und Erfahrungen aus der Arbeit der 
PKK im Bezirk Erfurt 21.1.1965 p. 185
13 ThHStAW SED BPA SED Kreisleitung Sommerda IV/A/4.10/077 Sektor Parteiinformation, Informationsbericht laut Arbeitsplan
4.6.1965 p.204.
14 e.g ThHStAW SED BPA BIV/2/5/363 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Parteiorgane Sektor Operativ Einschatzung zu den Fragen des 
innerparteilichen Lebens, der Parteierziehung, der politisch-ideologischen und organisatorischen Arbeit der Partei in den GO des 
Kreises Worbis. 13.10.1965 p.7.
15 ThHStAW SED BPA BIV/2/7 — 500 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Landwirtschaft, Analyse fiber die Mitgliederbewegung in den ersten 7 
Monaten des Jahres 1963 und die Durchfiihrung der Mitgliederversammlungen im Monat Juli. 15.8.1963 p.90.
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production. In the new hierarchy of agricultural production, the LPG chairmen, the board 
members of the LPG and the mid-level managers of the farms (the brigade leaders and 
above) were conduits of information and authority bringing about the most effective 
implementation of SED agricultural policy by the collective farmers in their local 
conditions. Politically reliable, technically proficient and managerially capable LPG 
cadres had thus to be found to communicate the policies of the regime to LPG members 
and successfully oversee their implementation in practice.
Owing to the decision to complete collectivisation in a very short space of time, 
by the time full collectivisation was announced, it was clear that insufficient preparation 
had been made however to provide LPGs with functionaries, trained in socialist 
agricultural theory and prepared to organise and run collective farms. Furthermore there 
were insufficient numbers of politically suitable cadres willing or able to be delegated into 
leading posts in new or newly expanded LPGs, either from already established LPGs, 
other sectors of the economy or indeed the state administration. As a consequence it was 
inevitable that the majority of the new LPG cadres were deficient either in political 
reliability, managerial skill or technical ability.
During the early 1960s the SED made concerted efforts to improve its position in 
the LPGs. During 1962 SED members involved more broadly in agricultural 
administration were given targeted training to take up functionary positions in the 
collective farms. Furthermore a programme of delegation of functionaries from the district 
state apparatus, state-owned farms and other stable LPGs as well as the VdgB and the 
MTS, into politically or financially unstable collective farms was established.16 Overall 
the number of mid-level functionaries in the LPGs (such as brigade leaders, agronomists 
and technicians) who were SED members in the Bezirk increased by six times from 1961 
to 1962 -  the result of an influx of trained and party loyal cadres as well as SED 
recruitment campaigns in the LPGs.17 This was important progress as far as the SED 
leadership was concerned, in making some collective farms more consistently responsive 
to new developments in collective farm practices and economic administration. 
Nevertheless in 1963 the Bezirk still lacked just under 300 agricultural functionaries with
16 ThHStAW SED BPA BIV/2/5-043 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Parteiorgane, Abt. OrgTKader, Informationsbericht Nr.8/62 pp. 149-157.
17 ThHStAW SED BPA BIV/2/7-495 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Landwirtschaft, Analyse iiber den Stand der Entwicklung der PO der 
LPG, VEG, MTS/RTS...24.5.1963 p. 15
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suitable political and technical backgrounds, despite having organised the delegation of 
208 cadres since the beginning of 1962.18
The majority of the LPGs then in existence in 1960 were new and barely 
functional. Most of them had adopted the statute of the Type I collective farm, opting for 
the minimum degree of collective ownership and collective farming practice allowed 
them. The running of many of these new collectives thus did not automatically fall 
immediately into the hands of those who could be relied on politically.19 Leaders were 
chosen by members of such LPGs for their farming credentials and local connections not 
for their subservience to the regime. At the very least, LPG members continued to assert 
an apolitical stance. As one farmer in an LPG in Kreis Heiligenstadt argued “we want 
practical not political men on the board of our LPG”.20
Nevertheless chairmen of LPGs of all types were certainly soon removed from 
their posts where they had not proved themselves subsequently to be sufficiently 
constructive in their leadership of the LPG. By the time of the annual members’ 
assemblies, at the start of 1962, the question whether or not LPG functionaries wished to 
remain in their posts and whether or not they were considered suitable -  on a political and
91ideological basis -  had become much clearer in the post-Wall climate. At the same time, 
the state’s efforts made since 1959 to cover the deficit of both politically reliable and 
agriculturally trained cadres available for deployment in the LPGs had begun to pay off in 
a small way. In April 1961 the Bezirksleitung had passed a resolution on the improvement 
of the development of cadres in agriculture and the qualification of the rural workforce as 
a whole. This resolution foresaw a range of measures to improve the numbers of LPG 
members with sufficient political as well as practical abilities to advance collective 
farming. All production plans produced by LPGs in 1961 were to be accompanied by a 
qualification plan. Delegates of the Kreisleitungen attached to the various MTS areas were 
given the central responsibility of ensuring action was taken, not only to persuade farmers
'* ThHStAW SED BPA BIV/2/7-602 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Landwirtschaft, Abt. Org./Kader Kaderpolitische Wertung der 
Qualifikations der Parteisekretare in den LPG. 23.3.1963 p. 1-4; Abt. Landwirtschaft, Berufsausbildung 26.7.1965 p.26-32; Abt. 
Landwirtschaft Bericht an Gen. Ludecke -  Stand der Qualifizierung der Werktatigen in der soz. Landwirtschaft 27.10.1966 pp.38-39.
19 ThHStAW BDVP 20.1/353 6. Bericht zur Situation in der Landwirtschaft 24.2.1962 p.43.
20 ThHStAW SED BPA BIV/2/5-043 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Org/Kader Informationsbericht Nr. 5/62 Neunter Bericht zur 
Durchsetzung der Direktice des ZK zur Sicherung der Staatsgrenze West 30.1.1962 p.80.
21 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/A/4.10/092 SED Kreisleitung SQmmerda, Abt. Landwirtschaft, Kreislandwirtschaftsrat, Einschatzung der 
durchgefuhrten JEV und Analyse der Entwicklung der LPG im Jahre 1963, 19.2.1964 pp.2-20.
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of the value of qualifications but also to develop some plans reflecting future cadre 
requirements.22
As a result of such measures, the number of farmers exposed to basic agricultural 
training conducted with a view to application in the LPG increased, providing the basis for 
the development of a future generation of cadres. Although there were many capable 
farmers, the long-term transformation of agriculture depended upon the creation of 
professional managers and technicians of collective production. The expansion of the 
system of qualification in the early 1960s was a crucial first step in this process, altering 
the basic context in which farmers perceived agriculture and its future development under 
the SED regime.23 By the late 1960s as the size of the agricultural work force declined and 
qualification programmes took effect, the proportion of the total working population in 
agriculture with a qualification was more than doubled from 16.5% to 39.75% in the 
Bezirk. Perhaps still more significantly the number of LPG members with the technical 
college certificate increased by 88%. On the basis of these figures it appears that an ever 
growing number of farmers were qualifying themselves to take up positions as mid- and 
top-level cadres in the LPGs and were thus now defining their interests and their prospects 
for promotion in the context of collectivised farming.24 As a consequence, chairmen of 
LPGs who had failed to prove themselves good managers of collective farmers and who 
had failed to ensure the farm met minimum production targets increasingly could be 
replaced with more suitable candidates.25
Nevertheless the proportion of LPGs with both a successful and politically reliable 
chairman remained low. Moreover, while individual party members in positions of 
authority in the LPGs were certainly necessary if SED agricultural policy was to be 
seriously proposed for implementation, such individual figures needed too the backing of 
others within the collective farm. Without an effective party organisation to back them,
22 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/2/3-373 Sekretariat der Bezirksleitung, Beschluss des Biiros der Bezirksleitung iiber die Verbesserung der 
Kaderentwicklung in der Landwirtschaft und die Qualifizierung der Werktatigen auf dem Lande. 14.4.1961 p. 87-93; ThHStAW SED 
BPA IV/A/2/1-009 Sekretariat der Bezirksleitung, Protokoll der 5. Bezirksleitungssitzung Erfurt am 25.4.1963 p. 116-124; BIV/2/4-299 
KPKK Muhlhausen, Bericht iiber die Untersuchung in der LPG “8.Mai” in Zella 7.4.1964 p. 170.
23 The same opinion with regard to farmers in the GDR as a whole is given in SAPMO B-Arch, DY30/IV 2/7/581 Bericht iiber einige 
Schlussfolgerungen bei der Durchsetzung der GrundsStze zur weiteren Entwicklung des Systems der Berufsausbildung in der DDR auf 
dem Gebiet der Landwirtschaft. 26.2.1960 p.21.
24 The proportion of the agricultural workforce with the basic qualification Facharbeiterpriijung rose from 4.5% to 11.5% between 
1960 and 1961; while the number of master farmers and those with technical college and university qualifications rose from 2% to 
3.5% within Bezirk Erfurt. Statistisches Jahrbuch -  Bezirk Erfurt 1970 Teil I. p. 126.
25 ThHStAW SED BPA BIV/2/3/278 Sekretariat der Bezirksleitung, SED Kreisleitung Nordhausen an den 1. Bezirkssekretar 28.2.1963
p.2.
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LPG chairmen were slow to develop the financial or agricultural organisation of the 
collective farm.
New Departures in the Administration of Agriculture
In the mid 1960s the first steps of a radical transformation of agricultural production were 
to be taken. The reforms of the New Economic System and the announcement of plans to 
progress to industrial-style production in agriculture were intended to bring about a 
fundamentally new ethos in all types of LPGs combining both an appeal to farmers’ 
material interests and an insistence on a specifically socialist modernisation of production. 
Gradual increases in state investment during the mid 1960s brought financial stability to 
most LPGs and encouraged steps to be taken by collective farmers to increase the scale of 
production in accordance with SED policies. The processes of economic integration of 
agriculture into the planned economy and the internal reorganisation of the collective 
farms which this entailed, created fruitful ground for futher conflict between the district 
state apparatus and LPG members. LPG Type Is began to adopt collective practices more 
fully and in some cases accepted mergers with neighbouring collective farms. Limited 
forms of cooperation between LPGs also began to develop. Nonetheless collective farmers 
retained opinions on the way in which their LPG, and indeed agriculture as a whole, 
should develop which diverged considerably from those of the SED leadership. Although 
the SED state had the potential in individual cases to impose its will upon LPG members 
and their functionaries, the effective implementation of policy in the long term demanded 
a less confrontational approach, not least in the interests of increasing production levels.
In 1963, the state administration running agriculture was reconfigured with the 
creation of Agricultural Councils (Landwirtschaftsrate) at national, Bezirk 
(Bezirkslandwirtschaftsrat or BLR) and Kreis level (Kreislandwirtschaftsrat or KLR). The 
creation of the agricultural councils promised to result in a better standard of leadership by 
the state in agricultural matters, with a new professional approach to the production 
process in the LPGs.26 The agricultural departments within the Rate der Kreise, which had 
overseen the collectivisation process, were considered now too bureaucratic and 
unsuitable for guiding the development of collectivised farming as a fully incorporated
26 SAPMO B-Arch DY 3 0 IV/A 2/2.023/15 Buro Griineberg, Die besondere Beziehung zwischen genossenschaftlicher und staatlicher 
Leitung nach dem Produktionsprinzip bei der Verwirklichung des NOSPL (undated 1964) p. 162.
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sector of the planned economy. The new agricultural councils in contrast promised to be 
more active, professional bodies with primary responsibility for maximising production in 
the LPGs. Leading collective farmers were to be explicitly included in the decision­
making process at district and regional level with the intention of improving the flow of 
information into the administration from the collective farms themselves. Thus scientists, 
veterinary surgeons and other agricultural experts were to work alongside collective 
farmers to come up with the most effective means of raising production using the latest 
technologies available.27 This policy of inclusion was also designed to put aside the ‘class’ 
conflicts of the collectivisation campaign in the interests of pursuing the common goal of 
raising production levels. As the chairman of the LPG Type III “Rotes Banner” Sollnitz 
put it to his fellow SED members at the SED Bezirksparteiaktivtagung at the end of 1963, 
economic success depended on including rather than controlling the newer and reluctant 
members of the LPG. Describing the grounds for the success of his LPG over the 
previous year, he explained: “We attempted together in our territory to win over those 
collective farmers who before [collectivisation] had had the best results. That wasn’t easy, 
since they had been bossed around in the past and their suggestions for improvements to 
the collective work had been ignored.” With their re-categorisation as the Class of the 
Collective Farmers, once-reluctant members of the LPG were now in theory to be seen 
less in terms of their potential for counter-revolution. Rather due consideration was to be 
given to their abilities as productive farmers, whose opinions on how to improve 
production in the LPG Type Ills should, within reason, be taken into account.28
The introduction of this new system of agricultural administration went hand in hand 
with a number of other proclaimed changes to the conditions in which the LPGs were to 
function. Plans were announced to begin the development of industrial-scale production in 
agriculture and were marked by the completion of the transfer and sale of the remaining 
machinery of the MTS to collective farms. Moreover new economic reforms for 
agriculture were announced for 1964 as part of the policies of the New Economic System 
of Planning and Management {das Neue Okonomische System der Planung und Leitung or 
NOS) introduced by Ulbricht in 1963. The aim behind both the NOS reforms in
27 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/A/2/3-051 Sekretariat der Bezirksleitung, Protokollauszug von der Burositzung am 8.2.1963.
28 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/A/2/2-38 Protokoll der Bezirksparteiaktivtagung Landwirtschaft am 17.12.1963, Referat Genosse Becker -  
LPG Sollnitz p.68.
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agriculture and the creation of the agricultural councils was to shift the emphasis of 
agricultural administration on to stimulating productivity rather than merely controlling 
production. The KLRs were to coordinate agricultural plans more realistically with 
accurate assessments of the productive capacities and profiles of the LPGs in each 
district.29 Equally, with the reforms of the NOS, it was expected that LPG members would 
be encouraged by a system of profit incentives to improve productivity. At the same time 
planning of production would, in theory at least, be organised with greater input from 
collective farmers rather than foisted upon the LPGs by the district administration. To this 
end the number of products for which administrative plan targets would be set, was 
reduced and the dual price system for production over and above the plan was abandoned 
for arable crops.30 As the head director of the produce purchasing organisation at Bezirk 
level mentioned in December 1963, he expected the introduction of the New Economic 
System into agriculture to resolve past inconsistencies between the plans of the farms
' i i
themselves and those of the district and regional administrations. Following the grim 
upheavals of the collectivisation campaign and the struggles of the first years of collective 
farming, there was much optimism among loyal supporters of the SED regime that the 
NOS and the agricultural councils would bring both increased production and greater 
unity within agriculture.32
Despite this apparent optimism and the at least rhetorical emphasis on conciliation, 
neither collective farmers nor all LPG functionaries were quick to embrace attempts to 
reform their LPG. The increased revenues which accompanied changes to price 
regulations as part of the NOS were welcomed by LPG members. However there 
remained considerable suspicion of any new measures which appeared to restrict the 
incomes of LPG members or diminish or deprive collective farmers of control over their 
funds, land or livestock in the future. The KLRs’ attempts to persuade LPG members to 
adopt greater degrees of collective use of land, livestock and machinery, and set about the 
implementation of more refined degrees of financial organisation to stimulate production 
achieved only limited success.
29 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/A/2/1-009 Protokoll der 5. Bezirksleitungssitzung am 25.4.1963, Referat Genosse Ludecke p.38.
30 SAPMO B-Arch Buro Gerhard Griineberg DY 30 IV/A 2/2.023/15 Die Weiterentwicklung des NOSPL 16.06.1964 p.22.
31 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/A/2/2-038 Protokoll der Bezirksparteiaktivtagung Landwirtschaft am 17.12.1963, Beitrag Genosse 
Riemann, Hauptdirektor der VVEAB pp.131-135.
32 ThHStAW SED BPA -  SED Kreisleitung Sommerda IV/A/4.10/102 Information von der am 24.4.1963 stattgefundenen Aussprache 
im Sekretariat der Nationalen Front 17.5.1963 p.3.
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Hostility to Change: the Limits of Reform
Opposition to outside interference was especially strong in the LPG Type I where, not 
least owing to the lack of LPG functionaries or members who had joined the SED, 
mistrust outweighed support for state interference in agriculture. The fear of losing still 
further control over their land, livestock and machinery was fundamental cause for LPG 
Type I members to be sceptical of all proposals to restructure the work organisation or 
reform the financial arrangements of the LPG. For much of the early 1960s the district 
agricultural councils struggled therefore to ensure the implementation of the basic 
practices and work organisation of an efficient collective farm in LPG Type I. It was one 
thing to establish the LPG as an administrative institution, replete with a hierarchy of 
command, responsible commissions and the routines of collective democracy, capable of 
coordinating collective work on arable land. It was another to develop a functioning 
collective farm which was taking steps to reduce and control the element of private 
ownership among its members. Establishing collective livestock herds, the organisation of 
collective farming of meadow land and of household plots; increasing the level of 
accumulated capital rather than the level of consumption of profits as income; reducing 
the significance of contributed land in the distribution of income, introducing the internal 
competition between members and establishing performance-related pay were all steps 
which LPG Type I members sought, with greater and lesser degrees of success, to resist. 
With the implementation of each of these measures, the prospect of the loss of both 
individual control over private production and the profits arising from it came nearer.
To LPG Type I members, there was not much to recommend merger with a 
neighbouring LPG Type III. Merger meant not only having a smaller voice in the running 
of the farm, it very likely meant coming under the direct influence of an SED party 
organisation. Most obviously the transfer of private livestock into collective use amounted 
to something akin to expropriation as far as some LPG Type I farmers were concerned.
The monetary value of the contribution required from Type I farmers joining LPG Type 
III was felt to be exaggerated too, while the animals and machinery contributed were often 
thought to have been undervalued. Type I farmers had little confidence either in the 
greater profitability of collective livestock holdings and indeed expected to suffer financial
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hardship in the LPG Type III. As can be seen from Figure 2. below, between September 
1960 and September 1970 the number of LPG Type Is in existence in the Bezirk dropped 
at a fairly steady rate, while the number of LPG Type Ills remained stable. In a few cases, 
mergers, or rather take-overs, undoubtedly occurred with LPG Type Ills despite the 
opposition of the majority of LPG Type I members, although what proportion of mergers 
occurred on this basis is uncertain. Even where ballots of the LPG Type I members were 
held, complaints were sometimes heard from collective farmers that they had been forced 
to vote under duress or misled as to what they were voting for.
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Figure 2.
Nevertheless on the whole the staff of KLRs were aware of the problems created by 
forcing through mergers of LPGs without sufficient preparation, if not the whole hearted 
enthusiasm, of collective farmers. The potential damage to production levels as well as the 
financial stability of LPGs as a result of the discontent of collective farmers and general 
disorganisation within the collective farm had been clearly demonstrated in many LPGs in 
the course of collectivisation. Mergers of LPG Type Is with LPG Type Ills were necessary 
to the transformation of agriculture in both the short and long term. As repositories of 
money, machinery and good stock as well as farming expertise, LPG Type Is potentially 
provided the solution to struggling LPG Type Ills in need of all these resources. Pressure 
from the KLRs on LPG Type Is to merge with neighbouring LPGs, particularly other LPG 
Type Is, was motivated too by practical concern for organising more efficient farming of 
arable land, enabling larger plantations of single crops. It could also be motivated by the
33 Statistische Jahrbiicher, Bezirk Erfurt 1960-1975 (Erfurt: Staatliche Zentralverwaltung fur Statistik, Bezirksstelle Erfurt: 1961-1976)
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recognition that very small LPG Type Is had very little prospect of sustaining the 
personnel or the machinery to provide the increases in production necessary to remain 
profitable in the future. At the start of 1964 nine LPGs Types I and II in Kreis Sommerda 
were singled out by the SED Kreisleitung as having no real future as independent 
economic units. Consequently the provision of financial support from the KLRs was made 
contingent on these LPGs planning to merge with a neighbouring farm.34
The feeling was widespread in rural communities that having once been forced into the 
LPGs, farmers should at least be now left to get on with improving production without 
unwanted state interference. In particular attempts to gauge labour productivity via the 
introduction of an official documented competition between farmers or the creation of 
work norms were still widely met with opposition during the early 1960s, particularly in 
LPG Type Is. The introduction of schemes to increase labour productivity was regarded at 
best as an unnecessary administrative burden by LPG farmers and functionaries.35 At 
worst the socialist competition was recognised and rejected as a means of state 
interference in the running of the LPGs and a lever with which to force increased 
productivity. The organisation of a competition internal to the LPG, between individual 
members, appeared too to undermine LPG members’ conception of their special identity 
as farmers, as naturally hard working and dedicated to their land and livestock, putting 
them rather in the same bracket as mercenary industrial wage labourers. In the words of 
the chairman of the LPG Type I in Nottleben, Kreis Erfurt-Land: “competition is an 
expression of mistrust. It suggests that farmers are lazy and are only motivated to work by
„  , j >36money.
Moreover competition between farmers in the same collective farm was seen as 
unnecessarily divisive. LPG functionaries already had difficulty in maintaining 
harmonious relations between the various different members and were unwilling to 
heighten tension further by adding money to the equation. In August 1962 only 10 of the 
96 LPGs in the district of Gotha had drawn up an internal competition, with LPG 
chairmen arguing that “competition causes bad blood” and even that competition
34 ThHStAW SED BPA — SED Kreisleitung Sommerda IV/A/4.10/092 KLR -  Produktionsleitung, Einschatzung der durchgefuhrten 
Jahresendversammlungen und Analyse der Entwicklung der LPG im Jahre 1963. 19.2.1964 pp.2-20.
35 ThHStAW SED BPA BIV/2/5-44 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Org./ Kader, Wie werden in den Leitungssitzungen und 
Mitgliederversammlungen entsprechend der Beschlusse der Partei, die wichtigsten Probleme in den Mittelpunkt gestellt? 25.7.1962 
pp.35-48.
6 ThHStAW SED BPA BIV/2/5-44 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Org./Kader, Information 19/62 30.7.1962 pp.49-57.
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“represents an illegal increase in the work unit”.37 In April the following year reports on 
LPG Type Is in the Bezirk as a whole reported the commonplace opinion of farmers that: 
“Competition brings disharmony in the LPG, especially between the older and the younger 
collective farmers. Competition does not increase work productivity.” Reiterating the 
rhetoric of the labour movement in the Weimar period, an explicit comparison was made 
between capitalist exploitation and exploitation under state socialism: “today we say 
competition and before it was called piece work and piece work is murder (.Akkord ist 
Mord).”39 Other administrative methods designed to stimulate productivity in LPGs were 
also considered with scepticism. In February 1963 information reports on the mood of the 
population pointed to a number of expressions of opposition to any form of performance- 
related pay in the collectives on the basis that “material incentive leads to mutual 
chicanery between individual farmers; payment according to the final product means 
discrimination against older farmers since they can’t put in the work the young ones 
can.”40 Instructors from the KLRs thus met with arguments which dismissed these 
innovations as unnecessary or even as downright destructive. Comments such as 
“competition is just passing fad” or even “our LPG is too small to run a competition,” 
were accompanied by more serious complaints as to the divisiveness of competition 41 By 
November 1963 it was noted that socialist competition was still being resisted, with only 
228 out of 723 LPGs Types I and II in the Bezirk participating.42 By the beginning of 
1964, the KLR in Kreis Sommerda could claim only 8 LPG Type Is had developed a good 
degree of collective work, which included adopting both internal and external competition 
and some form of performance related pay. At the other end of the spectrum, 6 LPGs were 
found to be still functioning as collectives in name only. The vast majority of LPGs Types 
I and II had made some but by no means enough steps to implement “good collective 
practice.”43
37 ThHStAW SED BPA BIV/2/5-44 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Org./ Kader, Kurzinformation 26/62 13.8.1962 p.87-91; Abt. Org./
Kader, Sektor Parteiinformation, Faktenmaterial: Wie wird mit dem Ministerratsbeschluss vom 17.9.1962 gearbeitet pp.441-449.
38 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/B/2/9.01-606 SED Bezirksleitung Ideologische Kommission, Arbeitsgruppe der Ideologischen 
Kommission, Information und Schlussfolgerungen...3.4.1963 p.17.
39 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/B/2/9.01-606 SED Bezirksleitung Ideologische Kommission, Arbeitsgruppe der Ideologischen 
Kommission, Information und Schlussfolgerungen...3.4.1963 p.20.
40 ThHStAW SED BPA BIV/2/5-380 Abt. Parteiorgane, Abt. Org./Kader an das ZK, Abt. Org./Kader, Informationsbericht Nr.4/63
18.2.1963 p.108.
41 ThHStAW RdB L599 Bezirkslandwirtschaftsrat, Analyse uber die okonomische Entwicklung der LPG im Jahre 1963 undated.
42 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/A/2/2-38 Protokoll der Bezirksparteiaktivtagung Landwirtschaft am 17.12.1963, Referat Genosse Thieme, 
Stellv. Leiter des Biiros fiir Landwirtschaft p.22.
43 ThHStAW SED BPA -  SED Kreisleitung Sommerda IV/A/4.10/092 KLR -  Produktionsleitung, Politische Wertung iiber die
Entwicklung der LPG des Kreises Sommerda im Jahre 1963 13.4.1964 p.25.
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Having implemented the highest degree of collectivisation of property on the farm, in 
contrast to the LPG Type Is, the LPG Type Ills were expected to lead the way in the 
implementation of the latest elements of economic planning and administration in 
farming. Their leading functionaries tended more often than in the LPG Type Is to be 
members of the SED and the size of the party organisation tended too to be larger, making 
for a stronger base of support for the latest methods or work organisation proposed by the 
SED leadership. As a consequence Type III LPGs were often quicker to develop new 
incentive-based pay structures and to develop the conditions for specialised and industrial- 
scale production. In Bezirk Erfurt as a whole, there was some evidence that Type III LPGs 
were beginning to prove themselves more capable of producing efficiently. The average 
income of a member working full-time in an LPG Type III rose from 3,360 Marks in 1962 
to just over 4000 Marks in 1963 according to figures from the BLR.44 Type III LPGs were 
able too to close the gap in productivity on the average LPG Type I and II in some parts of 
the Bezirk. According to figures on volume of produce (as measured in grain units) per 
hectare, production in Type Ills in Kreis Sommerda was able to match that of Type I/IIs in 
livestock and was only slightly lower in crop production in 1963. Nevertheless there 
remained in 1963 a large number of loss-making Type III LPGs, which were reliant on 
considerable credits and subsidies from the state, and many more in which working 
conditions left much to be desired.45 There was thus much scepticism of any change which 
did not immediately promise to improve the conditions under which these LPG members 
worked or, worse still, which threatened to compromise their incomes. Arguments were 
made in several LPGs against payment according to work norms and the introduction of 
performance-related pay, such as: “what do we need norms for? The main thing is that the 
work units are correct.” In the LPG Type III Tuttleben in Kreis Gotha, the women of the 
field brigade were reported to have expressed the opinion: “Our menfolk had to do piece­
work 20 years ago. You lot (i.e. Socialists) are against piece-work, but the performance 
principle is no different.”46 Despite improving incomes, it was clear that at the start of
ThHStAW RdB L599 Bezirkslandwirtschaftsrat, Analyse iiber die okonomische Entwicklung der LPG im Jahre 1963 undated.
43 ThHStAW SED BPA -  SED Kreisleitung Sdmmerda IV/A/4.10/092 KLR -  Produktionsleitung, Politische Wertung iiber die 
Entwicklung der LPG des Kreises SOmmerda im Jahre 1963 13.4.1964 pp.21-39.
46 ThHStAW SED BPA BIV/2/5-380 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Parteiorgane, Abt. Landwirtschaft, Informationsbericht Nr. 16 18.6.1963 
pp.344-354.
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1964, a large proportion of LPG members in the Type Ills continued to suspect the state 
via the LPG of seeking to exploit them as workers.47
Leading functionaries in the LPG Type Ills too resented the burden of implementing 
management methods which caused disquiet among the members and objected to the 
greater level of responsibility and accountability foisted upon them by the detailed gauges 
of the LPG’s economic performance now demanded by the KLRs. In 1965, reasonably 
clement weather over the previous year and a degree of success in the use of machinery 
collectively had led to a much improved harvest around the Bezirk. As a result the 
members’ assemblies at the start of the year were marked less than ever by signs of 
disgruntlement. To the dismay of the BLR, LPG chairmen however failed to suggest to 
their members that their improved incomes were a direct consequence of the systems of 
economic incentive which had so far been introduced.48 Even, it was noted, in the most 
advanced of the LPG Type Ills, the internal competition was widely thought to serve no
49purpose.
Assessing the discussions and statements made at district farmers’ conferences held 
around the Bezirk in March 1965, the BLR found that there was still a considerable 
shortfall in the extent to which economic reforms had been implemented in the LPGs.50 
Socialist business economics (sozialistische Betriebswirtschaft) -  a collective term used to 
describe the combination of administrative regulations, economic levers and systems of 
material incentive which LPGs were ideally to employ under the NOS -  appeared neither 
to be fully understood nor accepted by collective farmers and LPG functionaries alike. An 
information report on the state of the implementation of the NOS in May 1965 pointed to 
some sudden progress having been made in winning over LPG cadres in the Bezirk. 
Following a series of lectures and a propaganda campaign to help LPG chairmen and 
accountants understand socialist business economics, twice as many LPG Type Ills in the 
Bezirk had reportedly reached an advanced stage in the implementation of various forms 
of performance-related pay and strict accounting methods. Nevertheless proposals to index 
LPG functionaries’ pay directly to the financial results of the LPG still provoked
47 ThHStAW SED BPA -  SED Kreisleitung Sommerda IV/A/4.10/092 KLR -  Produktionsleitung, Einschatzung der durchgefuhrten 
Jahresendversammlungen und Analyse der Entwicklung der LPG im Jahre 1963. 19.2.1964 pp.2-20.
48 ThHStAW LI082 Bezirkslandwirtschaftsrat, Femschreiben an den Vorsitzenden und Produktionsleiter des KLWR 19.1.1965.
49 ThHStAW L1081 Bezirkslandwirtschaftsrat, Berichterstattung an die Bezirksleitung der SED, Abt. Parteiorgane 18.1.1965.
50 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/A/2/3-112 Bezirkslandwirtschaftsrat, Einschatzung der Kreisbauemkonferenzen im Bezirk Erfurt, 
Schlussfolgerungen 29.3.1965 p. 152.
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opposition among both brigadiers and LPG chairmen. There was no sense, they argued, in 
which they as managers could guarantee that the plan targets were fulfilled.51
If chairmen of the LPG Type Ills were not always supportive of new methods by 
which to run their collective farms, the leaders of LPG Type Is were still slower to insist 
on the implementation of changes in theirs. The threat to their livelihoods and their 
independence, which farmers in the LPG Type I perceived to come from the KLR’s 
proposals for the introduction of performance-related pay or greater collectivisation of 
land or livestock, prevented such issues even coming up for discussion in some LPG Type 
Is in 1964. In Flarchheim, Kreis Erfurt-Land, where the LPG Type I was among the most 
successful in the district, LPG members were reportedly easily able to resist attempts by 
the LPG’s directing board to introduce performance-related pay and socialist competition. 
It was suggested even that the LPG members would seek to vote those board members out 
of their positions if they continued to advocate such measures.52 Elsewhere in 1964 
attempts to introduce collective farming of pasture land and develop collective livestock 
herds continued too to fail in LPGs Types I and II.53 Although by May 1965 in the Bezirk 
as a whole 72% of LPG Type Is had some sort of collective livestock holding alongside 
privately kept animals, more than half continued to farm their pasture land on an 
individual basis.54
LPGs which resisted any form of change were most numerous in those parts of the 
Bezirk where LPG Type Is predominated and the SED had failed to establish an effective 
network of party organisations among either collective farmers, or indeed the rural 
population in general. This was particularly the case in the hilly north east of the Bezirk 
where the strength of the SED was limited by the resilience of close-knit Catholic 
communities and where the terrain and the pre-collectivisation pattern of land ownership 
precluded the rapid development of industrial-scale crop production or intensive livestock
51 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/A/2/3-112 Sekretariat der Bezirksleitung, Einschatzung der Arbeitsgruppe der Bezirksleitung uber die 
Fiihrungstatigkeit des Secretariats der SED Kreisleitung Nordhausen p. 100-119; BIV/2/5-382 Abt Parteiorgane, Informationsbericht 
Nr.16/65 29.5.1965 pp. 181-191; BIV/2/7-588 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Landwirtschaft Bericht Qber die politische Fiihrungstatigkeit zur 
Herausbildung von Kooperationsbeziehungen 1965 p.476-484; BIV/2/5-382 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Parteiorgane, Informationsbericht 
Nr.16/65 29.5.1965 pp.181-191.
52 ThHStAW NF 172 Bezirkssekretariat, Vorlage an das Biiro fur Landwirtschaft bei der Bezirksleitung der SED 13.6.1964 p. 117.
53 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/A/2/3-084 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Parteiorgane, Informationsbericht 7.4.1964 p. 16.
54 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/A/2/3-112 Sekretariat der Bezirksleitung, Einschatzung der Arbeitsgruppe der Bezirksleitung iiber die 
Fiihrungstatigkeit des Sekretariats der SED Kreisleitung Nordhausen p. 100-119; BIV/2/5-382 Abt. Parteiorgane, Informationsbericht 
Nr.16/65 29.5.1965 p. 181-191; BIV/2/7-588 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Landwirtschaft Bericht iiber die politische Fiihrungstatigkeit zur 
Herausbildung von Kooperationsbeziehungen 1965 p.476-484; BIV/2/5-382 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Parteiorgane, Informationsbericht 
Nr.16/65 29.5.1965 pp.181-191.
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holding. In Kreis Worbis suggestions that LPGs should begin to specialise production in 
single crops or in livestock were thus met with scepticism from farmers. Establishing a 
coherent arrangement of fields for concentrated production of a single crop was 
compromised in any case by the patchwork of household plots and dividing walls and 
hedges which had yet to be removed. More seriously farmers refused to countenance such 
measures on the grounds that they were just the beginning of a plan to expropriate farmers 
completely. In the neighbouring districts of Miihlhausen and Nordhausen, farmers 
similarly argued that concentration of production was just going to turn “farmers” into 
“labourers” or that it would make LPGs too dependent on one another to be efficient.55 
The head of the district ideological commission in the SED Kreisleitung Worbis reported 
on the ongoing of resistance of farmers to change at the end of 1964. At the root of the 
problem, he noted, was the fact that LPG chairmen agreed with the SED in principle but 
when it came to putting policies into practice were either unwilling or unable to see them 
through.56 Where LPG functionaries were themselves in favour of implementing reforms, 
the unopposed front of resistance presented by LPG members in those collective farms 
where no or few political ties or loyalties to the SED regime existed meant they found 
little support within the LPGs.57
Progress was made, at least on paper in many LPG Type Is and LPG Type Ills around 
the Bezirk following the holding of members’ assemblies at the start of 1966.58 
Approximately three quarters of LPGs, it was reported, had introduced forms of material 
incentive making incomes dependent on specific improvements in productivity.59 
Nevertheless the number of LPGs which had instituted the full raft of economic reforms 
which were supposed to drive the NOS in agriculture remained limited. LPG Type Is in 
areas such as Kreis Worbis, remained particularly resistant to the introduction of 
performance-related pay, indexed payment of leading cadres, collective farming of 
household plots and grassland or higher rates of capital accumulation.60
55 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/A/2/3-096 SED Bezirksleitung Abteilung Parteiorgane, Informationsbericht 18/64 20.8.1964 p.45.
56 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/A/2/2-042 Protokoll der Bezirksparteiaktivtagung, Btiro fur Landwirtschaft am 18.12.1964, Beitrag 
Genosse Storost, Leiter der Ideologischen Kommission der SED Kreisleitung Worbis p. 165.
57 ThHStAW SED BPA BIV/2/5/360 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Parteiorgane, Einschatzung der Kreisparteiaktivtagung Worbis am
2.6.1965,4.6.1965 p.l.
58 ThHStAW SED BPA BIV/2/7-565 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Landwirtschaft Einschatzung der bisherigen Ergebnisse der 
Durchfuhrung der JEV. ..12.1.1966 p.212.
59 ThHStAW SED BPA BIV/2/5/384 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Parteiorgane, Informationsbericht Nr.6/66 25.2.1966 p.14.
60 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/A/2/3-159 SED Kreisleitung Worbis, Sekretariat, Bericht iiber die Fiihmng der polit.-ideologischen Arbeit 
nach dem 11. Plenum. ..3.6.1966 p.29.
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Conclusion
During the course of the 1960s the problem of introducing new working practices into 
the LPGs was partially solved by a process of qualification, expansion of the party 
organisations, merger and cooperation. Economic reform and the transformation of the 
conditions of production (however gradual) were nevertheless not warmly received by 
collective farmers. Functionaries of the KLRs continued to face serious difficulties in 
persuading members and cadres of the LPGs to accept policies which at best they did not 
understand and at worst to which they maintained a fundamental ideological opposition. 
The long-term goals of SED agricultural policy ran too often contrary to collective 
farmers’ own conception of their best interests and their own sense of good practice. As a 
consequence the implementation of the economic reform required to establish specialised 
agriculture on an industrial scale and integrate agricultural production into a 
comprehensive system of economic planning required considerable time and effort. Until 
loyal and capable cadres occupied the leading positions in most LPG and reliable political 
lobbies had been established at the grassroots of farming, it remained problematic for the 
regime effectively and forcefully to persuade collective farmers -  particularly those in the 
LPG Type Is - that they should and would change their working practices in accordance 
with SED policy. LPG chairmen clearly had to be responsive to the demands placed upon 
them by the district agricultural councils to implement reforms and persuade their 
members to support the state’s plans for developing agricultural production. However they 
were also bound, if they were to retain the support of their fellow farmers and continue to 
run a successful farm, to act in their members’ interests and respond to their concerns. 
Attaining good production results and showing themselves not to be hostile to SED 
agricultural policy -  matters on which their future careers depended -  entailed balancing 
and mediating these twin pressures. As long as LPG members sought to assert interests 
which did not appear to be served by SED agricultural policy and as long as LPG 
functionaries lacked the desire or the strength and political support on the ground to 
overcome divergent opinions, the transformation of agriculture remained a slow process.
By the completion of the administrative collectivisation of farms in Bezirk Erfurt, as in 
the rest of the GDR in spring 1960, there was a basic deficiency of personnel in the LPGs,
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but particularly in the LPG Type Is, who would support the introduction of measures 
designed to reform the financial and agricultural organisation of the collective farms.
Steps had been taken since the 1950s to provide sufficient numbers of cadres, loyal to the 
SED, and trained to run the LPGs in accordance with SED policy. Steps had also been 
taken to recruit LPG members to the SED in order to create a lobby of support for SED 
policies within each of the collective farms. However in the early 1960s the deficiency of 
personnel remained a problem. Despite the construction of the Wall, the stabilisation of 
the LPGs in the aftermath, and development of a more production- orientated 
administration for agriculture, the quality and quantity of loyal LPG cadres and LPG 
members remained insufficient to persuade collective farmers as a whole of the value of 
further changes to the organisation of the LPG, not least where these changes appeared to 
expose the individual farmer to further outside interference. The existence of the LPG had 
been put beyond doubt; how and how quickly it would develop remained a matter of some 
contention.
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CHAPTER 5 
Resistance, Compromise and “Cooperation”
“Cooperation means making sure other LPGs have a higher value o f  work unit; bringing advantages for 
some but disadvantages for others; and it means that w e’d have to give up what w e’ve achieved to help 
those who have been left behind.” 1 (Machine Brigade Leader, Wundersleben, Kreis Sommerda, 1966)
By the mid 1960s, the LPGs were no longer a new or controversial phenomenon. The 
context in which farming took place in the GDR continued nevertheless to shift, as the 
SED leadership continued to pursue a radical transformation of the conditions of 
agricultural production. Levels of recruitment to the SED and levels of more and less 
advanced degrees of qualification among farmers continued to increase, as the size of the 
agricultural workforce declined. The economic pressures on members of Type I to 
establish collective livestock holdings or merge with LPG Type Ills ensured the extent of 
private farming was being continually scaled back. Moreover new technology was 
beginning to raise yields, and in turn improve working conditions and incomes for the 
agricultural workforce. Nevertheless growing uncertainty as to their future in a reformed 
system of socialist agriculture among both LPG farmers and functionaries continued to 
limit the pace and the extent to which the agricultural councils were in a position to drive 
the implementation of SED agricultural policy. With no guarantee of financial security 
there were few members of the LPG willing to compromise what stability they had thus 
far achieved.
The Early Development of Cooperation
Parallel to the debate over the implementation of the NOS in the LPGs was the issue of 
how to establish the conditions for more cost-intensive mechanised production. By the 
mid 1960s, after a series of mergers, most LPGs had reached a stable position financially 
and responding to the policies of the NOS had raised significant levels of accumulated 
capital. This alongside considerable improvements in the numbers and capacity of tractors, 
harvesters and other machinery available in the GDR made mechanised crop production 
on a larger scale and the beginnings of large-scale intensive livestock production possible.
1 ThHStAW SED BPA -  SED Kreisleitung Sommerda IV/A/4.10/077 Sektor Parteiinformation, Informationsbericht laut Arbeitsplan
4.4.1966 p.247.
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However it was still not clear what was the most effective means by which collective 
farmers would be brought to combine their resources. Solutions to these problems 
presented themselves in two forms -  the development of cooperative relations between 
two or more LPGs or the merger of collective farms together to form a Grand LPG 
combining crop and livestock production on a larger scale under a single leadership.
There were strong tendencies among some LPG leaders to seek to develop the scale of 
production under their control.3 In most cases however the KLRs were reluctant to 
endorse mergers between LPGs across more than one village during the early 1960s, for 
fear this would limit further possibilities for a more effective rationalisation of resources 
in later years. Moreover the development of cooperative relations did not preclude but 
rather provided the basis for possible mergers in the future.
Cooperation between LPGs could occur in a number of different forms and had begun 
to be developed on a small-scale since the early 1960s. LPGs had already started to 
combine their efforts on construction projects, cooperate on building up stocks of animals 
cooperatively between the collectives and form joint land improvement cooperatives. As 
the 1960s developed LPGs were encouraged to expand their participation in local 
cooperative projects particularly with regard to the use of land and machinery as increased 
yields would enable the GDR to become less dependent on importing feed for livestock.
To achieve greater yields LPGs had to be encouraged to combine their resources to 
increase the fertility of the soil and to move on to ever more effective use of the large 
machinery now available. While few farmers objected in principle to cooperation where 
there was mutual benefit, there was however considerable suspicion of what cooperation 
might lead to and of how the finances of their LPG would be affected.
At the start of 1964 the BLR claimed 28 cooperative building organisations 
(Zwischenbetriebliche Bauorganisationen, ZBO) already existed, and the goal of 
establishing one ZBO in each MTS region by the end of the year seemed attainable.4 A 
few LPGs had also begun to build up joint livestock production facilities and combine
2 Grand LPG serves here as a translation for the term “Gross-LPG'.
3 Examples of LPG members opinions to this effect may be found in ThHStAW SED BPAIV/B/2/2-022 Protokoll der 
Bezirksparteiaktivtagung zu den Fragen und Aufgaben der soz. Landwirtschaft am 7.3.1968 Beitrag Genossin Zessin p.103; SED BPA 
IV/B/2/13-378 SED Bezirksleitung Einschatzung iiber das Einwohnerforum in der Grenzgemeinde Berka/Werra Kr. Eisenach 
27.1.1969 p.l.
4 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/A/2/3-084 SED Bezirksleitung, Abt. Landwirtschaft Konzeption fur das landliche Bauwesen im Bezirk 
Erfurt fur das Jahr 1964..20.3.1964 p. 127; IV/A/2/3-122 SED Kreisleitung Nordhausen, Bericht fiber die Entwicklung der 
massenpolitischen Arbeit...25.6.1965 p.20.
127
their herds forming separate cooperative entities responsible to each of the constituent 
LPGs. These were known as Inter-collective Establishments
{Zwischengenossenschaftliche Einrichtungen or ZGE) and formed the basis for early 
attempts to concentrate and specialise in livestock production. Another early form of 
cooperation concerned land improvement projects. Given the obvious mutual advantages 
of schemes draining and irrigating land over a wide area and the extent of manpower and 
machines often required by such projects, the formation of so-called melioration 
cooperatives (Meliorationsgenossenschaften) did not automatically raise objections among 
LPG members either. Assessing developments in March 1965 the BLR estimated that 
approximately 15% of the LPGs in the Bezirk were involved in some form of cooperation.
The degree of openness to the idea of establishing cooperative relations between LPGs 
among collective farmers and the leading functionaries of the LPGs varied across the 
Bezirk. Kreis Erfurt-Land and Kreis Weimar had the most cooperating collective farms.
In contrast in Kreis Nordhausen and Kreis Miihlhausen very few LPGs had entered into 
any form of cooperative relationship. Part of the reason for this difference, even at this 
early stage in the development of cooperation was the different solutions which 
cooperative relations offered the LPGs in different parts of the country. In the uplands of 
the Bezirk where the LPGs were small, mainly of Type I and arable land not very easily 
farmed on a large-scale, cooperation was immediately worthwhile above all for building 
larger, more efficient livestock sheds, silage and storage facilities. This required LPG 
members to be willing to invest considerable sums in construction projects which would 
bind them together with their neighbours for years to come as well as committing them, if 
they belonged to an LPG Type I, to scale back their private livestock.5 Cooperative 
relations thus represented a degree of commitment to the long-term transformation of the 
conditions of ownership for members of LPG Type Is which they considered neither 
practicable nor desirable. At the SED Bezirksparteiaktivtagung in December 1964 it was 
reported that among a number of farmers particularly in the smaller LPGs, cooperative 
relations with their neighbours were rejected outright. Members of the LPG Type I in 
Gormar, Kreis Miihlhausen allegedly believed: “cooperative relations have the purpose of
5 ThHStAW SED BPA IVA/2/3-112 Bezirkslandwirtschaftsrat, Der Vorsitzende u. Prod.leiter an das Sekretariat der Bezirksleitung der 
SED Betr: Schlussfolgerungen zur Verallgemeinerung der Erfahrungen bei der Herstellung kooperativer Beziehungen im Bereich 
Obemissa 18.3.1965 p.33.
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enabling large LPG to swallow small collective farms and enrich themselves at their 
expense.”6 In Kreis Nordhausen members of small LPGs under 100 hectares also doubted 
the value of cooperation, raising questions such as: “aren’t we giving up our independence 
with the creation of cooperative relations? Won’t we be done over by stronger LPGs?”
In contrast in the flat lands in the heart of the Bezirk where large-scale arable 
plantations were possible, cooperative institutions were set up mainly to deal with 
auxiliary processes from crop production such as feed preparation and the transport and 
drying of crops. Not only was participation in such forms of cooperation not necessarily 
an overwhelming commitment which entailed compromising the independence of a 
significant facet of (private) production, it was also of clear and immediate benefit to the 
LPGs involved.8 An analysis of the extent of cooperation in Kreis Erfurt-Land in 1965 
noted thus that all of the LPGs in the district belonged to one of 17 so-called Cooperative 
Communities (Kooperationsgemeinschaften or KOGs) of two or more cooperating LPGs.9
From the SED’s point of view cooperation was an ideal solution to many of the 
problems undermining agriculture’s development since collectivisation. The imbalance in 
the economic and social development of individual LPGs could begin to be evened out 
once neighbouring collective farms began to share the burdens of improving production 
facilities. The influence of politically loyal collective farmers and technically capable 
cadres was given the opportunity to spread beyond the confines of a single LPG. At the 
same time the possibilities increased for establishing industrial-scale specialised 
production above all in joint arable farming between LPGs. Cooperation provided too a 
halfway house to ease the transition for small LPG Type Is on their way to a merger with a 
larger neighbour. The process of working together brought with it necessarily both greater 
familiarity and steps towards greater conformity in the financial organisation of the LPGs, 
potentially making for a smoother merger. However these arguments in favour of 
cooperative relations provided the basis too for much of the opposition from collective 
farmers, who remained resistant to interference in the internal workings of their collective 
farm. Cooperation threatened to subordinate LPG members’ interests to outside influence,
6 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/A/2/2-042 Sekretariat der Bezirksleitung, Protokoll der Bezirksparteiaktivtagung Landwirtschaft am 
18.12.1964 Referat (unnamed) p.70.
7 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/A/2/3-122 SED Kreisleitung Nordhausen, Bericht fiber die Entwicklung der massenpolitischen 
Arbeit...25.6.1965 p.20.
8 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/A/2/3-112 Bezirkslandwirtschaftsrat, Schlussfolgerungen zur Verallgemeinerung... 18.3.1965 p.31.
9 ThHStAW RdB, Bezirkslandwirtschaftsrat, Produktionsleitung, Kurzanalyse fiber den Kreis Erfurt-Land, Bereich Landwirtschaft 
undated 1965.
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transform their way of life and working practices and potentially rob them of their 
independence altogether. The progress of cooperation between LPGs depended therefore 
heavily on the perception of collective farmers of their status and future within agriculture 
in the GDR.
Farming practices had changed since 1960. Investment in construction and machinery 
for agriculture had brought with it new routines and new expectations for all those 
involved in the LPGs. In five years of full collectivisation, approximately one in five 
members of the agricultural workforce had left the profession, while the number of 
tractors available to the LPGs had doubled and the number of combine harvesters had 
tripled, the total number of LPGs had been reduced through mergers and a number of LPG 
Type Is had begun to develop collective livestock holdings. The process of transforming 
agriculture from small-scale, unspecialised and un-concentrated production methods, over 
which little direct control could be exerted, into an industrial-scale specialised and 
concentrated system of production responsive to state demand and more easily 
subordinated to administrative control had begun with collectivisation. Establishing 
cooperative relations between LPGs promised to move this process forward. The long­
term consequences of developing cooperative relations between LPGs represented 
however a far more dramatic transformation of rural existence in the GDR even than 
collectivisation.
Grounds for Continuing Hostility to Cooperation
As a result of the expansion and specialisation of production which went hand in hand 
with cooperation between neighbouring LPGs, collective farmers expected not only 
changes to their daily work routine and the location of the work place but also a change in 
their status as farmers -  at the very least a dilution of their rights as theoretical land 
owners. Both collective farmers and LPG chairmen who had remained suspicious of the 
impact on them -  on their status as farmers and stakeholders in the LPG - of a rapid 
transformation of agricultural production remained thus keen to limit the speed with which 
such measures were implemented. Their reticence was exacerbated by a desire to 
consolidate and a growing sense of identification and possession of the LPG among its 
members which rejected the prospect of their LPG losing independent control over its
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wealth, land and machinery. Where in 1960 the individual farmer had protested against 
any incursion on his private ownership of his land or animals, or his independence, now 
LPG members acted as one to protect the resources and independence of their LPG.
The 1st Secretary of the SED Bezirksleitung was at pains to make it clear to leading 
party members working in agriculture that the precondition for an LPG’s participation in 
cooperation and subsequent merger ought to be mutual consent. Appearing to respond to 
complaints that LPG Type Ills had with state and party agreement in fact exploited 
neighbouring Type Is he cautioned agricultural functionaries attending the SED 
Bezirksparteiaktivtagung in December 1965: “You can’t do things, and I say it quite 
openly, in such a way that the LPG Type Ills pillage the Type Is.”10 Throughout the 
Bezirk, LPG Type I members and their chairmen nevertheless remained wary of 
establishing cooperative relations which threatened to lead to exploitation of their 
resources and ultimately loss of their independence. In some cases their fears were 
justified. The BLR clearly intended that the district agricultural councils should 
concentrate their efforts on establishing cooperative relations between neighbouring LPG 
Type Is and LPG Type Ills where the latter were in clear need of the resources of the 
former.11 During 1965 and 1966 the KLRs thus sought to increase the pressure on the 
smallest LPGs to develop cooperative relations with their neighbours in order to maximise 
the scale on which production could be undertaken.
The desire to consolidate what had already been achieved hardened rejection of 
cooperation even where KLR functionaries argued that independent production was no 
longer reasonable given the machinery now available. Those LPGs which had begun to 
achieve a level of profitability were unwilling to jeopardise either this success or their 
independence, calling upon the authorities of party and state to leave them be for a
1 9while. Members of all LPG Types argued that they would rather buy their own
machinery with their own money and use it independently even if they weren’t able to 
• 1 ^maximise its effect. LPG chairmen, charged with brokering effective relations with one
10 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/A/2/2-043 Sekretariat der Bezirksleitung, Protokoll der Bezirksparteiaktivtagung Landwirtschaft am 
7.12.1965, Referat Genosse BrSutigam p.176.
11 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/A/2/3-112 Bezirkslandwirtschaftsrat, Einschatzung der Kreisbauemkonferenzen im Bezirk Erfurt, 
Schlussfolgerungen p. 152.
12 ThHStAW SED BPA BIV/2/5-382 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Parteiorgane, Informationsbericht Nr. 16/65 29.5.1965 p. 181.
13 ThHStAW SED BPA BIV/2/5-382 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Parteiorgane, Informationsbericht Nr.26/65 19.8.1965 p.333.
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another, clearly were convinced that their LPGs had much more to lose than others in the 
long-term as a result of cooperation.
In this context it is unsurprising that attempts at the joint deployment of machinery 
belonging to more than one LPG during the harvest in 1965 were often marred by mutual 
suspicion. So-called integrated deployments (Komplexeinsatze) of machinery from a 
number of different LPGs at the same time demanded a clear plan for the order of work 
and a clear division of authority. Such matters however had rarely been finally and 
definitely agreed upon in August 1965 as LPG chairmen were reluctant to commit 
themselves to measures which might disadvantage their LPG. The few attempts at the 
integrated deployment of machinery by groups of LPGs during the harvest in 1965 tended 
thus to breakdown. LPG functionaries, it was reported, tended to see to their own concerns 
before helping their partners in the cooperation.14
Attempts to arrange informal cooperation in the use of machinery between some LPGs 
in the course of the harvest also tended to break down rather quickly amid confusion and 
mutual suspicion. Given the importance of exploiting good weather conditions and the 
potential danger to any crop left too long in the field, the leading functionaries of the 
individual LPGs were understandably concerned not to lose out to their neighbours in the 
timely use of machinery. Quite apart from the loss of income, appearing to be hoodwinked 
by one’s neighbours was a sign of weakness which few LPG cadres did not resent, and 
which few LPG members did not scom in their leaders.
Without functioning cooperative councils (Kooperationsrate or KORs) to coordinate 
the resources in men and machines of the constituent LPGs of the cooperative 
communities and no formal agreements on how the harvest was to proceed, LPG leaders 
soon insisted on taking back their own machinery and equipment to harvest 
independently.15 Even in the more advanced districts such as Kreis Erfurt-Land, harvest 
machine systems were deployed independently by individual LPGs. There were even 
instances of large LPG Type Ills refusing “socialist aid” to their neighbouring collective 
farms despite the fact that their machinery was not in use at the time.16 LPG Type III
14 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/A/2/2-042 Sekretariat der Bezirksleitung, Protokoll der Bezirksparteiaktivtagung Landwirtschaft am
7.12.1965 p.2 and p. 160.
15 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/A/2/2-043 Sekretariat der Bezirksleitung, Protokoll der Bezirksparteiaktivtagung Landwirtschaft am
7.12.1965 Referat Genosse Liideckep.2.
16 ThHStAW SED BPA BIV/2/7-547 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Landwirtschaft, Einschatzung der Fuhrungs- und 
Leitungstatigkeit. ..11.11.1965 p.41.
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farmers resented having to adopt struggling LPG Type Is which appeared to be paying the 
price now for the (‘selfish’) refusal to develop their production facilities in the past. 
Certainly there was no desire to put one’s own LPG in financial jeopardy for the sake of 
another. On occasion chairmen of LPG Type Ills were known thus to refuse proposals 
from the KLR that they cooperate with farmers from the LPG Type I at the very least
17unless they could demonstrate the ability to achieve parity in their yields.
In 1965 there was some evidence of successful cooperation between several LPGs 
based around the small town of Trebra, Kreis Sondershausen. The SED Kreisleitung 
reported that there had been sufficient prior discussion among leading local cadres -  party 
secretaries as well as LPG chairmen -  to enable machinery to be shared between the 
LPGs. The Kreisleitung's Secretary for Agriculture made clear above all that the key to 
success had been sufficient preparation of farmers beforehand. In his words: “LPG 
farmers prefer not to slip into a finished corset”.18 It was clear however that at this stage 
LPG farmers of all types along with their leading cadres on the whole were not convinced 
that they were not going to be stitched up - be it in a corset of either their own making or 
someone else’s.19
In 1965 LPG Type Is still outnumbered LPG Type Ills in the Bezirk. Of 651 LPG 
Type Is 122 were less than 100 hectares in size and a further 350 less than 300 hectares in 
size.20 Cooperation was thus put forward as the key to rationalising production while 
maintaining the rights of the individual farmer, just as collectivisation had been. However, 
just as they had with collectivisation many farmers regarded this as yet another restriction 
on their independence. In contrast to the spring of 1960 however establishing cooperation 
by force was deemed by the SED leadership to be worth neither the risk of damage to 
production nor the social discord in the countryside which it would inevitably produce. 
Rather the transmission of SED agricultural policy relied heavily on the willingness and 
ability of LPG functionaries to explain it and persuade LPG members of its value to them 
as well as to the society at large. It became clear however that LPG functionaries remained
17 ThHStAW SED BPA BIV/2/7-588 Bezirksvorstandes der DBD, Bericht iiber die Entwicklung von 
Kooperationsbeziehungen..25.11.1965 p.23.
18 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/A/2/2-043 Sekretariat der Bezirksleitung, Protokoll der Bezirksparteiaktivtagung Landwirtschaft am
7.12.1965 Referat Genosse Dyballa p. 160.
19 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/A/2/3-144 Sekretariat der Bezirksleitung, Abt. Landwirtschaft Vorlage an das Sekretariat, ErgSnzung zum 
Beschluss des Secretariates der BL Nr.995 vom 16.12.1965 zur Vorbereitung des IX. Deutschen Bauemkongresses. Massnahmeplan 
pp.39-51.
0 5 out o f475 LPG Type III were less than 100 hectares and 135 LPG Type III less than 300 hectares in size.
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more often than not unconvinced of the benefits of further change to the structure of 
agriculture and the establishment of cooperation either to themselves, the LPG members 
or society in general.
The attainment of a reasonable level of profitability in the LPG, which enabled LPG 
members to receive satisfactory incomes, had brought a degree of social harmony and 
stability to collective farms not seen since before the collectivisation campaign. There was 
thus understandable desire on the part of the cadres and ordinary members not to rock the 
boat with further change. This attitude was critically dismissed in the rhetoric of party 
sources as “the theory of mediocrity” which derided resistance to further change on such
grounds as merely signs of incompetence or cowardice among LPG cadres and ideological
21backwardness among their members.
After the failure of cooperation during the harvest in 1965, the Bezirksleitung certainly 
regarded LPG cadres as a weak link in the chain of policy implementation in agriculture 
from the development of cooperation through to the use of material incentive and 
economic levers as part of the New Economic System:
A whole range of leading cadre in the collectives, chairmen as well as crop and 
livestock brigadiers are not getting to grips with the current problems of society’s 
development. This is the result of their level of qualification, even though many of 
them are themselves state qualified farmers or master farmers. This is expressed in 
their failure to understand the necessity of payment of leading cadres according to 
overall performance, the necessity of implementing feed sharing according to stocks 
and market production of livestock, in insufficient rates of capital accumulation and 
the lagging construction and extension of collective livestock stalls as well as in the 
insufficient consideration of the issues of cooperative relations.. .In most cases the 
functionaries appear to be the progressive party in the collective. But already in the 
boards of the collective farms these leading cadres often do not find sufficient support 
in order to realise the tasks in the collectives individually....
Worse still many LPG cadres clearly had no desire to continue in a position where 
they were under constant pressure to push through policies which the majority of their 
fellow farmers rejected. The report continued:
21 ThHStAW SED BPA BIV/2/5-382 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Parteiorgane, Informationsbericht Nr. 16/65 29.5.1965 pp.181-191.
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In all the districts in which new elections are being held there are problems with filling 
posts as chairmen and board members. They refuse to be candidates using in part 
paper-thin arguments. They claim not to understand the integrated deployment of 
machinery and cite among other things internal difficulties in the collectives, health 
reasons, age, unreasonable state demands for grain delivery, poor support from the 
board, differences within the LPGs. The real causes lie however not in these 
arguments but are rather to be found in the fact that these chairmen shy away from 
confrontations with LPG members over the implementation of the decisions of the 
party and the government.22 
Given the degree to which LPG of all types, but particularly Type I, were failing to take 
the steps to develop with the speed the SED leadership desired, doubts were raised as to 
the competence or indeed the political reliability of the leading cadres of the LPG. It had 
already been made clear that LPG chairmen who proved flagrantly to be unable or 
unwilling to establish a functioning collective farm were liable to be labelled opponents of 
progress and removed from their posts.23 During the end of year assemblies for 1963, the 
SED Kreisleitung in Kreis Sommerda for example deemed it necessary to ensure that 
changes were made to the heads of several LPGs, because they had conspicuously failed 
to impose order on the collective.24 However immediate wholesale changes to those 
running LPGs which were not rapidly implementing SED policies were neither possible 
nor worthwhile. Not only was there a lack of suitably qualified, suitably skilled and 
suitably reliable replacements, but transforming agriculture while retaining some stability 
in collective farms and winning LPG members’ support for the transformation was 
recognised to be necessarily a gradual process.
In the face of ongoing hostility to cooperation from LPG members and LPG 
functionaries, administrative attempts were made to move the situation forward in the 
Bezirk. To ensure members of smaller LPGs supported cooperation or merger, the head of 
the BLR made it clear at the end of 1965 that in future access to new machinery would be 
predicated on the development of effective cooperative relations. LPG Type Is with less
22 ThHStAW SED BPA BIV/2/7-565 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Landwirtschaft, Einschatzungen uber die Vorbereitungen der 
Neuwahlen bzw. Erganzungswahlen in den Genossenschaften des Bezirkes Erfurt. 10.12.1965 pp.206-209.
23 ThHStAW SED BPA BIV/2/3-278 SED Kreisleitung Nordhausen, Bericht uber die Lage und die eingeleitete Massnahmen zur 
Veranderung und Verbesserung der genossenschaftlichen Arbeit in der LPG Typ III “Rotes Banner” Ellrich, 31.7.1963 pp.2-8.
24 ThHStAW SED BPA -  SED Kreisleitung Sdmmerda IV/A/4.10/092 KLR -  Produktionsleitung, Einschatzung der durchgefiihrten 
Jahresendversammlungen und Analyse der Entwicklung der LPG im Jahre 1963. 19.2.1964 pp.2-20.
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than 100 hectares would not be able to purchase machinery until they could prove that it 
would be used to the maximum of its capacity. Similarly no credit would be given to 
enable the construction of larger sheds for livestock unless LPG Type Is were participating 
in a cooperative enterprise.25 Reporting in March 1966, the agriculture department in the 
SED Bezirksleitung suggested that in most cases it was relatively clear to the LPG 
functionaries with whom and how cooperative relations could be set up. The essential 
problem was that these leading cadres either claimed to find it impossible to gain the 
support of members or had simply refused to confront them on this issue.26 Particularly in 
the LPG Type Is in the Bezirk, there was a willingness to resist cooperation in practice and 
a continuing suspicion of the regime’s motives in insisting upon it. In Kreis Worbis, the 
SED Kreisleitung reported a range of arguments widely raised against those state and 
party officials advocating cooperation between LPGs in the district: “we don’t need 
cooperative relations for machinery; we’ll carry out our own work alone, we’ve got 
enough tractors and horses.. ..you want to take away from us our right to use the 
machinery we bought ourselves.” It was clear too that there was a fundamental hostility to 
the state’s repeated attempts to interfere in the running of the collective farms. LPG Type I 
members in Kreis Worbis responded to SED Kreisleitung functionaries with comments 
such as: “Why don’t you leave the LPGs in peace? You’ve always got something new”.27 
However during 1966 LPG chairmen were put under increased pressure by the KLR to 
sign their LPGs up to participation in a KOG and commit their machinery to cooperate in 
crop production during that year’s harvest, regardless of the attitudes of the collective 
farmers themselves.28
By August 1966, at least on paper, the development of cooperation appeared to have 
advanced with all but 20 of the Bezirk'’ s 1062 LPGs apparently signed up to participation 
in a cooperative community (KOG) with other LPGs. The KLR’s administrative success 
in this regard however again failed to match up with the actual practice of the LPGs
25 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/A/2/2-043 Sekretariat der Bezirksleitung, Protokoll der Bezirksparteiaktivtagung Landwirtschaft am
7.12.1965 Referat Referat Genosse Kummer p. 131.
26 ThHStAW SED BPA -  SED Kreisleitung Sommerda IV/A/4.10/097 Abt. Parteiorgane an die Bezirksleitung, Erganzung zur 
Kreisanalyse iiber die Kampfkraft der Partei laut Femschreiben Nr.26 vom 15.1.1966, 19.1.1966 pp.41-54.
27 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/A/2/3-159 SED Kreisleitung Worbis, Bericht iiber die Fiihrung der polit-ideologischen Arbeit.. .3.6.1966 
p.29.
28 SAPMO B-Arch Biiro Gerhard Griineberg DY30 IV A 2/2.023/147 Material iiber Erfahrungen der Parteiarbeit im Bezirk Erfurt zur 
Losung der ideologischen Fragen bei der Entwicklung von Kooperationsbeziehungen in der sozialistischen Landwirtschaft 4.5.1966; 
ThHStAW SED BPA IV/A/2/3-150 Sekretariat der Bezirksleitung, Entwurf des Berichtes an das Sekretariat des ZK iiber “Die 
Erfahrungen der Parteiarbeit speziell zur Losung der ideologischen Fragen bei der Entwicklung von Kooperationsbeziehungen”. pp.37- 
55.
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during the harvest. Rather as during the collectivisation, it was one thing to gain 
agreement in theory, it was quite another to see to a policy’s implementation in practice.
In this respect, LPG chairmen remained as clearly beholden to their members’ opinions 
when it came to carrying out the harvest, as they were, at least outwardly, to conform to 
the demands of the KLRs. Thus in much of the Bezirk harvest machinery was reported to 
have been used with only the minimum lip-service paid to the notion of cooperation 
between LPGs. Until strict agreements had been reached between LPG chairmen and 
ratified in a vote of the respective members’ assemblies of the LPGs, it was argued that 
cooperative use of machinery could only occur under the terms of ‘socialist aid’ and hence
90not in a coordinated deployment, as the KLR might have wished. Even where tentative 
agreements had been made, LPG Type I chairmen tended, as they had the previous year, 
to withdraw their machinery and return to working independently after only a matter of 
days.30 In Kreis Worbis the development of cooperation had been outwardly successful 
with the inclusion of all the LPGs in the district in one or another KOG. In practice 
individual LPGs resisted using their machinery in cooperation with one another reaching 
agreements only on temporary exchanges of machinery.31
At this stage it was clear that few LPG chairmen were either willing or able to begin 
more than superficial cooperation during the harvest. Collective farmers, if not LPG 
chairmen themselves, had by this stage not been sufficiently persuaded of the value to 
them of cooperating with their neighbours in crop production. Until they could be 
persuaded, the KLRs were forced to accept that cooperative relations would not develop 
with any degree of consistency or comprehensiveness. The balance of interests which 
defined the organisation of agriculture remained heavily influenced by farmers’ concern to 
protect their rights of ownership and the independence of local decision making, against 
the SED leadership’s project of industrialising production and rationalising administrative 
control over LPGs and rural communities at large.
29ThHStAW SED BPA IV/A/2/3-159 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Landwirtschaft, Stellungnahme zum Massnahmeplan des Rates des 
Bezirks...13.6.1966 p.132.
30 ThHStAW SED BPA 1V/A/2/3-169 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Parteiorgane, Informationsbericht Nrl9/66 24.8.1966 p.31; IV/A/2/3- 
169 Abt. Parteiorgane, Einsch&tzung des Standes des soz. Bewusstseins der Bevolkerung unseres Bezirkes.. .8.9.1966 p.79.
31 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/A/2/3-159 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Agit./Prop, Stellungnahme der Bezirksleitung zur Berichterstattung des 
Sekretariats der SED Kreisleitung Worbis, 13.6.1966 p.28.
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Competing Interests and the Obstacles to Persuasion
During 1967 and 1968 the SED leadership in the Bezirk sought to make more rapid strides 
towards the development of advanced cooperative relations between LPGs in crop 
production and the implementation of a set of financial controls in the LPGs which would 
make them more responsive to incentive-based economic planning. The extent to which 
this was achieved continued however to be hampered by the insufficient reliability of LPG 
functionaries and the inadequacy of the network of regime supporters at the grassroots -  
primarily in the SED party organisations but also in the DBD.
In the mid 1960s there were simply not enough LPG leaders who could be relied upon 
to advocate cooperation to their members and to cooperate successfully with their 
neighbours, being themselves neither convinced of the logic of such measures 
agriculturally nor indeed supportive of any steps which appeared to compromise their own 
personal authority. How far LPG chairmen’s attitudes towards cooperation conformed to 
those of the SED leadership depended in large part on how beneficial to them and to their 
LPG it might prove to be. It was also dependent on how strongly they were influenced as 
well as supported by the SED party organisation in the LPG. As far as cooperation was 
concerned however, LPG chairmen and even SED party organisations in the LPG, let 
alone the rank and file collective farmers found that they had good reason to be sceptical 
of the benefit to them of the policy in practice, if not in theory. In the rhetoric of the 
administration’s documents, “Betriebsegoismus” (“Enterprise Egotism”) was seen to be at 
the root of the failure of cooperation.32
With regard to the LPG, as a phrase “Betriebsegoismus” covered a multitude of 
apparent sins against the spirit if not always the letter of SED agricultural policy. 
Essentially it was used to describe any behaviour or act undertaken by LPG chairmen 
which was considered to be purely in the interests of the success of their own collective 
farm and consequently to the cost of others. Although it was clearly used as a label to 
criticise the behaviour of LPG functionaries who were not wholehearted in their support 
for cooperation on the terms proposed to them, it did identify a real obstacle to successful 
conduct of cooperative relations between LPGs. Regardless of political loyalties,
32 e.g ThHStAW SED BPA IV/B/2/5-161 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Landwirtschaft Handmaterial zur Berichterstattung des Sekretariats 
der SED Kreisleitung Sdmmerda vor dem Sekretariat in der Land- und Nahrungsgueterwirtschaft 7.5.1968 p.57 for a dramatic 
representation of such conflicts of interest see: Sakowski H., Daniel Druskat, (E. Berlin, 1976).
138
collective farmers were openly hostile to any measures which threatened to compromise 
their incomes or their independence and were capable of bringing pressure to bear on their 
leading functionaries to prevent their implementation. How well these cadres worked 
together was crucial to the success of cooperation. However there were considerable 
obstacles to a harmonious relationship between LPG chairmen. Not only did they have 
their own individual concerns not to be seen to be outdone, the scorn they could face from 
their constituent collective farmers if thought to have failed to act in their best interests 
could make their position untenable.
Within the LPG and the KOG Walschleben, Kreis Erfurt-Land, clashes of personalities 
became a serious problem between 1965 and 1967. At one point members of the LPG 
Type III Gebesee were reportedly openly opposed to continuing with cooperative relations 
with their neighbours, accusing their chairman of being so subservient that he was little 
more than “the coach driver” of the chairman of the LPG Type III Walschleben.33 During 
a discussion in Heringen, Kreis Nordhausen over the future of cooperation between LPG 
in the area in April 1967, the chairman of the LPG Type III in Urbach pointed out how 
difficult it was for chairmen of the LPG Type Is to persuade their members: “Our 
colleagues in the LPGs Types I and II, the chairmen and board members who are 
concerned to participate [in the KOG] are still subject to serious attacks. The development, 
which would have been reckoned good thus far, reached its high point with an almost 
catastrophic collapse. The chairman of the LPG Type II was heavily criticised by his 
members who accused him of wanting to throw everything away; they had given him the 
title “the red general” and said that he was selling the LPG out.. .”34 Under such pressures, 
cooperative relations tended to break down. Thus it was that a working group from the 
Bezirksleitung monitoring the harvest in 1967 in Kreis Apolda found a number of LPGs 
refusing to allow their harvesters to be used in combination with those of other LPGs. One 
LPG chairman reportedly defended his actions on the basis that he could not afford not to 
look after his own farm’s interests first: “last year we were conned by the integrated
33 ThHStAW SED BPA BIV/2/7-550 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Parteiorgane Erfahrungen und Schlussfolgerungen...3.11.1965 p.100; 
BIV/2/5-384 SED Bezirksleitung Abt.Parteiorgane, Information 27.9.1966 p.256-258; BIV/2/7-588 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. 
Landwirtschaft, Einschatzung des Kooperationsbereiches Walschleben 6.7.1966, p.145-154; SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Landwirtschaft, 
Abt. Parteiorgane, Faktenmaterial zu einigen Problemen der Partei und Massenarbeit der PO der Kooperationsgemeinschaft 
Walschleben. 23.11.1966 pp.174-177.
34 ThHStAW SED BPA BIV/2/7-588 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Landwirtschaft, Protokoll iiber den Erfahrungsaustausch am 28.3.1967 
in Heringen. 11.4.1967 pp.320-348.
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deployment of machinery. We gave up our harvesters when the weather was good and 
then all we received was wet grain.”35
Part of the opposition to cooperative relations from even among those who were 
ordinarily supportive of the regime’s goals for industrialising and modernising agricultural 
production was the result of divergent opinions on the means to achieve these goals. 
Applying fertiliser and pesticides, improving the quality of the soil through drainage or 
irrigation and raising the efficiency of the production process through the use of 
machinery appeared to be most cost-effective on a large scale. How this scale might best 
be achieved remained a matter of some dispute in farming circles. There had long been 
strong tendencies among LPG functionaries to seek to create large self-contained mixed 
arable and livestock farms -  so-called Grand LPGs36 - , which nevertheless could operate 
using the latest technologies and scientific theories to increase productivity, while 
overseeing the balanced development of both strands of production.37 The essential 
argument in favour of Grand LPGs was the importance of maintaining the traditional 
direct relationship between feed production, livestock and organic fertiliser under one 
administration. Adherence to this traditional principle did not however tally with the 
principles of a progressive industrialising agricultural policy which sought to dispense 
with traditional approaches to farming.
From a production perspective, maintaining mixed farms on this scale threatened to 
put unnecessary limits on the extent of specialisation of production possible. Agricultural 
production had to be responsive to the demands of the economy as a whole and had to 
develop accordingly. As part of a wider complex economic system, the potential for 
increasing production through intensive specialisation where possible took precedence 
over maintaining what appeared to be simplistic and outdated notions of the 
interdependence of crop and livestock farming. Additionally the Grand LPGs gave too 
much power to the individual chairmen who ran these giants and created a degree of 
bureaucracy and administrative complexity internal to the LPG which made them not only
35 ThHStAW SED BPA BIV/2/7-557 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Landwirtschaft der Bezirksleitung, Bericht iiber den Einsatz im Kreis 
Apolda, 9.8.1967 p.72-76; IV/A/4.10/077 SED Kreisleitung Sommerda, Parteiorgane, Einschatzung der MV 10.9.1967 p.50-57,
5.10.1967 p.58-63 27.11.1967 pp.74-81.
36 Grand LPG serves here as a translation for the term “Gross-LPG".
37 Examples of LPG members opinions to this effect may be found in ThHStAW SED BPA IV/B/2/2-022 Protokoll der 
Bezirksparteiaktivtagung zu den Fragen und Aufgaben der soz. Landwirtschaft am 7.3.1968 Beitrag Genossin Zessin p.103; SED BPA 
IV/B/2/13-378 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Landwirtschaft, Einschatzung iiber das Einwohnerforum in der Grenzgemeinde Berka/Werra 
Kr. Eisenach 27.1.1969 p. 1.
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difficult to run efficiently but limited the extent to which their practices could be 
scrutinised by the state. In their size, they also bore the stigma for LPG members of the 
Soviet Kolkhoz, in which farmers -  according to popular perceptions borne in part no 
doubt out of Nazi propaganda as well as the actual experiences of German POWs - were 
deprived of an individual status and condemned ultimately to work as farm labourers ruled 
by office-bound apparatchiks. However as an approach to developing autarkic production 
in the GDR, it appeared to offer a happy compromise for some LPG functionaries between 
modem practices and scale on the one hand and traditional farm organisation and local 
identity on the other. It also made redundant any complex cooperative agreements 
between neighbouring LPGs and appeared to avoid the traps of suspicion and conflict 
which went with cooperation, either in crop production or in the constmction of 
cooperative livestock facilities. Moreover as more LPG Type I members were persuaded 
to relieve themselves of the burdens of private livestock production by joining the LPG 
Type Ills, merger rather than cooperation appeared to be a more successful approach to 
reaching an expanded yet sustainable scale of agriculture.
During the late 1960s, economic pressures and an ageing workforce were beginning to 
have an effect on the ability of the LPG Type Is to maintain their independence. A 
stagnation in the level of production had already begun to take place since 1967, with 
percentage increases in production in a number of upland districts, where LPG Type Is 
predominated, growing at a slower rate than the Bezirk average. The extreme age of many 
members of the LPGs Types I and II whose children could not be kept in the LPGs and 
who were unwilling or unable to continue to farm naturally limited the quantity of produce 
which they made available to the state. In the past the burden of work on individual 
members had been kept down by transferring animals from private holdings to collective 
holdings in sheds which had been extended for the purpose as it became necessary. 
However without extensive investment in modem livestock sheds, the potential options 
for accommodating animals with the workforce and the buildings available were 
becoming increasingly limited in the Type Is. Given bottlenecks in the supply of materials 
and a general lack of funds to invest in a suitably extensive programme of construction in 
the upland districts of the Bezirk, those members of LPG Type Is who were not seeking to
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retire found themselves forced to petition to join the LPG Type Ills in order to sustain an 
adequate income.
LPG Type Ills did not necessarily respond to the plight of their neighbours with great 
sympathy. Previous conflicts and rivalries between neighbouring LPGs of different types 
as well as the high incomes of many Type I farmers over previous years tempered the 
willingness on the part of Type III farmers to help. At the very least this manifested itself 
in tough conditions for merger set by LPG Type Ills who were often only willing to take 
over whole LPGs rather than accepting merely those farmers who were unable to keep 
their own private livestock any longer. Mergers inevitably took place without the consent 
of all members of the LPG Type Is. Disgruntlement among former LPG Type I farmers 
following merger into an LPG Type III could indeed be serious enough to make clear to 
the Ministry for State Security the need for the recruitment of informants to give regular 
reports on the situation.38 The compromise position of allowing some farmers to maintain 
extensive private livestock despite having become members of the LPG Type III was one 
method of easing the immediate burden of merger on both parties. However in Bezirk 
Erfurt in 1968 the practice appeared to be largely limited to LPGs in Kreis Eisenach with 
only odd examples thus far in other districts.39
In some LPG Type I the resolve to resist merger among the members hardened and 
farmers echoed their comments during the original collectivisation campaign, insisting “as 
long as it’s still possible, we continue as we are”.40 For more LPG Type I than ever before 
in 1968, merger with LPG Type III was however unavoidable. Of the 517 LPG Type I in 
existence in Bezirk Erfurt in September 1967, only 289 existed in 1969.
The expansion of the proportion of agricultural land which was farmed under the 
statute of LPG Type III and the reduction of the extent of private livestock farming to the 
benefit of collective livestock holdings certainly aided the evolution of the SED 
leadership’s general policy of transformation of agriculture and rural society. The 
incorporation of more pasture and arable land, machinery and buildings and above all 
financial resources certainly enabled the development of production on a grander scale.
38 BStU Aussenstelle Erfurt, 1584/84 Kreisdienststelle Erfurt, Werbung des IMS “Max” 7.7.1967 p.23.
39 ThHStAW RdB LO14542 Rat fur Landwirtschaft und Nahrungsgiiterwirtschaft, Analyse iiber den Anfall von Altersbetrieben in den 
LPG des Typ I und II in den nachsten Jahren und Vorschlage von Massnahmen zum Auffangen der Produktion 1969.
40 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/B/2/5-161 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Parteiorgane, Wocheninformation zu einigen Problemen der 
Fuhrungstatigkeit des Sekretariats der SED Kreisleitung Sommerda, 26.3.1968 p.24.
142
More importantly the incorporation of LPG Type Is into LPG Type Ills promised to 
enable the communication of agricultural policy to collective farmers in a more 
comprehensive and consistent manner. The pockets of hostility to change which LPG 
Type Is so clearly represented during the earlier 1960s were increasingly subsumed in the 
LPG Type Ills. Recalcitrant leaders of the LPG Type I were no longer in a position to 
delay changes to the structure or practices of farming in their local area and the members 
in general who were hostile to agricultural transformation could no longer necessarily 
expect to win a majority of votes during members’ assemblies. Nevertheless the expansion 
in size of LPG Type Ills did not necessarily make them entirely pliant to the demands of 
the KLRs for agricultural development. Indeed in some respects the growth in power of 
single LPGs as economic units, enabled the LPG leadership to seek to run agriculture 
more on their own terms rather than those proposed by the district party and state 
administration.
LPG Chairmen of large LPG Type Ills on the plains of Bezirk Erfurt maintained thus 
that cooperation was not necessary for them. By 1967 mergers between LPGs (whether 
preceded by cooperation or not) had enabled LPG chairmen to expand the size of single 
collective farms sufficiently to claim to have no need of developing formal cooperative 
relations with their neighbours. At their current size, chairmen pointed out, the LPGs were 
easily capable of developing field sizes sufficient to use the machinery currently available 
to its full capacity. Members of large LPGs in Bad Langensalza thus maintained that they 
already had developed the conditions for industrial scale farming and had no need of 
cooperation in order to use their machines efficiently. The size of their fields, they 
claimed, matched the specifications set by the VIII. German Farmers Congress for the use 
of the latest machine systems.41 Similarly in Kreis Erfurt Land resistance to cooperation 
was based on the LPG leaders’ confidence in being able to cope without it, with 
arguments such as: “we have a high level of production, we deliver a lot to the state, why 
should we introduce something new.” Even when the value of cooperation was conceded, 
there was seen to be no reason why it should be permanent cooperation -  rather 
cooperation for certain major campaigns was suggested instead.42
41 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/A/2/3-186 Sekretariat der Bezirksleitung, Thesen fur den Bericht der Bezirksleitung an die 
Bezirksdelegiertenkonferenz p.42.
42 ThHStAW SED BPA BIV/2/3-278 SED Kreisleitung Erfurt-Land an den Genossen Brautigam, Informationsbericht 14.11.1967 
p.389.
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Such attitudes showed up however a serious deficit among leading cadres, even in 
LPG Type Ills, of obedience to or understanding of the ‘correct’ path of future 
development in agriculture in the GDR. More often than not, LPG chairmen appeared 
more willing to ensure their LPG increased production, than back SED agricultural policy.
The Ideological Deficit in the LPG
The balance in authority between LPG chairmen, the LPG members who sat on the 
directing board of the collective farm on the one hand and the SED party secretary and the 
party organisation on the other was crucial to the way in which proposals for significant 
change in the organisation and structure of the LPG were communicated to and received 
among the collective farmers. Ideally there was considerable overlap between the 
members of the SED party organisation and the leading LPG members who made up the 
LPG board. Equally the chairman of the LPG was ideally also a member of the SED, 
ensuring that the party organisation took the leading role in shaping the development of 
the collective farm in line with the latest proposals of the SED leadership.
In practice SED party organisations in the LPGs varied considerably in size and 
activity and the degree of influence which they sought or were able to exert over the 
LPG’s leaders or indeed the collective farmers in general was often minimal. LPG 
chairmen, regardless of their party affiliation, were not consistent in their support for the 
concerns of the party secretary or the party organisation where they appeared to differ 
from his conception of the interests of the LPG. Moreover the board members of the LPG 
(the majority of whom were without a party affiliation) often represented a more 
dominant, influential body of opinion among the members than any party organisation.
SED Party organisations in the farms (Betriebsparteiorganisationen or BPOs) 
appeared too often to be either ineffective or indeed themselves not united in support of 
SED agricultural policies. The attitudes of SED members on the ground in the individual 
LPGs also did not always conform to those expected of them by the SED Kreisleitung. 
Where LPG Type Ills were concerned the unreliability of the SED members and the SED 
party organisation were particularly apparent on the issue of cooperation. Following 
discussion of the 11th Session of the ZK of the SED in the BPOs in early 1966, the first 
steps towards winning over party members to the development of extensive cooperative
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relations between LPGs had been taken. In Kreis Sommerda, SED members continued 
nevertheless not to stand folly behind the implementation of this policy nor indeed where 
they did, could they make an impact on the prevailing sentiment among the collective 
farmers in general.43 In early 1966 the SED Kreisleitung claimed that the party 
organisations of 10 LPGs had led initiatives toward establishing cooperative relations and 
cooperative contracts successfully, resulting in four groups of cooperating LPGs. 
Nevertheless this was the exception rather than the rule, with SED BPOs where they 
existed and where they supported cooperation still unable to have much of an impact on 
LPG chairmen let alone LPG boards, mid-level managers (i.e. work brigade leaders and 
technical advisors) and collective farmers in general.44 In Kreis Sommerda throughout 
1967 the SED Kreisleitung received reports of discord -  even where BPOs were 
considered to have some influence -  between members of the board, the chairmen and the 
SED party leadership on essential questions of cooperation.45
Even in LPG Type Ills with relatively large party organisations, issues such as 
cooperation between LPGs still provoked enough opposition to the party line as to render 
party members powerless in the face of such opposition. In the LPG Type III in 
Beichlingen for example the Kreisleitung Sommerda claimed in 1968 that: “the influence 
of the opposing forces goes so far that the class conscious forces of the party organisation 
are being pushed onto the defensive.”46 A general overview of the district farmers’ 
conferences throughout the GDR in 1968 revealed continuing antipathy towards 
cooperative relations. Just as had been the case after collectivisation in which individual 
farmers adopted the trappings but not the actual practices of collective farming, so too 
now were LPGs found to be cooperating in name alone. KOGs were found to have formed 
to the extent that a cooperative council had been organised but beyond this no practical 
action was actually being taken to alter the structure of the farms or the organisation of 
work. Even where chairmen had gone so far as seemingly to cooperate folly in the farming 
of the arable land between the constituent LPGs, the reality was not always very far
43 ThHStAW SED BPA -  SED Kreisleitung Sommerda IV/A/4.10/077 Sektor Parteiinformation, Informationsbericht laut Arbeitsplan
1.2.1966 p.238.
44 ThHStAW SED BPA BIV/2/3-278 SED Kreisleitung Nordhausen an den Genossen Brautigam, Informationsbericht 16.10.1967 
p.317.
45 ThHStAW SED BPA -  SED Kreisleitung Sommerda IV/A/4.10/077 Abt. Parteiorgane -  Sektorparteiinformation, Einschatzung der 
Mitgliederversammlungen Januar 1.2.1967 pp.3-10; Sektor parteiinformation, Einschatzung der MV im Monat August 10.9.1967 p.56.
46 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/B/2/5-161 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Parteiorgane, Faktenmaterial fur die Berichterstattung des Sekretariats 
der SED Kreisleitung S6mmerda..8.5.1968 p.59.
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removed from the practice pre-cooperation. The brigades and crops continued to be 
organised primarily in accordance with the territorial boundaries of the constituent 
LPGs.47 In Kreis Sommerda in July 1968 attempts to introduce the integrated deployment 
of harvesters were reportedly rejected by LPG functionaries despite the insistence of the 
SED BPOs.48 The effectiveness of the BPOs of a number of LPG Type Ills was thus 
increasingly called into question particularly as regarded making the case for
49cooperation.
The failure of the SED BPOs to influence LPG cadres with regard to the 
implementation of economic reforms within the LPGs was also apparent. This was most 
obvious in the LPG Type Is, where SED party organisations -  if they existed at all -  
tended to be small and where the LPG chairmen and certainly the LPG board members 
were often not party members. It was also the case however even in a number of LPG 
Type Ills, that leading cadres were basically unresponsive to the SED party organisation’s 
proposals to develop their LPGs in accordance with the principles of “sozialistische 
Betriebswirtschaft”. In meetings of the SED party organisations in October 1967 in Kreis 
Sommerda among the reasons cited for their continuing failure to influence the 
development of their collective farms was the repeated failure of management cadres to 
speak politically to the work collectives. The chairman of the LPG Type III Griefstedt 
reportedly continued, for example, to proclaim his opposition to socialist competition as 
bringing only irritation among members.50 Reports on meetings of the BPOs the following 
month pointed to some success in persuading party members of the value of implementing 
the NOS, as a necessary step towards developing industrial production in accordance with 
the resolutions of the VII. SED Party Congress. However LPG cadres were reported to be 
continuing to oppose economic reform on the basis that it caused disquiet among members 
of the LPGs and that the LPGs lacked sufficient numbers of cadres to implement it in any 
case.51
47 SAPMO B-Arch Buro Gerhard Griineberg DY30IV A 2/2.023/72 ZK der SED Abt. Landwirtschaft, Einige weitere Probleme, die 
aus den KBK sichtbar werden 8.5.1968.
48 ThHStAW SED BPA SED Kreisleitung Sommerda IV/B/4.10/101 Abt. Parteiorgane, Einschatzung der MV -  Monat Juli 5.8.1968 
p.39.
49 ThHStAW SED BPA -  SED Kreisleitung Sdmmerda IV/B/4.10/101 Abt. Parteiorgane, Einschatzung der MV -  Monat August
30.8.1968 p.50.
50 ThHStAW SED BPA -  SED Kreisleitung Sdmmerda IV/A/4.10/077 Abt. Parteiorgane Sektor Parteiinformation, Einschatzung der 
MV im Monat September 5.10.1967 pp.58-63.
51 ThHStAW SED BPA -  SED Kreisleitung Sdmmerda IV/A/4.10/077 Abt. Parteiorgane Sektor Parteiinformation, Einschatzung der 
M V Monat November 27.11.1967 pp.74-81.
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The DBD and Voices of Conservatism
While the numbers of SED members in leading positions in the LPGs had increased by 
1968, the KLRs and the SED Kreisleitungen were still reliant on a considerable proportion 
of functionaries in the LPGs who had not joined a party or who were members of one or 
other of the block parties (primarily the DBD) to advocate their agricultural policy. The 
DBD leadership’s role in the collectivisation campaign had long since signalled an end to 
the DBD’s potential to be a political refuge for those with opinions about agriculture in the 
GDR which diverged radically from those of the SED. However the DBD continued to 
claim a membership among newly collectivised farmers, particularly among members of 
the LPG Type Is where the SED struggled to find any support following collectivisation.
In 1963 the DBD leadership formally adopted the party programme of the SED as its 
own, making thereby a definite statement of its subordinate position in agriculture as in 
other matters to the SED. After 1963 the DBD hierarchy could thus on the whole be relied 
upon to speak publicly in favour of SED policy and maintain party discipline within its 
ranks. However DBD members did not automatically become nearly as accepting of the 
SED’s claim to know best how to develop agriculture. An assessment by the SED Central 
Committee of the ideological situation in the DBD prior to the elections to the 
Volkskammer (National Parliament) in 1963 noted that there were signs of dissent among 
DBD members throughout the country at their party leadership’s apparent capitulation. 
Wherever local groups of the DBD had a large membership, resistance to accepting the 
SED’s leading role in agriculture remained strong. Arguments were reported to be 
prevalent among DBD members such as: “the SED should decide things among workers 
and in industry and the DBD should do so in the countryside.” DBD members who were 
members of LPG Type Is certainly did not appear as a result of the DBD’s new status to 
have developed any less suspicion for aspects of SED policy which appeared to put them 
at a financial disadvantage. Many DBD members clearly continued to have little regard 
for SED agricultural policy or indeed for SED functionaries’ ability to decide agricultural 
matters correctly.52 Such attitudes persisted into the late 1960s.53
52 SAPMO B-Arch DY30/IV A 2/15/103 ZK der SED, Abt Befreundete Organisationen, Die ideologische Situation in der DBD vor 
den Volkskammerwahlen 1963.
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Despite the proclaimed loyalty of the DBD to the SED agenda, at the grassroots 
members of the DBD often claimed greater technical expertise and were willing to 
criticise any proposals which they considered impractical.54 Some DBD functionaries 
recast the old debate of received farming wisdom and traditional practice versus the SED’s 
progressive agricultural policy as practical conservatism in the LPG versus change for 
change’s sake. With the LPG Type III Neuholland held up as a national model for the 
introduction of socialist business economics in LPGs, many mid-level cadres in the LPGs 
who had joined the DBD explained their reluctance to introducing similar measures 
themselves by emphasising the differences between this model LPG and their own 
situation. “We lack the qualified staff to do the office work” they protested; “We don’t 
have the sort of support from academics like they do in Neuholland”. Alternatively they 
pointed out, with the sort of (justified) self satisfaction which infuriated the district 
functionaries of the SED, “We fulfil our plans even without Neuholland’s methods”.55 The 
so-called ‘green comrades’ (Griine Genossen) of the DBD were thus regularly criticised 
for their lack of support for the evolution of socialist agricultural policy, for the sake of 
their own LPG’s interests.
In March 1968 speakers at the SED Bezirkparteiaktivtagung reviewed the causes of 
the failure of LPG cadres to adopt the economic reforms required of them. Mid- and top- 
level cadres had according to the SED Bezirkleitung's agricultural secretary failed to grasp 
the “systematic character” of the NOS. The financial organisation of LPGs had to be 
transformed in order for agriculture to be integrated efficiently into the wider reformed 
economy. Agriculture was to be seen as a part of a wider system which created flexible 
responsive links between aspects of agricultural production and other interrelated sectors 
of the economy. It had thus too to develop appropriate corresponding forms of financial 
organisation as defined by socialist business economics. The fact that economic reform 
had not been fully achieved appeared therefore to be in large part down to the failure of 
LPG cadres to see the value or necessity of this project of economic integration.
53 SAPMO B-Arch DY30/IV A 2/15 - 103 ZK der SED, Abt. Befreundete Organisationen Sekretariat des Parteivorstandes der DBD, 
Analyse iiber die Entwicklung der Leitungstatigkeit der Vorstande und des sozialistischen Bewusstsein der Mitglieder seit unserem VII. 
Parteitag, 23.2.1968.
54 for example ThHStAW SED BPA IV/B/2/9.02-289 SED Kreisleitung Eisenach, Femschreiben, Information iiber die Gemeinde 
Dippach.. 14.8.1968 p.48
55 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/B/2/5-410 SED Kreisleitung Eisenach an die Bezirksleitung der SED, Einschatzung iiber die 
Kreisdelegiertenkonferenz der DBD am 12.1.1968 in Eisenach 1.2.1968 p.42
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More than half of LPG chairmen in the Bezirk had taken part in courses over several 
weeks during the winter months between 1967 and 1968 to help them comprehend both 
the long-term goals behind the economic reforms as well as the best strategies for their 
actual implementation. Nevertheless in the Bezirk as a whole only 75 LPGs had actually 
introduced the reforms comprehensively.56 In Kreis Weimar 6 LPG chairmen were named 
and shamed at the District Farmers’ Conference in April 1968 for having done nothing to 
implement socialist business economics. Rather more had failed to implement one or other 
of the essential reforms required of them. The continuing failure of these cadres to take 
action in their LPGs smacked therefore of either a lack of ability or a lack of reliability. 
Either, it was suggested, they did not understand the issues involved or they were afraid of 
confronting old traditions and ideas about farming.57 Either way it was apparent that there 
was a deficit in the extent to which LPG chairmen sought actively to implement change, 
responding in part to the concerns of their members.
Uncertainty and the Limits of Transformation
At the heart of the reticence of farmers and functionaries within LPGs of all types to 
accept cooperation or the economic reforms was a lack of confidence in the positive effect 
of further change. There was no doubt that the development of cooperation raised 
numerous fundamental existential questions. Many women farmers feared that they would 
not be given work in their own village once cooperation was underway. The loss of 
flexible working hours and proximity to the household and children represented a 
considerable upheaval in the lifestyles of women in rural communities, which were not 
necessarily thought to be positive.58 Men also had their doubts about going to work away 
from their local area as a result of cooperation. Nor were they particularly confident of 
having to work alongside strangers. A number of tractor drivers were found to doubt 
whether the other drivers they worked with would be as diligent as them. More generally 
the fear of loss of earnings or financial insolvency as a result of having to cooperate was
56 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/B/2/2-022 Protokoll der Bezirksparteiaktivtagung zu den Fragen und Aufgaben der soz. Landwirtschaft
7.3.1968 Referat des Genossen Liidecke p.3
57 SAPMO B-Arch Buro Gerhard Griineberg DY30 IV A 2/2.023/220 Protokoll der Kreisbauemkonferenz Weimar am 18 und
19.4.1968, Referat Gen. Schiiffler, Produktionsleiter und Vorsitzender des Kreislandwirtschaftsrat.
58 ThHStAW SED BPA IVB/2/5-165 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Parteiorgane, Information iiber einige Probleme aus der operativen 
Tatigkeit 23.7.1968 p. 112
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paramount.59 In July 1968 mid-level cadres in the LPGs were reported too to be in fear of 
losing their positions as a result of cooperation. Ordinary farmers, among them SED 
members, predicted it would be their “doom”.60
The arguments against socialist business economics reportedly given by mid- and top- 
level cadres in LPGs tended to see reforms as too much extra work and hardly worth 
introducing as a passing fad.61 The differing genesis of LPGs in the course of the 10 to 15 
years since collectivisation had begun to occur, left neighbouring farms with 
fundamentally similar potential for production at vastly different stages of development 
and different degrees of financial security looking forward to an uncertain future. Given 
these differences in past development, collective farmers could have very different 
conceptions of how their best interests were to be served. There is no doubt that many 
LPG Type Ills benefited from leading the way in economic reform, gaining in status as 
well as material reward. On the other hand, successful LPGs were understandably loth to 
alter what appeared to be a well-functioning organisation. Equally the members of 
struggling LPGs were not always open to the latest measures, fearing further reductions in 
their incomes or still less control over their farm as a result. The problems faced by state 
functionaries suggesting alterations to farmers’ ways of working over the last 10 years 
were well summed up by a former functionary in the state agricultural apparatus: “How 
often have I personally had to hear in the 13 years of my employment in the State 
apparatus as I gave good advice in the farms: it’s all right for you to talk, you get good 
money anyway.”62 As long as LPG members and LPG functionaries were uncertain what 
economic reform entailed for their future prosperity as stakeholders in their LPG, they 
remained un-persuaded of the value of change.
In practice however giving security to the LPGs with regard to their future 
development was not easily achieved. The beginnings of an economic meltdown in the 
economy at large in 1968 undermined the validity of long-term economic planning. Not 
for the first time and certainly not the last, LPG members complained that they were being
59 ThHStAW SED BPA -  SED Kreisleitung Sommerda IV/B/4.10/197 Abt. Landwirtschaft, Kreisbauemkonferenz am 3. und 4. Mai 
1968 Diskussionsbeitrag Otto Kohler, Kleinhausen Typ I pp.158-165.
60 ThHStAW SED BPA IVB/2/5-165 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Parteiorgane, Information zu Fiihrungsproblemen der Secretariate der 
Kreisleitungen... 16.7.1968 p.105.
61 SAPMO B-Arch Biiro Gerhard Griineberg DY30IV A 2/2.023/220 Protokoll der Kreisbauemkonferenz Weimar am 18 und
19.4.1968, Diskussionsbeitrag Helmut Seidel, Vorsitzender LPG Typ II Saalbom.
62 ThHStAW SED BPA -  SED Kreisleitung Sommerda IV/B/4.10/197 Abt. Landwirtschaft, Kreisbauemkonferenz am 3. und 4. Mai 
1968 Diskussionsbeitrag Walter Schreck, KOG Frommstedt pp. 144-150.
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made to bear the brunt of an increase in prices for the sake of industry. Despite the 
supposed existence of buffers which reduced some of the prices charged LPGs for 
essential products from industry, there appeared to have been a systematic increase across 
the board for the machines, equipment and materials required for LPGs to develop 
industrial-scale production. Any savings on costs as a result of a reduction in manpower
63were reportedly being outweighed by excess costs for material and machinery.
A report by the Agricultural Council of the GDR in March 1968 on the mood in the 
LPGs pointed to a number of perceived injustices raising anger among farmers around the 
country. LPG chairmen found that they were unable to meet the rising costs of production 
with the income from the sale of their produce. In other words industrial prices appeared 
to be rising faster than the prices and bonuses paid for increased deliveries of agricultural 
produce. On top of this farmers complained they were not even getting value for money. 
Despite the raised prices there appeared to be no guarantee of availability as far as the 
provision of machinery and tools was concerned. Any long-term planning or contractual 
supply even for the coming year was out of the question. Just to add insult to injury some 
of the machines with which farmers had been supplied were found too to be faulty.64
The degree of concern among collective farmers over their future status in agriculture 
was highlighted by discussion of the new national constitution to be introduced in 1968. 
Article 13 of the proposed constitution appeared to describe the products produced by 
collective farming of the soil as consequently collective property. Given that livestock 
owned privately by Type I farmers relied on the crops farmed collectively, some LPG 
members in Bezirk Erfurt reportedly expressed fears that the produce from their individual 
livestock farming could now be construed as collective property. More seriously farmers 
in general voiced questions as to whether the development of cooperation between LPG 
particularly in crop production signalled the end to the distinction between collective use, 
yet private ownership of land -  a de facto expropriation of farmers.65
For LPG Type Ills which had struggled for years to achieve better results without 
success, there was too a good deal of scepticism towards making changes without a clear
63 SAPMO B-Arch Biiro Gerhard Gruneberg DY30 IV A 2/2.023/72 ZK der SED Abt. Landwirtschaft, Einige weitere Probleme, die 
aus den KBK sichtbar werden 8.5.1968.
54 B-Arch Abt. DDR, DK I VA Neu 2846 Landwirtschaftsrat der DDR, Information zum Verlauf der Friihjahrsbestellung sowie 
Kritiken, Hinweise und Anfragen 22.3.1968.
65 B-Arch Abt. DDR, DK 1 VA Neu 2846 Landwirtschaftsrat der DDR, Information zu einigen Problemen der Verfassungsdiskussion 
in den sozialistischen Betrieben der Landwirtschaft 1.3.1968.
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prospect for the long-term future. In the LPG Type III in Buttstadt for example farmers 
responded to attempts to interest them in discussion of the upcoming national referendum 
on the constitution with a straightforward refusal, unless somebody came to give them a 
clear indication of how they were to be helped to develop: “first there must be clarity 
about our future, then we’ll talk about other problems”.66
Conclusion
By 1968 much had been changed already in socialist agriculture. The number of LPG 
Type Is had been reduced to less than the number of LPG Type Ills in most of the districts 
of the Bezirk. As the size of the agricultural workforce had declined, levels of qualification 
had risen significantly [see Figure 3]. The percentage of LPG members in Bezirk Erfurt 
who belonged to the SED rose too from a paltry 6.9% in 196267 to 14.2% in 1968.68
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Much too had been achieved in establishing the conditions for mechanised production 
on a large-scale, with mergers and some forms of cooperation taking effect. Despite 
resistance to the NOS, in many LPGs performance-related pay, bonuses and detailed
66 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/B/2/5-161 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Parteiorgane, Erganzung zu Problemen der Fiihrungstatigkeit im Kr. 
Sommerda, 15.4.1968 p.33.
67 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/A/2/3 -  186 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Parteiorgane, Analyse der Mitgliederbewegung im Jahre 1966
9.1.1967 pp.142-163.
68 SAPMO B-Arch DY 30/1794 ZK der SED Abt. Landwirtschaft, Anzahl der Mitglieder und Kandidaten der Partei zu den 
Gesamtmitgliedem in den LPG Typ I, II und III 1969 p.44.
69 Statistische Jahrbucher, Bezirk Erfurt 1960-1979 (Erfurt 1961-1980). By 1968 the proportion of the agricultural workforce with the 
basic qualification Facharbeiterpriifung was at 47%. The proportion of those qualified as Master farmers, or with a technical college or 
university qualification was at 7.8%. Statistisches Jahrbuch. Bezirk Erfurt 1970/1 (Erfurt 1971) p. 126.
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accounting of costs and profits were an accepted part of the production process. The 
trappings of collective democracy -  meetings of LPG commissions, weekly board 
meetings, plenary members’ assemblies and particularly brigade assemblies - had to some 
extent become a routine part of the functioning of the LPGs, essential to the sharing of 
information and the transmission of authority within the collective farm. There had 
however by no means been uniform progress across all the districts of the Bezirk in the 
development of cooperative relations, the implementation of economic reform or indeed 
the improvement of productivity. There were still a number of struggling LPG Type Ills 
and LPG Type Is whose members despaired of the future, particularly in the uplands in the 
north and west of the Bezirk. Moreover the evolution of working conditions in livestock 
production was still very differentiated between LPGs.70
A survey of opinion by the institute for research into popular opinion among farmers 
in a number of LPGs from each of the Bezirke in the GDR in 1967 illustrated clear limits 
to the extent to which collectivised farming had been embraced by a considerable 
proportion of farmers. Although technological improvements were broadly welcomed, 
collective farming had clearly failed to convince many farmers that they were in a better 
position than they had been as private land owners. Only 5.5% of respondents from the 
LPG Oberreissen in Bezirk Erfurt agreed that they enjoyed their work more today in the 
LPG than they had prior to collectivisation. Most respondents in all 4 LPGs surveyed in 
Bezirk Erfurt, as well as in the average for the GDR as a whole, agreed with the statement 
that work gave them as much pleasure today as it did before. Very few respondents valued 
the work organisation in their LPG or regarded personal income as a benefit of 
collectivisation j^ffcit^e rest of the GDR as in Bezirk Erfurt fewer than half of the 
respondents recognisedt'any other benefits than improved access to modem machinery.71
Nevertheless identification with the LPG appears also to have grown among all 
farmers, not least perhaps given the futility of continuing to hark back to the days of 
private farming. While concessions continued to be made to farmers in the form of 
household plots and livestock, working conditions had changed considerably, with many 
(although not all) residual elements of private farming replaced with a collective working
70 for example ThHStAW SED BPA IV/B/2/9.01-289 SED Kreisleitung Erfurt-Land, Gruppenaussprache mit Mitgliedem der 
Viehwirtschaftsbrigade, Kerspleben 1.11.1968 p.79.
71 SAPMO B-Arch Biiro Gerhard Gruneberg DY30IV A 2/2.023/82 Genosse Norden an Griineberg, Material des Instituts fur 
Meinungsforschung iiber einige Probleme der sozialistischen Landwirtschaft 24.4.1967.
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culture.72 As a woman farmer in the LPG Bachra, Kreis Sommerda described at a district 
farmers’ conference in May 1968: “the brigade members do not just produce together, 
they spend a part of their spare time in the work collective. Group trips, events and 
discussion are a fixed part of life in the Brigade.. .”73 At the same conference a member of 
the LPG Schillingstedt offered his conception of the transformation over the last 10 years. 
10 years ago “that was still my field and my animal and it became only later gradually our 
field and our animal and today it is a matter of course that every individual thinks 
collectively.”74 Of course this sentiment was not shared by all collective farmers, 
nonetheless it seems that increasingly the LPG did provide formerly private farmers with a 
new sense of identity. Shortly before the VIII. SED Party Congress, a survey was carried 
out by the Institute for Social Sciences at the ZK. Asked whether they felt personally 
connected with their LPG 81.4% of the 2462 respondents to this question agreed. When 
questioned as to the main changes which they considered to have taken place among the 
people during the development of the LPG far and away the most popular answer was the 
level of qualification. Second highest was the “development of comradely collaboration 
and mutual aid between colleagues”.75 Some of the essential changes associated with the 
development of agriculture such as technical education and collective work practices 
appeared thus to have had an impact on the way farmers perceived themselves.
It was certainly true that by this stage SED party organisations had made significant 
strides not only in the quantity but also in the quality of their members in the farming 
community in the Bezirk. Technical training had also gone hand in hand with political 
conformity. The positive benefits of collective farming had begun to become visible and 
more and more farmers were being incorporated through technical training and 
qualification into a socialist system of modem agriculture which promoted cooperation. 
Nevertheless considerable persuasion was required still to win over even loyal leading 
functionaries in the LPGs, let alone sceptical mid-level cadres and the majority of rank
72 Private home production (individuelle Hauswirtschaften) remained central to life as a collective farmer and was a crucial means of 
supplementing income for farmers. It came also to be essential to the production of certain items of produce for the GDR as a whole 
from the late 1970s. See for an example of the meaning of the individuelle Hauswirtschaft to members of an LPG, B. Schier, 
Alltagsleben im ‘Sozialistischen DorjT (Munich 2001) pp.223-237.
73 ThHStAW SED BPA -  Kreisleitung Sommerda IV/B/4.10/197 Abt. Landwirtschaft, Kreisbauemkonferenz am 3. und 4. Mai 1968 
Diskussionsbeitrag Kollegin Krempl -  LPG Bachra p.l 84.
74 ThHStAW SED BPA -  Kreisleitung Sommerda IV/B/4.10/197 Abt. Landwirtschaft, Kreisbauemkonferenz am 3. und 4. Mai 1968 
Diskussionsbeitrag Koll. Tettenbom, LPG Schillingstedt p. 187.
75 SAPMO B-Arch Biiro Gerhard Griineberg DY30IV A 2/2.023/83 Institut fur Gesellschaftswissenschaften beim ZK der SED, 
Lehrstuhl marxistisch-leninistische Soziologie, Einschatzung und Wertung der Beantwortung der Fragen 1-21 und der Rangfolge der 
Vorgaben in diesen Fragen (nach ihrer Haufigkeit) aus der schriftlichen Beffagung der Genossenschaftsbauem...l7.2.1971.
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and file collective farmers, to the next steps in the development of agriculture. Fear of 
future expropriation and redundancy, loss of independence and subordinate status loomed 
large in farmers’ responses to the rate at which change was supposed to occur in 
agriculture. The mechanisation, specialisation and concentration of production on an 
industrial scale promised exciting and dramatic improvements in productivity as well as 
working and living conditions in rural communities. However such developments also cast 
doubt over the future status and security of work in agriculture and life in the village for 
all members of the collective farms.
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CHAPTER 6 
Critical Transitions
“From 1969 w e’ll carryout crop production in common with the LPG Type III....What do you want from 
us now, we produce well. We have a high production; we have what we need and w e’re doing fine..
(LPG Type I members in Burgtonna, Kreis Bad Langensalza make clear their lack of enthusiasm for 
developing advanced cooperation in crop production, February 1968.)
“The solutions to the issue o f cooperation are more difficult or rather more grave than was the formation of 
the LPG.”2 (Comments made by leading agricultural functionaries in discussion in Kreis Miihlhausen in 
October 1968.)
Much had been achieved during the 1960s in transforming agriculture in the GDR 
and changing the context in which agricultural policy was implemented. More LPG 
chairmen were technically trained and politically loyal. SED party secretaries and SED 
party organisations were becoming increasingly influential. An ever increasing proportion 
of LPG members were achieving qualifications in socialist agricultural methods, learning 
specialist trades and at more advanced levels, learning the techniques of socialist 
agricultural management and economics. Moreover with the continuing absorbtion of LPG 
Type Is into LPG Type Ills and the development of collective livestock herds, greater 
centralisation of farm management increased the uniformity and consistency with which 
the SED leadership was able to communicate its authority over the front-line of 
production. Arguably by the end of the 1960s there had been some internalisation of the 
norms of socialist, collectivised and industrialised agriculture among the agricultural 
workforce alongside a stabilisation and rountinisation of the structures of agricultural 
administration. These processes of transformation had however by no means been 
consistent or comprehensive in their scope and rested on fragile foundations.
There remained in 1968 a considerable gulf between the theoretical degree of 
agriculture’s development in the GDR and the actual extent to which individual LPGs 
were prepared to evolve. As had been too often demonstrated, there were limits to the 
speed with which reforms could be imposed on reluctant collective farmers without 
damaging production and alienating a proportion of the population which was only just
1 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/B/2/7 -  268 SED Bezirksleitung, Abt. Landwirtschaft, Bericht tiber die LPG in Burgtonna 29.2.1968 p. 123- 
124, the report describes how a members’ assembly was held in secret in order that a resolution could be passed against cooperation 
without interference from the village mayor or the chairman of the LPG Type III.
2 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/B/2/7 -  268 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Landwirtschaft, Information tiber Aussprachen im KOV Milch- und 
Molkereierzeugnisse Miihlhausen vom 22.-24.9.1968 unter Leitung des Genossen Semisch, Mitglied des ZK der SED. 1.10.1968 p.79.
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beginning literally and metaphorically to come to terms with the regime. There were also 
limits to the ability of the economy as a whole to provide the investment needed to sustain 
this speed of transformation. Finally there were limits to the certainty of LPG 
functionaries as to which path of development was likely to be the most effective means of 
reaching the ultimate goal of a cost-efficient mechanised, concentrated and industrial-scale 
agriculture. In 1968 and 1969 some LPGs were indeed marching forward but not all were 
following the same path. Many LPGs, particularly LPG Type Is, were standing resolutely 
still, while the vast majority were being jostled and cajoled into more or less reluctant 
steps toward an uncertain future.
Forced Evolution
Since the late 1950s a considerable amount had been achieved in transforming the living 
conditions and working practices of villagers and farmers. It remained the case however 
that the zeal of district state and party agricultural functionaries for transforming the 
fundamental organisation of agriculture in the country did not correspond to the 
willingness or the ability of a large proportion of LPG cadres let alone the members at 
large to accept change at such a rapid rate. At the same time agriculture owing to its 
reliance more than ever on machinery, fuel and electricity was increasingly becoming 
subject to growing inefficiencies in the rest of the economy. Bottlenecks in the supply of 
essential products from industry to agriculture were beginning in 1968 already to have an 
impact on the efficiency of the LPGs in Bezirk Erfurt. The circumstances were thus by no 
means auspicious for any attempts to introduce a new pattern of agricultural organisation. 
1968 however saw the SED leadership call for far-reaching change in the status of the 
LPGs as it was within the GDR’s economic system. In particular, the VII. Party Congress 
of the SED in 1967 and the X. German Farmers’ Congress in 1968 set a new agenda for 
the development of collective farming in the GDR advocating the deepening of horizontal 
cooperative relations between LPGs above all in crop production and no less significantly 
the development of new structures regulating the LPGs’ supply of produce for public 
consumption. Attempts to force the rapid evolution of agricultural organisation served 
however only to demonstrate the limits of the SED regime’s power in the countryside.
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Speaking in March 1968 at the SED Bezirkparteiaktivtagung, the Secretary for 
Agriculture in the SED Bezirksleitung had stressed the need for ideological persuasion of 
LPG members before steps were taken in the formation of advanced cooperative relations 
between LPGs.3 As a farmer from an LPG Type I in Kreis Sommerda was reported to 
have said with regard to suggestions of permanent cooperation in crop production: “It 
would be very easy.. .to make the whole thing law with a resolution. That would however 
be a breach of inner collective democracy and would erase the fact that ‘all power comes 
from the people.’” As it was the people, in this case collective farmers particularly in the 
LPG Type Is, remained deeply sceptical of any measure which appeared to change their 
status. The development of permanent cooperation in crop production between two or 
more LPGs appeared to entail far-reaching changes to rights of ownership of land and also 
to the independent status of the LPGs. It also appeared to sever the traditional connection 
between livestock and crop farming, which was something which farmers and agricultural 
functionaries in the state administration alike found hard to countenance.4
Ulbricht’s comments at the X. German Farmers’ Congress in 1968 were crucial 
inspiration for action to be taken by the KLRs to put renewed pressure on LPG chairmen 
to commit their farms to the rapid development of permanent cooperation in crop 
production. He appeared to announce that the structure of farming had to be and would be 
transformed in order to take advantage of the latest scientific and technological 
developments, which would in turn transform “the social organisation of production.” 
More clearly than ever before it was articulated that traditional ideas of maintaining mixed 
crop and livestock farms - what ever the size - had no place in the future of agriculture in 
the GDR. In Ulbricht’s own words: “relatively ever more independent large production 
units for crop production and for the different branches of livestock production will 
gradually develop.” Cooperation was confirmed as no mere temporary solution but the 
essential link in the chain of future agricultural development.5
At the same time a radical change to the status of agriculture within the economy was 
announced. The solution to the problems involved with integrating agriculture into more a
3 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/B/2/2-022 Protokoll der Bezirksparteiaktivtagung zu den Fragen und Aufgaben der soz. Landwirtschaft am
7.3.1968 Referat Genosse Ludecke p.3.
4 ThHStAW SED BPA -  SED Kreisleitung Sommerda IV/B/4.10/190 SED Kreisleitungssitzung, Teil Landwirtschaft 5.6.1968 pp.12- 
36.
5 SAPMO B-Arch DY 30 IV A/1/7/57 ZK Abt. Landwirtschaft, Seminarplan fur das Seminar mit den Fiihrungskadem aus der LuN am
13.11.1968 in Liebenwalde.
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more flexible demand-orientated planned economic system was sought in the formation of 
a new administrative body designed to regulate agriculture in conjunction with the food 
industry. At the X. German Farmers’ Congress in July 1968 it was proposed therefore that 
the agricultural councils (Landwirtschaftsrate) were expanded to include representatives 
of the food industries (Rate fur Landwirtschaft und Nahrungsgiiterwirtschaft or RLNs).
As a unified administration in the districts and the Bezirke the RLNs would, it was hoped, 
be able to oversee the coordinated development of agricultural organisation in line with 
the demands of the various food industries for industrial-scale, specialised production of 
certain agricultural products. In order to coordinate and fund the construction of the 
necessary facilities for this development, so-called cooperative unions 
(Kooperationverbande or KOVs) were formed combining farmers with representatives of 
the food processing and distribution industries. With the growth of so-called vertical 
cooperation between LPGs and the food industry, reflected in administrative terms by the 
formation of the KOVs, the long-term goal of transforming agriculture into a controllable 
and therefore somewhat more predictable branch of the wider economy appeared in theory 
to be rapidly approaching.
The actual prospects for implementing this vision of modem agriculture and 
responsive economic planning any time soon were rather slim. Attempts to introduce 
material incentive and closer economic regulation through strict cost analysis and socialist 
competition into the LPGs during the 1960s had been intended not only to stimulate 
production but also to enable the regulation of different strands of agricultural production 
more efficiently. Under the New Economic System, rather than being defined by 
economic planners in the state administration, agricultural development -  i.e. the 
specialisation and concentration of production - was ultimately to be orchestrated directly 
according to the priorities set by those industries which relied on agricultural produce to 
function.6 Agricultural production was thus to be flexibly controlled according to contracts 
established between the food processing industries -  the so-called final producers who 
were best placed to gauge demand for particular produce -  and the LPG. The efficiency of 
vertical relations relied however on LPG chairmen implementing a system of contractual 
relations regulating the relationship between the various strands of crop and livestock
6 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/A/2/3-179 Rat des Bezirkes, Erfurt, Bericht iiber den Stand der Konzeption und Erprobung einiger 
Grundsatzfragen zur weiteren Anwendung und Vervollkommnung des NOSPL. ..19.11.1966 p.85.
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production in accordance with sozialistische Betriebswirtschaft in agriculture. By 1968 
very few chairmen had however been moved to go so far. The vast majority of LPGs had 
not developed contractual relations between crop production and livestock brigades 
without which little fundamental administrative and economic distinction could take 
place.7 By1969 approximately 60% of LPGs in the Bezirk still had not implemented in full 
the system of sozialistische Betriebswirtschaft and LPG members had yet to be convinced 
of the value of vertical cooperation.8
The lack of trust in the system of vertical cooperation was unsurprising given the 
problematic relationship LPGs often had with the food industries. Assessing the situation 
in 1968 in the experimental KOVs already established in Bezirk Erfurt, the agricultural 
department of the SED Bezirksleitung concluded that the majority of final producers had 
proved unable to take effective responsibility for the whole chain of cooperation and were 
found to have resorted to “outdated working styles”, relying too heavily on bureaucratic 
methods to force LPGs to comply with their demands.9 In 1969 it became clear that 
representatives from final producers still not only did not necessarily have the requisite 
technical knowledge to make reasonable demands on farmers but also simply did not 
know enough about their suppliers to influence their development appropriately.10
If there were obstacles to LPGs’ inclusion in vertical cooperation, the prospects for 
horizontal cooperation between collective farms to enable specialisation of crop 
production were also slim. Pressure on KOGs in Kreis Sommerda to develop specialised 
crop production in advance of most of the rest of the Bezirk demonstrated the lack of 
convinced support for the policy among collective farmers or indeed among many LPG 
brigadiers, board members and even LPG chairmen. In a number of KOGs in Kreis 
Sommerda, the organisation of permanent cooperative crop production had been attempted 
during May and June. This had proved less than successful however. LPGs commonly 
chose not to share their machinery with one another. Few had specialised their crop 
production or changed their crop rotation or field structure in order to mass produce, even 
where they had been given access to the latest machine systems. Despite the arrival of new
7 SAPMO B-Arch DY30 IV A 2/2.023/220 Biiro Gerhard Griineberg Protokoll der Kreisbauemkonferenz Weimar am 18 und
19.4.1968, Referat Gen. Schilffler, Produktionsleiter und Vorsitzender des Kreislandwirtschaftsrat.
8 SAPMO B-Arch DY60/5000 DBD Bezirksverband Erfurt, Abt. Parteiorgane, Parteiinformation 27.2.1969.
9 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/B/2/7-248/1 Abt Landwirtschaft, Entwurf-  Analyse tiber die Weiterfiihrung des Experimentes des 
OSS..30.4.1968 p.3.
10 SAPMO B-Arch DY60/5000 DBD Bezirksverband Erfurt, Abt. Parteiorgane, Parteiinformation 27.2.1969.
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technology in the form of the E512 combine harvester, the size of fields in even advanced 
cooperative communities (KOG) such as those based around Weissensee and Mannstedt, 
Kreis Sommerda, where the average was below 15 hectares, still did not allow for the 
most effective deployment of machinery.11
Even in the most advanced KOGs the integrated deployment of machinery had barely 
been put into practice. Tractor drivers in Schellenburg expressed no desire to take their 
tractors to work around Sommerda; LPG members in Tunzenhausen warned each other 
against allowing Sommerda to “put one over on them.” In the LPG Straussfurt the 
prospect of specialisation as part of cooperation raised the question of what the rest of the 
workforce would do. In LPG Grossbrembach there was opposition to cooperation on the 
grounds that they were doing “quite well already and saw no reason to give others a 
boost”.12 The farmers of successful LPGs were rarely happy to cooperate with their 
underachieving neighbours. How, the crop production brigadier in Kleinneuhausen 
wondered in 1968, could he convince his fellow farmers of the benefits of cooperative 
relations as long as Beichlingen and other LPGs within the KOG continued to have such 
bad yields.13 There was little desire among either collective farmers or their functionaries 
to sacrifice their success for the sake of their neighbours. Thus although all KOGs in the 
district had worked out exact plans for the integrated deployment of machinery, putting 
these measures into practice was undermined by instances of “Betriebsegoismus” }A
Persuading the rank and file members of the collective farms of the value to them of a 
joint crop production unit within their KOG was no small matter. The practical 
implementation of cooperation required fundamental changes not only to working 
practices but the whole manner in which farmers perceived their status and identity. As the 
chairman of the LPG Vehra, Kreis Sommerda put it: “ the step to a common crop 
production and the development of various cooperative relations is comparable to the step 
from being a private farmer to being a collective farmer. But back then there was a clear 
statute which indicated to each person what his rights and obligations were and everyone 
knew exactly, from their neighbours’ experience too, how things proceeded and what
11 ThHStAW SED BPA -  SED Kreisleitung Sommerda IV/B/4.10/190 SED Kreisleitungssitzung, Teil Landwirtschaft 5.6.1968 p.20.
12 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/B/2/5-161 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Landwirtschaft, Handmaterial zur Berichterstattung des Sekretariats der 
SED Kreisleitung Sommerda...7.5.1968 p.51.
13 ThHStAW SED B PA - SED Kreisleitung Sommerda IV/B/4.10/190 SED Kreisleitungssitzung, Teil Landwirtschaft, 5.6.1968 p.21.
14 ThHStAW SED BPA -  SED Kreisleitung Sommerda IV/B/4.10/190 Abt. Landwirtschaft, Zu miindlichen Berichten vor dem 
Sekretariat der Bezirksleitung 7.5.1968 p. 1.
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awaited them. With the common crop production there is still a great deal unclear and we 
can’t give concrete answers to the questions members pose.” Collective farmers were not 
on the whole willing to agree to the principle of the matter while their pay and conditions 
in the new system remained uncertain. “How will pay be measured out fairly -  will it be 
set at the level of the highest paying LPG? Will all the best functionaries work in crop 
production? How are all the requirements of the plan to be met if we specialise our crop 
production.”15 Even top- and mid-level cadres were reluctant to advocate something 
without any clear idea how it would affect their future. What status, they wondered, would 
they have within the new leadership structure in the joint crop production and the LPG. 
More seriously still, what if any status would the LPG have? If cooperative livestock units 
were set up alongside the cooperative crop production unit, would the individual LPG 
cease to exist altogether?16
Despite the fact that such questions remained unresolved, the RLN (K) and the SED 
Kreisleitung in Kreis Sommerda in particular, but also in neighbouring districts such as 
Kreis Bad Langensalza and Weimar17, pressed cooperative councils to develop specialised 
cooperative crop production during the coming year. In accordance with the apparent 
instructions given at the X. German Farmers’ Congress and the VII. SED Party Congress, 
LPG chairmen who were anxious to be at the forefront of agricultural development set 
about arranging crop production in their KOGs independently of the individual LPGs. By 
February 1969 on paper there had been some success. Of the planned 9 KOGs in Kreis 
Sommerda, 6 had already fixed their main specialisation in crop production. Above all the 
RLN (K) claimed to have finally ended any tendencies in the district toward establishing 
Grand LPGs through the full merger of the constituent collective farms in the KOG. It was 
clear however that mid-level cadres -  technical advisors and heads of the work brigades - 
in the LPGs remained doubtful of the sense of separating crop production from the LPGs. 
There were also serious disagreements among leading cadres in a number of cooperative 
councils which had the potential to scupper harmonious cooperation.18
15 ThHStAW SED BPA -  SED Kreisleitung Sommerda IV/B/4.10/101 Abt. Parteiorgane, Einschatzunsg der MV -  Monat November
29.11.1968 p.96
16 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/B/2/7-268 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Landwirtschaft, Faktenmaterial zu Aktivtagung der KOG Straussfurt 
am 26.6.1968 pp.42-49
17 The KOG Berlstedt, Kreis Weimar was among the most advanced in the GDR in developing specialised production through 
cooperation. As an experimental model for the most efficient means of establishing agriculture on an industrial-scale it had an 
exceptional status within the Bezirk, which enabled it to develop organisationally far in advance of other KOG.
18 ThHStAW SED BPA -  SED Kreisleitung Sommerda IV/B/4.10/200 Abt. Landwirtschaft, Perspektiv 10.4.1969 p. 137.
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The development of the scale of crop production had gone a long way since the early 
1960s. The pressure for even more rapid progress in the latter half of 1968 and 1969 via 
cooperative crop production came however increasingly at the expense of suitable 
preparation and persuasion of collective farmers. Much of the apparent progress which 
zealous LPG chairmen and RJLN functionaries claimed to have made in organising 
cooperative crop production had been achieved so rapidly that there were real concerns 
that in practice it might have an adverse effect on production. Given growing problems in 
the economy at large as well as unrest in Czechoslovakia, there was arguably good reason 
to be wary of any measures which might unnecessarily undermine food production within 
the country. Whether this entered into his calculations or not, Walter Ulbricht himself 
made some damning criticisms during the 10th Plenary Session (or Plenum) of the SED 
Central Committee in April 1969 of the progress of agricultural transformation which his 
comments in 1968 had apparently sparked.19 The response to this intervention in the LPGs 
revealed a degree of confusion and deception alongside suppressed resentment and 
conflict throughout LPGs in the Bezirk which thoroughly surprised agricultural 
functionaries at all levels in the regime hierarchy. Enormous change had been achieved in 
the past decade; however the limits and the possibilities of the social transformation of the 
countryside could now be seen in truer light. The extent to which agricultural 
administration at the grass roots was formed by and beholden to the interests and attitudes 
of collective farmers rather than the malleable object of socialist modernising policy was 
once again demonstrated.
The Crisis Precipitated
Ulbricht’s intervention was necessary because certain aspects of the party line had, he 
claimed, been misinterpreted. Crop production was not to become independent of the 
LPGs, but as he had said at the X. German Farmers’ Congress “relatively” independent. 
The food industries were to have a coordinating and directing role over agriculture 
through the use of mutual contractual relations -  not through their dominance of the 
councils of cooperative unions (KOV). There were thus two lines to his criticism of the 
situation in agriculture: the organisation of the cooperative unions had given too much
19 SAPMO B-Arch DY30/IV 2/1/395 Tagungen desZ K - 10. Plenum desZK, 24.4.1969, Schlusswort des Genossen Ulbricht pp.211 - 
2 2 1 .
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power to administrators in the food industry and undermined the independent status of the 
LPGs; secondly a minority of LPGs in advanced states of cooperation had gone too far too 
quickly in the development of independent crop production. Change at such a rate was not 
suitable for all LPGs and thus these LPGs were no longer to receive publicity as models of 
the correct path of development. The cooperation based around Berlstedt, Kreis Weimar 
had for many years been a model of advanced socialist agricultural policy. However in the 
context of the 10th Plenum in 1969, Walter Ulbricht made it clear that Berlstedt was no 
longer an example which should be followed. Although not wholly critical of the 
developments made by the LPGs in the KOG Berlstedt, the overall direction was no 
longer to be publicised, particularly as regards specialisation. Central to his comments was 
the notion of inviolability of the LPG as an economic unit, in which the principles of 
collective democracy were to be meticulously implemented. If a separate crop production 
was to exist, it was to be a sub-department of the KOG and its leaders subordinate to the 
chairmen of the LPGs. Moreover Ulbricht argued that the development of cooperative 
relations in crop production must and could only occur gradually in consultation with LPG 
members.20
At a meeting of the RLN of the GDR in May 1969 to evaluate the 10th Plenum, 
Ulbricht’s arguments against the independence of the crop production units were 
reiterated.21 In the ensuing discussion it became clear how widespread divergent 
conceptions of the imminent development of agricultural organisation had become. At the 
meeting the influential chairman of the LPG Dahlen described how teachers at a technical 
college found the essence of the 10th Plenum difficult to grasp, given what they 
themselves had been told would be the next stage in the GDR’s agricultural development. 
It had been drummed into them thus far, one teacher told him, that in the future: “of the 
LPG only the telephone and the desk would be left”, in other words, the establishment of 
independent cooperative units by the KOG was indeed as far as they understood the 
situation, the first step on the road to abandoning the idea of collective property 
altogether.22
20 SAPMO B-Arch DY30/IV 2/1/395 Tagungen des ZK -  10. Plenum des ZK, 24.4.1969, Schlusswort des Genossen Ulbricht pp.211- 
2 2 1 .
21 SAPMO B-Arch Biiro Gerhard Griineberg DY30 IV A 2/2.2023/169 RLN der D D R - 6. Tagung am 16.5.1969 Beitrag des Ministers 
Georg Ewald.
22 SAPMO B-Arch Biiro Gerhard Griineberg DY30IV A 2/2.2023/169 RLN der D D R - 6. Tagung am 16.5.1969, Beitrag des Genossen 
Dohler, Vorsitzender der LPG Dahlen.
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There was certainly a tendency in much of the theoretical literature to predict the 
dissolution of the class of the collective farmers in the near future. A dominant role for 
food industries in controlling agricultural production and the transfer of farm land from 
collective (genossenschaftlich) to cooperative (<kooperativ) use seemed to point towards a 
change in the status of those working in agriculture and render the LPGs increasingly 
obsolete. This attitude was not wholly surprising given the continual and deliberate 
erosion of the proprietary ties between individual farmers and the land they farmed 
inherent in the reform of LPGs during the 1960s. Gerhard Griineberg, speaking to the 
national RLN, nevertheless now made clear that too much theorising had gone on, 
particularly as regards the guiding role of the food industries in conjunction with 
agriculture. “There are mountains of books, and one is amazed, when one feels obliged to 
busy oneself with the matter, by all that has been written about agriculture and the food 
industry.” His message to the delegates at the conference was that it was not practical for 
agriculture in general and the LPGs in particular to have their independence compromised. 
Farmers and not simply administrators were still essential to the effective management of 
a sector of the economy which remained in many respects subject to uncontrollable 
(unpredictable and thus unplannable!) natural conditions and would not submit simply to 
the plans of a bureaucrat, however efficient he might be.23
Criticism of recent developments in some LPGs sent shock waves running through the 
state and party administration concerned with agriculture. To some extent Ulbricht (and in 
his wake Griineberg) had in fact done little more than publicly rein in those zealous 
functionaries who sought to realise the long-term goals of transformation in agriculture 
ahead of schedule. The essential course of agricultural development was more or less the 
same as before. Cooperative relations were still to be at the heart of a gradual move 
towards greater specialisation. The Grand LPG had not been overtly approved as a more 
effective means of reaching industrial-scale production. The persuasion of LPG members 
and their subsequent ratification of new measures in accordance with the demands of 
‘collective democracy’ now as before was required (at least rhetorically) before progress 
could be made. Yet it soon became clear that the administration of agriculture from top to
23 SAPMO B-Arch Buro Gerhard Griineberg DY30 IV A 2/2.2023/169 RLN der D D R - 6. Tagung am 16.5.1969, Beitrag des Genossen 
Griineberg.
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bottom was in fact highly sensitive to any suggestion that the steps taken thus far had been 
in any way mistaken.
In the course of 1968 and 1969 terms such as “rump LPG” had begun to be used to 
describe what was left of some LPGs in the Bezirk once all-but-independent joint crop 
production units had been set up in a few of the KOGs. While the use of this pejorative 
phrase clearly expressed what was going wrong with the hasty development of 
cooperative crop production, there had equally clearly been some confidence among LPG 
functionaries that pursuing the administrative separation of crop production from the 
LPGs had been officially sanctioned. In some KOGs in Kreis Sommerda there were 
reports that LPGs and joint crop production units had separated so much that headed letter 
paper had been designed and company name signs put up advertising their new status as 
either a “Cooperative crop production enterprise” or a “Livestock production enterprise”. 
In such cases, where Ulbricht’s comments had some clear and direct relevance, i.e. in 
those few LPGs where intentions to proceed rapidly with developing separate specialised 
crop and livestock production had already begun to be put into practice, the Kreisleitungen 
were quick to respond. In the KOG Bachra, Kreis Sommerda, the development of 
cooperation in crop production had proceeded so far that the joint crop production was on 
the verge of proclaiming its independence from its constituent LPGs. The SED 
Kreisleitung intervened to ensure that the head of the crop production was subordinate to 
an LPG chairman and responsible to the cooperative council. The chairman of the 
cooperative council could not thus at the same time be the head of the crop production 
unit. Furthermore the joint crop production was to be renamed to identify its subordinate 
position to the LPGs. It was now to be known as a Cooperative Crop Production Unit,
(.Kooperative Abteilung Pflanzenproduktion or KAP), emphasising its dependence on the 
LPGs for its legal status.24
Responding directly to the technical criticisms made by Ulbricht was one thing. 
Dealing with the confusion and rumour which abounded among farmers, LPG 
functionaries and the state apparatus in the districts was quite another. The variety of 
responses to Ulbricht’s comments in the LPGs and the district party and state 
administration revealed the complex balance in the relationship between collective
24 ThHStAW SED BPA -  SED Kreisleitung Sommerda IV/B/4.10/200 Abt. Landwirtschaft, Probleme der Kooperation -  Beschluss 
Politburo vom 25.7.1969 pp.150-159.
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farmers, their leading functionaries and the state and party hierarchy. The impossibility of 
agricultural transformation without some degree of consent from collective farmers 
themselves and the often ambiguous role played by LPG functionaries in communicating 
state authority while protecting personal and local interests was once again demonstrated.
Crisis and Confusion in Agricultural Administration
Such were the tensions which had developed in recent years within LPGs, within KOGs 
and between LPGs and the district authorities that Ulbricht’s comments were seized upon 
as an excuse for attacking all that seemed to be wrong with the status quo in agriculture. 
What appeared to give farmers and LPG functionaries alike the grounds for their attacks 
was the emphasis placed upon the independence of the LPG and the importance of 
consultation as part of collective democracy. Anger and resentment over the lack of 
consultation with LPG members on policies such as cooperation or the introduction of 
socialist business economics had reached boiling point. There were thus various strands to 
the complaints unleashed at the grassroots by the 10th Plenum, not all of which bore an 
immediate relation to the actual subject of Ulbricht’s own criticisms.
A meeting of the SED Kreisleitung Sommerda in July 1969 to discuss Ulbricht’s 
concluding remarks heard a report on the reaction of farmers in the district. It was claimed 
hopefully that the majority of the collective farm members understood correctly that the 
10th Plenum did not mean a correction of agricultural policy but rather a continuation of 
the resolutions of the VII. SED Party Congress, with the caveat that this process must not 
be mismanaged through impatience. In the first days and weeks after the 10th Plenum 
however mid-level cadres were marked out as being particularly problematic spreading the 
opinion that “thanks to the 10th Plenum they could all now take their time and that 
cooperation would be scaled back.” More seriously Ulbricht’s remarks were being 
interpreted as a licence for collective farms to assert their individual independence from 
outside interference, be it from other LPGs or the state apparatus. One chairman of an 
LPG was reported to have collected all the newspaper articles he could find on the subject 
of collective democracy. His intention appears to have been to use them as proof that he 
could not legitimately implement change without the agreement of his members.25
25 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/B/4.10/190 SED Kreisleitung Sommerda, Abt. Landwirtschaft, Kreisleitungssitzung 3.7.1969 pp. 136-155.
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Members of the LPG Lutzensommem in Kreis Bad Langensalza were among the first 
in Bezirk Erfurt to take the opportunity to voice their frustration and re-claim some 
independence. The KOR and the RLN (K), they complained, had too often taken decisions 
affecting the LPG members without any prior discussion of the matter and they had thus 
been forced to accept what amounted to faits accomplish6 Reports compiled by the DBD 
in Bezirk Erfurt during May 1969 on the mood in the countryside highlighted the sense 
among LPG members that so far they had been bullied into things or not listened to 
sufficiently by functionaries at various levels of agricultural administration from the LPG 
board, the KOR up into the district state administration and this situation would now have 
to be rectified. In Erfurt-Land in particular, DBD members complained about the damage 
done to the independence of their LPG because of the pressure put upon them by the RLN 
(K).27 Such complaints could be more or less justified in the context of the 10th Plenum. 
However doubts over the validity of previous agricultural policy began too to be 
expressed. LPG members made the point that they had the right to be properly consulted 
and prepared for cooperation and the separation of crop and livestock production. They 
also however began to suggest that they had a right actively to determine their own path of 
development. If cooperative relations could only be developed against the will of 
collective farmers then, the question was raised, was it not correct that no such relations 
exist until farmers were convinced of their value? In Kreis Amstadt as well as Kreis Bad 
Langensalza, collective farmers who in the past had been particularly obstinate in their 
resistance to cooperation began to draw this conclusion. Where few or no extensive 
cooperative relations had developed between LPGs, they considered themselves right all 
along not to have participated in cooperation. Doubts even began to be raised as to 
whether KOGs could continue to exist at all, if the majority of LPGs opposed them.28
Faced with the vindication of collective farmers’ hostility to cooperation after the 10th 
Plenum, LPG functionaries and the staff of the RLN (K) appeared for a time to be at a loss 
as to how to respond. The chairman of the LPG Kalteneber in Heiligenstadt expressed his
26 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/B/2/5 -  183 SED Bezirksleitung, Abt. Parteiorgane, Kurzinformation, Stimmen von 
Genossenschaftsbauerinnen und -bauem zum Schlusswort des Genossen Walter Ulbricht auf der 10. Tagung des ZK zum Problem der 
soz. Landwirtschaft 21.5.1969 p.326.
27 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/B/2/5-410 DBD Bezirksverband, Bericht an den 1. Sekretar der Bezirksleitung der SED 23.5.1969 pp.174- 
180.
28 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/B/2/5 -  183 SED Bezirksleitung, Abt. Parteiorgane, Kurzinformation, Stimmen von 
Genossenschaftsbauerinnen und -bauem zum Schlusswort des Genossen Walter Ulbricht auf der 10. Tagung des ZK zum Problem der 
soz. Landwirtschaft 21.5.1969 p.327.
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confusion and disillusionment: “the question which concerns me is whether agricultural 
policy has changed since the 10th Plenum? There are currently many discussions: 
cooperation is going to be broken up, or cooperation will lead to the liquidation of the 
class of the collective farmer. I’m not against new things, but it’s not so easy for us up 
her£ as it is for those farmers down in the plains.”29 In Kreis Heiligenstadt, Miihlhausen 
and Erfurt-Land, staff of the district councils appeared to be uncertain what was going on 
in the LPG assemblies.30 DBD sources noted too that the LPG were no longer receiving 
guidance from staff from the SED Kreisleitung or the RLN (K) who themselves no doubt 
were unclear what the correct path ought to be. In Steinrode, Kreis Worbis some DBD 
members pointed out that representatives of the district authorities used to participate in 
every meeting of the cooperative council, but had not turned up once since the 10th 
Plenum.31
Even where the RLN (K) did attempt to continue to advise the LPGs however, it was 
soon clear that concrete decisions about the future of individual KOGs were not possible. 
Following the 10th Plenum, the RLN (K) in Kreis Sommerda initially continued to press 
ahead encouraging the development of joint crop production in the KOG Kolleda. The 
economics advisory service attached to the RLN (K) had worked out plans and practices 
for a joint cooperative crop production in the KOG Kolleda which appeared to be in tune 
with the 10th Plenum line as they “in no way limited the role of the LPGs and foresaw the 
payment of farmers via the individual collective farms.” There remained however a major 
obstacle to the establishment of a joint cooperative crop production in the KOG: namely 
the “current ideological attitude of members.” This the RLN (K) admitted would have to 
be discussed shortly in “comprehensive consultation” in the LPGs.32 The following month 
in a discussion at the district RLN in Kreis Sommerda it was reported however that the 
fixed attitude of LPG members in a number of collective farms was that cooperation in 
crop production should be broken up and the LPGs allowed to be independent again. 
Among these was the LPG “Neuer Weg” (“New Path”) Kolleda. In a letter sent by the
29 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/B/2/5 -183 Abt. Parteiorgane, Kurzinformation, Stimmen von Genossenschaftsbauerinnen und -  
bauem...21.5.1969 p.326.
30 ThHStAW SED BPA ThHStAW SED BPA 1V/B/2/5-183 Abt. Parteiorgane, Kurzinformation iiber den Stand der 
Durchfuhrung... 17.7.1969 p.392.
31 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/B/2/5-410 DBD Bezirksverband, Auswertung der Berichte der Kreisverbande tiber Meinungen unserer 
Mitglieder zum 10. Plenum des ZK der SED und unserer 5. Parteivorstandssitzung undated pp. 181-186.
32 ThHStAW SED BPA -  SED Kreisleitung Sommerda IV/B/4.10/200 RLN Sdmmerda, Produktionsleitung an die SED Kreisleitung, 
tiber KOG Ktilleda, 17.7.1969 p.139.
169
chairman and party secretary to the chairman of their KOG, they explained the decision of 
the LPG’s board to withdraw from cooperative crop production. The letter concluded with 
the chairman and party secretary expressing their regret at this decision having been 
reached. They pointed out however that even they could not get around the words: “the 
farmers decide”.
By mid-August, the RLN (K) could not help but notice that some KOGs were likely 
to be hard put to continue even with minor forms of cooperation between LPGs during the 
harvest. The KOG Mannstedt, it found, was more or less falling apart. In the neighbouring 
LPGs in Buttstadt, Olbersleben and Essleben the opinion was widespread, among LPG 
cadres as well as ordinary farmers, that joint crop production would be broken up and the 
LPGs allowed to become independent again. It was thus unsurprising that in the KOG 
Buttstadt even the use of machinery in combination between LPG Essleben and LPG 
Buttstadt had fallen apart and each LPG had begun to employ its own machinery for its 
own purposes. All in all, in the words of the SED Kreisleitung, the level of cooperation in 
this part of the district had “just about reached zero”.34 At the August meetings of the SED 
party organisations in the LPGs in Sommerda district, the backlash against cooperation 
continued. In Wemingshausen among other places, the opinion was widespread among 
LPG members that the deployment of harvesters in cooperation put their LPG at a 
disadvantage.35
Looking back on 1969, a report on the development of cooperation by the SED 
Bezirksleitung admitted that “immediately after the 10th Plenum people no longer worked 
conscientiously towards realising and fixing cooperative relations.” Among leading 
cadres in the LPG as well as in the state apparatus there was insecurity and a wait and see 
attitude to the further development of cooperation. In 69 out of 150 cooperative 
communities in the Bezirk a joint unit for crop production had in theory been established. 
However given the confusion and conflicts surrounding cooperative production, these 
KAP were often not particularly efficient and their inefficiency had only been exacerbated 
by the poor weather during 1969. Justified dissatisfaction with the whole notion of the
33 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/B/4.10/200 SED Kreisleitung Sommerda, Vorsitzender und Parteisekretar der LPG “Neuer Weg” Kolleda 
an den Vorsitzenden der KOG Kolleda 28.8.1969 p. 163.
34 ThHStAW SED BPA -  SED Kreisleitung Sommerda IV/B/4.10/200 Information tiber Beratung der Produktionsleitung des RLN (K) 
am 14.8.1969 pp.160-162.
35 ThHStAW SED BPA SED Kreisleitung IV/B/4.10/101 Abt. Parteiorgane, Bericht tiber die im August stattgefundenen 
Parteiversammlungen p. 137.
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KAP among LPG members developed as a result along with the revived tendency among
O IT
leading cadre to advocate the Grand LPG as a better alternative.
Now that the need for large-scale production was widely accepted, it seemed to 
many farmers, the best alternative to cooperation, which seemed to solve the conflicts 
between LPGs and confusion over ownership and distribution of profits and costs between 
crop and livestock production, was once again the Grand LPG. In December 1969, the 
situation in the KOG Greussen, Kreis Sondershausen, contrasted with that of its near 
neighbour, the model KOG Weissensee in Kreis Sommerda. Here dissatisfaction with 
cooperation had restarted arguments that either there should be a merger of the constituent 
LPGs -  producing a Grand LPG - or that each should go their own way.37 As far as the 
SED Bezirksleitung in Erfurt was concerned the failure of LPGs to advance with 
establishing cooperative crop production following the 10th Plenum and the growing 
support for Grand LPGs among LPG members and cadres alike was continuing lack of 
sufficient SED presence and influence in farming.
The lack of an influential body of advocates of SED agricultural policy promoting 
the continuation of cooperation in either the KOGs or in individual LPGs clearly increased 
the chances that alternative ideas would gain widespread support among the general 
membership. In January and February 1970 a number of reports came in to the SED 
Bezirksleitung of party organisations whose members claimed to be unable to exert any 
influence on the boards of the LPGs. In many LPGs, party comrades complained that they 
were not being sufficiently informed. SED members in Bad Tennstedt remarked: 
“whenever the discussion is about decisive questions, we don’t get asked, but rather find 
out about the decisions made by the board only in the pub later on.” In Ossmanstedt SED 
members similarly complained: “basically we don’t get asked at all, if for example some 
thing needs to be built, that’s the board’s decision alone.”38
Where the SED was weak, this was often put down to the existence of a strong 
alternative party group. DBD members occupying the key functionary positions in
36 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/B/2/7-267 Abt. Landwirtschaft Information tiber den Stand der Entwicklung der Kooperationsbeziehungen 
im Bezirk Erfurt und die sich daraus ergebenden Schlussfolgerungen. ..19.1.1970 pp.79-95.
37 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/B/2/7-268 Abt. Landwirtschaft, Inforation tiber die Aussprache des Genossen Meister mit dem Sekretar fur 
Landwirtschaft der SED Kreisleitung Sondershausen, Genossen Junge am 19.12.1969,22.12.1969.
38 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/B/2/5-165 Sektor Operativ, Faktenmaterial tiber einige Probleme der Parteiarbeit in der Landwirtschaft und 
Nahrungsgiiterwirtschaft Jan 1970 p.392; IV/B/2/9.01-289 Abt. Parteiorgane, Bericht tiber eine Aussprache mit einer Parteigruppe der 
BPO der SED der LPG “Rotes Banner” KOmer, Krs. Miihlhausen 3.12.1969 p.226; Abt. Parteiorgane Protokoll tiber die 
Gruppenaussprache mit Genossen in der LPG Bad Tennstedt am 3.12.1969,4.12.1969 p.240.; Information tiber die am 3.12.1969 in der 
PO der LPG Type III, Willerstedt, Krs. Apolda, durchgefuhrte Aussprache 5.12.1969 p.255
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particular appeared in a number of cases to be blamed for the failure of SED organisations 
to have sufficient influence over the direction of individual LPG’s development. Naturally 
there were many cases in which DBD cadres and party groups in general worked well with 
SED party members and sought actively to implement current SED policy. The support 
for the Grand LPG and hostility towards cooperation shown by some DBD members 
however raised suspicion in the SED Kreisleitungen.39 As a consequence, where 
cooperative relations had ground to a halt, DBD members in leading positions in the LPGs 
were suspected, whether fairly or not, of deliberately undermining cooperation while 
speaking publicly in their favour.40
In a meeting with the first secretary of the SED Kreisleitung, Weimar in August 
1970, the chairman of the LPG Kromsdorf, himself a member of the DBD, sought to
tiloutline some of the basic problems with the development of cooperation since the 10 
Plenum in his KOG. In his analysis, the mood in the collective farms had worsened 
because: “the 10th Plenum has not gone out of the minds of the members yet.” At the same 
time the new organisational structure of the crop production was not conducive to efficient 
farming. It was proving difficult, for example, for LPG chairmen to have to apply for 
access to machinery and manpower to a functionary -  the head of the crop production unit 
-  who was technically not his superior. The dropping value of the work unit and a cut in 
the funds available for bonuses had also added to the general dissatisfaction with the new 
arrangements. The SED Kreisleitung however chose to see the problem as essentially one 
of ideological discipline. Their report concluded: “it certainly does not overstate the case 
to make the assertion that cooperative relations above all are hindered by such cadres as 
do not belong to the SED” 41
Whether this assessment was entirely fair or not, in the aftermath of the 10th 
Plenum, it became clear that the SED regime had failed to close the ideological deficit in 
the LPGs. The long-term goals of socialist agricultural policy continued to be regarded
39 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/B/2/5-165 Sektor Operativ, Faktenmaterial tiber einige Probleme der Parteiarbeit in der Landwirtschaft und 
Nahrungsgtiterwirtschaft Jan. 1970 p.392, SAPMO B-Arch DY60/2973 DBD Bezirksvorstand, Abt. Parteiorgane, 
Neuwahlabschlussbericht 21.1.1970.
40 SAPMO B-Arch, DY60/2973 DBD Parteivorstand, Abt. Parteiorgane, Wertung des Weiteren Verlaufs der Diskussionen zur 
Vorebreitung des Perspektivplanes; DBD Bezirksverband, Parteiiformation, 11.8.1970; DBD Bezirksverband, Abt. Parteiorgane, 
Neuwahlbeschlussbericht 21.1.1970; ThHStAW SED BPA IV/B/4.10/198 SED Kreisleitung Sommerda, Abt. Landwirtschaft, 
Kreisbauemkonferenz am 4. und 5.3.1970, Diskussionsbeitrag K. Schwarz, LPG Mannstedt pp.157-165; IV/B/2/5-165 Abt. 
Parteiorgane Erste Einschatzungen der Kreisleitungssitzungen zur Auswertung der 14. Tagung des ZK 19.1.1971 pp.568-574.
41 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/B/2/7-268 SED Kreisleitung der SED Weimar, Bericht an Genossen Ltidecke, Abt. Landwirtschaft der 
Bezirksleitung 12.10.1970 pp.371-375.
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with suspicion by collective farmers and for the time being the apparatus through which 
agricultural policy was to be communicated and implemented in the LPGs appeared at 
best unsure of itself and at worst to have broken down. Amid a worsening economic crisis, 
the district state authorities appeared unable to give sufficient guidance or practical advice 
to the LPGs on how they ought to organise themselves. At the same time, LPG chairmen 
found it impossible to agree with each other on how to proceed with cooperation. Under 
these circumstances, the possibilities for a coherent programme of future development to 
be agreed between LPG cadres, LPG members and the district agricultural councils was in 
most cases remote.
Administrative Gridlock
After the upheavals resulting from the 10th Plenum, how LPGs of various Types, in their 
various stages of development towards merger and cooperation could or should proceed to 
develop their production facilities remained obscure to LPG members and their 
functionaries. The RLN (K) appeared too to be reticent in dictating a coherent direction to 
the LPGs given the re-assertion of collective democracy and consultation of collective 
farmers which Ulbricht’s comments had provoked. Whether or not cooperation between 
LPGs, leading to the ultimate separation of crop production from livestock production, 
ought to be actively pursued for the time being was once again cast into doubt. By the 
same token, LPG chairmen were not sure whether they ought rather to pursue merger with 
their neighbours or indeed whether they should seek to remain independent and build up 
their production facilities individually.42
Dealing with these dilemmas was made far more complicated by the atmosphere 
of uncertainty and fear of financial catastrophe among collective farmers which resulted 
from sudden shortages in the supply of essential equipment to LPGs in 1969 and 1970. 
DBD functionaries in Kreis Sommerda and Kreis Worbis found they could give little 
satisfactory explanation to collective farmers who could not understand why the supply of 
essential spare parts for machinery was so much worse than in previous years.43 A lower 
than average yield from the 1969 harvest added to the sense of crisis in some parts of the
42 SAPMO B-Arch DY60/2973 DBD Bezirksvorstand, Abt. Parteiorgane, Wertung des weiteren Verlaufs der Diskussionen zur 
Vorbereitung des Perspektivplanes 21.9.1970.
43 SAPMO B-Arch DY60/2973 DBD Kreisverband Worbis, Abt. Parteiorgane, Parteiinformation 16.2.1970; DBD Kreisverband
Sommerda, Abt. Parteiorgane, Information iiber die Arbeit unserer Partei in der Wahlvorbereitung 9.2.1970.
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for less than half the LPGs. For the majority there was still considerable opposition to 
cooperation. A number of SED Kreisleitungen were still reporting a lack of clarity over 
the “meaning in principle and objective necessity of cooperative relations” among LPG 
members and functionaries. In Kreis Sommerda LPGs were still considering withdrawing 
from KOGs.51 In the KOG Tannroda, Kreis Weimar, the LPG chairmen themselves were 
thought to be preventing the development of cooperative crop production by simply not 
taking the steps in practice which they had publicly agreed upon in the cooperative 
council. The SED Kreisleitung regarded this state of affairs as the result of unwillingness 
rather than incapability. Allegedly the discussions of the KOR were also notorious among 
some members of the LPGs for failing to correspond to reality, earning their meetings the 
nickname: “the fairytale hour”.52
Reports on the mood among collective farmers paint a rather desperate picture, 
with stagnation in development, problems with production and an apparent inability for 
either the RLN (K) or the cooperative councils to take action to improve the situation in 
the individual farms.53 As a result of the conflicts which cooperation in crop production 
seemed to cause, there was certainly no consensus in the Bezirk that the separate 
specialisation of crop and livestock production was indeed the correct way to develop 
agriculture. During 1971 there were a number of discussions with farmers in the LPGs 
where cooperative crop production units had been recently established. The same 
complaints came up repeatedly in nearly all the LPGs in the district where such 
discussions were held, that the new relationship between crop and livestock was having a 
negative effect on the quantity and quality of the feed on offer. As a result both ordinary 
members and leading cadres of the LPGs began openly to suggest that the “tearing 
asunder” of crop and livestock production was mistaken.54 Even though LPG cadres were 
known to have been removed from their posts for actively advocating the Grand LPG as 
an alternative to the separation of crop and livestock production, there remained 
considerable uncertainty as to whether such views would not soon be considered
51 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/B/2/5-165 Abt. Parteiorgane, Erste Einschatzungen der Kreisleitungssitzungen zur Auswertung der 14. 
T agungdesZK  19.1.1971 p.568.
52 ‘Fairytale hour translates here the German “Marchenstunde”: ThHStAW SED BPA IV/B/2/7-268 Abt. Landwirtschaft, Information 
Qber Aussprachen in der KOG Tannroda, Kreis Weimar 8.3.1971.
53 KA SOmmerda 264, RdK Sdmmerda, Untersuchung der 4. Arbeitsgruppe zur Vorbereitung der Kreisdelegiertenkonferenz der SED in 
Sdmmerda 1.3.1971.
54 ThHStAW SED BPA SED Kreisleitung Sdmmerda 1V/B/4.10/149 A bt Landwirtschaft, Aussprache in der LPG “Rotes Banner” 
BQchel 7.4.1971 p.83; RLN (K), Aussprache in der Milchproduktion in einem Kollektiv der Milchviehhaltung der LPG Beichlingen 
22.4.1971 p.86.
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acceptable. Until the outcome of the SED’s VIII. Party Congress was known, LPG 
chairmen were known to be hesitant to pursue cooperation.55
Conclusion
The last two years of the decade demonstrated more dramatically than ever before the 
limits of the state apparatus’ ability to drive forward transformation and the lack of strong 
SED influence over farmers. The shifting parameters within which agricultural 
development had taken place were necessarily shaped by technological advancement and 
the transformative ideals of socialist ideology. However they were also clearly shaped by 
the need for compromise with the personal interests of collective farmers themselves, as 
they were managed (and mismanaged) by the functionaries of the LPGs and the 
agricultural administration at the grassroots. With the future still uncertain, the failure to 
deal with the lack of consensus of interests between the SED regime and LPG members 
and their functionaries exposed the fragility of what up to then had seemed increasingly 
stable structures of authority in the districts.
Out of the conflict and confusion arising after the 10th Plenum and the more general 
economic uncertainty caused by the failure of economic reforms, paradoxically a new 
relationship began however to take shape between the SED leadership and the agricultural 
workforce. As ever greater restrictions were placed on private production, increasingly 
well trained and specialised collective farmers began to accept the necessity of 
specialising agricultural production and actively supported the development of new and 
stable structures of agricultural administration at the grassroots. The promise of an end to 
austerity and a secure future under a more rigorous system of economic planning began 
too to enable both new and older generations of collective farmers to accept a 
reconfiguration of the agricultural system.
55 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/B/2/7-268 Abt. Landwirtschaft, Information iiber Kooperationen des Kreises Weimar (Auftrag des 
Genossen Liidecke) 30.8.1971.
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SECTION 3
Stable Instability:
Economic Stagnation and the End of Transformation
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CHAPTER 7 
Regaining the Initiative: From Ulbricht to Honecker
“All new things have to get properly settled in .. .there is agreement with the social development as a whole,
but it must be organised properly. Then w e’ll get something out o f  it We don’t want to earn less.”1
(Opinions o f LPG members in Stottemheim showing their tentative acceptance o f plans for the formation of 
the KAP.)
The explicit transfer of power at the top of the SED hierarchy from Walter 
Ulbricht to Erich Honecker in 1971 sealed a shift in the approach of the SED leadership 
towards the management of the economy. Austerity and economic reform in the pursuit of 
utopian goals of social and economic transformation were broadly speaking abandoned in 
order to overcome a deficit of popular support for the SED regime. In its stead a form of 
consumer socialism was established which sought to satisfy the material needs of the 
population though with little consideration for the longer term costs to the state’s 
economic viability. The transfer of power from Ulbricht to Honecker was thus an 
important turning point. Measures to improve living and working conditions in rural 
communities, along with increased investment in agriculture engendered greater 
confidence in the possibilities for financial security under a transformed system of 
agricultural organisation. The gradual return of coherence to the state administration’s 
approach to agriculture, renewed efforts by the SED to assert its influence over the LPGs 
themselves and the final restriction on private production with the demise of the LPG 
Type Is were vital in subduing any lingering opposition to the transformation of 
agriculture through cooperation. The stabilisation of the structures through which SED 
policies were communicated to and the manner in which they were received by collective 
farmers during the 1970s must also be seen however in the context of the conflicts and 
accommodations made between farmers, LPG chairmen and the functionaries of the 
district state and party apparatus during the previous decade.
1 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/C/2/7 -  356 SED Kreisleitung Erfurt-Land an den Sekretar fur Landwirtschaft der Bezirksleitung, 
Information iiber den Stand der Bildung der KAP Stottemheim/Grossrudestedt, die gegenwartig stehenden Probleme und der sich 
daraus ergebenden Schlussfolgerungen fur die Leitungstatigkeit. 1.3.1973 p.83.
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Rural Living and Working Conditions in the 1960s
The 1960s have been regarded as the dynamic years of the GDR’s development. The 
security lent the SED leadership by the erection of the Wall at the start of the decade 
allowed Ulbricht to lead the GDR down a path of radical social transformation and 
attempted economic reform. They were certainly challenging and exciting years for those 
who sought to push forward the transformation of the scale and organisation of 
agricultural production and with it the social fabric of rural society. The gradual 
professionalisation of the agricultural workforce through increased qualification, the 
provision of more advanced machinery to the LPG and the increased scale of crop 
production and to a lesser extent livestock production under the auspices of the relatively 
independent district agricultural councils were elements of what was for some a positive 
transformation of agriculture since collectivisation. The consolidation of the LPG and 
their stabilisation as independent financial institutions certainly brought a degree of 
harmony and prosperity to some rural communities relative to the period directly after the 
completion of full collectivisation.3 The 1960s and early 1970s have certainly been said by 
some former collective farmers with hindsight to have been “the best years” in the GDR.4
As we have seen however collective farmers of all Types, but especially in the 
LPG Type I, were by no means convinced of the benefits of this process of socialist 
modernisation thus far. Moreover in terms of living and working conditions in rural 
communities, there was much less cause for contentment: agricultural transformation did 
not bring with it comprehensive or consistent improvement to working conditions around 
the Bezirk, while Ulbricht’s wider economic reforms came at the price of a degree of 
austerity which few in rural communities were ultimately willing to pay.
In the early 1960s, in the first years after the completion of collectivisation, the 
villages of Bezirk Erfurt were by no means idyllic. The amount of labour required by 
collective farmers in all sorts of LPG was back-breaking and rendered doubly hard by 
difficult weather conditions and a relative lack of resources of building materials and
2 See for example the collection of essays in Schildt, A., Siegfried, D., Lammers, K. (eds.) Dynamische Zeiten (Hamburg 2000).
3 Siegfried Kuntsche pinpoints the positive impact of the NES and the Agricultural Councils in enabling the LPGs a greater degree of 
self determination over the development of their production facilities during the 1960s, which in turn encouraged greater identification 
with the LPGs. In contrast the 1970s saw greater centralisation of state control over investment and limitation of local autonomy. 
Kuntsche, S. “Die Umgestaltung der Eigentumsverhaltnisse und der Produktionsstruktur in der Landwirtschaft” in Keller, D. et al.
(eds.) Ansichten zur Geschichte der DDR Vol. 1 (Berlin 1993) pp. 191-211.
4 This was the comment of farmers interviewed by Christel Nehrig, Nehrig Ch., “Das Leben auf dem Lande: Die Genossenschaften 
(LPG)” in Badstubner E (ed.), Befremdlich Anders. Leben in der DDR (Berlin 2000) pp. 195-216 here p.216.
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machinery, fertiliser and good quality seed, to name but a few shortages. Next to no 
villages were connected to a central water supply, while the quality of the road network 
and access to public transport left many communities in relative isolation. Access to the 
latest consumer products and labour saving devices was very limited given the problems 
of delivery and the size of the local village shop, while the possibilities for entertainment 
centred almost exclusively on the local village pub.5 Improving housing too proved to be 
a serious problem in rural communities as it was in urban centres. Much of the housing in 
the village was over a hundred years old and though not so ravaged by war bombardment 
was in a poor state of repair. There was thus considerable room for improvement.6
There is no doubt that by the late 1960s some modem conveniences had become
n
available to villagers in line with the GDR’s industrial development during the decade. 
Furthermore the LPG -  particularly where they were the largest local employer -  had 
started playing an active role in organising and funding the construction of better 
communal facilities and improving housing.8 Very often for the least well-off, the LPG 
represented something of a liberation -  there was much to be said for the regular payment 
of wages, a regulated working day, subsidised kitchens and even the opportunity for 
holidays. There is no doubt too that many in the 1960s benefited from the social change 
associated with collectivisation. Greater access to higher education opened channels for 
new career opportunities and some social mobility. Landless farm labourers were able to 
achieve new status in the LPG, while women and young people were to some extent 
granted greater independence as their traditional obligations to the farm and to the 
household were reconfigured in the LPG. Moreover the bureaucracy and welfare 
infrastructure which accompanied the expansion of LPGs made a range of new -  not 
strictly agricultural -  jobs available in the countryside.9 This enabled women to take up 
positions of not inconsiderable authority and responsibility in a range of roles from the 
LPG canteens to the LPG bureaucracy.10 The potentially powerful position of chief
5 SAPMO B-Arch Biiro Gerhard Griinberg IV 2/2.023/36 Die 5. Tagung des Zentralrats der FDJ am 22. und 23. April 1960, 
Discussionbeitrag p.90.
6 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/C/2/7-344 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Landwirtschaft, Analyse und Probleme der Entwicklung des 
gesellschaftlichen Lebens in den Gemeinden des Bezirkes 27.3.1972 pp. 14-35.
7 Merkel I, Utopie und Bediirfnis Die Geschichte der Konsumkultur in der DDR (Cologne 1999) p.353.
8 ThHStAW RdB L041313 Referat fur Ratssitzung -  Genosse Rummer (Experiment) 22.8.1968.
9 ThHStAW Bezirksplankommission, Information iiber die von der Bezirksplankommission fur die Bilanzierung der Planangebote AK- 
Entwicklung. ..21.3.1967.
10 Ross, S., Langenhahn D “Berufskarrieren von Frauen” in Hombostel S. (ed.) Sozialistische Eliten: Horizontale und Vertikale 
Differenzierungsmuster in der DDR (Opladen 1999) pp.147-162.
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accountant was increasingly occupied by women in LPG during the 1960s and 1970s. 
Within the farm itself, there is evidence into the 1970s of women farmers being barred 
from participation in decision making and discouraged from gaining qualifications and 
male farmers continued to occupy most of the responsible jobs within the LPG up to 1989. 
Nevertheless an increasing proportion of women were able to participate in the LPG 
boards, become brigade leaders or in a very few cases heads of the LPG. Women, for this 
among other reasons, when interviewed after the Wende continued to acclaim the benefits 
of the collective model. The experience of community, the chance to gain recognition of 
personal achievement, greater free time and less rigid social control in the village were 
considered of particular value.11
Nonetheless in most rural communities by the end of the 1960s, the degree of 
improvement in living standards and working conditions in general terms had by no means 
been dramatic.12 The process of separating out and then concentrating crop and livestock 
production as well as other essential elements of agricultural production (machine repair, 
building, fertiliser and chemical storage) over a wider area encouraged (indeed required) 
the centralisation of the facilities for agricultural production and administration in single 
central villages. These in turn attracted investment in housing and other amenities, 
beginning in some respects to fulfil the SED’s proclaimed intention of matching rural with 
urban living conditions. However this process left a large number of smaller but by no 
means obsolescent communities with little prospect of future improvement or even the 
maintenance of their local services. A few villages were beginning to undergo a process of 
depopulation losing their status both as settlements and as centres of production. The 
proportion of people required to work in agriculture was declining steadily during the 
1960s owing to technological development. At the same time many young men were 
leaving the villages thanks to the introduction of military service in 1962, and the prospect 
on completion of this service of further education and training and access to better jobs in 
industry. On the whole however the disparity was most clear to Villagers themselves in the 
extent to which living standards in rural communities had failed to improve in comparison 
to those in towns over the decade.
11 Van Hoven, B. “Women at Work- experiences and identity in rural E. Germany” in Area 33.1,2001, pp.38-46.
12 ThHStAW SED BPA -  Kreisleitung Sommerda IV/B/4.10/214 Abt. Staatsfragen, Einschatzung der Durchsetzung der Aufgaben der 
vorangegangenen Plenum und vor allem des VII. Parteitages 16.8.1968 p.2.
181
The quid pro quo of collectivisation and subsequent steps to transform the 
organisation of agriculture -  restricting private production and local independence - had 
always been the improvement to living and working conditions in rural communities 
which social and economic transformation would bring. By the end of the 1960s, however 
a large proportion of those who remained in the agricultural workforce could see no real 
improvement in the living standard available to them, especially when compared with the 
conditions for those who worked in industry and lived in towns. Although the incomes of 
farmers had improved since the early 1960s, there was a consistent sense that they were 
being underpaid for the amount of time and effort they put in. A comparison with working 
conditions in industry had long been a problem for those functionaries at the grassroots 
attempting to quell dissatisfaction among collective farmers and persuade young people to 
remain in agriculture. Concessions to consumerism and immediate improvements to 
working conditions which were introduced under Walter Ulbricht and considerably 
extended under Erich Honecker served often only to highlight the lesser status of 
agricultural production in this respect.
In 1967 the Secretary for Agitation and Propaganda in the SED Kreisleitung in 
Kreis Sommerda wrote of the damage done to popular opinion of the SED regime by the 
lack of improvement to working and living conditions. In particular he singled out the 
consistent complaint among farmers that improvements to working conditions (such as the 
5-day week) promised by the VII. SED Party Congress did not appear to include them, 
especially if they were tending livestock.13 Discussion of how in practice to introduce the 
5-day week had been under consideration by the agricultural council for some time. In 
response to a request from the chairman of the Rat des BezirkQs for information on how it 
might be introduced in agriculture at the end of 1965, the head of the Bezirk agricultural 
council was forced to point out essential problems which prevented the 5-day week from 
being applied to the LPGs. As things stood it was still difficult to find the personnel to 
give livestock farmers a regular 6-day week let alone anything less. Furthermore with the 
seasonal variation in agricultural work, 5-day weeks could only be arranged around the 
peak working periods.14 The introduction of the fortnightly 5-day week elsewhere in the
13 ThHStAW SED BPA -  SED Kreisleitung Sommerda IV/A/4.10/092 Genosse Hermann, Sekretar der SED Kreisleitung an Genossen 
Friedrich, Sekretar der Bezirksleitung, Abt. Agit./Prop 29.5.1967 p.74.
14 ThHStAW RdB L1075 Band I Bezirkslandwirtschaftsrat, Vorsitzender an den Vorsitzenden des Rates des Bezirks, Probleme, die 
sich aus der Einfuhrung der 5-Tage Arbeitswoche in der Landwirtschaft’ergeben 23.12.1965.
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economy provoked complaints during end of year assemblies held in LPG in Kreis 
Amstadt in January 1966 that agriculture “never gets taken into account when it comes to 
such social improvements.”15
During discussion of the new constitution in 1968 the continuing disgruntlement 
over their living standards and working conditions was made clear by farmers. The 
commitment in Article 30 of the constitution to provide employment for everyone and 
allow everyone the freedom to choose their employment - albeit according to the 
requirements of the economy -  sparked new hopes among some farmers that they might 
be able to abandon their membership of the LPG more easily and take up better paid work 
in industry. Article 31 of the constitution which guaranteed a right to free time and 
relaxation to all, provoked some cynicism from LPG members who compared the 
conditions for those working in industry with the long hours and numerous handicaps 
faced by farmers in the GDR.16 Although there had been considerable increases in the 
amount of machinery available to farmers particularly in the field which alleviated some 
of the more laborious tasks in agriculture, suitable machinery was not always available or 
reliable. Root crops in particular continued in many LPGs to be harvested by hand. 
Moreover those, usually men, who worked with the machinery themselves sustained in 
large numbers severe physical injury from the new conditions in which they worked. Less 
manpower may have been necessary thanks to the new technology but not always less 
individual physical effort from the machine operator.
For those, very often women, who worked with livestock, conditions were 
reported to be especially hard. Working hours were very long and there was little scope 
for days off given the shortage of those free to deputise. At the same time, the 
concentration on improving crop production had forced LPGs on the whole not to invest 
properly in the construction of new buildings in which to house animals or in the 
machinery to alleviate the most labour-intensive tasks of tending the stock. The lack of 
mechanisation in the sheds to deal with the provision of feed and the removal of dung 
gave the lie to promises of better conditions in the near future. As one woman farmer 
pointed out at a meeting of women farmers in the Erfurt-Land district in June 1963: “a lot
15 ThHStAW RdB LI 158 Bezirkslandwirtschaftsrat, Information iiber die durchgefiihrten Jahresendversammlungen in den LPG im 
Bezirk Erfurt 12.1.1966.
16 B-Arch Abt. DDR, DK 1 VA Neu 2846 Landwirtschaftsrat der DDR, Information zu einigen Problemen der Verfassungsdiskussion 
in den sozialistischen Betrieben der Landwirtschaft 1.3.1968.
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is said about new technology but in livestock we work like we did in our great 
grandfather’s time. Especially the mucking out and the fodder transport is so difficult that 
many women don’t want to work in the sheds. And when we ask the men to help us with 
the heavy work, they’d rather do it all themselves. The newly built animal sheds are often 
so primitive and so far away from the village. It doesn’t help us to make the work easier or 
to enjoy it either.”17 By the late 1960s improvement had often not been forthcoming.
How seriously the conditions for livestock production had been neglected in LPGs 
in Bezirk Erfurt at the end of the decade is revealed in a report by the veterinary 
department at the RLN (B) in 1971 which noted serious levels of livestock mortality. In 
most cases the causes for the unnaturally high number of deaths of animals could be traced 
directly to the conditions in which they were being kept. An investigation found that in 
approximately 1 in 7 LPGs and 1 in 3 VEGs “unbearable” conditions - in most cases 
overcrowding, damp, cold and lack of ventilation in livestock sheds -  had caused heavy 
losses in both old and new livestock sheds. Old buildings were often found to be primitive 
and not properly suited to the uses being made of them, particularly in terms of the 
quantities of animals housed in them. Meanwhile new buildings were found to have been 
left unfinished or shoddily constructed owing to a lack of materials or insufficient funds to 
pay for them. The conditions in which cattle were kept in a number of LPGs were 
described as particularly vile. In 13 LPGs it was noted that the holdings were vastly 
overcrowded resulting in the laming and suffocation of animals and in 9 LPGs a basic lack 
of sufficient feed had caused animals to die of starvation. Elsewhere large numbers of 
cows, bullocks and calves were kept in several small sheds, which had no efficient means 
of disposing of the quantities of muck and slurry produced. This lay consequently thick on 
the ground and had contaminated much of the rest of the farm, greatly enhancing the risk 
of disease as well as creating an unbearable climate in the sheds.18
The problem of livestock production was in large part down to the limitations 
placed on the LPGs during the 1960s for the sake of the ideal transition to industrial-scale 
farming in the future. Little investment had been allowed in the development of new
17 ThHStAW SED BPA BIV/2/7-497 Information iiber die durchgefuhrten Kreisbauerinnenkonferenzen 14.6.1963 p.83; IV/A/2/2-38 
Protokoll der Bezirksparteiaktivtagung Landwirtschaft am 17.12.1963, Referat Genosse Thieme, Stellv. Leiter des Biiros fur 
Landwirtschaft p.22.
18 ThHStAW Abt. Veterinarwesen, Bericht zur Konzeption fur die Untersuchung der objektiven und subjektiven Ursachen der 
Tierverluste 16.8.1971.
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facilities until it was clear how this could be done on a scale and with a degree of 
specialisation which allowed the most rational use of resources and provide the greatest 
level of productivity possible. In the meantime the numbers of livestock had nonetheless 
to be maintained in order to ensure proper use could be made of the facilities once they 
were built. In a number of LPGs Types I and II where the average age of the members was 
now close or beyond retirement age and where it had not been possible to alleviate some 
of the burdens of private livestock production because of the lack of space in collective 
buildings, LPG members were beginning to despair of the future.19 In one LPG Type I, the 
members commented on the impossibility of their situation: “in the immediate future 
we’re not allowed to build and we’re not allowed to merge with an LPG Type III...” they 
complained “.. .where and how are we supposed to contain the livestock production from 
old people’s farms?”20 The abandonment of the dual price for produce from livestock in 
1969 placed the LPG Type I on an equal footing with LPG Type III making it necessary to 
introduce new measures to control the reinvestment of profits in developing industrial- 
scale agriculture. Given the straitened economic circumstances in the GDR as a whole and 
the ongoing conflicts within agriculture itself however, it is not surprising that they were
91not universally welcomed.
During 1970 new regulations were announced to establish in LPGs greater controls 
over the balance between consumption of profits in pay and bonuses and accumulation for 
investment.22 The RLN (K) and the State Bank for Agriculture and the Food Industry were 
given greater powers to encourage cooperative investment and to force LPGs, particularly 
the few remaining LPG Type Is to fund the formation of industrial-scale production 
facilities. The financial burden met with a negative response from farmers particularly in 
those districts where LPG Type Is still existed in large numbers. A number of chairmen in 
Kreis Sondershausen suggested that the new system punished farmers for having been
19 SAPMO B-Arch DY60/2973 DBD Bezirksvorstand, Abt. Parteiorgane, Wertung des weiteren Verlaufs der Diskussionen zur 
Vorbereitung des Perspektivplanes 21.9.1970.
20 SAPMO B-Arch DY60/2973 DBD Bezirksvorstand, Abt. Parteiorgane, Weitere Kurzeinschatzung iiber Verlauf und Ergebnisse der 
Diskussion in MV und in der politischen Massenarbeit zur Vorbereitung des Perspektivplanes und zur weiteren Anwendung des OSS 
10.9.1970.
21 Roesler, J. Zwischen Plan und Markt. Die Wirtschaftsreform 1963-1970 (Berlin 1990) p.147.
22 Siegfried Kuntsche refers to such measures to centralise control over investment and accumulation as an erosion of the autonomy 
which the LPG had enjoyed under the NOS. The loss of independence bound up with the loss of incentive in turn he suggests was a 
severe blow to LPG members’ traditional identities as farmers. Certainly it was a turning point for the remaining members of the LPG 
Type I. Siegfried Kuntsche et al (eds.) ‘Die Umgestaltung der Eigentumsverhaltnisse und der Produktionsstruktur in der 
Landwirtschaft’ in D. Keller, et al. (eds.) Ansichten zur Geschichte der DDR Vol. 1 (Bonn 1993) pp. 191-211 here pp.206ff.
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successful.23 In particular in Heiligenstadt there was a general feeling among Type I 
members that: “we’re are being scrubbed dry by the state -  now they want to take every 
last thing away from us”.24 In a report by the DBD in Heiligenstadt in July 1970 the new 
economic regulations were considered by some even to spell the end of the existence of 
the collective farmer “now they’ll pull the rope taut for us”.25 Similar responses such as 
“now they even want our trousers” or “there’s no point in working” were found in other 
districts in relation to the new restrictive regulations on pay, bonuses and social security 
contributions in the LPGs.26 Leading DBD members in functionary positions in the LPG 
were found to be actively highlighting the negative impact of new economic regulations 
on the immediate net income of the collective farmers rather than concentrate on their 
political and national economic rationale. Some mid-level cadres had even gone so far as 
to threaten to withdraw from the LPG if they themselves were forced to accept any less 
pay than they received before the regulations were introduced. Such moves to restrict pay 
for those working in agriculture seemed merely to add insult to injury given that it seemed 
to many farmers that they had never before been so badly supplied with spare parts by
27industry.
When the economy seized up and bottlenecks in supply throughout industry and 
agriculture began to occur towards the end of 1969 and during 1970 collective farmers and 
villagers in general felt themselves to be bearing the brunt of the shortages which arose. 
Bottle-necks in industry had begun to compromise the supply of consumer goods to the 
population, particularly in rural areas which were always hit worst by a breakdown in 
distribution and supply. In the run-up to elections in 1970 in Kreis Sommerda, among the 
main causes of popular dissatisfaction in the villages recorded by the SED Kreisleitung 
were the lack of basic amenities and ongoing supply shortages of certain key goods. 
Complaints on the lack of street lighting and the poor quality of roads, were accompanied 
by complaints on the lack of coal deliveries and failure of rubbish collection services.28
23 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/B/2/5-184 Abt. Parteiorgane, Kurzinformation Nr.54 22.6.1970 pp.142-144
24 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/B/2/5-165 Abt. Parteiorgane Kurzinformation 57/70.. 13.7.1970 p.491.
25 SAPMO B-Arch DY60/2973 DBD Kreisvorstand Heiligenstadt, Information, 17.07.1970.
26 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/B/2/5-165 Abt. Parteiorgane, Information aus der operativen Tatigkeit..30.7.1970 p.513.
27 SAPMO B-Arch DY60/2973 DBD Bezirksvorstand, Abt. Parteiorgane, Parteiinformation 11.8.1970.
28 ThHStAW SED BPA -  SED Kreisleitung Sommerda IV/B/4.10/211 Abt. Parteiorgane, Wie wird die Lage in den einzelnen Orten 
eingeschatzt? 19.2.1970 p.162; Rat des Kreises, Kreiswahlburo, Bericht iiber die durchgefuhrten Rechenschaftslegungen in 
Vorbereitung der Volkswahlen sowie iiber die Eingabenbewegung p. 182.
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Such complaints provoked some serious criticism and self-criticism within the 
SED at all levels in the party hierarchy with regard to the management of the economy 
and public relations. A report on the situation by the SED Kreisleitung, Sommerda put the 
blame for the country’s economic problems on the inadequacy with which complex 
economic reforms had been implemented and the failure of the party to communicate 
effectively with the people. Lack of decent housing, shortages of goods available, lack of 
plan fulfilment all backed up general public scepticism with regard to the SED’s claims of 
socialism’s superiority. The state’s sudden inability to supply the everyday goods which 
had previously been available and the feeling too that the people’s complaints were not 
being properly listened to had, the report suggested, led to a sense of resignation that 
“things will not improve”. In the state apparatus the opinion was reportedly widespread 
that: “there’s no point talking about future development. It’s not clear now and it keeps 
changing anyway.” What confidence there was in the SED regime to provide stability and
2Q
security as well as economic and social improvement was badly undermined.
In the run-up to the VIII. SED Congress in 1971 criticism of the manner of 
implementation of SED agricultural policy began to mount. There were calls for the RLN 
(K)s to be more clear and conscientious in their advice and support for the organisation of 
farming. Better training was also demanded for LPG chairmen so that they would be given 
the know-how to conduct cooperative crop production. This fitted too with calls for the 
independence of the LPGs to be given greater respect, particularly as far its own finances 
were concerned. The amount of control exercised by the Bank for Agriculture and Food 
Industries over LPGs’ use of funds and access to credit had created the impression among 
some collective farmers that they had no control over their own money. In particular 
complaints were made that the bank demanded too high an interest rate on loans to the 
LPG and used the threat to raise rates to force LPG chairmen to check or advance the 
development of the LPG.
Although no direct attacks were made on Ulbricht’s decisions with regard to 
industrialising production, it was clear that agriculture had suffered from the failure of his 
economic reforms. LPGs were being forced, it seemed, to carry the burden of the 
difficulties of other sectors of the economy. As a result of price reform in industry, the
29 ThHStAW SED BPA -  SED Kreisleitung Sommerda 1V/B/4.10/148 Abt. Agit./Prop, Gesichtspunkte eines Beschlusses des Politburo 
vom 5.10.1970, Zu inhaltlichen Problemen der politischen und ideologischen Arbeit und ihre Wirksamkeit 10.11.1970 pp.49-66.
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cost of materials and equipment purchased by the LPGs had risen considerably. A vastly 
higher proportion of LPGs’ profits was thus being spent on equipment - which was not
30always of good quality -  while farmers were being compelled to cap their incomes. 
Particularly at a time of organisational transition for LPGs, the inability to work out a plan 
for their future development which was based on secure supply of tools, machinery, 
fertiliser and building materials was clearly a serious problem with far reaching 
consequences. Discussions on plan fulfilment reported on by the DBD Kreisverband in 
Kreis Gotha revealed the degree of irritation growing amongst farmers. Exhortations to 
farmers to be more efficient must have been like a red rag to a bull. One farmer reportedly 
commented: “You lot talk about clever leadership, and yet there are no spare parts here for 
the machines, no tyres for the trailers -  everywhere you look something is missing. Give it 
a rest with the leadership and the planning.”31 If this system of economic administration 
was to continue, farmers suggested, then the LPGs must be allowed to employ lawyers for 
themselves so as to advocate their interests against industrial enterprises which had failed 
in recent years to keep their contractual obligations. The failure with little or no notice to 
supply spare parts for machinery, fertiliser, disinfectant, veterinary equipment, and 
protective work clothing had all contributed to poorer working conditions and lower 
production levels in agriculture, for which farmers now sought redress.32 The head of crop 
production in Griesheim made his expectations no less clear in June 1971 -  “we expect 
that as a consequence of the VIII. SED Party Congress, all the relevant sections of the 
economy will give us better support, especially those who produce agricultural machinery. 
One can’t get rid of the feeling that in several places citizens are sitting around actually 
doing the work of the enemy and getting away with things by coming up with all sorts of
i t
excuses.”
Concerns over the manner in which agriculture was being treated was not just an 
issue for the collective farmers and LPG functionaries but also resonated throughout the 
agricultural administration of party and state. It was certainly not the intention of leading
30 SAPMO B-Arch Biiro Gerhard Griineberg DY30/ IV A 2/2.023/2 Analyse der Vorschlage, Hinweise und Kritiken der Werktatigen in 
der Landwirtschaft und Nahrungsgiiterwirtschaft in Vorbereitung des VIII. Parteitages der SED 10.5.1971 pp.l 16ff.
31 SAPMO B-Arch, DY60/2958 DBD Kreisverband Gotha, Abt. Parteiorgane, Parteiinformation, 2.4.1971.
32 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/B/2/5-410 DBD Bezirksvorstand an den Sekretar fur Landwirtschaft der SED Bezirksleitung,
Sozialistischer Wettbewerb nach dem Beispiel Tuchheim 15.2.1971 p.229-234; DBD Bezirksverband an die SED Bezirksleitung, 
Vorschlage unserer Mitglieder aus MV, differenzierten Beratungen und personlichen Aussprachen 4.5.1971.
33 SAPMO B-Arch DY60/2958 DBD Kreisvorstand Amstadt, Einschatzung der Meinung der Mitglieder unseres Kreisverbandes zum 
VIII. Parteitag der SED. 24.6.1971.
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SED functionaries responsible for agriculture to see productivity in agriculture reduced. 
They were well aware that low morale among collective farmers sustained by difficult 
working and living conditions was not conducive to the successful development of 
agricultural production. It was even more clear to leading agricultural functionaries in 
Berlin that agriculture was in danger of being made the financial scapegoat for difficulties 
in industry or construction. As a result Griineberg was active in lobbying for agriculture to 
be given greater protection from increases in the prices for industrial products and for 
greater recognition to be given to the achievements of agriculture since collectivisation. It 
was argued that comprehensive investigation into the impact of industrial price policy 
over a number of years on agriculture pointed to a number of negative consequences 
which had hampered agricultural development, particularly towards the end of the 1960s 
and early 1970s. Most tellingly it had seen production costs raised across the board in 
agriculture by approximately 14.1%. Furthermore fluctuating prices as a result of the 
industrial price regulatory system developed as part of the latest economic reforms had 
caused such administrative grief and hampered cost control so much that what usefulness 
it had was heavily outweighed by the expense it caused. Inflation in prices for construction 
materials and the exorbitant prices charged for new machinery acted as natural 
disincentives for the development of industrial-scale agriculture.34 The major departure 
established by VIII. SED Party Congress was thus the reorganisation of the economy 
along more conservative lines. A degree of central control and more extensive centrally 
defined plans replaced the complex systems of economic planning and incentive 
established by the various reforms of the Ulbricht era.
Continuities
With the VIII. SED Party Congress in 1971 which marked the final transition of power 
from Ulbricht to Honecker, there was little immediate change in socialist agricultural 
policy. The gradual development of ever more comprehensive cooperation in crop 
production was still at the heart of the plans for reaching the next stage in agriculture and
34 SAPMO B-Arch Biiro Gerhard Griineberg DY30 IV A 2/2.023/50 Hausmitteilung, Dr. Feil an Genossen Griineberg, Stellungnahme 
zur “Analyse der Preisentwicklung wichtiger Produktionsmittel fur die Landwirtschaft” 28.6.1971; Information fur Genossen Kiesler, 
“Im Zusammenhang mit den Untersuchungen zur Preispolitik und den dazu notwendigen Berechnungen....” 26.7.1971; Information 
iiber weitere Manipulationen der Staatlichen Zentralverwaltung fur Statistik und des Amtes fur Preise bei der Darstellung der Industrie- 
und Baupreisentwicklung, 28.7.1971; Untersuchungen zur Preispolitik -  Teil Landwirtschaft 24.8.1971.
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rural society’s social and economic development. The confirmation of the party line, 
despite the apparent transfer of power however did remove much of the remaining 
reticence in the hierarchy of both party and state in their attempts to implement policy.
The paralysis of the previous year and a half was to some extent relieved by the clear 
official sanction given at the VIII. SED Party Congress to the continuation of cooperative 
crop production. The path and pace of development continued nevertheless to vary 
considerably from LPG to LPG. There was certainly no sudden uniform enthusiasm nor 
centrally driven mass agitation campaign for cooperation or for the separation of crop and 
livestock production.
A modus vivendi between farmers, the leading cadres in the LPGs and the district 
functionaries of party and state could not be established everywhere with ease. The same 
arguments still remained pertinent to local protagonists disputing the value of cooperative 
relations with one another. There was thus considerable continuity in the immediate 
experience of farmers and LPG functionaries on the ground. Despite the apparent 
significance of Ulbricht’s loss in authority within the SED hierarchy, the continuing 
presence of Gerhard Griineberg as the leading force in the Politburo on agricultural 
matters ensured that the vision guiding the ultimate social and economic transformation of 
agriculture in the GDR remained as before. After the uncertainty of the last years of 
Ulbricht’s period in office, there is no doubt that a degree of initiative and dynamism 
returned to socialist agriculture, though the impact was neither immediate nor universal.
In September 1971, there was general acclamation in the party meetings of the LPG 
BPOs in Bezirk Erfurt of the decision made to supply the LPGs with extra sources of 
fodder to balance out the problems caused with recent difficult weather.35 This was a 
much needed measure and brought relief to several LPGs facing another difficult year 
feeding their livestock. It also took the pressure off the existing cooperative crop 
production units to be immediately very efficient in exceeding their plan targets. However 
Honecker could not claim the plaudits for a general improvement in living conditions in 
rural communities. Improvements on the grain front were balanced by problems on the 
potato front. In Bezirk Erfurt, difficulties with the potato harvest saw a public relations 
disaster for the regime in general and in particular for state functionaries in several rural
35 ThHStAW SED BPA -  SED Kreisleitung Sommerda IV/B/4.10/101 Parteiorgane, Einschatzung der MV -  Monat Oktober 8.11.1971 
p.356.
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communities. The need to reclaim potatoes from the cellars of LPG members in order to 
ensure there were sufficient numbers available in the shops brought with it some lasting 
bad blood. As a representative of the trade organisation in Leubingen pointed out in 
September 1972: “We all remember all too well, what a political outcome the 
reclamations from the population had last year. Quite apart from the effort which we and 
the affected farms had with loading and unloading, we can’t allow ourselves another such 
dilemma again.”36
The concluding report by the Bezirksverband of the DBD preparing for the election in 
November 1971 pointed to continuing disgruntlement among its members, despite the 
seemingly positive overall changes expected from Honecker’s replacement of Ulbricht.
The continuing lack of a sufficient supply of inorganic fertiliser in the Bezirk caused some 
farmers to voice the suspicion even that ‘economic sabotage’ was being committed. The 
response to the extra grain which was distributed to the LPGs also was not wholly 
positive. Farmers could not see why they had had to wait so long to receive such grain 
subsidies, complaining that “it is wrong to deliver the grain only once the animals have 
lost lots of weight, as it will lead to lower weight increase results.”37 People’s Petitions 
(Eingaben der Bevdlkerung) in the second half of 1971 sent to the ZK agricultural 
department showed that for farmers across the GDR not all the supply problems in 
agriculture could be solved overnight. A lack of spare parts continued to render new 
machines useless provoking widespread complaints.38
The RLN (K)s in different districts too did not immediately improve in their ability to 
solve the problems of the struggling LPGs/KOGs for which they were responsible. In 
conjunction with the VIII. SED Party Congress in 1971, criticism of the state apparatus for 
agriculture -  particularly with regard to the development of cooperation -  had prompted 
investigation into the functioning of the agricultural councils and their production staff. A 
report by the SED Bezirksleitung on the working practices of the RLN (B) as well as the 
RLN (K)s in early 1972 noted in typical party jargon “great differentiation” in the quality 
of the work done at all levels in the hierarchy of state administration. As usual however, it
36 ThHStAW SED BPA -  SED Kreisleitung Sommerda IV/C/4.10/073 Sekretariat, Protokoll iiber die Kreisparteiaktivtagung am
25.9.1972 27.9.1972 Diskussionsbeitrag Gen. Freistauer, HB Leubingen pp.65-66.
37 SAPMO B-Arch DY60/2958 DBD Bezirksvorstand, Abt. Parteiorgane, Erganzender Abschlussbericht iiber die Arbeit unserer Partei 
in Vorbereitung und Durchfiihrung der Wahlen am 14.11.1971,17.11.1971.
38 SAPMO B-Arch Biiro Gerhard Griineberg DY30 IV B 2/2.023/24, ZK der SED, Abt. Landwirtschaft, Einschatzung der Eingaben aus 
der Bevdlkerung 25.1.1972.
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was the staff of the RLN (K)s who were found to be severely in need of both more 
political education and more technical training.39 Despite the clear approach set out at the 
VIII. SED Party Congress, the RLN (K)s were not in a position to take action to resolve 
all divergent trends on their territory with any speed. There were still competing ideas 
about how and how quickly further specialisation and industrialisation of agricultural 
production should take place.
The idea of establishing wholly separate administration for crop and livestock 
production even in the long term still provoked in 1971 an openly negative response from 
some collective farmers. In one LPG, an SED member argued that if cooperation should 
be continued at all, then livestock production should be part of the cooperation too.40 
Pursuing such a plan was rejected on the grounds that it would lead effectively to the 
formation of a Grand LPG based on the merger of the collective farms in the KOG. Come 
April 1972 and the RLN (B) had however still to report that success with regard to the 
gradual reinvigoration of cooperative crop production was still being overshadowed by 
widespread desire among farmers to form such large mixed crop and livestock farms. In 
Kreis Erfurt-Land, the LPGs based in Andisleben, Grossrudestedt and Kerspleben had all 
begun to expand through mergers. Between the 3 of them, they occupied more than one 
fifth of the district’s agricultural land. Similar tendencies were also noted in LPGs in Kreis 
Eisenach and Bad Langensalza.41 Thus while in Kreis Sommerda and Kreis Apolda more 
than 70% of land was being farmed in a cooperative unit in 1972, the rest of the Bezirk 
was by no means so far advanced. Only 20% of land was being farmed in this way in 
Kreis Worbis and Kreis Sondershausen further to the north where LPG Type Is in 
particular had remained resistant to cooperative crop production. In the Bezirk as a whole, 
72 cooperative crop production units (Kooperative Abteilungen Pflanzenproduktion or 
KAPs) administered 45% of the farm land, leaving more than half to be farmed by LPGs 
either independently or in less formal cooperation with one another.42
39 ThHStAW RdB L041299 SED Bezirksleitung, Abt. Landwirtschaft an das Sekretariat, Ergebnisse der Arbeitsgruppe zur 
Untersuchung der Arbeitsweise der Produktionsleitung des RLN des Bezirkes Erfurt und der Produktionsleitungen einiger Kreise 
9.3.1972.
40 ThHStAW SED BPA -  SED Kreisleitung Sommerda IV/B/4.10/101 Abt. Parteiorgane, Einschatzung der MV -  Monat September 
5.10.1971 p.344.
41 ThHStAW RdB L041299 RLN (B) Information an das Sekretariat der Bezirksleitung Erfurt der SED iiber den Stand und die 
Entwicklung horizontaler Kooperationsbeziehungen in der Pflanzenproduktion des Bezirkes Erfurt 3.4.1972.
42 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/C/2/7-344 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Landwirtschaft, Analyse und Probleme der Entwicklung des 
gesellschaftlichen Lebens in den Gemeinden des Bezirks 27.3.1972 pp.14-35.
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Nonetheless in the course of the next two years, the proportion of farm land officially 
administered by a KAP increased steadily. Concerted efforts by the SED Kreisleitung and 
the RLN (K) ensured LPG cadres took steps to establish stable cooperative crop 
production within the KOGs, overcoming rivalries between the individual collective farms 
and carrying out sufficient consultation with their members before radical steps were 
taken which had a direct impact on working conditions.
Reconstituting Cooperation
There were still tendencies among agricultural functionaries to seek to win the plaudits for 
achieving rapid advances in the LPGs and KAPs and in the process they neglected to gain
ththe approval of the collective farmers beforehand. Nevertheless the message of the 10 
ZK Plenary Session in April 1969 regarding the sovereignty of the individual LPG and the 
importance of collective democracy continued to be emphasised by the GDR’s leading 
agricultural functionaries. In January 1973 in a document prepared for Erich Honecker’s 
discussions with the 1st secretaries of the Bezirke, Gerhard Griineberg’s office outlined the 
current position on agriculture. The document suggested optimistically that there was now 
unity from top to bottom among all who worked in agriculture in the GDR on the correct 
policy. To maintain this unity however, it re-emphasised the importance of a slow process 
of transition and real discussion with the farmers themselves before greater concentration 
and specialisation of production was introduced. In order for socialist agricultural policy 
to be successfully put into practice, it was necessary above all not to undermine the special 
-  traditional - commitment of farmers to the production process. The continuing existence 
of LPGs, with their structures of inclusion and participation, and the element of 
proprietary ties to the land for which they stood in theory, if not entirely in practice, were 
essential to this policy, as they maintained farmers’ “moral and material interestedness”.43
The reorganisation of working patterns, competences and responsibilities in the LPGs 
as a result of the formation of a separate crop production unit entailed potentially serious 
upheaval for many LPG members and raised serious doubts about the nature of their 
future employment: primarily where and with whom they would be working, and on what 
basis they would now receive an income for the labour and land they had contributed.
43 SAPMO B-Arch DY30 IV A 2/2.023/1 Buro Gerhard Griineberg, Griineberg an Honecker, Material fur die Beratung mit den 1. 
Bezirkssekretaren 24.1.1973.
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During the SED district party activists’ assembly for agriculture in September 1972, a 
representative of the KOG Sommerda spoke of the need to strike the balance between 
taking into account the wishes of the individual LPG member and moving forward with 
formation of a separate crop production unit: “We will take on no member, who hasn’t 
been spoken to; we will take on no member where a signed delegation agreement has not 
been presented and we will accept no cadre files where the questionnaire has not been 
filled out.”44 Prior to the establishment of the KAP Stottemheim/Grossrudestedt in Kreis 
Erfurt, for example, careful attention was paid to ensuring the personal objections of the 
individual members were aired and dealt with before the KAP was set up. Resolutions 
were passed in the members’ assemblies of the LPGs and discussions held with members 
in their brigades as to who was to be delegated into the KAP and on what basis they were 
to be paid.45
After the VIII. SED Party Congress, LPG cadres certainly felt themselves constrained 
by the need to proceed with developing cooperative relations in line with SED policy and 
state pressure, and accepted therefore the necessity of forming a KAP. They remained 
however no less keen to avoid any suggestion that they had failed to protect the LPG 
members’ interests, and sought initially therefore to relinquish as little control over LPG 
finances to the KAP as possible. The question in particular of how to bring about the fair 
sharing of the profits of the cooperation, given the varying inputs of the LPGs, was at the 
heart of discussions in the cooperative councils. The leadership of the LPG Tunzenhausen 
for example had to admit in a meeting in January 1972 that: “the members are sceptical, 
they want to enjoy the fruits of their labour, as now the construction work on the 
Tunzenhauser territory as well as the land improvement and the construction of paths have 
been completed. Tunzenhausen” he went on “does not want 100% cooperation as this will 
just get the dispute started again, especially as far as the sharing of profits is concerned.” 
With each LPG having different resources, there was considerable contention about how 
these resources could or should be shared and balanced in the division of profits. As a
44 ThHStAW SED BPA -  SED Kreisleitung Sommerda IV/C/4.10/073 Sekretariat, Protokoll iiber die Kreisparteiaktivtagung am
25.9.1972,27.9.1972 Referat des Genossen Heckmann, Kooperation Sommerda p.58.
45 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/C/2/7-356 SED Kreisleitung Erfhrt-Land, Information iiber den Stand der Bildung der KAP 
Stottemheim/Grossrudestedt... 1.3.1973 p.83.
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consequence LPG chairmen insisted on a certain amount of the financial organisation 
continuing to be run via the LPGs themselves.46
With the formation of a KAP within a KOG initially often only slight changes were 
made to the conditions under which collective farmers worked. Thus in the majority of 
cases where a KAP had been officially formed this initially did not in fact entail any 
massive reorganisation of production. Most often the field brigades were divided along 
territorial lines, such that one or at the most two LPGs functioned as a subsection of the 
KAP. As a result collective farmers could continue to work in their home area. Given that 
each LPG often continued to receive the produce which yielded from their own fields and 
used most of their own machinery too, there was little radical changed involved in forming 
a KAP.47 The opinion: “What grows on the territory of the LPG must belong to the LPG” 
continued thus to be prevalent particularly in those LPGs where large investments had 
been made in recent years in producing certain special crops such as hops and types of 
fruit. This opinion was also present particularly in those LPGs which had long had better 
yields on their fields than their neighbours.48 Conflicts on questions of sharing profits and 
resources within the KAP had the potential to be highly disruptive where no unified 
system of paying all the KAP’s employees had been worked out. Attempts to set up a 
KAP in the KOG Grossbrembach were seriously undermined by mutual suspicions 
between LPG members. Tractor drivers from the LPG Grossbrembach were found to have 
agreed to the return of machines and apparatus to the individual LPGs in the KOG on the 
basis that the other tractor drivers were irresponsible with the machines and that the other 
LPGs were living off the back of their hard work. They felt they were being “continually 
duped”. In response the chairman of the LPG Vogelsberg argued that his members had 
been done out of 250,000 Marks during the sharing of profits, being forced to pay a work 
unit rate of 9,50 M compared to the 11M paid in the other LPGs. Furthermore the
** ThHStAW SED BPA -  SED Kreisleitung Sdmmerda IV/C/4.10/171 Abt. Landwirtschaft, LPG Koop. Sdmmerda, Protokoll der 
Beratung der Vorsitzenden und ParteisekretSre mit Vertretem der Kreisleitung der SED und der Produktionsleitung des RLN. p.
4.1.1972 pp. 1-3.
47 B-Arch Abt. DDR, DK 1 VA neu 2464 Ministerium fUr LFN AbL Wissenschaftliche Fuhrungstatigkeit und Inspektion, Bericht - 
Erfurt, 1972.
44 ThHStAW SED BPA -  SED Kreisleitung Sdmmerda IV/B/4.10/200 Abt. Landwirtschaft, Stellungnahme zum vorliegenden Bericht 
der Produktionsleitung iiber den Stand der Entwicklung der Kooperationsbeziehungen in der Landwirtschaft 11.10.1971 p.252.
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development of cooperative crop production had meant the end of his LPG’s lucrative line 
in poppy production.49
Despite the occurrence of such disputes, over the course of 1973, continued pressure 
from the SED Kreisleitung and the RLN (K) on LPG chairmen ensured new KAP were 
formed and existing KAPs overcame their difficulties. Active support was given to the 
cooperative councils to ensure steps were taken to ensure the constituent LPGs in the KAP 
were placed on an equal footing and a uniform system of payment was established for 
KAP workers. The RLN (K) helped the members of the cooperative councils set out a plan 
for establishing a unified level of work units through a unified set of work norms and 
system of incentives across the constituent LPG, aiming thereby to prevent the sort of 
disputes which had proved so divisive in the past.50 By March 1973 in approximately half 
of the existing KAPs unified work norms had been introduced.51 The resolution of 
essential financial questions lent a degree of confidence to collective farmers faced with 
the prospect of working in the KAP. The idea of cooperative crop production was no 
longer dismissed out of hand. As long as the incomes of the LPG members were protected 
and there was confidence in the efficiency of the new structure, the KAP appeared to 
receive greater acceptance among LPG members. The step to cooperative crop production 
was now positively compared with the step from private to collective farming:
“Everything new has to get properly settled in. 1960 during the formation of the LPG, 
there were people who could already see their downfall. But everyone has developed since 
then and no-one has been ruined.”52 In the KOG Buttstadt, the formation of KAP had 
repeatedly failed since 1969 for various reasons, including supposedly the reluctance of 
LPG leaders to organise one properly, in the face of hostility from collective farmers. 
Having in the course of 1972 refused to accept “a ramshackle KAP”, by 1974 sufficient 
pressure from the RLN (K) had been brought to bear on the KOR and sufficient 
preparation and consultation of LPG members had occurred for their resistance to the 
KAP to be dropped.
49 ThHStAW SED BPA -  SED Kreisleitung SOmmerda IV/B/4.10/200 Abt. Landwirtschaft, Fragen zur Entwicklung der Abt. 
Kooperative Pflanzenproduktion der KOG Grossbrembach undated p.283.
50 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/C/2/7-356 RLN (B), Betriebswirtschafllicher Beratungsdienst, Einschatzung der gesellschaftlichen 
Entwicklung der Kooperation Greussen 23.2.1973 p.33.
Jl ThHStAW SED BPA IV/C/2/7-356 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Landwirtschaft, Handmaterial zur Information zum Stand der 
Entwicklung der kooperativen Beziehungen zwischen den LPG,....27.3.1973 p. 144.
5* ThHStAW SED BPA IV/C/2/7-356 SED Kreisleitung Erfurt-Land, Information uber den Stand der Bildung der KAP 
Stottemheim/Grossrudestedt... 1.3.1973 p.83.
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A New Structure for Agriculture -  A New Context for SED Authority
During the early 1970s considerable transition was taking place in many of the LPG Type 
Is in the Bezirk, which had up until this point successfully guarded their independence. It 
was becoming increasingly apparent to members of LPG Type Is that they would not be 
able to continue in this way for much longer. Where the financial hardship had not yet 
forced LPG Type Is to merge with their neighbours, the RLN (K) were bound to take 
action to end the anomalous existence of the remaining LPG Type Is in the Bezirk. Merger 
with a neighbouring LPG Type III was still often a bitter pill to swallow. Eingaben 
received by the ZK Agricultural Department during the 3rd quarter of 1972 contained 
several from members of LPG Type Is complaining about the level of contribution they 
were required to pay the LPG Type III to ensure there was no loss of capital funds per 
hectare after the farms had merged. Sums of between 2,500 and 3,500 marks per hectare 
were felt by those Type I members with few animals left to offset this sum to constitute a 
crippling burden.53 However there was by the early 1970s considerably less will among 
the collective farmers to continue to maintain their independence than there had been in 
the previous decade. For the considerable proportion of LPG Type I members who were 
approaching or had even surpassed retirement age, there was some relief in the prospect of 
not having to struggle on fulfilling state demands for increased production. An analysis of 
LPG Type Is in 1972 had already identified the extreme age of their members as reaching 
crisis levels.54 For the rest of the remaining Type I farmers attempting to hold on to 
independence appeared increasingly futile given the now clear direction of SED policy 
towards separate intensification of crop and livestock production, and was likely only to 
bring further financial penalties. Merger or transfer of livestock into a collective herd and 
participation in cooperative crop production increasingly seemed therefore the only viable 
option for these LPG members. In a few cases the prospect of merger was mitigated by the 
fact that those farmers who wished it were sometimes allowed to maintain an extended 
number of livestock privately for a certain amount of time beyond the date of the
S} SAPMO B-Arch Buro Gerhard Griineberg DY30 IV B 2/2.023/24 ZK der SED, Abt. Landwirtschaft, EinschStzung der Eingaben aus 
der BevOlkerung im III. Quartal 1972 19.10.1972.
54 SAPMO B-Arch DY30 1609 ZK der SED Abt. Landwirtschaft, Brief an Genossen Kiesler von Genossen Ewald, Analyse iiber einige 
Hauptprobleme des gegenwartigen Entwicklungsstandes der LPG der Typ I.
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merger.55 By January 1974, the number of animals held in LPG Type V IIs had been 
dramatically reduced as a result of mergers and switching to a higher LPG Type. In Bezirk 
Erfurt only 2.8 % of cattle, 2.3% of pigs and 1.4% of sheep were now being held in the 
remaining 49 LPG Type Is.56
The merger of LPGs and the formation of the KAP had brought with it a “changing of 
the guard” in agriculture, providing opportunities for SED members to be established in 
positions of influence over wider areas of production. Specifically in Bezirk Erfurt a new 
generation of functionaries trained in the latest socialist agricultural theory and methods 
and largely loyal to the SED had taken positions as heads of KAP.57 Obstruction of steps 
towards the formation of separate crop and livestock production by LPG cadres had often 
been put down by the SED Kreisleitungen to the fears of the LPG functionaries 
themselves to be demoted as a result. There were certainly a number of cases in Bezirk 
Erfurt in which DBD members were considered to be hostile to the development of 
cooperative crop production. The political constellation of the chairmen involved in the 
KOG Buttstadt was weighted 4:3 in favour of the DBD compared to the SED and this was
co
believed to be among the main causes for the slow development here of a KAP. Whether 
or not LPG chairmen who were members of the DBD really did obstruct the development 
of the KAP for fear of losing their position, the concentration of crop production in the 
KAP provided an opportunity for the SED to assert its dominance over agriculture.
During a training week for leading members of the DBD in Kreis Nordhausen, an 
instructor from the SED announced in a speech that the position of head of the KAP 
would only go to SED comrades. When challenged about this comment afterwards, on the 
basis that the head of the DBD in Bezirk Erfurt, Willy Grandetzka had only recently 
suggested the opposite, the SED member responded that Grandetzka would have to revise 
his opinion too.59 In the KOG Grossengottem for example changes to cadre positions with 
the creation of the KAP in August 1972 was the cause for discussion among DBD 
members. The new administrative construction of the KAP was described by DBD
55 D. Gabler EntMicklungsabschnitte der Landwirtschaft in der ehemaligen DDR, (Berlin 1995) p.227; Statistisches Jahrbuch -  Bezirk 
Erfurt Teil I p. 173.
56 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/C/2/7-344 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Landwirtschaft, Faktenmaterial zum Stand und zur Entwicklung der 
Landwirtschaft des Bezirkes 13.12.1974 pp.85-96.
57 ThHStAW SED BPA 1V/C/2/3-164 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Landwirtschaft, Material fur die Mitarbeiterberatung am 27.8.1973 
p. 184.
51 ThHStAW SED BPA -  SED Kreisleitung Sdmmerda IV/C/4.10/171, Abt. Landwirtschaft Information iiber die Aussprache in der 
Kooperation Buttstadt zur Entwicklung der Kooperation in der Feldwirtschaft, 12.1.1972, pp.4-9.
59 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/C/2/15-517 SED Bezirksleitung, AbL Landwirtschaft Aktennotiz p.39.
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members who considered themselves to have been demoted compared to their former 
positions as a “great changing of the guard”. Some even asked to join the SED instead, if 
this would allow them to hold their functions.60 By the end of the year, complaints were 
still arriving from DBD members at Grandetzka’s desk. In Grossengottem the KAP head 
had allegedly told a member of the DBD that he had no chance of being sent to qualify 
himself at the LPG school in Meissen in the near future, as all SED members would be 
sent there first and SED members would be the ones occupying the mid- and top- level 
functions in the future.61
With the settlement of the status of all but a few LPG Type Is, the proportion of land 
in the Bezirk under the control of LPGs actively participating in cooperative crop 
production was considerably increased. By 1974 the switch to KAP had been almost 
completed across the Bezirk. There were now 115 KAPs in the Bezirk with an average size 
of 3,033 hectares.62 Moreover steps were being taken to revolutionise the conditions of 
production. Many of the KAPs had already begun to be restructured towards specialised 
production of particular crops over large areas. In the process working conditions began to 
change for those LPG members who had been delegated into the KAPs. With the 
development of a different layout of fields and crop rotation, the KAPs began to organise 
their work brigades on more than the simplest territorial lines, combining some territorial 
brigades with other task specific brigades whose members might come from various LPGs 
and which might be deployed in various parts of a KAP.63 This was a radical departure 
for the organisation of agricultural production and signalled a considerable change in the 
status of the agricultural workforce, seeming to break the traditional connection of 
responsibility between the individual collective farmer and the land and livestock of his 
LPG.
Conclusion
By the mid 1970s, the basic elements of a new stable context in which the SED 
leadership might seek to exert its authority over agricultural production at the grassroots
w ThHStAW SED BPA IV/C/2/15-517 SED Kreisleitung Muhlhausen an die Bezirksleitung Abt. Parteiorgane, Information 30.8.1972 
p.30.
61 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/C/2/15-517 SED Bezirksleitung Information an den Bezirksvorsitzenden der DBD 21.12.1972 p.42.
62 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/C/2/7-344 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Landwirtschaft, Faktenmaterial zum Stand und zur Entwicklung der 
Landwirtschaft des Bezirkes 13.12.1974 pp.85-96.
63 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/C/2/7-356 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Landwirtschaft, Handmaterial zur Information zum Stand der 
Entwicklung der kooperativen Beziehungen zwischen den LPG,....27.3.1973 p.144.
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had been established in Bezirk Erfurt. There were still numerous obstacles to overcome in 
the organisation of the relationship between crop and livestock production, however a 
significant milestone had been reached. With the demise of the LPG Type I, the last 
remnants of the concessions necessary to private production had been removed. With the 
formation of the KAP, any tendencies towards the Grand LPG and the pursuit of the 
traditional pattern of mixed livestock and crop farms had been abandoned.64 At the same 
time, the process of professionalisation of the agricultural workforce in line with 
specialisation of production was beginning to make itself felt. Just as the number of 
agricultural workers had begun to reach a steady level in balance with the machinery and 
technology available, so a steady ratio of farmers attained a basic qualification in socialist 
agricultural theory and methods. Perhaps most importantly in the mid-1970s the SED as a 
party was able to achieve a more consistently dominant status within the structures of 
agricultural production on the ground. Although the SED BPO continued to vary in their 
ability, the proportion of party members among collective farmers reached unprecedented 
levels. More importantly still, the party had established itself firmly among the leading 
local functionaries determining the manner in which policy was implemented at the front 
line of farming. A stabilisation of SED authority was thus beginning to take place at the 
grassroots of agricultural production.
64 some elements of the debate for and against the Grand LPG are discussed in: Langenhahn D,. ‘“ Wir waren ideologisch nicht 
ausgerichtet auf die industriemassige Produktion.’ Machtbildung und forcierter Strukturwandel in der Landwirtschaft der DDR der 
1970er Jahre” in Zeitschrift fur Agrareeschichte und Aerarsoziologie Heft 2/51,2003 pp.47-55.
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CHAPTER 8 
Stabilisation and Stagnation
“If the fodder is good and the earnings are right, there’ll be no negative discussions...”1 (A comment by a 
board member in the LPG Buttstadt prior to a merger with the neighbouring LPG Essleben and the 
formation o f  a KAP)
After a long period of transformation marked by conflict and compromise, by the 
mid 1970s the terms on which the SED leadership communicated its authority to the 
agricultural workforce at the grassroots had, it seemed, ceased to be racked with conflict 
and uncertainty over the fundamental direction of agricultural development. In this more 
stable context, steps could be taken to consolidate the administrative separation of crop 
and livestock farming and the process of intensification and specialisation of production in 
agriculture rapidly, without the overt hostility to transformation among collective farmers 
which had characterised previous years. The district state administration and LPG cadres 
could now be relied upon to be consistent in communicating SED policy to collective 
farmers, acting with the backing of a more substantial and in most cases more efficiently 
run SED party organisation than had been the case five years previously. With the terms 
of their participation in agriculture thoroughly transformed, collective farmers had no 
choice, but also often no desire, but to pursue their interests as far as possible in the 
context of the new structure of agricultural production, rather than in spite of it. By the 
same token however, a heavy burden of expectation now rested on the SED leadership to 
prove the worth of the socialist modernisation of agriculture in improving the incomes and 
the working conditions of the agricultural workforce.
Early signs that the structures now in place to regulate agricultural production at 
the grassroots, primarily the relationship between crop and livestock farms, were prone to 
imbalances, did not however bode well for the future. As early as 1971 a small number of 
leaders of advanced KAPs had already begun to assert a degree of independence, 
motivated by the financial incentives to specialise in the production of a particular crop. In
1 KAS Rat des Kreises Sommerda 2907 Protokoll uber die Vorstandssitzung der LPG Buttstadt am 13.9.1974, 16.9.1974.
2 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/C/2/7 -  348 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Landwirtschaft, Aufstellung der KAP ohne GO 12.11.1975 p.2; SED 
Bezirksleitung Abt. Landwirtschaft, Einschatzungen der Entwicklung der Kampfkraft der GO in den einzelnen Pflanzenbaubetrieben 
des Kreises 11.1.1977 p.6.
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so doing they had proved themselves unheeding of the concerns of LPG chairmen for the 
damage to the supply of livestock feed which such specialisation might entail.3 
Establishing effective relations between crop and livestock farms continued to be a 
problem throughout the decade. By the 1980s general economic decline aggravated the 
failure of agricultural functionaries in the district state and party apparatus and the 
LPG/KAP to regulate increasingly chronic imbalances in the relationship between crop 
and livestock farms. Arguably with the completion of the separation of crop and livestock 
production and the concomitant reconfiguration of the agricultural workforce, the 
structures of agricultural administration had stabilised. Nevertheless the terms on which 
stability had been achieved, could not protect against and indeed exacerbated grounds for 
discontent among collective farmers in the coming years.
Consolidation and Conflict
During the second half of the 1970s, throughout the Bezirk, KAPs began to merge with 
one another increasing the size of individual field plots and expanding the potential for 
large expanses of monocultural production. Along with this process of expansion and 
specialisation came further steps to develop the work organisation within the crop 
production farms. Brigades were increasingly organised according to specific tasks, rather 
than purely specific areas of the farm, in an attempt to concentrate and deploy, in the most 
rational way, the skills and machinery available. This entailed bringing to an end the 
connection between the individual farmer and a particular territory. What remained of the 
intimacy of understanding of local conditions, the inherited relationship between the 
farmer and his land and his locality were deemed in practice increasingly irrelevant, at 
least on the scale which had hitherto been the case.4 However by this stage there were no 
reports of serious hostility to the new arrangements. Although the configuration of 
brigades and the prospect of working on distant territories was not always a welcome 
change, there was little to be gained by opposing it. Greater quality and quantity of yields 
were now more widely seen by collective farmers to be primarily attainable via processes 
which occurred on a grand and necessarily supra-local scale. Having accepted the dilution
3B-Arch Abt. DDR, DK 1 VA neu 2464 Ministerium fur LFN, Probleme der FuhrungstStigkeit im Bereich der Landwirtschaft und 
Nahrungsguterwirtschaft im Bezirk Erfurt, 1971, undated.
4 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/C/2/7-344 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Landwirtschaft Information uber die Jahresendversammlung der LPG 
Kranichfeld, Kr. Weimar am 21.1.1972, 27.1.1972 p.6.
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of their rights to participate in the running of the farm and their rights to local self- 
determination, as a result of the expansion of the KAPs, there however was the 
expectation that at least incomes would be steadily improved.5
Deployment of manpower and use of modem machinery, the systems of spreading 
fertiliser and pesticides, irrigation and drainage and the specialisation in particular cultures 
could occur most efficiently with as little territorial division within the crop farm as 
possible. As a consequence of the growing irrelevance of old boundaries between 
collective farms and the greater unity and coherence of the KAPs, however, the 
relationship between the leaders of KAPs and their nominal superiors, the chairmen of the 
LPG became increasingly anomalous. As the structures and work organisation of the 
KAPs ceased to bear direct correlation to the constituent LPGs, the on-going sharing of 
administrative competence between KAP leaders and LPG leaders was increasingly 
difficult to uphold. The KAP was in theory still a subordinate structure to the LPG within 
the context of the cooperative community and hence was financially bound to the 
constituent collective farms. Yet as the primary producers of the feed on which several 
LPGs relied and as the financially dominant institution in any cooperative community, this 
subordinate position appeared to be increasingly anomalous in practice. LPG chairmen 
had official seniority and an obligation to ensure that the LPG as an institution retained its 
dominant position and as a livestock farm was well served by the KAP. KAP leaders 
however had to balance the not always equally influential demands of the various LPGs in 
their vicinity with the demands of the state as well as seeing to their own financial 
security. Consequently relations between chairmen of LPG and the leaders of KAP could 
easily become fractious.6
The institutions which had grown up out of cooperation between LPGs, including 
the KAP, were officially not to be seen as independent structures, and were not to 
undermine the fundamental importance of the LPG as the dominant administrative 
structure through which agriculture was to be regulated on the ground and the interests of
5 ThHStAW RdB 036208 RLN (B) Produktionsleitung flir Land- und Nahrungsguterwirtschaft, Bericht iiber die Ergebnisse der JHV, 
JEA 1974 sowie der Betriebsplanung 1975 der VEG, LPG, GPG und ihren kooperativen Einrichtungen 6.3.1975.
6 SAPMO B-Arch DY30/1516 ZK der SED Abt. Landwirtschaft, Analyse zu einigen wichtigen Problemen der gesellschaftlichen 
Entwicklung in der Pflanzen- und Tierproduktion 21.12.1973 p.235 In Bezirk Erfurt in particular the KAP Greussen, Kreis 
sondershausen, Leubingen, Kreis SOmmerda, Sonnebom, Kr. Gotha and FOrtha in Kreis Eisenach were accused of making such 
premature applications for recategorisation. An additional problem was the break down in the use o f members’ assemblies for all 
members o f the LPG with the establishment of the KAP. As a consequence the priniciples of collective democracy were seen to be 
suffering.
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collective farmers were represented. However it was clear, particularly as KAPs merged 
and established a complex internal structure and work organisation, that although the 
KAPs were themselves merely transitional institutions, they would sooner rather than later 
become de facto independent of their constituent LPGs. Uncertainty over how and when 
this would occur made for still more uneasy relations as the heads of the KAP sought to 
cut the ties of dependency on the LPGs as quickly as possible and LPG chairmen sought 
to maintain their authority.
On the one hand LPG chairmen were accused of attempting to abuse their senior 
position, pettily refusing to advise the KAP or to provide additional workers during peak 
times and more seriously of ensuring the prices for feed and services arranged between 
LPG and KAP were fixed in the favour of the livestock farm. Equally some KAP heads 
were found to be deliberately trying to limit the influence of the LPGs over the KAP, and 
to develop the KAP into an independent specialised farm as soon as possible, without due 
consideration of the feed requirements of the LPGs, or the impact this step might have on 
the development of livestock production. That these tendencies were not being 
satisfactorily arrested at district level is apparent from the content of a document prepared 
for a discussion between Gerhard Griineberg and leading agricultural functionaries in the 
Bezirksleitungen in 1974. KAP heads were still found, he warned, to be disregarding the 
needs of the LPGs which they were obliged to respond to and satisfy.7
The step from KAP to independent LPG for Crop Production {LPG 
Pflanzenproduktion or LPG P) occurred at different rates from area to area. Some model 
specialised LPG P had already been set up in Bezirk Erfurt after the VIII. SED Party 
Congress.8 In the course of 1975 steps began to be taken in a small number of KOGs in 
Bezirk Erfurt to establish several more LPG Ps and thereby impose some order on the 
strivings for independence among some KAP heads.9 Those collective farmers who had 
technically been delegated from the LPGs into the KAP received thereby a new status as 
members of a wholly separate new LPG P. In the process their rights as a member of an 
LPG to participation in the running of the collective farm in which they were employed
7 SAPMO B-Arch Buro Gerhard Griineberg DY30 IV B 2/2.023/24 Material fur die Beratung mit den SekretSren und Abteilungsleitern 
fur Landwirtschaft der Bezirksleitungen am 29.7.1974.
* ThHStAW SED BPA -  Kreisleitung Sdmmerda IV/B/4.10/200 GO der SED der 4 LPG der Kooperation Weissensee, Vorlage fur das 
Sekretariat der Kreisleitung und der Bezirksleitung der SED 26.11.1971 p.258.
9 SAPMO B-Arch ZK der SED, Abt. Parteiorgane DY30/IV B 2/5/459, Rat des Bezirkes Erfurt, Information an das Sekretariat der 
Bezirksleitung uber die Bildung von LPG und ZBE (P) und die Zusammenschlusse von LPG, GPG und KAP mit Beginn des Jahres 
1977, 18.10.1976
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was reasserted, as was their right to a household plot which in some KAPs had been 
denied. Parallel to the LPG Ps, LPGs for Livestock Production {LPG Tierproduktion or 
LPG T) formed out of what remained of the original collective farms: the cooperative 
livestock production facilities which had been set up between LPGs or the remnant 
livestock production in the individual LPGs themselves. During the course of the next four 
years KAPs began gradually to transfer to LPG Ps, and LPG Ts formed with varying 
degrees of specialisation. Although the formation of LPG Ps and LPG Ts resolved the 
ambiguous status of delegated LPG members and set the relationship between heads of 
crop and livestock farms on a new footing in theory, it did not resolve in practice all of the 
problems of the new structure of agriculture.
Ostensibly there were key criteria which the KAPs had to satisfy before their 
leading functionaries could submit a request to change their status to that of an LPG P to 
the RLN (K) and the SED Kreisleitung. These criteria were a mix of technical and 
administrative conditions designed to ensure that the transition to full independence for 
crop production could be justified in terms of administrative efficiency as well as 
productivity for both crop and livestock production, and would be carried out with the due 
signals of support from the constituent collective farmers. A due scale of plantations had 
to be established, with a due complexity of work organisation ensuring the most rational 
approach had been adopted to intensifying production. At the same time, the LPG Ps had 
also to demonstrate their ability to meet the needs of the livestock farms in the area. In 
theory the transition of LPG to LPG T and the KAP to LPG P rectified thus some of the 
problems which had developed between the KAPs and the LPGs.
In practice however there remained serious problems in balancing the relationship 
between crop production and livestock production, given the difficulties of coordinating 
the interests of LPG Ps and LPG Ts in the context of a shortage economy. Ideally the 
formation of large-scale crop farms with an advanced system of work organisation and 
specialisation of particular cultures would enable sufficient overall increases in 
productivity such that increased consumer demand could be met, levels of agricultural 
imports could be reduced and the demand for feed from ever larger livestock holdings 
satisfied. With greater productivity in livestock production, it was hoped that excess 
production over and above domestic demand could be used to gain valuable foreign
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currency as exports. For this ideal situation to be realised however productivity from crop 
production farms had to increase steadily matching the demands of increasing numbers of 
livestock held in the Bezirk. Such regular increases proved in practice elusive given the 
competition across the East German economy for essential materials and financial 
investment.
Amid a worsening economic situation in the GDR during the later 1970s, the 
relatively low status of agriculture within the SED’s investment priorities severely tested 
the efficiency with which the relationship between separate crop and livestock farms was 
regulated. In such straitened circumstances, neither the leading cadres of the LPGs and 
KAPs nor the agricultural functionaries of the state administration in the Bezirk, nor 
indeed the SED Kreisleitung were effective in preventing some serious imbalances in the 
distribution of funds and resources to livestock farms. As a consequence working 
conditions, particularly in the smaller livestock farms, failed to improve and in some cases 
steadily worsened. Not only was there a shortage of feed available to feed the animals and 
maintain productivity, the rising costs facing LPG Ps and KAPs were passed on to 
livestock farms reducing still further their ability to fund improvements to production 
facilities and working conditions.
Inadequate Industrialisation
Given the state of agricultural development at the end of the 1960s, continuing the project 
of creating and then sustaining truly modem industrial production in agriculture during the 
1970s could not be achieved cheaply. It required heavy initial investment in construction 
for storage and preparation of crops, as well as for intensive livestock holding. However it 
also required continuous investment to provide the buildings with heat and light and 
sustain a regular supply of machinery and vehicles as well as the fuel to run them. In 
addition there were numerous other expenses such as chemical fertiliser and pesticides for 
crops as well as medicines for the livestock which were prone to mass outbreaks of 
disease when kept in large numbers in such close proximity to one another. Where the 
money to pay for the transformation of agriculture would come from was no easy matter.
Despite the expense, there was a general reluctance in the SED leadership to risk 
popular discontent by passing on some of the cost of production to the population in
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higher prices for foods. Motivated by the spectre of the June 17th 1953 uprising as well as 
the loss of face sustained by the SED leadership during the shortages at the end of the 
Ulbricht era, Honecker remained consistently opposed to cutting price subsidies for the 
population. At the same time, the limits to which resources could be gained from 
collective farmers themselves appeared to have been reached after the austerity of the 
1960s. Particularly once the last vestiges of private production in the LPG Type Is had 
been subsumed into the LPG Type Ills, there were no obvious resources left in private 
hands to exploit. As a result LPGs depended very heavily on state subsidies on the prices 
they paid for machinery, fuel and other resources as well as loans to sustain the 
development of agricultural production. Given the limited extent of the GDR’s own 
natural resources, the cost of the raw materials on which the development of agricultural 
production (and indeed GDR’s industry in general) relied, was heavily dependent on the 
balance of world trade. During the 1970s, as prices on world markets rose, the cost of 
production for industry and for agriculture in the GDR rose rapidly, forcing the SED 
leadership to increase the financial burden on the LPGs themselves, while reducing 
imports and increasing exports of valuable commodities.
Under better economic conditions, it had been expected that crop production 
would become still more efficient using intensive methods to achieve dramatic increases 
in yields. At the same time, the construction of intensive livestock sheds were expected to 
minimise feed requirements while raising productivity. However by the start of the 1980s 
the development of such efficient industrial production had proved impossible as growing 
costs made sustained investment in agriculture prohibitively expensive. Without this 
sustained investment however, the prioritisation of resources made for a very uneven and 
often mistaken industrialisation of agriculture. Working conditions for a large proportion 
of collective farmers did not improve, leaving the SED leadership to suffer from a clear 
indication of its fallibility.
The End of ‘Realistic Plans’
As the sector of the economy whose potential for further mechanisation and rationalisation 
was greatest, it had long been incumbent upon agriculture to accept steady and 
considerable reductions in its workforce. The departure of rural youth to work in industry
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had long been encouraged in order to fulfil the ever increasing demand for labour. 
Provision of a suitable budget for machinery was thus vital to replace the lost manpower 
and improve working conditions for the rapidly ageing workforce. On the one hand LPGs 
could in theory spend more on machinery and construction if their profits were improved 
as a result of improved labour productivity. On the other however regular increases in the 
incomes of the remaining collective farmers were essential to harmonious relations 
between LPG members and functionaries in the LPGs and the district party and state 
administration. The austerity of the last years of the Ulbricht era could not be repeated. 
Additional state subsidies alongside the investment of the LPGs’ own capital were thus 
necessary to sustain the cost of both increasing incomes and the purchase of machinery. 
More importantly the state had to ensure the machines and materials required by 
agriculture were available for purchase. At the end of 1974 Gerhard Griineberg had 
already begun to warn Gerhard Schiirer at the State Planning Commission that the supply 
of combine harvesters was not keeping pace with the reduction in the agricultural 
workforce as a result of old age and the recruitment of young people to industry. A major 
side-effect of this imbalance between machinery and a reduced labour force was the 
requirement that farmers continue to do much manual labour and put in large numbers of 
overtime hours and forego weekends. Long-awaited and long-promised improvements in 
working conditions remained thus noticeably absent, even if incomes continued to 
improve. As Griineberg pointed out to Schiirer: “the situation is such that we are seriously 
behind in carrying out socio-political measures for male and female collective farmers.”
In this situation Griineberg was adamant that an increased export of agricultural 
machinery when it was badly needed at home could only ultimately result in a reduction of 
agricultural production. This in turn, he argued, would have a damaging effect on working 
conditions and serve only further to undermine the morale of farmers and with it the 
legitimising claims of the SED regime.10 A month later in a memorandum for Erich 
Honecker, Gerhard Griineberg pressed his point home further about the need to improve 
the provision of machinery for home agricultural development. The successes of the years 
following the VIII. SED Party Congress (1971) he suggested had been the result of a 
return to working with “more realistic plans”. Such had been the drive for economic
10 SAPMO B-Arch Buro Gerhard Griineberg DY30 IV B 2/2.023/33 Bemerkungen in der Beratung bei Genossen Schurer am 
24.10.1974.
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efficiency and rationalisation during the period of economic reform under Ulbricht, that 
impossible advances in productivity had been demanded of agriculture given the 
investment made available. In contrast in the first years of Honecker’s period in office, 
investment had been sufficient to enable real advances in productivity. This had to be 
sustained. Unless the steady supply of machines and spare parts continued, Griineberg 
now argued, it could not be expected of farmers that they continue to increase 
production.11 Despite his pleas however it was clear that agriculture occupied a relatively 
lowly position in the GDR’s economic priorities as decided by the SED’s leading 
economic functionaries such as Gunter Mittag and Gerhard Schiirer. As long as the current 
balance in the world economy made it necessary for the GDR to limit its imports and 
maximise its exports, agriculture would have to make do with what it had already been 
provided with.
Problems with the supply of essential resources on world markets particularly oil 
had an immediate impact on agriculture in the GDR. In January 1975 instructions were 
issued by the Rat des Bezirkes to the heads of all agricultural enterprises to reduce the 
levels of fuel used compared with the previous year with the aim of reducing consumption 
by 20%. The amount of fertiliser available to agriculture in some districts also dropped by 
5-6% since the previous year. This could not be helped, it was argued, owing to the 
enormous increase in the price on the world market which had limited the level of imports
1 7possible. In February 1975 a discussion was held in the Rat des Bezirkes outlining some 
of the economic problems facing the GDR in the coming year. Of primary concern was 
the fact that the prices for essential raw materials were increasing more rapidly on the 
world market than prices for finished products in which the GDR primarily specialised. In 
order to deal with this the GDR would have to increase exports to maintain a balance of 
trade, reduce imports of raw materials as far as possible and additionally increase its 
national debt. Consequences of this problematic situation for rural communities were 
numerous as supplies of both consumer goods to the population and machines and 
materials to agriculture were likely to be badly affected.13
11 SAPMO B-Arch Gerhard Griineberg DY30 IV B 2/2.023/16 Griineberg an E. Honecker 29.11.1974.
12 ThHStAW SED BPA -  SED Kreisleitung Sdmmerda IV/C/4.10/183 Demokratischer Block, Protokoll uber die Kreisblocksitzung am
6.2.1975, Referat Genosse Lindenlaub p.78.
13 ThHStAW RdB L041322 RLN (B) Probleme in Auswertung der Dienstberatung vom 3.2.1975 beim Vorsitzenden des Rat des 
Bezirkes 5.2.1975.
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With many farms in the midst of upgrading their production methods to an 
industrial-scale with greater mechanisation, the knock-on effect of high oil prices on the 
cost and availability of transport, construction and machinery was a severe blow. With 
some LPGs and KAPs forced to delay construction of larger livestock sheds, land 
improvement schemes or the purchase of modem machine systems, the gulf in the 
productivity and working conditions which existed between different KAP as well as 
between LPG even within single districts remained severe.14
As the KAPs had merged and expanded to some extent a similar process of 
consolidation had occurred in livestock production, however there had been much less 
rapid, much less consistent progress on this front by the mid 1970s. Remaining LPG Type 
Is had been subsumed into the administration of the LPG Type Ills even where no large- 
scale livestock sheds had been constructed. Neighbouring LPG Type Ills too merged with 
each other combining their resources, with the goal of specialising when possible in a 
single branch of meat or dairy production or livestock rearing. However in only a small 
number of cases had intensive livestock holding sheds been constructed by the mid 1970s. 
The rest of the LPG Ts were at vastly different stages of development either in their 
facilities or degrees of specialisation. By 1977, although some concentration of 
production had occurred in most LPGs in Bezirk Erfurt with the renovation or extension of 
livestock sheds, a large proportion of livestock continued to be kept in multiple small 
buildings which lacked even basic labour saving machinery for feed distribution or 
manure removal.15 The number of livestock production units employing a large number of 
workers was thus relatively few. Most people employed in livestock production worked in 
small numbers in several sheds, where conditions had rarely changed significantly since 
the 1960s.16 There was thus an increasingly obvious stratification of financial and 
productive status and with them political clout between livestock farms.
Suggestions by DBD members on how to organise things more effectively in 
August 1975 pointed out that realistic plans had to be worked out as to how much fodder 
was actually produced and how much was likely to be consumed by concentrated
14 ThHStAW SED BPA -  SED Kreisleitung Sommerda IV/C/4.10/183 Demokratischer Block, Protokoll uber die Kreisblocksitzung am
6.2.1975, Referat Genosse Lindenlaub p.78.
15 ThHStAW SED BPA 1V/C/2/17-541 Rat des Bezirkes, Information an das Sekretariat der Bezirksleitung uber die Arbeits und 
Lebensbedingungen der Genossenschaftsbauerinnen, die in alten herkommlichen Stallen der Tierproduktion arbeiten 5.1 1.1976 p.95.
16 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/C/2/7-348 SED Bezirksleitung, Abt. Landwirtschaft, Untergliederung der Betriebe der Tierproduktion nach 
der Anzahl der Beschaftigten 1.11.1977 p.66.
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livestock holdings, at the expense of other livestock holdings in the locality.17 Between 
1975 and 1976 a number of new large-scale industrial livestock holdings were opened in 
Bezirk Erfurt among them two 12000 place pig fattening centres in Hermstedt and 
Uthleben. As a consequence other LPG Ts were to be deprived of a large part of their 
share of high protein feed, which in turn would be bound to reduce their productivity. To 
add insult to injury, when LPG in the Bezirk managed to produce additional mixed feed on 
the assurance that it would be distributed among the traditional LPG Ts, a delay in 
establishing the mixed feed producing plant in Ebeleben meant that this too was
1 ftswallowed up, leaving the Bezirk with an overall deficit of 23 kilotonnes of mixed feed. 
The lack of feed available in 1975 for livestock production was also a desperate problem 
for the LPG Schwerstedt, as the chairman explained in a meeting with the head of the 
BPKK in April 1975. With the creation of a bull rearing station in Straussfurt the balance 
of feed distribution in the cooperation had been upset resulting in serious shortages for 
other livestock farms provided for by the KAP. Not only was there a serious lack of 
roughage as well as protein feed, there were also no reserves available.19
In the mid 1970s the problems facing agriculture were considerable but by no 
means insurmountable. There was still room for further increases in production via further 
mechanisation, concentration and specialisation of production. By 1976 the potential of 
such large specialised production units such as the KAP and LPG P to increase production 
levels had been proved in Bezirk Erfurt with increases in the gross production of 2.3 
billion marks. At the same time the level of productivity per head of the workforce had 
also increased by 34.2% on the previous year even though the level of wages had risen by 
11.6%. However it could not be overlooked that the costs incurred had increased at a 
faster rate than the increase in gross production. The price of construction, as well as the 
price of fuel, materials and machinery had gone up while administrative costs had also 
increased considerably.20 Certainly industrial-scale production was capable of producing 
more, but given the economic climate and the cost of essential materials on the world 
markets this increased production was not more cost efficient.
17 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/C/2/17-541 DBD Bezirksverband, VorschlSge zur Ldsung von Entwicklungsproblemen und Aufgaben in 
der Landwirtschaft des Bezirkes Erfurt 20.8.1975 p. 101.
"  SAPMO B-Arch DY30/1705 ZK der SED Abt. Landwirtschaft, SED Bezirksleitung an Genossen Kiesler 1.12.1976 p. 183
19 ThHStAW RdB L041322 RLN (B) Sekretar der Produktionsleitung an Genossen SchrOter, Information uber die Aussprache in der 
Bullenmastanlage Straussfurt zur Futtersituation 23.4.1975.
20 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/C/2/7-344 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Landwirtschaft, Bericht flber die Verwirklichung der Beschlusse des 
VIII. Parteitages...Jan 1976 p.192.
211
Nonetheless as the 1970s progressed, LPG cadres and agricultural functionaries in 
the districts sought to consolidate the administrative separation of crop and livestock 
farming and increase the specialisation and concentration of agricultural production in line 
with SED policy. In the process, however the chronic vulnerability of this separation of 
administrative competence to economic decline became more and more apparent, resulting 
in a seriously flawed industrialisation of agriculture.
Problems of Scale
The decision to form separate LPG Ps and LPG Ts was confirmed at the IX. SED Party
Congress in 1976, precipitating the transfer of more KAP to LPG P status and an even
more radical expansion of individual farms. Prior to the formation of an LPG P it was
considered necessary in some cases for neighbouring KAPs to merge in order to produce a
sufficient scale and degree of specialisation of production to warrant new status as
independent units. At the end of 1976 5 KAPs submitted plans to become LPG Ps. At the
same time 8 KAPs merged to become 4 KAPs and 48 LPG Ts merged to become 21 LPG
Ts. The size of the LPG P/KAP formed varied from district to district, with those in Kreis
Sommerda all over 5000 hectares, those in Kreis Worbis all under 3000 hectares and those
in Kreis Eisenach a mixture of these two size brackets. KAPs in the flat lands could more
easily justify merger on the grounds that it enabled the formation of large continuous
7 1fields on which single crops could in theory be most efficiently harvested. However the 
sheer size of these farms presented their own difficulties.
With the expansion of the LPG Ps and LPG Ts to such sizes, individual collective 
farmers role in decision making was heavily diluted. They were no longer in a position to 
judge for themselves easily whether or not the farm was being run correctly. In any case 
they were subject to a much more dominant SED presence in the LPGs than had
previously been the case, which tended to subdue and limit the expression of divergent
22opinion. LPGs were now run exclusively by highly trained, politically loyal cadres. As a
21 SAPMO B-Arch ZK der SED, Abt. Parteiorgane DY30/IV B 2/5/459, Rat des Bezirkes Erfurt, Information an das Sekretariat der 
Bezirksleitung uber die Bildung von LPG und ZBE (P) und die Zusammenschlusse von LPG, GPG und KAP mit Beginn des Jahres 
1977, 18.10.1986.
22 Following the issuance of the new model statutes in 1977,41 new LPG P were formed from KAP. 78% of the chairmen of these LPG 
had a university and 22% a technical college education. 31 of the 41 chairmen were also SED members, 6 DBD, 3 CDU with only 1 
cadre with no party membership whatsoever. SAPMO B-Arch ZK der SED, Abt Parteiorgane DY30/IV B 2/5/479, Rat des Bezirkes 
Erfurt, Information an das Sekretariat der Bezirksleitung uber die Schritte der weiteren gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung von LPG, GPG, 
KAP und ZBE imJahre 1978 17.10.1977.
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consequence, however, it seemed that LPG members were beginning to abdicate 
responsibility for the success or failure of the farm to which they belonged. In theory the 
right to participate in decision making via the members’ assembly or the LPG board as 
well as the continuing right to a household plot had enabled the individual LPG member to 
maintain his traditional understanding of his profession as a farmer and thus his 
motivation to do well ought in theory to rest on more than avarice. In practice LPG 
chairmen were forced to rely more and more on raising incomes to sustain the efficiency 
of the workforce.
An overview of farmers’ attitudes toward agriculture in the Bezirk concluded that 
the socialist farm had comprehensively demonstrated its superiority over traditional 
farming. However it also pointed out that there was an unhealthy reluctance among LPG 
chairmen to limit the levels of income claimed by their members. Some managers 
reportedly had adopted the attitude that: “the main thing is making sure the money’s good, 
then the farmers will go along with everything”.23 Such comments in some sense broke a 
taboo. Notionally the transformation of agriculture had occurred without undue to damage 
to farmers’ special status as owners and guardians of the land. It also showed up a serious 
handicap to organising cost-efficient agriculture.24 Even as the LPGs failed to reduce other 
production costs, wage bills too were bound to increase.
The rate of growth of production was thus being outstripped by the rate at which 
money was being spent. In 1979 an overall increase of 2.1% was made in gross 
production. This was however exceeded by a 2.4% increase in costs, which was 
compounded by an increase in the wage bill by 1.6% since 1978.25 By 1979, the grand 
scale of crop production established in the LPG Ps and KAPs appeared to exacerbate 
rather than reduce the problems of rising costs. On the whole Bezirk Erfurt was found to 
be neither especially good nor especially bad in comparison with the other Bezirke. 
Nevertheless here as elsewhere the rising costs of production could quite simply not be 
matched by an equivalent increase in gross production. Although the level of 
concentration and specialisation in crop production was deemed to be on the whole
23 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/D/2/7-477 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Landwirtschaft, Einschatzung des Standes der dkonomischen 
Massenagitation und -propaganda in der Landwirtschaft im Bezirk p.20.
24 ThHStAW RdB L041292 Wissenschaftlich-technisches Zentrum der Landwirtschaft des Bezirkes Erfurt, Einige Ergebnisse der 
Produktionstatigkeit der landwirtschaftlichen Betriebe des Bezirkes in den Jahren 1975-1977.
25 SAPMO B-Arch DY30/1541 Information zu wichtigen Ergebnissen der sozialistischen Landwirtschaft im Jahre 1979, 15.4.1980 
p.171.
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justifiable in terms of the potential for further exploitation of the natural resources in the 
Bezirk, it was becoming increasingly difficult to manage the work required given the 
shortage economy. With such a large-scale of production, meeting agro-technical 
deadlines proved increasingly problematic without sufficient supplies of fuel or spare parts 
for machinery.
In livestock production, mergers appeared too to fail to improve productivity. An 
essential reason for the merger of LPG Ts was to reduce the cost of management and 
spread the number of highly qualified cadres more efficiently. Furthermore it was hoped 
that neglected livestock farms would benefit from better conditions as a result of the 
mergers. The heads of the new LPGs, like the KAPs, were overwhelmingly SED 
members in possession of a university or technical college degree. In practice however, 
mergers of LPG Ts often brought neither a concentration of resources, nor better 
management to livestock farming. With so many production sites spread across several
77villages, LPG chairmen reportedly found overseeing production particularly difficult.
Between 1971 and 1978 a total of 37.8 billion marks had been invested in 
agriculture in the GDR. However from 1975 onwards the decline in manpower in the 
LPGs and the shortage of machinery available to balance this decline had been noted as a
78having a negative effect on the rate at which productivity increased. A report in 1979 on 
the problem of maintaining a sufficient workforce throughout the farms in Bezirk Erfurt 
made it clear that here no further reduction could be sustained without a consequent down 
turn in production capability.29 The lack of machinery was certainly becoming an 
increasingly frequent topic for Eingaben to the ZK agricultural department by 1978.30 In 
November 1978 the LPG P Bosleben sent an Eingabe to the ZK agricultural department to 
complain about the lack of essential machinery available to them, which had been the 
cause of disruption throughout the year both for crop production and livestock production. 
It was particularly galling however that certain machines ideally suited for agriculture
2t SAPMO B-Arch ZK der SED, Abt. Parteiorgane DY30/IV B 2/5/459, Rat des Bezirkes Erfurt, Information an das Sekretariat der 
Bezirksleitung Qber die Bildung von LPG und ZBE (P) und die Zusammenschlusse von LPG, GPG und KAP mit Beginn des Jahres 
1977, 18.10.1986.
27 SAPMO B-Arch DY30/1541 ZK der SED Abt. Landwirtschaft, Tendenzen, Ergebnisse und Schlussfolgerungen aus den 7 
Bezirksanalysen. 24.4.1979 p.33.
2* SAPMO B-Arch IV B 2/2.023/2 Buro Gerhard Griineberg, Anlage: Entwicklungsprobleme der Landwirtschaft bei der weiteren 
Durchfuhrung der Beschlusse des VIII. und IX. Parteitages 31.10.1979.
29 ThHStAW RdB L041292 Fachorgan Land-, Forst und Nahrungsguterwirtschaft, Stand und Entwicklung des gesellschaftlichen 
Arbeitsvermogens in der Land- und Nahrungsguterwirtschaft des Bezirkes Erfurt, 19.4.1979.
30 SAPMO B-Arch Buro Gerhard Griineberg DY30 IV B 2/2.023/24 ZK der SED Abt. Landwirtschaft, Einschatzung der Eingaben aus 
der Bevdlkerung im II. Quartal 1978 15.7.1978.
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tended to be made available to industrial factories first. Furthermore the lack of basic 
requirements such as spare parts for trucks to transport produce and personnel meant 
tractors were having to be used for haulage rather than for agricultural purposes.31
On average the GDR was producing more per hectare than it had previously. The 
average gross turn-over in crop production and in livestock production for the years 1974- 
1978 exceeded that of the years 1969-73 in the GDR as in Bezirk Erfurt.32 Nonetheless the 
progress of agricultural transformation had come at a price which appeared increasingly 
unsustainable, given the strain under which the East German economy was operating. As 
the pinch on the economy at large began to be felt, the SED’s leading agricultural 
functionaries in Berlin began to find themselves under increasing pressure from their 
colleagues to justify the level of financial support received by the LPGs, in particular the 
balance of price policy between industry and agriculture.33 In a letter to Honecker at the 
start of May 1978 Griineberg described one memorandum attacking the lack of benefit 
received from high investment in agriculture as “extremely one-sided, tendentious and in 
several points and figures factually wrong.”34 In the face of continuing reductions in the 
quotas of machinery being made available to the LPGs during the late 1970s, the SED’s 
leading agricultural functionaries in Berlin could only continue their calls for investment 
in agriculture to be sustained in order to balance the decline in the workforce. In particular 
it was argued there was insufficient money being planned for agriculture even to maintain 
their original levels of machinery, let alone expand. Unless alternative economic decisions 
were made, it was predicted that after a period stagnation, production levels would drop.35
31 SAPMO B-Arch Buro des Genossen Griineberg DY30 IV B 2/2.023/24 LPG P Bosleben an das ZK der SED Abt. Landwirtschaft 
23.11.1978.
32 SAPMO B-Arch DY30/1541 ZK der SED Abt. Landwirtschaft, Tendenzen, Ergebnisse und Schlussfolgerungen aus den 7 
Bezirksanalysen. 24.4.1979 p.33.
33 In April 1978 Bruno Kiesler -  head of the ZK’s agriculture department - wrote to Gerhard Griineberg complaining about a set of 
suggestions for the future economic development o f agriculture which he had been asked to co-sign by the head of the department for 
planning and finance in the ZK. These documents he maintained contained evaluations of developmental questions in agriculture which 
were clearly marked by the tendency to contrive to provide evidence that in the development of agriculture too much had been and was 
continuing to be invested with little positive benefit. Many of these evaluations which the statistical office as well as other institutions 
had been commissioned to produce, Kiesler suggested, contained consciously false representations and one-sided analyses. He went so 
far as to repeat the attitude of certain people that “for a certain amount of time, certain influential people have been systematically 
conducting a witch-hunt against agriculture and - as they are connected to agriculture - against certain people too.” Suggestions 
primarily to force agriculture to pay higher prices for industrial goods and to create a fund with which to balance out any excessive 
investment were due to be presented to the Sekretariat of the ZK a few days later, with the possible intention to have them agreed upon 
at a time when, Kiesler suggested, Griineberg would be absent. SAPMO B-Arch IV B 2/2.023/2 Buro des Gerhard Griineberg, Kiesler 
an Griineberg 21.4.1978.
34 SAPMO B-Arch DY30 IV B 2/2.023/2 Biiro Gerhard Griineberg, “Einige wichtige Fakten zum Beitrag der Land- und Forstwirtschaft 
zur Produktion des Nationaleinkommens der DDR” 22.3.1978.
35 SAPMO B-Arch IV B 2/2.023/2 Buro Gerhard Griineberg, Kiesler und Griineberg an Honecker, 31.10.1979.
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These fears seem well founded. According to the Bezirksleitung in 1978, in Bezirk 
Erfurt an investment of 1 billion marks had been made during the past two years to 
support the introduction of industrialised farming. Nonetheless there had by no means 
been a general improvement in the level of yields produced throughout the Bezirk. Despite 
their fundamentally similar terrain and quality of soil, the amount of produce per hectare 
harvested in Kreis Bad Langensalza exceeded that of neighbouring Kreis Erfurt-Land for 
grain by 1.5dt, for potatoes by 20.5dt and for sugar beet by 42dt.36 Analysing the balance 
of the economic results for agriculture, the Bezirk directorate of the Bank for Agriculture 
and Food Industries found that in 1979 over half the crop production farms in Bezirk 
Erfurt were struggling to sustain development. Increased costs above all for repairs to 
machinery had compromised the profitability of LPG Ps.37 Moreover in 1979 it was 
reported that in the majority of LPG Ps and KAPs in the Bezirk, problems in the formation 
of an effective work organisation with fixed work collectives had not been conducive to 
reducing excessive costs. In 70% of LPG Ps and KAPs, leading functionaries had yet to 
settle on the correct combination of brigades responsible variously for particular crops, 
particular tasks or particular areas of the farm. The inevitable consequence of this was the 
breakdown of effective planning at the brigade level and the impossibility of seriously 
assessing where costs could be reduced at the front line of production and comparing 
results between brigades.38
It was however livestock farms rather than the LPG Ps which tended to bear the 
brunt of rising costs and sinking productivity. In 1978, the lack of feed as a result of the 
poor grain harvest meant that the demand from LPG Ts could only be met by 2/3 in the 
Bezirk as a whole.39 As a result of shortages of feed and increases in costs, livestock 
production farms were thought to be in still worse a condition than the LPG Ps in 1979, 
with little margin for accumulation and thus little prospect of building up the investment 
necessary to transform the conditions of production.40
36 SAPMO B-Arch ZK der SED, Abt. Parteiorgane DY30/IV B 2/5/416, Protokoll der Bezirksleitungssitzung Erfurt vom 12.4.1978, 
Referat von Genossen Brauner, Sekret&r der Bezirksleitung.
37 ThHStAW RdB L043160 Wissenschaftlich-technisches Zentrum Erfurt, Leistungsvergleich der Kreise des Bezirkes Erfurt im 
Zeitraum der 5-Jahrplanes 1976-1980 und insbesondere der Jahre 1979 und 1980 II. Quartal 1980.
3* SAPMO B-Arch DY30/1541 ZK der SED Abt. Landwirtschaft, Tendenze, Ergebnisse und Schlussfolgerung aus den 7 
Bezirksanalysen. 24.4.1979 p.33.
39 SAPMO B-Arch ZK der SED, Abt. Parteiorgane DY30/IV B 2/5/416, Protokoll der Bezirksleitungssitzung Erfurt vom 12.4.1978, 
Referat von Genossen Brauner, Sekretar der Bezirksleitung.
40 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/D/2/7-800 SED Bezirksleitung Abt. Landwirtschaft, Information uber die MV der BPO der 
Bezirksdirektion der Bank fur Landwirtschaft und Nahrungsguterwirtschaft am 19.11.1979. p.3 5 5.
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The Failures of Cooperation
At one level the reason for the continuing divide between LPG Ps and LPG Ts could be 
found very simply in the absence or inactivity in practice of the administrative structures 
which were intended to regulate and coordinate the relationship. A document prepared for 
the office of Gerhard Griineberg in May 1976 on the future of agriculture, noted that the 
cooperative councils were in most cases barely functioning. No body existed therefore 
outside the state administration actively to ensure a mutually beneficial relationship 
between crop and livestock production was maintained. The state administration appeared 
however to be unable to broker effective relations between crop and livestock farms.
A particular issue of complaint among the Eingaben sent to the ZK agricultural 
department during 1976 was the desperate need in livestock farms to replace old 
machinery and renovate livestock holdings in order to improve conditions for animals and 
humans alike. The lack of funds available to LPG chairmen to pay for these improvements 
was put down to the failure in particular of the Rat des Kreises to regulate the setting of 
feed prices and ensure there was a sufficient supply of feed for livestock, leaving livestock 
farms at a serious financial disadvantage compared with the LPG Ps and KAPs. 41 A series 
of discussions held with farmers working with livestock in 1977 in Bezirk Erfurt reiterated 
these problems.42 There appeared however to be little prospect of resolving these 
complaints for the time being, as LPG Ps and KAPs tended, often with the backing of the 
Rat des Kreises, to extend their plantations of market crops at the expense of their feed
43crops.
Certainly in Bezirk Erfurt with state approval, essential changes occurred in the use 
and quality of agricultural land which worked to the disadvantage of livestock farms.
Large swathes of land had already been lost during the 1960s to building projects and 
mining and for the period between 1976 and 1980, it was expected that still more largely 
high-quality arable land would be lost to building, quarrying and water management 
schemes among other things. At the same time, there were strong financial incentives for
41 SAPMO B-Arch Biiro des Genossen Griineberg DY30 IV B 2/2.023/24 ZK der SED Abt. Landwirtschaft, Einschatzung der 
Eingaben aus der Bevdlkerung im IV. Quarial und im Jahre 1976 insgesamt 20.1.1977.
42 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/D/2/9.01 Abt. Parteiorgane Informationsbericht Nr.22/77 28.7.1977 p.54.
43 SAPMO B-Arch Buro des Genossen Griineberg DY30 IV B 2/2.023/24 ZK der SED Abt. Landwirtschaft, Einschatzung der 
Eingaben aus der Bevdlkerung im IV. Quarial und im Jahre 1977 insgesamt 13.1.1978.
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LPG Ps and KAPs to use much of their most fertile land for fruit plantations to meet 
growing public demand. The replacement of this lost arable land by ploughing less fertile 
meadow and pasture land however led to a serious overall drop in the productive capacity 
in the Bezirk. Rather than reducing the amount of produce made available for public 
consumption, the brunt of this drop in productive capacity was bom by a reduction in the 
amount of feed made available for livestock. On the one hand there had been a reduction 
in the amount of pasture land available. On the other, with large areas specialising in grain 
and sugar beet and strict quotas on the amount which had to be made available for public 
consumption, there had been a reduction in the proportion of the yield devoted to 
providing feed for livestock as well as a reduction in the proportion of the land devoted to 
growing particular feed crops. While LPG Ps/KAPs met their obligations, the LPG Ts 
bore the brunt of any shortage. The amount of land available for fodder production per 
head of livestock dropped steadily between 1970 and 1978 leading inevitably to a 
stagnation and even a down turn in the productivity of the LPG Ts. Adding insult to 
injury, stability in the level of yields had clearly yet to be achieved in the major crops, 
with considerable variations dependent on the clemency of the weather. Given the 
dependency of livestock farms on their local KAP/LPG P and the latter's balance of 
priorities, any drop in the annual yield tended to have a directly negative impact on the 
supplies available to livestock farms.44
A meeting of the cooperative council of KOG Sommerda in September 1977 
reveals the seriousness of the situation with which agricultural functionaries were faced in 
the late 1970s. Although 1,3 billion marks worth of fodder had been imported the situation 
was still tight. The secretary for agriculture in the SED Kreisleitung was reported here 
upbraiding the LPG chairmen for some mistakes which had led to unnecessary losses. She 
concluded: “We all know how things currently look at the moment in agriculture. In such 
extreme situations, we also begin to see some weaknesses, which one otherwise does not 
normally immediately recognise.”45
At the end of 1977, the Rat des Bezirkes put forward some suggestions for 
rectifying the problems faced by the LPG Ts. Conditions in the livestock farms were to be
44 SAPMO B-Arch DY30 1540 Rat des Bezirkes, Stellvetreter des Vorsitzenden fur Land-, Forst- und Nahrungsguterwirtschaft, 
Information uber die Entwicklung der Landwirtschaft seit 1970, dabei auftretende Probleme und Schlussfolgerungen, 3.10.1978.
45 ThHStAW SED BPA -  SED Kreisleitung Sommerda IV/D/4.10/167 KOR Sbmmerda, Protokoll uber die Beratung mit den 
Vorsitzenden der LPG am 24.9.1977, pp.42-45.
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improved by ensuring that LPG Ps were made to contribute money into a fund to pay for 
investment in future development. If “unjustifiably high” differences existed in the 
financial resources of the LPG Ps and the LPG Ts which could be traced back to unfair 
prices then a financial settlement was to be reached or money contributed into a common 
fund.46 However in 1978 conflicts between crop production enterprises and livestock 
production over the price, quantity, quality and delivery of fodder and the removal of 
animal excrement continued to run.47 An investigation by the ABI in 1978 into the state of 
LPG Ts around the GDR noted serious increases in livestock mortality resulting in part 
from the inability of the district state authorities to ensure the interests of the LPG Ts were 
taken fully into account by the LPG Ps.48
The problems of cooperation between LPG Ps and LPG Ts became more critical as 
economic problems became more serious. While LPG Ps failed to reach expected targets 
for increases in production, it was essential that the price for this failure was not 
automatically passed on to the LPG Ts. However a fundamental lack of common interests 
between LPG Ps and LPG Ts led to an apparent lack of understanding on the part of the 
former for the “financial reproduction process” of the latter. With the cooperative councils 
which were intended to broker good relations between LPG Ps and LPG Ts widely non­
existent, there was a tendency for LPG Ps not to give sufficient priority to their partner 
LPG Ts’ needs. In Bezirk Erfurt, although 56.4% of the gross production in agriculture 
came from livestock production, only 8.2% of the accumulation of capital was carried out 
by livestock production farms themselves. As a result they remained largely beholden to 
the crop production farms for sufficient investment to improve the working conditions of 
their members as well as to rationalise production. With crop production failing to 
produce sufficient yields and thus unwilling to share their profits with livestock 
production the potential for an unequal distribution of wealth between crop and livestock 
production had increased. In the GDR as a whole over 12,000 requests were made for 
withdrawal from an LPG at the beginning of 1978, an increase of over 1,500 on the year 
before. The majority of those wishing to leave were employed in livestock production,
46 SAPMO B-Arch ZK der SED, Abt. Parteiorgane DY30/TV B 2/5/479, Rat des Bezirkes Erfurt, Vorlage an das Sekretariat der 
Bezirksleitung uber die Konzeption zur Durchfuhrung der JHV in LPG, GPG, VEG und ihren kooperativen Einrichtungen 13.10.1977.
47 ThHStAW SED BPA -  SED Kreisleitung Sdmmerda IV/D/4.10/149 Abt. Parteiorgane, Bericht uber Ergebnisse der JHV in den LPG 
und Erfahrungen bei der Anwendung der neuen Musterstatute der LPG 09.02.1978 pp. 18-21.
4* SAPMO B-Arch Buro des Genossen Griineberg DY30 IV B 2/2.023/61 Komitee der ABI, Information uber Kontrollergebnisse zur 
Entwicklung der Tierverluste in der Rinder- und Schweinehaltung 21.11.1978.
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with over a quarter of requests specifically citing poor working conditions in LPG Ts.49 In 
1980 a similar number made requests to withdraw from the LPGs. More than half of those 
who made requests to leave LPGs in Bezirk Erfurt cited a desire for improved living and 
working conditions.50
With the financial burden passed on to the LPG Ts in the form of excessive 
charges for feed production and delivery, it was essential that the chairmen of the LPG Ps 
and LPG Ts who still nominally formed together a cooperative council maintained 
communication. The failure of these councils to function since the full administrative 
separation of crop from livestock production, existing on paper only, had led to a complete 
breakdown in communication. The lack of detailed knowledge of (and perhaps implied 
also a lack of concern for) the financial position of neighbouring LPGs led inevitably to 
serious breakdowns in fair relations between farms.51 In the case of the LPG P and the 
LPG T Tottelstadt it was found that the cooperative council had in effect ceased to exist 
by the end of 1979. Attempts to resurrect cooperation between the heads of the LPGs were 
found to flounder on the rocks of bitter disagreement between them.52 Even where they 
did exist, however, this was no guarantee that it was possible to reach a mutually 
beneficial agreement.
In November 1976 a meeting of the cooperative council for the KOG Walschleben 
in Kreis Erfurt-Land was held. The essential conflict of interests was played out here 
between the agricultural cadres in charge of crop production, those in charge of livestock 
and those in the state and party administrations at district level attempting to coordinate 
these two sides of production. In response to the planned supply of fodder offered by the 
LPG P which appeared to fall far short of the amount required, the chairmen of the LPG 
Ts could only counter: “we cannot recognise this level of fodder production” and “I will 
sign no contract which does not guarantee fully our fodder supply”. Although there was 
general sympathy for their position, the chairmen of the LPG Ts were forced to recognise 
that they would have to accept the contracted level of supply on paper and then seek their 
own ways to meet their requirements. Given its own obligations, the LPG P could not
49 SAPMO B-Arch DY30/1610 ZK der SED Abt. Landwirtschaft, Genosse Lindner an Genosse Kiesler, Information uber Antrage von 
Genossenschaftsmitgliedem auf Austritt aus LPG 9.1.1978 p.54.
50 SAPMO B-Arch DY30 1469 ZK der SED Abt. Landwirtschaft, Erste Zusammenfassung der Mitgliederbewegung in LPG 1979 
30.1.1980 p. 180.
51 SAPMO B-Arch DY30/1541 ZK der SED Abt. Landwirtschaft, Tendenze, Ergebnisse und Schlussfolgerung aus den 7 
Bezirksanalysen. 24.4.1979 p.33.
52 ThHStAW SED BPA 493 SED Kreisleitung Erfurt, Beschluss des Sekretariates vom 23.11.1979 Nr. 372, 13.11.1979 p. 13.
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improve its offer on the one hand and on the other the Bezirk authorities would withhold 
financial aid from the LPG Ts unless they signed the contract. In the face of this 
intransigence and the lack of fodder available in the district, there was some desperation 
among the assembled cadres about where the LPG Ts would find the feed to fill the 
shortage. At this stage, complaining directly at the ZK in Berlin appeared to be the only 
possible solution.53
The minutes of a meeting of the cooperative council for the farms based around the 
LPG P Andisleben, Kreis Erfiirt-Land in May 1979 reveals some of the basic difficulties 
facing LPG cadres trying to coordinate production in both crop and livestock farms. With 
several livestock farms supplied by the LPG P, large central silos had been constructed 
from which each was to take his agreed amount. While this reduced transport costs for the 
LPG P, it increased costs for the LPG Ts and raised mutual suspicion as to whether one 
LPG was not taking more than its fair share of the silage. As this exchange in the protocol 
of the meeting demonstrates the shortage of feed made for strong competition between 
LPG Ts:
K. M. (LPG T): “We have to get to the stage where every LPG has its own silo and farms 
with that”
G. B. (LPG P): “It will continue to be the case that we have a few central silos from which 
several LPGs collect”
K. D. (LPG T): “There are always LPGs which don’t stick to the agreements”
M. S. (LPG T): “Sort things out in your patch before you go into other people’s”
With the news that the Rat des Bezirkes was organising extra silage to be 
purchased from elsewhere outside the district which would have to be transported in, the 
chairman of the LPG P made a telling comment: “Actually over there is where the cattle 
belong. That’s what you were thinking too. This is no situation to be in -  you are always 
hungry and we always get the blame.” In other words, the real problem was that no 
effective balance had been struck in the Bezirk between the quantity of livestock held in 
any one area and the amount of land which was devoted to providing feed for them.54 It 
had been for precisely this reason that the administrative separation of crop and livestock 
production had been opposed in the first place.
$} KAS Rat des Kreises Erfurt 1451 Protokoll uber die Kooperationsratssitzung, Kooperation Walschleben am 18.11.1976.
54 KAS Rat des Kreises Erfurt 1451 Protokoll der KOR Sitzung Pflanzen-Tier-Produktion vom 22.5.1979.
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A form of agriculture had been developed which had shown and continued to show 
its potential for extraordinary levels of yields. However in order to sustain these levels, 
steady access to machinery, fuel and chemical fertiliser and pesticides were necessary at a 
reasonable price. As these resources became more scarce, prices rose for crop production 
making LPG Ps unprofitable unless they in turn passed on their additional costs to 
livestock production. LPG Ts however suffered too from a shortage of machinery and 
fuel. Moreover given the cost of feed and the limits to the amount with which they were 
supplied, LPG Ts found themselves unable to maintain their levels of production, let alone 
develop the number of animals they kept or the efficiency of the facilities in which they 
kept them. Without the prospect of progress in the production facilities, there was little 
hope for improving living or working conditions in those poorer LPG Ts. This had serious 
consequences for certain villages whose importance as sites of employment and 
settlement, and thus of commerce was rendered increasingly obsolete. A vicious circle 
was created and fuelled by the separation of crop and livestock production which could 
only drive on an unequal differentiation of living standards between communities in the 
East German countryside.
Rural Development under Honecker
Following the completion of the transition of power at the top of the SED from Walter 
Ulbricht to Erich Honecker, at the VIII. SED Party Congress in 1971 there was some 
optimism among farmers and agricultural functionaries alike that a change in course 
would rectify some of the economic problems which had manifested themselves so clearly 
in the years before. Reports from the DBD in Bezirk Erfurt in November 1971 suggested 
however that no such improvements had yet made themselves felt. Rather complaints were 
directed at the growing corruption of the system of supply from industry to agriculture. 
Spare parts could in fact be obtained, it was rumoured, if one was willing to grease the 
palm of the supplier. To add insult to injury the black market was reportedly open to 
inflation -  as one DBD member put it: “What one got a few years ago for an extra 20 M 
note, is only possible these days with an extra 50 M note.”55 Nevertheless as greater 
investment was made in the provision of consumer goods to the population, rural
55 SAPMO B-Arch DY60/2958 DBD Bezirksvorstand, A bt Parteiorgane, ErgSnzender Abschlussbericht uber die Arbeit unserer Partei 
in Vorbereitung und Durchfuhrung der Wahlen am 14.11.1971, 17.11.1971.
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communities were able to benefit along with the rest of the population. The sense 
remained however among LPG members that they were being given less than those who 
worked in industry, while at the same time the disparities between individual rural 
communities began to become more pronounced.
As certain villages in rural areas were identified as new centres of the industrial- 
style agricultural production, so too did the demand for housing in and around them 
increase. In 1971 the agricultural department of the Kreisleitung Sommerda pointed out 
that the district agricultural council needed urgently to address the provision of living 
space in certain key villages and LPGs such as Weissensee, Buttstadt, Kolleda and 
Straussfurt where the quality and quantity of housing were insufficient.56 New housing 
and materials for renovation were however also desperately required elsewhere too. Not 
all farms had been supplied with sufficient machinery to reduce the amount of manpower 
required to keep them productive and with an ageing workforce, holding on to younger 
members was essential. From the early 1970s onwards solutions to the housing problems 
in rural areas were sought in encouraging LPGs to support the aspirations of their 
members to go about constructing their own homes. This was a boon to those who were 
able to find the resources to do so. Certainly as early as 1971 the mayor of Gemrode cited 
the positive response of villagers at the announcement of new plans to encourage people 
to build their own homes in line with the VIII. SED Party Congress.57
In 1979 it was reported with some pride that in Kreis Sommerda 17 houses had 
been built over the course of the last three years thanks to cooperation between the LPGs 
and the local state organs. Nonetheless considering the size of the problem of housing in 
rural areas such advances were clearly not sufficient to resolve the issue. There were also 
now numerous complaints from LPG members unable to gain access to the necessary 
materials or disgruntled by broken promises of support from their LPG on these matters.58 
The rural population’s conception of their living standards appears to have depended to a 
large extent on how well they were supplied with material with which to repair and 
improve their homes. It might well be argued that the pride farming families had felt in
54 ThHStAW SED BPA SED Kreisleitung SSmmerda IV/B/4.10/149 AbL Landwirtschaft, Melkeraussprache in der LPG Weissensee 
p. 146.
ThHStAW RdB L014597 BQrgermeister der Gemeinde Gemrode, Kreis Worbis, an den RLN (K), Einschatzung der Gemeinde 
3.6.1971.
51 ThHStAW SED BPA -  SED Kreisleitung SOmmerda IV/D/4.10/150 Abt. Parteiorgane, Bericht uber die Arbeit der Kreisleitung auf 
der Grundlage des Beschlusses des ZK vom 7.11.1978 pp.21 -35.
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private ownership of land could at least to some extent be rediscovered in pride in home 
ownership. This sense of pride was further re-invigorated by attempts to encourage 
villagers to keep livestock privately. Since the 2nd Plenary Session of the ZK in 1976, all 
attempts to further limit private holdings were to be countered. Ideologically speaking this 
was a retrograde step for the SED regime. The social transformation of the last twenty 
years had been aimed at diminishing the importance of private ownership. Re-emphasising 
it did certainly provide some solutions to food supply and housing problems and improved 
the morale of a proportion of the rural population who were able to take advantage. 
However it also created greater potential for obvious disparity between the prosperity of 
individual citizens and ultimately created a source of further disgruntlement as shortages 
of building materials and other resources proved to be more frequent in the 1980s.
During the 1970s agricultural production reached new heights. Technologically it 
had never been so advanced and the prospects for further improvement appeared to be 
good. New machinery and methods for crop production and the construction of high-tech 
production sites for concentrated livestock farming promised to improve efficiency as well 
as reduce the level of manual labour required in the future. At the same time, the benefits 
of Honecker*s social and economic policy filtered through to the rural population who 
were able increasingly not only to build their own houses but have access to their own 
cars, televisions, radios, fridges and washing machines. In practice however by the late 
1970s a very uneven industrialisation of agriculture had taken place across Bezirk Erfurt, 
as across the GDR.
In an increasingly unfavourable economic climate, the organisation of farming 
created by the SED’s agricultural policy proved itself too fragile and susceptible to the 
weaknesses of the planned economy at a time of shortage. Huge efforts continued to be 
made by farmers and LPG functionaries to maintain standards, despite shortages of 
essential resources (of machinery, fuel, feed grain) as can be seen from the levels of 
overtime worked by collective farmers. However by the beginning of the 1980s the 
prospects for the improvement of productivity and with it working conditions had largely 
evaporated, while environmental damage caused by an inadequate industrialisation of 
agriculture worsened.
224
Conclusion
The second half of the 1970s saw a brave attempt to transform agriculture and with 
it rural society half fail and half succeed. There is no doubt that the formation of separate 
LPG Ps and LPG Ts was a radical step towards advanced and specialised production. 
However the inability of the LPG Ps and Ts to function efficiently in the worsening 
economic climate and shortage economy demonstrated the fragility of this method of 
agricultural production in the face of wider economic constraints. Furthermore the failure 
for LPG Ps and LPG Ts to cooperate with one another and the consequent severe 
differentiation in the living and working conditions of certain farmers gave the lie to the 
SED’s claims to provide social improvements to all.
In the late 1970s, in the face of such an uneven transformation of agricultural 
production, DBD members -  many of whom occupied positions as mid-level managers in 
LPG T - called for steps to be taken to reinvigorate the cooperative council.59 Two years 
later, in 1981 the X. SED Party Congress saw an attempt to take heed of these concerns. 
This congress, which was preceded by the death of Gerhard Griineberg, signalled a 
realisation that the current direction of agriculture was not conducive to efficient 
production given the reality of the economic situation in the GDR. Consequently plans 
were made to scale back the size of some excessively large individual farms and limit the 
extent of monocultural specialisation where it appeared to be damaging to production.
This slight change in course did not arouse much indignation among farmers and LPG 
leaders, nor was it seized upon as an excuse to abandon separate crop and livestock 
production (as had occurred in 1969 at the 10th ZK Plenum). Not only had the proportion 
of the farming population been reduced and their local coherence and identity as 
indigenous farmers been negated by modernisation and industrialisation of agriculture, the 
introduction of industrial labour practices gave them a fundamentally different attitude 
towards their work and their position in the hierarchy. The most fundamental changes in 
the position of the farmers with respect to the land, their livestock and their locality had 
been accepted. Moreover SED and DBD party organisations in the LPGs were better 
organised than ever and were able to influence the reception of the X. SED Party Congress
59 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/D/2/15-575 DBD Bezirksverband an die Bezirksleitung 30.1.1979 p.83.
more effectively. At this stage the ability of the SED leadership to communicate its 
authority was not seriously in doubt.
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CHAPTER 9
Economic Crisis and Popular Dissatisfaction -  the Road to 1989
The 1980s began with a more self-critical attitude in the SED hierarchy concerning 
the previous course of agricultural policy. The arrival of Werner Felfe to replace Gerhard 
Griineberg as the leading figure directing SED agricultural policy along with the new 
course set during the X. SED Party Congress promised some retreat from the worst 
excesses of the gigantism and over-specialisation of the previous five or so years. It also 
promised to oversee some efforts to ensure that crop and livestock production were better 
coordinated in future. Attempts to scale back the separation of crop and livestock 
production, improve prices for agriculture and encourage private production in the course 
of the early 1980s had a positive effect in some cases. Price reforms in 1984 certainly 
went some way to restoring the finances of farms on paper. However they could not alter 
much the impact of the worsening economic crisis which the GDR was facing by the mid 
to late 1980s. The financial burden on agriculture continued to be severe, limiting the 
extent of improvement possible in those farms which had thus far been neglected in terms 
of investment and seriously handicapping those industrialised farms which relied on fuel, 
fertiliser and machinery in plentiful supply. Not only did many LPGs find it increasingly 
difficult to maintain standards of productivity, there was also no foreseeable solution to 
the problems of running agriculture productively and efficiently given the GDR’s 
economic problems. The conditions under which collective farmers had to work thus 
became increasingly fraught by crises.
By the late 1980s sustained shortfalls in investment across the economy were 
having a serious impact on living conditions in rural communities too. Since the 
completion of collectivisation rural communities had undergone considerable changes, 
particularly during the course of the 1970s as the industrialisation of agriculture began to 
have an impact on the pattern of rural settlement, elevating the status of some villages 
while relegating others. During the 1970s and early 1980s some of the negative impacts of 
the transformation of agricultural production on rural communities were mitigated by 
improvements (or the promise of them in the near future) to the standard of living possible 
in other respects. The distance from the home to the work place may have increased
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considerably and the status of the individual farmer within the collective farm might have 
been diminished, but increased incomes and access to a range of modem conveniences in 
the home nonetheless were welcome improvements to the standard of living. However 
those villages which did not become centres of the newly industrialised agriculture were 
often left behind in the distribution of resources for the improvement of public amenities -  
transport and road networks, water and electricity supplies. By the 1980s the seriousness 
of the economic problems facing the GDR limited the potential for making up for this 
neglect. Popular dissatisfaction at for example the lack of a consistent running water 
supply could then only be aggravated still further by shortages in the supply of essential 
goods to villages -  which again necessarily were less well supplied than towns. The extent 
of environmental pollution which had come with the (often incomplete or mismanaged) 
industrialisation of agriculture and the spread of industry (from 1980 brown coal fired) 
into the countryside then had a damaging effect on the health of the population as well as 
the reputation of the SED regime. By the late 1980s there was not only considerable 
disparity in the working conditions in different sites of agricultural production, there was 
also considerable disparity in the living conditions in rural communities. Worse still 
perhaps there appeared to be no immediate potential for improving the situation, as 
general economic decline and environmental pollution continued to worsen.
Agricultural Reform
In 1981 the future did not look good for agriculture in Bezirk Erfurt as in the rest of the 
GDR. In September that year the agriculture department at the ZK received with dismay 
the latest demands of the State Planning Commission for a further reduction in the levels 
of grain imports into the GDR above and beyond the previous target. The SPK intended 
that by 1985 instead of the 3.1 million tonnes of grain previously planned only 0.5 million 
tonnes would be imported. As a consequence the amount of grain available for livestock 
feed from domestic production as well as imports was expected to sink to 20,423 
kilotonne grain units. Alongside this quantitative reduction, it was also expected that there 
would be a qualitative reduction in the feed available with the purchase of cheaper, less 
nourishing varieties. Under these conditions it seemed unavoidable that the level of meat 
and dairy production would have to be scaled back. There was an obvious agenda in the
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agricultural department’s presentation of a worse case scenario. No department relished 
the prospect of cuts to the budget it was allocated. Nevertheless a drop in grain imports 
was certain to have a far-reaching effect.
Given such grain shortages, it made sense to allocate resources to those farms 
which produced most efficiently at the expense of other less efficient production sites. It 
was not however entirely clear which of the GDR’s farms were the most efficient 
producers. In theory the modem concentrated production facilities were the most 
productive. This however did not always prove to be the case in practice, given their fuel 
consumption and problems with disease as well as waste disposal. Closing or reducing the 
capacity of such facilities was tantamount to a public admission of economic crisis and 
implied that the SED policy of industrialisation of agriculture had, as many farmers had 
predicted, been at best mis-implemented, if not fundamentally ill-conceived. Continuing 
to supply them at the expense of other smaller LPG Ts, which had been denied the chance 
to develop but had nonetheless maintained production levels was potentially 
counterproductive and was bound to anger the farming population. The ideology of 
progress on which socialist agriculture and socialist ideals of rural development had been 
built and justified to the rural population was thus seriously under threat from the dire 
economic straits in which the GDR was increasingly finding itself from the early 1980s 
onwards.1
At the start of 1982 there was an increasingly clear imbalance between the 
financial solvency of the LPG Ps compared with that of the LPG Ts. Eleven times as 
many LPG Ts as LPG Ps were found to be struggling to maintain production levels. Given 
that the LPG Ts were in many ways dependent on the LPG Ps for their ability to produce 
effectively there was a clear issue of cooperation to be addressed.2 In the face of this 
imbalance and with the prospect of a reduction in imported feed supplies, there was strong 
support within the state and party apparatus as well as amongst farmers for a return to a 
more traditional symbiotic style of relationship between crop and livestock production. As 
early as February 1980 a Politburo resolution had been published in the Neue Deutsche 
Bauemzeitung (The New German Farmers’ Newspaper) calling upon LPGs to form
1 SAPMO B-Arch DY30 1512 ZK der SED, Abt. Landwirtschaft, Standpunkt zu den neuen Forderungen der Staatlichen 
Plankommission 8.9.1981 p.299.
1 ThHStAW SED BPA 3865 Ubersichtsstatistik Stand 01.10.1982.
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cooperative councils to coordinate relations between crop and livestock production. This 
call was reiterated during the X. SED Party Congress in 1981. An analysis of the district 
farmers’ conferences held in 1982 prior to the XII. German Farmers’ Congress noted 
widespread support for attempts to strengthen cooperative councils. Farmers were clearly 
motivated by the realisation that the mutually (if not equally) dependent relationship 
between crop and livestock production needed to be better managed.3 Reports on the 
situation in agriculture in the various districts of the Bezirk discussing the factors which 
caused particularly LPG Ts to have low production levels, referred again and again to 
basic problems concerned with the irregularity in the yields and delivery of fodder by the 
LPG Ps.4
Following the XII. German Farmers’ Congress (13-14.5.1982) and the 
promulgation of a new LPG Law in 1982 giving a clear legal basis for cooperation 
between LPG Ts and LPG Ps, effective action was taken to organise cooperative councils 
containing delegates from LPG Ps and one or more of their neighbouring LPG Ts. The 
composition of the cooperative communities which were established in many respects 
reflected partnerships of previous standing between LPGs and KAPs, although this was 
not always the case given the pattern of mergers over the previous few years. The tasks of 
the cooperative council and the central elements of the cooperation between the LPGs 
were laid out according to a clearly defined and largely uniform pattern.5 How effective 
were the cooperative relations between LPG Ps and LPG Ts varied. In theory the contracts 
drawn up to regulate the cost, quantity, quality and delivery of feed which the LPG P were 
to provide LPG Ts were binding. In practice however recourse to the courts to claim 
restitution for breach of contract was unheard of, leaving the settlement of disputes down 
in part to the relative strength, characters and connections of the antagonists in their 
respective LPGs. How well the cooperation functioned depended therefore to a large 
extent on the abilities of the honorary chairman of the cooperative council.
The KOR chairman was usually one of the heads of the constituent farms and 
remained in his position on the whole for a period of three years or until he was deemed
3 SAPMO B-Arch BQro Werner Felfe DY30/32 ZK der SED, Abt. Landwirtschaft, Information Qber den Verlauf und Ergebnisse der 
KBK zur Vorbereitung des XII. Bauemkongresses der DDR 24.2.1982.
* ThHStAW RdB L041357 Rat des Bezirkes Stellvertreter des Vorsitzenden fUr Land-, Forst- und NahrungsgQterwirtschaft, Protokoll 
uber die Durchfiihrung des Beschlusses des Rat des Bezirkes Nr.0046 im Kreis Nordhausen 19.4.1982; Information uber die 
Realisierung des PolitbQrobeschlusses vom 6.4.1982 im Kreis MQhlhausen 19.5.1982.
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no longer able to cope with his work load. The role of cooperative council chairman took 
on increased significance as the state administration devolved considerable powers on to 
the KORs to coordinate the economic and social development of rural communities within 
the cooperation. In a Politburo resolution in October 1983 the decision to extend formally 
the power exercised by the cooperative councils and their chairmen was alluded to in the 
description of the KOR as having the “the function of an organ which directs the 
economy”, an ambiguous phrase which caused some confusion among LPG chairmen as 
well as state and party officials.6 The debate as to what this designation might entail saw 
the prospect of an actual end to the separation of crop and livestock production raised 
again for discussion within agricultural circles. In DBD members’ assemblies farmers 
asked whether the LPG Ps and Ts would now in practice be merged together or if still 
larger single mixed farms would be established.7 In essence the Politburo resolution 
entailed the transfer of a range of powers to the cooperative council to enable it actively to 
plan and coordinate agricultural production by the various farms within the cooperation 
over an extended period of time. Without actually cancelling the separation of crop and 
livestock production, the enhanced standing given to the cooperative councils also enabled 
cooperating LPG Ps and LPG Ts to be regarded for administrative purposes as single 
entities. The acquisition of these extended powers and enhanced status took place 
gradually. Only by the start of 1986 were all farms within the purview of a KOR officially 
designated with the new functions. Extending the powers of KORs was intended to enable 
in large part more effective use of funds with which to develop production facilities and 
organise recruitment and qualification measures territorially in the future. As before 
however the extent to which KORs fulfilled fully the additional administrative tasks
o
required of them varied considerably.
Considerable efforts were thus made to improve productivity and working 
conditions in LPG Ts through improved coordination between the administration of crop
5 Gabler, D Entwicklungsabschnitte der Landwirtschaft in der DDR. (Berlin 1995) pp.300-304.
6 There already existed the phrase “organ which leads the economy” but describing the KOR not as being such an “organ" yet having 
the function of one provoked some debate as to what the difference between the two designations might actually be. No conclusive 
answer was ever given!
7 SAPMO B-Arch DY60 3097 DBD Bezirksverband, Abt. Parteiorgane, Einschatzung der Mitgliederversammlungen im Monat 
Dezember 1983,8.12.1964.
* see Gabler pp.363-371 Diethelm Gabler devotes considerable space in his book to the constitution o f the cooperative councils in 
Bezirk Erfurt, reproducing a number of documents which describe the duties and responsibilities required of them and the varying 
extent to which the KOR claimed to have fulfilled them. It is not clear how far the KOR were able or needed to fulfil all these duties
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and livestock production. However there continued to be fundamental problems arising 
from the incompatibility of the manner in which agricultural production had been 
conducted in the past five years and the new economic climate which did much to 
undermine these efforts. One of the first issues facing the KORs was how best to organise 
work brigades and arrange market and feed crop plantations in order to meet the needs of 
LPG Ts more effectively than had previously been the case, while still fulfilling the quotas 
for market crops demanded by the state. Intensive specialised production of single crops 
had to be balanced by the regular removal of manure and slurry from the LPG Ts and the 
regular supply of sufficient quantities of silage, fresh fodder and other types of feed to the 
LPG Ts based in different parts of the LPG P’s territory. Moreover fuel efficiency in the 
transport of produce and manpower had to be balanced against the most effective use of 
land, machinery and fertiliser. Reaching such a balance was no easy task and proved to be 
beyond the reach of many farms given the difficulties faced by the economy in the GDR.
Mis-industrialisation
The shortage of heavy machinery and spare parts, fertiliser as well as manpower rendered 
agriculture on an industrial scale increasingly fraught with crisis. No less worrying for 
farmers was an apparent drop in the fertility of the land in some LPGs thanks to wind 
damage over the unbroken expanses of oversized fields and soil exhaustion as a result of 
intensive monocultural plantations. Together these factors rendered the achievement of 
consistently good yields almost impossible and in so doing prevented the realisation of 
one of the primary goals of the socialist transformation of agriculture: namely the 
achievement of consistency, predictability and thus plan-ability in agricultural production. 
A study of the extent of mechanisation in Kreis Eisenach in August 1982 revealed that the 
LPGs had reached the limit beyond which any further reduction of the workforce would 
have a serious negative impact on the ability of farmers to maintain agro-technical 
deadlines. At the same time, it was noted that measures to prevent further erosion of the 
soil in large parts of the district were necessary.9 Ongoing plan shortfalls along with
and responsibilities in practice. Some cooperations were clearly much more successful than others, although this had much to do with 
the productive capacities o f the constituent farms as with the competence o f the KOR.
9 ThHStAW 041358 Wissenschaftlich-technisches Zentrum der Landwirtschaft des Bezirkes Erfurt, Analyse des gegenwSrtigen Standes 
der landwirtschaftlichen Produktion und Schlussfolgerungen zur weiteren Intensivierung der Produktion im Kreis Eisenach Juli/Augst 
1982.
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‘unjustified’ variation in yields between similarly situated districts in Bezirk Erfurt 
continued to be reported in 1983.10 If yields were inconsistent this could only have a 
negative impact on livestock production. In Bezirk Erfurt there had been a drop in the 
gross turn over in livestock production between 1980 and 1983, with a notable decrease, 
for example, in the quantity of milk produced per cow at 4% fat content level. In 1982 70 
livestock farms had herds producing no more than 2500kg per cow, a figure 
embarrassingly low considering 3000kg had been considered an attainable target at the 
start of the 1960s.11
Shortages of fuel were becoming increasingly problematic for agriculture during 
the course of the 1980s. This was in small part because the quantity of fuel allowed the 
LPG was often spent on carrying out other tasks within the local community (such as 
rubbish collection or road repairs). More seriously however, exacerbated by a non- 
territorial organisation of production, the fuel requirements for transport of manpower as 
well as crops had been increased considerably and were now unsustainable given the price
1 9of oil. With growing uncertainty about how to sustain industrial-style agriculture at a 
reduced cost and with reduced inputs of key raw materials -  in particular fuel -  new 
consideration was given to the optimum organisation of crop production. Plantation sizes 
had reached averages of over 50 hectares for grain, 40 hectares for potatoes and 57 
hectares for sugar beet in the GDR as a whole. In some parts of the GDR, plantations had 
expanded to as much as 250 hectares. Opinion was growing that such expanses were not 
sustainable in practice and indeed could have a deleterious effect on productivity. As one 
report on the subject put it: “the advantages of large field plots with a single crop rotation 
and integrated deployment of large machines are often exaggerated, while the 
consequences of high transport requirements for goods and personnel are downplayed”.
Moreover there was growing concern that productivity was being compromised by 
the lack of personal connection and responsibility felt by the LPG farmer with regard to 
the land he now worked on. It was argued that the fields should be of a reasonable size to 
allow those working on them to develop a sense of responsibility for the soil and the yield
10 SAPMO B-Arch Bflro Werner Felfe DY30/141 Berichterstattung im Politbflro, Material zu einigen Problemen der Entwicklung der 
Landwirtschaft des Bezirkes Erfurt 15.5.1983.
11 SAPMO B-Arch DY60/3097 DBD Bezirksverband, Monatsbericht Qber die Ergebnisse der Parteiarbeit im Monat November 1984, 
8.12.1984.
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produced there.13 This was of course not simply a question of the size of the fields but 
how the farmer was deployed to work on them.
It was an essential part of the KOR’s work to organise cultivation plans which 
maximised the use of machinery over large areas as far it was efficient to do so, but took 
into account the best use of land and the needs of the livestock units in each of the 
territories which the LPG P encompassed. In conjunction with these cultivation plans, a 
system of work organisation had also to be established which enabled the deployment of 
workers with specialised knowledge and training in particular production processes but 
was flexible enough to cope with territorial differences. As far as the organisation of work 
brigades was concerned, LPG Ps had long struggled to establish the correct balance 
between those with territorial and those with task specific responsibilities.14 Territorial 
brigades enabled a more flexible approach to the work which needed to be done in a given 
area of the farm. Having greater knowledge of the land and the range of work which could 
be done on it at any given time of the year enabled such brigades to respond to sudden 
shortages or crises at short notice, reducing down-time caused by delays beyond their 
immediate control. Arguably too the reinvigoration of local pride associated with 
territorial brigades gave added incentive to farmers to devote themselves to improving 
production. How far this was true in practice is uncertain. However there is no doubt that 
the quantity of income collective farmers could earn was essential to the degree to which 
they accepted the conditions under which they worked.
Following complaints about the feed situation during public meetings at the start of 
1985, the Rat des Bezirkes did in some cases intervene to alleviate immediate problems in 
some LPGs. Following a public meeting in Marlishausen, the LPG members successfully 
called upon the state district functionaries present to take action not only with regard to 
ensuring punctual collection of animals by the food processing industry but also with 
regard to the quality and quantity of the feed supplied them locally by the LPG P 
Bosleben.15 As a consequence directives were given to the cooperative council in
12 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/D/2/7-488 A bt Wirtschaftspolitik, Information zur Einhaltung der DieselkraftstofTkontingente 1981,
11.12.1981 p.59; Von dem Stellv. des Vorsitzenden fiir LFN an den Minister fiir LFN, Gen. Kuhrig 21.10.1981 p. 10.
15 SAPMO B-Arch DY30 1512 ZK der SED, Abt. Landwirtschaft, Information zu Schlaggrdssen sowie ihr Einfuluss auf den effektiven 
Einsatz der Technik und geringe Transportentfemungen 16.11.1981 p.395.
14 ThHStAW SED BPA IV/D/2/5-396 Referatdes Stellvetreters des Vorsitzenden f. LFN des Rat des Bezirkes am 15.7.1981..p. 190
,5 ThHStAW RdB L041358 Bezirkskomitee der Arbeiter- und Baueminspektion der DDR, Schreiben an den Rat des Bezirkes, 
Einwohnerforum in Marlieshausen, Kr. Amstadt 1.2.1985.
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Bosleben to reorganise the relationship between crop production and livestock production. 
The LPG P was to divide itself strictly on a territorial basis in order to guarantee the 
supply of feed to each of the LPG Ts which relied upon it.16 So serious was the question 
of how to provide enough feed and limit expenditure on imports that Honecker sought to 
impress upon SED party secretaries the absolute necessity of raising fodder production 
and reducing grain imports at the 3rd Plenary Session of the Central Committee in 1984. 
As the party secretary of the LPG P Trebra, Kreis Sondershausen quoted in an article for 
Der Parteiarbeiter (“The Party Worker”), a journal for SED members: “it affects the life 
interests of our republic that the yields above all of grain and feed should be 
systematically increased and thus the imports of grain gradually reduced. Doing this is a 
matter of the secure provision of the population and of important raw materials. These 
questions are of increasing importance in the international class confrontation. Today one 
can certainly compare the grain problem in its status with the oil problem.”17
The attachment of such economic significance to sustaining agricultural 
production goes some way to explain the renewed interest shown by the Ministry for State 
Security in the LPGs during the early 1980s. In August 1983 a report on the situation in 
agriculture in Bezirk Erfurt by the head of the responsible department in the Bezirk 
administration of the Stasi called for plans to be made to counter suspected economic 
sabotage in the LPGs. Judging by the list of recommendations for improvements to the 
work of Stasi necessary in future, the extent of operations in agriculture had up to this 
point been greatly limited. This was arguably because of the lack of flash points of overt 
hostility to SED policy in the sphere of agriculture during the later 1970s, since the 
transition to separate large-scale crop production had effectively ended the existence of 
the remaining LPG Type Is. In the Stasi’s district administrations the staff responsible for 
agriculture tended to be responsible for general matters in the whole rural area, with the 
result that the networks of informers already recruited tended not to be well focused on 
centres of agricultural production. In a number of industrial livestock production facilities 
such as the major pork production centre in Neumark, Kreis Weimar not a single informer 
had been recruited in 1983. Quality of information gathering and reporting varied across
16 ThHStAW RdB L041358 Rat des Bezirkes, Stellvertreter des Vorsitzenden fiir Land-, Forst- und NahrungsgQterwirtschaft, Schreiben 
an das Bezirkskomitee der Arbeiter- und Baueminspektion der DDR 4.3.198S.
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the Bezirk. While the Stasi administrations in districts Weimar and Gotha were praised for 
being effective at organising cells of informers to infiltrate agriculture, in Nordhausen and 
Heiligenstadt no such cell had been formed. Heiligenstadt along with Apolda, Eisenach 
and Erfurt was also criticised for failing to provide sufficient information to the Bezirk
1Rauthority on agricultural affairs. “Unofficial collaborators” and so-called “security 
deputies” in key positions in the administration of agriculture and the collective farms 
were to be recruited and charged with looking out for evidence of illegal actions in 
particular by LPG cadres. The district administrations in Worbis, Bad Langensalza and 
Sommerda all began investigations into leading functionaries in the LPGs. Those who had 
made “negative comments about socialist agricultural policy”, had active contacts in the 
West, were thought to be maintaining too many private livestock or to be involved in 
criminal trade above all in stolen animal feed were placed under scrutiny. “Official and 
unofficial information” collated by the Stasi also caused agricultural functionaries in the 
state apparatus in a number of districts to come under suspicion for involvement in a 
similar selection of illegal activities.19 Ultimately however investigations by the Ministry 
for State Security were most often prompted by obvious economic failure in an LPG.
At this point, while most of the LPG Ps in the Bezirk were able to maintain 
financial solvency, there were at least 30 LPG Ts considered to be struggling with low 
production levels. Such was the prevalence of high rates of livestock mortality among 
those LPGs which were struggling financially that this was taken to be the consequence of 
economic sabotage or at least criminal negligence. Premature deaths among livestock 
were caused on the whole by a lack of sufficient feed and overcrowded and unhygienic 
living conditions for the animals. In some cases there was undoubtedly some mistreatment 
of livestock and dereliction of duty by those working in the LPGs. Some LPG Ts were no 
doubt mismanaged. Nonetheless it was clear that in most struggling LPG Ts the basic 
cause for low productivity levels and high mortality rates lay in insufficient financial and 
material investment over a number of years. Rather than exposing widespread ‘hostile’ 
activity, the Stasi investigation illustrated the extent to which the system for scrutinising
17 ThHStAW SED BPA 3372 SED Bezirksleitung, Entwurf fur die Schriftenreihe “Der Parteiarbeiter” von Georg Fister, ParteisekretSr 
der LPG P Trebra, Kr. Sondershausen p.25.
"  BStU Aussenstelle Erfurt, BdL 1031, Bericht des Leiters der Abt XVIII zur politisch-operativen Lage in der Landwirtschaft fur die 
Berichterstattung beim Leiter der Bezirksverwaltung am 22.08.1983, 18.8.1983 p.3.
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and taking action to improve the state of affairs in LPGs had consistently failed to have an 
impact over the course of several years. Officially agricultural functionaries in the district 
state apparatus were criticised for failing to take action to find solutions to the dire 
situation some LPG Ts found themselves in. At the same time LPG cadres were blamed 
and in some cases removed from their posts for failing to take action against irresponsible 
and negligent work by LPG members, such as their failure to attend the births of new-bom 
animals. It was nevertheless apparent that disparity in the performance of LPGs was the 
consequence of the state’s economic inadequacy and long-running prioritisation of 
resources.
LPG P cadres too came in for criticism and suspicion if the amounts of produce 
their farm made available to the state or the quantity of feed they made available to their 
neighbouring LPG Ts were considered inadequate. The LPG P Isseroda in Kreis Weimar 
and the LPG P in Stockhausen Kreis Eisenach were found to be showing particular 
shortfalls in production. In these cases the heads of the LPG were criticised for 
mismanaging the farms, though not accused of actual sabotage -  in the case of Isseroda 
low yields were very likely the result of soil exhaustion. There was however also 
suspicion of LPG cadres in general many of whom were thought to be involved in 
deliberate misrepresentation of the LPG’s actual yields during the harvest, with the 
intention of building up an unregistered reserve supply of produce. Stocks, particularly 
of grain, were at a premium in the 1980s giving LPGs added incentive to seek to keep 
control of the amounts they gave up and the payment they received for it. The shortage 
economy and the half-achieved industrialisation had made it necessary for LPG chairmen 
to pursue every avenue available to them -  including ones which subverted the system - 
to sustain the levels of profit and production expected of them, by the state on the one 
hand and the members of the LPGs on the other.
Financial Reform
At the heart of support for a return to “joined-up” crop and livestock production was the 
hope, particularly among farmers in LPG Ts, that working conditions and incomes would
19 BStU Aussenstelle Erfurt, BdL 1031, Bericht des Leiters der Abt. XVIII zur politisch-operativen Lage in der Landwirtschaft fur die 
Berichterstattung beim Leiter der Bezirksverwaltung am 22.08.1983, 18.8.1983 p.3.
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be improved as a result. Better relations with the LPG P would bring reduced feed and 
transport costs and greater financial and material resources with which to develop more 
efficient, less labour-intensive production facilities. Given the shortage of manpower in 
agriculture, farmers were already having to perform very high numbers of overtime hours 
during the late 1970s and 1980s in order to maintain production. Information collected on 
the level of overtime being carried out in LPGs in response to an Eingabe from the 
chairman of the LPG P Gamstadt, Kreis Erfurt-Land noted that in 1980 more than 250 
extra hours per fully employed member of the production personnel were being carried out 
on average in LPGs in the GDR each year. In the LPG Ts the average was considerably 
higher at 317 hours. This compared unfavourably with workers in industry who performed 
on average only 57 hours of overtime a year. Thus while each person working in 
agriculture earned only slightly less than an industrial worker in total, they had to do 
longer hours. On average the income per hour of an agricultural labourer and member of 
the LPGs remained at only 88% of that of an industrial worker.21 As further reduction of 
the agricultural workforce became increasingly unsustainable as a result of the lack of 
machinery and spare parts, there was a clear need to make agriculture attractive enough a 
job prospect to retain sufficient manpower. Given the ongoing gap in the incomes of 
farmers and industrial workers, this was a clear area for possible improvement.
In resolutions made by the Politburo in October and then by the Ministerial 
Council in November 1982, the intention to carry out a price reform in two years time 
largely to the benefit of agriculture had been settled, predominantly in response to the ever 
worsening balance between costs and gross production in a large number of the LPGs. 
Until the price reforms came into effect, in Bezirk Erfurt 31 LPG Ps and 89 LPG Ts were 
not expected to improve the balance of their cost efficiency. Indeed a number of LPG Ts 
were expected to sustain severe financial losses of several hundred thousand marks. The 
price reform, it was hoped, would explicitly appeal to “good farming traditions of clever 
calculation”. Moreover it was intended to put a “more correct” value on agricultural
20 BStU Aussenstelle Erfurt, BdL 1031, Bericht des Leiters der A bt XVIII zur politisch-operativen Lage in der Landwirtschaft fur die 
Berichterstattung beim Leiter der Bezirksverwaltung am 22.08.1983, 18.8.1983 p.3
21 SAPMO B-Arch DY30 1926 ZK der SED, Abt. Landwirtschaft, Standpunkt zur Eingabe des Genossen O., Vorsitzender der LPG P 
Gamstadt Kreis Erfurt. 17.11.1981 p.393.
22 ThHStAW RdB L041333 Rat des Bezirkes, Bericht ‘ Auf der Grundlage des Beschlusses des PolitbOros... ’ undated
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production in the GDR and in so doing increase the income of the individual farmer. The 
report by the Rat des Bezirkes on the consequences of the 1984 price reforms for the SED 
Bezirksleitung predicted considerable improvements in the financial stability of the LPGs. 
The monetary increase in value of the gross product of LPGs in the plans for 1984 would - 
after tha reforms - far outstrip increases in costs. This in turn was expected to be reflected 
in the level of personal incomes per full-time member of the agricultural workforce which 
would rise to a planned level of over 10,000 Marks in both crop and livestock farms. The 
expectation was that there would no longer be any LPG operating at a loss.24 This 
expectation appears to have been borne out. A report on the state of the finances of the 
LPGs in the Bezirk in 1988 pointed out that the number of LPG Ts which were counted 
among those with a low production level had been reduced since the early 1980s, and only 
two LPG Ts were found to be operating with a cost margin which exceeded 100%.25
Although there were some complaints that the price reforms had brought an 
increase in costs for private small holders who purchased their supplies from the LPG at 
now increased prices, the overall impact of the price reform was to encourage private 
production. In Kreis Sondershausen the SED Kreisleitung intervened to ensure the number 
of pigs held in private production retained its previous level by encouraging LPGs which 
sold piglets to private producers to return their prices to the pre-1984 level.26 Information 
from the Ministerial Council on the effects of the price reform in May 1984 noted above 
all a positive impact on individual -  i.e. private -  production with a rise in profits in this 
branch of agriculture equalling 400 million marks.27 By the late 1980s private 
smallholders, largely LPG members, were responsible for supplying over 10% of eggs, 
animals for slaughter and fresh vegetables in the Bezirk.
Although private production was vital to maintaining satisfactory production 
levels, the SED Bezirksleitung was aware that the benefits the reforms would bring 
agriculture overall ought not to be exaggerated. Despite the apparent skew in favour of
23 ThHStAW RdB L041325 Ministerrat der DDR, Beschluss Ober die Durchfiihrung der Agrarpreisreform 11.11.1982
24 ThHStAW RdB L041333 Rat des Bezirks, Leiter des Fachorgans fiir Land-, Forst- und NahningsgQterwirtschaft, Bericht an das 
Sekretariat der Bezirksleitung der SED fiber die Auswirkungen der Agrarpreisreform auf die Entwicklung der sozialistischen 
Landwirtschaft im Bezirk. 23.5.1984
25 ThHStAW SED BPA 4964, Rat des Bezirkes Erfurt an das Ministerium ffir Land-, Forst und NahningsgQterwirtschaft..Analyse zur 
Wirkung der Agrarpreise... 12.04.1988 p.84
26 ThHStAW SED BPA 4047 SED Kreisleitung Sondershausen, Politisch und Organisatorische Massnahmen zur Erfullung des VW- 
Planes 1984 10.09.1984 p.24
27 ThHStAW RdB L041325 Ministerrat der DDR, Vertrauliche Verschlusssache, Information fiber die Auswirkungen der 
Agrarpreisreform auf den Reprodukionsprozess...24.5.1984
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agriculture the new prices were designed too to accommodate changes in industrial prices 
which would eventually increase costs to the LPGs. Moreover, although the price reform 
in theory would enable LPGs to be able to afford to pay for machinery, fertiliser and fuel 
which they so badly needed and maintain the incomes of the farmers at the levels now 
expected, there was no guarantee that these resources would be available to purchase. A 
report on the members’ assemblies of the DBD in July 1984 suggested that despite the 
price reforms farmers were sceptical of the possibilities for increased production given the 
actually reduced amount of fuel, materials and spare parts available.29 Throughout the late 
1980s farmers complained of shortages of vital machinery and equipment. At the district 
farmers’ conferences in 1985 there were widespread complaints about a lack of sufficient 
machinery for use in the harvest of nearly all main crops, for use in livestock sheds, as 
well as in the transport and loading and unloading of produce. Shortages of protective 
clothing, of spare parts, tyres, fertiliser and pesticides were all cause for complaint as well. 
The situation had become so severe, farmers argued, that even with the greatest care and 
continual repair of the machinery available it was impossible to harvest within the agro- 
technical deadlines. Regardless of the quality of the yield that year, losses of produce were 
therefore bound to occur.30
Despite the formation of the KORs and the price reforms, agriculture in the Bezirk 
as in the country as a whole was still racked with conflict and crisis. The economic 
performance of LPG Ts remained precarious (even after the price reforms) and many of 
them had costs which exceeded 90% of their incomes and had not significantly improved 
their production levels. The worst cases had had long histories of poor production results 
having failed to transform the conditions of production over the years.31 LPG Ps too 
continued to vary considerably in productivity. Within Kreis Sommerda alone the LPG P 
Grossbrembach made more than 3 times the profit per full-time employee than the LPG P 
Kindelbriick.32 A report by the Rat des Bezirkes in September 1989, as the first waves of
24 ThHStAW RdB L041333 Bezirksleitung der SED, Stellungnahme zum Bericht des Rates des Bezirkes Erfurt uber die Auswirkungen 
der Agrarpreisreform am 31.05.1984
29 SAPMO B-Arch DY60/3097 DBD Bezirksverband, EinschStzung der Mitgliederversammlungen im Monat Juli 1984,9.8.1984
30SAPMO B-Arch Bflro Werner Felfe DY30/32 Information fur das Politburo des ZK der SED liber die wictigsten Ergebnisse der KBK 
1985 22.4.1985
31 ThHStAW RdB L043382 Rat des Bezirkes, Sekretariat des Stellvertreter der Vorsitzenden fur Land-, Forst- und 
NahrungsgOterwirtschaft, Bericht an das Sekretariat der Bezirksleitung der SED fiber die Ergebnisse bei der Festigung der LPG und 
VEG sowie der weiteren Vertiefung der Kooperation. ..22.9.1987
32 ThHStAW SED BPA 4964, Rat des Bezirkes Erfurt an das Ministerium fiir Land-, Forst und NahrungsgOterwirtschaft..Analyse zur 
Wirkung der Agrarpreise... 12.04.1988 p.84
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mass protest began to gather strength in the GDR, did not paint a rosy picture of the state 
of the LPG. Gross production in agriculture had not succeeded in attaining the level of 
growth required by the national economy and in spite of the price reforms of 1984 there 
was still considerable variation in the profitability between LPGs, particularly between 
LPG Ps and Ts.33
Popular dissatisfaction: Pollution, Shortage and Neglect
Environmental issues were central to the complaints of villagers about deteriorating living 
and working conditions. Complaints arising from the over-expansion of fields and the 
overuse of chemical fertiliser had been made sporadically since the 1960s, while 
concentrated livestock holdings had long been a source of irritation to those who lived 
nearby. As early as 1968 there was some anxiety that the land improvement schemes 
which were developed as part of the drive towards a large-scale field system, threatened at 
the same time to undermine the ecology of the land. According to reports on the SED 
members’ assemblies in the party organisations of the LPG in Kreis Sommerda where 
land improvements were underway in February 1969 there were continual complaints 
from members that trees were being cut down but no new trees were being planted 
elsewhere. This they claimed would lead to a ‘steppe-ification’ of the countryside and 
would in the long-run be damaging to agriculture.34 A report by the Workers’ and 
Farmers’ Inspectorate in the Bezirk on the state of security, order and cleanliness in the 
villages and farms of the Bezirk in April 1969 described poor conditions in a surprisingly 
high percentage of cases. In over half the villages in the Bezirk evidence was found of 
uncontrolled contamination of the water supply with muck or seepage from the silos. In 
Kreis Worbis this had led in a number of cases even to contamination of swimming pools. 
44% of farms in the Bezirk were found on investigation to be unclean and disorderly in the 
vicinity of livestock holdings. Amenities for those working with livestock were also found 
to be lacking or inadequate in a large proportion of farms. 40% of farms had for example 
no washrooms near the livestock sheds. More often than not the environmental problems
33 ThHStAW SED BPA 4964, Rat des Bezirkes Erfurt, Stellv. des Vorsitzenden fiir Land-, Forst- und NahningsgQterwirtschaft, 
Information fiber die Entwicklung des Rentabilitfitsniveau in den LPG...2.9.1989 p.63
34 ThHStAW SED BPA Kreisleitung Sdmmerda, IV/B/4.10/101 Abt. Parteiorgane, Einschatzung der MV -  Monat Februar 28.2.1969 
p.127
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caused by livestock holdings was down to a lack of sufficient planning.35 The regularity of 
such complaints increased considerably however as a result of the expansion of 
industrialised farming during the 1970s. The failure to deal with the negative side-effects 
efficiently could only be compounded by a shortage of resources in the 1980s.
An essential question for rural communities throughout the latter part of the 
GDR’s existence was the development of sewage removal and water supply systems. The 
development of internal plumbing in village houses was a sign of progress, with the 
proportion of homes with inside toilets marked in SED propaganda as a sign of the 
benefits of socialism. The issue of water supply and sewage was however fiaught in the 
East German countryside as it was in rural communities throughout much of Europe. The 
connection of small communities to larger networks could not often be easily justified by 
the cost and the difficulty of doing so, particularly in a shortage economy. The need for a 
regularised system however was becoming increasingly pressing with the development of 
industrial agriculture which itself required an efficient water supply but also had the 
tendency in rural areas to pollute the drinking water of natural springs on which many 
villages relied. From the 1960s onwards considerable progress was made in the 
connection of rural households to a central water supply. Nonetheless the progress was 
again by no means comprehensive or universal and became a cause of considerable 
dissatisfaction in those communities which were neglected or suffered the consequences 
of contamination by agro-industrial production sites.
The problem of disposal of slurry caused particular difficulties for several of the 
livestock farms in Kreis Worbis, leading to mistakes with regard to where it was 
dispersed. In one case slurry from the LPG Teistungen in July 1988 was mistakenly 
deposited on meadow land near the village of Jiitzenbach leading to an Eingabe from an 
outraged villager, because the smell had caused a number of children to be violently 
sick.36 In 1979 and 1980 a number of Eingaben were written from around the Bezirk 
complaining about the deliberate piping of slurry into rivers and lakes by LPG Ts which 
lacked alternative solutions for disposing of their waste products. Although occasionally 
fines were imposed for such actions, the balance between economic necessity and the
35 ThHStAW RdB L014785 Arbeiter- und Baueminpektion Erfurt, Bericht flber die Ergebnisse der Massenkontrolle “Sicherheit, 
Ordnung und Sauberkeit” in den Gemeinden und sozialistischen Landwirtschaftsbetrieben des Bezirkes Erfurt 24.4.1969
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rhetoric of environmental protection were clearly heavily skewed in the former’s favour.37 
These Eingaben tallied with an analysis of the Eingaben dealt with by the Rat des 
Bezirkes' deputy for the environment and water in the Bezirk. Apart from a slight increase 
during the dry years of 1976, the number of complaints had remained stable between 1974 
and 1980. 1981 saw the number of Eingaben in this area of government doubled and then 
trebled in 1982.38
By 1988 the level of connection to a central water supply was supposed to be 98% 
across the Bezirk. However in Kreis Erfurt-Land more than 10% of the population 
remained unconnected despite many years of complaint and lobbying for improvements to 
be made. A report in October 1988 mentioned “serious” discussions in public meetings in 
30 villages in the district on the continued lack of a constant supply of drinking water, 
which compounded dissatisfaction at problems with the supply of basic food stuffs in 
villages such as meat, bread and dairy products.39 In Kreis Amstadt where the district 
could boast a 99.7% connection rate to a water supply, a number of villages continued to 
complain about the quality of the drinking water with which they were supplied.40 A 
report by the Rat des Bezirkes’ representative for the environment and water management 
in Kreis Apolda noted that despite 99.1% of the district being connected to a central 
supply of water, drinking water remained unsuitable for small children. Babies were to be 
supplied strictly with fizzy water only.41
The negative consequences of agricultural transformation were felt broadly across 
rural settlements, the majority of which neither were undergoing serious depopulation nor 
were clearly slated as centres of production. The mistakes of over-expansion in agriculture 
and the breakdown in cooperation between crop and livestock production in the late 
1970s, compounded by increasingly severe economic problems facing the GDR as a
36 ThHStAW RdB 046350 Rat des Bezirkes, Stellv. des Vorsitzenden fiir Umwelt.. .an den Rat des Kreises Worbis 21.6.1988; Rat des 
Kreises Worbis an Herrn B, JQtzenbach 5.7.1988.
37 ThHStAW RdB 046467 Oberflussmeisterei Erfurt fiir das I. Halbjahr 1979 28.6.1979; Oberflussmeisterei Erfurt, Analyse ilber die 
Eingabenarbeit in der Oberflussmeisterei 1979,6.12.1979; Rat des Kreises Erfurt, Abt. UWE, Eingabenanalyse I. Halbjahr 1980 
14.7.1980; Rat des Kreises Worbis, Abt. UWE I. Halbjahr 1980 9.7.1980; Rat des Kreises Weimar, Abt. UWE, Eingabenanalyse III. 
Quartal 1980 3.10.1980
3* ThHStAW RdB 045464 Rat des Bezirkes, Stellv. des Vorsitzenden fiir Umwelt., an den Ministerrat der DRR, Stellv. des 
Vorsitzenden und Minister fiir Umwelt., Eingabenanalyse 1982,4.1.1983
39 ThHStAW RdB 046500 Rat des Bezirkes, 1. Stellv. des Vorsitzenden, Stellungnahme zur Berichterstattung des Rates des Kreises 
Erfurt-Land in Auswertung der Einwohnerforen mit dem Bezirksreferentenkollektiv vom 17.8.1988,31.10.1988
40 ThHStAW RdB 046502 Rat des Bezirkes, 1. Stellv. des Vorsitzenden, Stellungnahme zur Berichterstattung des Rates des Kreises 
Amstadt uber die Verbesserung der staatlichen Leitungstatigkeit in Auswertung der Einwohnerforen am 16.11.1988,27.2.1989
41 ThHStAW RdB 046501 Rat des Bezirkes, Stellv. des Vorsitzenden fiir Umwelt., Einschatzung zur Leitungstatigkeit des Rat des 
Kreises Apolda im Umweltschutz und in der Wasserwirtschaft 24.10.1989
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whole in the 1980s, served only to exacerbate popular dissatisfaction. Rural settlements 
were in many respects far worse hit than towns receiving a lower priority in the provision 
and supply of a whole range of goods and materials which were considered by many basic 
essentials (rather than luxuries) of an adequate living standard. There was some 
understanding for these shortages. Villagers did not expect to be able to purchase 
everything from the local shops. It was obvious too that the cost of supplying a few houses 
with running water or improving local roads or transport networks could not be always be 
covered immediately but that money would have to be accumulated. It was recognised by 
many too that those who lived in rural communities were often able to benefit from 
privately owned land and livestock and were able too to take advantage of the LPG’s 
support to construct their own houses and carry out improvements to their communities. 
Nonetheless access to such benefits was limited and the standard of living in other 
respects still left much to be desired.
In 1978 a report on the quality of supply in Sommerda district noted an 
unsurprising though important fact for rural communities: namely that the smaller the 
community the worse the provision of goods. Thus those villages with less than 800 
inhabitants tended to have the worst level of plan fulfilment for supply. The report 
concluded: “all in all the opinion and attitude of the people with regard to supply is not the 
best. Above all there is a lack of understanding for the fact that certain products are only 
being offered in the Bezirk and Kreis capitals.”42 This situation was made particularly 
clear during the cold snap of the winter of 1978 to 1979 which saw several villages in 
Kreis Sommerda not being supplied with beer for weeks on end.43 In the 1980s shortages 
of consumer goods in rural shops became a more frequent occurrence, making more 
frequent trips to the towns an unwelcome and time-consuming necessity. “Customers” it 
was reported in March 1983 by the SED Kreisleitung, Sommerda, “abuse the sales’ girls 
because those whose wishes could not be fulfilled accuse the staff of wrong doing. These 
are above all customers from the villages for whom the purchase of certain household 
goods is barely possible at all anymore.” These issues as well as the ongoing shortage of 
protective work clothing had begun to become a regular topic in assemblies of LPG 
members. The report writer put the blame (with perhaps a hint of ironic detachment) on
42 ThHStAW SED BPA -  Kreisleitung Sbmmerda IV/D/4.10/149 Abt. Parteiorgane, Versorgungsinformation 12.10.1978 p. 107
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the “rationalisation measures in bulk trade” which had led to “the range and number of 
goods on offer in towns and villages continually worsening.” The concentration of 
shopping facilities in urban and industrial centres had led to the closure too of many rural 
shops whose range of goods and level of turnover no longer justified their existence. “The 
rural population” the report concluded “is very irritated by this”. Over the following 
months the lack of a number of popular cigarette brands led to questions being asked in 
assemblies of LPG members and the lack of availability of non-alcoholic (!) drinks in the 
villages owing to transport problems was a cause of further complaint.44 The problems of 
access to certain goods presented here was compounded too by the belief that prices were 
rising beyond the capacity of certain sections of the community to pay for them. Reports 
from the DBD organisations in Bezirk Erfurt recorded some popular acclaim for new 
measures introduced to improve conditions for vulnerable members of the population in 
the mid-1980s. Increases in the net incomes of families with more than three children, and 
of pensioners were welcomed; however it was also felt that these measures should have 
been taken earlier. The increasing prices demanded for certain goods had long made 
themselves felt, it was argued, not least because they were often no longer available in the 
standard Konsum shops but were only on sale at an inflated price in the luxury Delikat 
shops.45
The sense of rural neglect was added to still further by the failure of basic 
improvements to be made to what many people now considered basic infrastructure 
throughout the Bezirk. In public meetings in Kreis Apolda the lack of road building was a 
common source of criticism voiced by villagers, as was the ever worsening provision of 
transport for workers. In Niederroslar the comment was made that: “the workers get 
driven to work alright, but whether they ever get home, doesn’t bother anyone.” In 
Sonnendorf, Kreis Bad Langensalza a number of complaints were made by villagers, that 
theirs was a “forgotten village”, owing not least to the lack of improvement to the access 
road, the lack of bus transport and the lack of repairs carried out to the path to the school 
in Grossheringen. On these issues however as well as the long-standing supply problems
43 ThHStAW SED BPA -  Kreisleitung Sdmmerda IV/D/4.10/150 Abt. Parteiorgane, Versorgungsinformation 13.02.1979 p.36
44 ThHStAW SED BPA -  Kreisleitung Sdmmerda IV/D/4.10/152 Abt. Parteiorgane, Versorgungsinformation 16.03.1981 p.42; Abt. 
Parteiorgane, Versorgungsinformation 1S.0S.1981 p.63; A bt Parteiorgane, Versorgungsinformation 16.6.1981
45 SAPMO B-Arch DY60/3097 DBD Bezirksverband, Einschatzung der Mitgliederversammhingen im Monat Juli 1984,9.8.1984
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to the village, the inhabitants had reportedly ceased to expect much improvement.46 
Similar feelings of resignation were felt in the village of Friedrichsrode in Kreis 
Sondershausen where the lack of transport connections and the lack of work other than in 
the turkey farm of the LPG T Immenrode had led to rapid depopulation. All previous 
Eingaben had failed to have an impact, as there was simply not enough economic 
justification for investment to transform the prospects of this rural community.47
The rhetoric of progress espoused by the SED leadership consistently throughout 
the 1960s and 1970s as justification for the radical transformation of conditions in the 
countryside with the collectivisation and subsequent industrialisation of agriculture had 
burdened functionaries in the LPGs and the district party and state administration by the 
1980s with great expectations of improvement among collective farmers and villagers 
more generally. Their consistent failure to provide the promised improvements to quality 
of life in some rural communities, along with ever more critical working conditions in the 
LPGs rendered the SED regime’s claims to legitimate authority increasingly hollow. The 
majority of farmers were earning considerably better money than they had ever done 
before; however there was little to spend it on and, despite the reinvigoration of the KORs, 
little prospect of actual improvement to either living or working conditions as the basic 
financial bankruptcy of the GDR under the present SED leadership became ever more 
tangible.
Conclusion
During the autumn of 1989, the proportion of collective farmers who participated in 
demonstrations showing their open rejection of the SED regime was not recognisably very 
high. Nonetheless it was clear that the SED leadership was considered morally as well as 
financially bankrupt in the villages as elsewhere in the GDR. Loyalty remained in many 
cases to the LPGs and too to LPG functionaries regardless of their party affiliation. In 
1989 and 1990, the LPG Ts and the LPG Ps still remained at the heart of village life and 
given the enormous lack of certainty about the future, the prospects for the individual 
remained bound up closely to the prospects for the collective farm to which they 
belonged. Leading functionaries of LPGs often fought hard to maintain some viable form
44 ThHStAW SED BPA 3068, Abt. AgitVProp, Einwohnerforen im Kreis Apolda am 29.10.1986,7.11.1986 p.8
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of large-scale agricultural production in which to employ as many as possible of the 
members of the LPGs. However loyalty to the SED regime as a whole evaporated in the 
countryside as quickly as elsewhere in the GDR. In many villages in Bezirk Erfurt, the 
church had remained of central importance particularly to the older generations who 
continued to make up a large proportion of the village’s population. SED membership 
and DBD membership had certainly become more commonplace among farmers in the 30 
years since collectivisation had got underway, however party groups remained relatively 
small and weak in comparison to their counterparts in industry. The breakdown of the 
SED regime was thus not mourned immediately by many.
This thesis does not seek to give a full explanation for the collapse of the GDR or 
the SED regime. If one were to explain all the causes of the collapse of the SED regime in 
1989, one would not necessarily dwell very long on the problems of agricultural 
production, the failure to improve living conditions in villages or the crisis conditions in 
some LPG. Nonetheless the growth of popular dissatisfaction with the SED regime and 
discontent too among party members and functionaries of the state administration as the 
possibilities for countering the consequences of worsening economic crisis during the late 
1980s diminished was part of a complex of causes and consequences which prompted the 
end of the SED dictatorship. The growth in the extent of popular discontent lent increasing 
strength to the calls for change begun by small opposition groups. Nonetheless the depth 
of the impact on the SED leadership of these demonstrations as well as the causes of 
popular dissatisfaction must be traced to the bankruptcy of the GDR and the withdrawal of 
Soviet economic and ultimately political support. By the time the borders to West 
Germany were opened there was little prospect of sustaining the GDR’s existence, as the 
majority of the population looked to the West for economic salvation, rejecting the failed 
consumer socialism of the SED dictatorship.
47 ThHStAW SED BPA 3068, Abt. Agit./Prop, Einwohnerforen im Kreis Sondershausen am 24.9.1986,30.9.1986 p.22
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CONCLUSION
The Practice and Problems of Agricultural Transformation in the GDR
The establishment by force of collectivised farming throughout the GDR was 
merely the beginning of a gradual process by which the SED leadership sought to 
establish more comprehensive control over agricultural production. A social and economic 
transformation in the countryside was to take place under the terms of a specifically 
‘socialist’ modernisation of farming, designed not only to enable increased productivity 
but also to render agricultural production more easily predictable and plan-able. Under 
SED guidance the private, small-scale and traditional means of agricultural production 
were to become progressively more collective, large-scale and industrial. The degree of 
success which the SED leadership had in achieving these aims in practice depended on the 
extent to which collective farmers themselves received and understood SED policy and 
were willing to participate in its implementation. This in turn depended on the efficiency 
with which policy was communicated and with which the authority of the SED was 
asserted at the grassroots as mediated by the low-level functionaries of party and state and 
the LPG themselves.
With a micro analysis of the processes of communication and policy 
implementation in Bezirk Erfurt, this thesis has attempted to show up in detail how the 
agricultural administration functioned at the grassroots, primarily during the 1960s and 
1970s, a period largely neglected thus far in the historiography. In so doing it has sought 
to highlight the complexity and variation, even within a confined area, of the manner and 
consequences of the SED’s transformation of agricultural organisation on the ground, not 
apparent in other accounts of this period.1 Using documents referring to regional and local 
circumstances from a range of sources, it has been possible to build up a picture of the 
conflicts and compromises which took place at the front line of agricultural production at 
various stages during the GDR’s existence. With this picture, some light has been shed on 
the factors contributing to a stabilisation of SED authority in the GDR during the 1970s: 
not least how the state’s use of force was but one element in the process of consolidation
1 Gabler, D. Entwicklungsabschnitte in der Landwirtschaft der DDR (Berlin 1995). This account of agricultural development in Bezirk 
Erfurt in various periods from the 1950s to 1989 though detailed in its survey of the various structures o f collectivised and 
industrialised agriculture makes only very limited use o f the available sources, tending to provide a superficial account o f the practice 
of policy implementation.
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of the LPG and the development of new structures of agricultural organisation, alongside 
farmers’ and functionaries own motives for compromise and participation.
The campaign for full collectivisation itself demonstrated the limited usefulness of 
implementing policies predicated on the threat of force alone. The building of the Wall 
was crucial to the stabilisation of SED authority in the GDR, forcing those who remained 
in the GDR to come to terms with a future in the LPG. Nevertheless there remained a clear 
deficit of support for the SED’s agricultural policies among farmers and LPG 
functionaries during the 1960s, culminating in the rejection of the forced evolution of 
cooperative relations between LPGs and the separation of crop and livestock production in 
1969. It was not until the early 1970s that a sufficient proportion of LPG members and 
LPG functionaries were supportive of, or at least reconciled to, the direction of 
agricultural development in the GDR to enable the implementation of measures to 
radically alter the manner in which farming was undertaken. Against a background of 
advances in technology, demographic shifts and an expanded system of agricultural 
training, by the late 1970s a fundamental transformation of the structure of agricultural 
production had however taken place in the GDR. In the course of this transformation and 
the shifting political and economic development of the GDR as a whole, the essentials of 
an -  albeit top heavy -  compromise between the SED regime and the collective farmers 
were established.
In Bezirk Erfurt, it was not until some years after Erich Honecker had replaced Walter 
Ulbricht as General Secretary of the SED that the crucial final step towards an absolute 
transformation of the basis of agricultural production could be taken. Attempts in the late 
1960s to transform rapidly the structure of agricultural production had demonstrated the 
limited efficiency with which SED policy was communicated to collective farmers and the 
inadequacy of the SED leadership’s authority over the LPGs at this stage. During the early 
1970s, after the economic and administrative crises at the end of the Ulbricht era had been 
overcome, the proportion of farmers and LPG functionaries who were in a position to 
oppose transition to a specialisation of crop and livestock production under separate 
administrations was steadily being diminished. At the same time the efficiency with which 
the SED was able to exert itself in rural communities and communicate with farmers 
improved.
249
A renewed confidence in the clear direction of agricultural development among 
functionaries in the party, state and LPGs in the districts, along with renewed state 
investment, provided the impetus for LPG members to accept essentially new structures of 
agricultural organisation. At the same time, the proportion of farmers with a tradition of 
hostility to SED agricultural policy began to be reduced as new generations of 
professional collective farmers emerged and consistent economic pressure forced large 
numbers of LPG Type I members to retire from agriculture and relinquish their livestock 
to collective control and their land for use in cooperation with other LPGs. Almost 
simultaneously however agriculture was faced by serious problems of sustaining 
production as the economic climate in the GDR as a whole began to deteriorate.
Ironically these were problems which the new structures of organisation tended to 
some extent to exacerbate. Looking at the vulnerability of industrialised agriculture to 
economic decline, this thesis has attempted too to shed light on some of the factors 
contributing to the ineffectiveness of the SED dictatorship amid worsening economic 
circumstances, which hastened its ultimate collapse. Crop production was now so 
structured towards the use of labour-saving, high-intensity methods and on such a large- 
scale with a finely balanced system of agro-technical deadlines, that coping with cuts to 
fuel, fertiliser and machinery threatened to undermine the economies of scale. At the same 
time livestock production was increasingly dependent on energy to run intensive 
production plants, as well as on fuel for efficient transport of feed as well as animals. The 
consolidation of industrial style agriculture during the late 1970s occurred at the same 
time as a number of factors converged to undermine the strength of the East German 
economy and deprive industrialised agriculture of the necessary inputs in order to make it 
efficient. Rising prices on the world markets and cuts to financial and material support 
coming from the Soviet Union led to shortages of fuel and fertiliser. Moreover the GDR’s 
national debt had risen exponentially during the 1970s, with the result that there were 
limits on the amount of Western currency which could be spent on imports particularly of 
necessary feed supplies, while machinery manufactured in the GDR was necessarily being 
made available for export despite an unsatisfied demand at home. A tighter prioritisation 
of resources at all levels led inevitably to some casualties of administrative rationalisation,
2 SAPMO B-Arch IV/B 2/2.023/2 Abt. Landwirtschaft an Honecker, Entwicklungsprobleme der Landwirtschaft bei der weiteren 
Durchffthrung der BeschlOsse des VIII. und IX. Parteitages. 31.10.1979.
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resulting in increasing differentiation in living and working conditions between LPGs and 
rural communities.3 In these circumstances agricultural production appeared to be 
becoming less rather than more efficient.4 By the mid 1980s the negative effects on living 
and working conditions in rural communities of the policy of gigantism in agriculture 
were exacerbated by the inefficiencies of the planned economy. Shortages of essential 
materials and fuel as well as the environmental impact of industrialised agriculture 
undermined the advantages of the SED’s radical transformatory social and economic 
policies in the countryside.
Amid much conflict and compromise a limited social and economic transformation of 
the conditions of agricultural production developed following the completion of full 
collectivisation, transforming the context in which the SED leadership sought to assert its 
authority over agricultural production and rural society. Ultimately however the 
reconfiguration of the administration of agriculture at the grassroots proved unable to 
prevent, indeed arguably exacerbated the problems of production and the differentiation in 
living and working conditions in rural communities which so clearly undermined the SED 
leadership’s claims to know best.
3 SAPMO B-Arch IV/B 2/2.023/61 Komitee der ABI, Information fiber Kontrollergebnisse zur Entwicklung der Tierverluste in der 
Rinder- und Schweinehaltung 21.11.1978; DY30/1512 ZK Abt. Landwirtschaft, Standpunkt zu den neuen Forderungen der staatlichen 
Plankommission 8.9.1981 p.299.
4 SAPMO B-Arch DY30/1541 ZK Abt. Landwirtschaft, Tendenzen, Ergebnisse und Schlussfolgerungen aus den 7 Bezirksanalysen 
24.4.1979 pp.33-56.
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